195:
state shall comprise the southern part of the
Philippine Archipelago inhabited by the Muslims, namely Cotabato, Davao, Zamboanga and Zamboanga City, Basilan City, Lanao, Sulu, Palawan, and other adjoining areas that are inhabited by Muslims. The MIM states that the 4 million population of Muslims possess their own culture and history that are distinct from the majority Christians in Philippines which makes integration impossible. The manifesto also stated that the secession request a response to "the systematic extermination of the Muslim youth - like the Corregidor Fiasco" (the Jabidah massacre) and “the policy of isolation and dispersal of the Muslim communities” that have been pursued vigorously much to the detriment of the Muslim community. In the addendums and subsequent documents issued from 8 June 1968 to 26 July 1968, Matalam, as the principal signatory of all these documents, further clarified that the organization is to be known as the Muslim Independence Movement and be referred to as MIM. Membership for the movement is only open to able-bodied Muslims within the Philippines and application can be done through the secretariat. In one of the documents, Matalam added that Muslims would need its own defined territory to abide by their own
117:(1966–1986) to systematically resettle people into Mindanao. This led to the proportion of indigenous peoples in Mindanao to shrink from majority in 1913 to minority by 1976. The best lands in Mindanao were given to settlers and owners of corporate agriculture, while most development investments and government services were offered to the Christian population. This caused the Muslim population to be backward and rank among the poorest in their own country. The resettlement programme was not entirely peaceful as some settlers managed to obtain land from the native Muslims through harassment and other violent efforts which drove the Muslims out of their own lands.
314:
most important and significant result of this conference was the official formation of the MNLF. As the MIM was “abandoned” by its leaders who were offered high positions in the government, young passionate followers such as Nur
Misuari saw that they had to continue the battle and went on to form the MNLF. Based on an interview with a Bangsa Moro Commander conducted by Frank Gould, the MNLF reportedly arose as an underground movement in the youth section of the MIM. These young followers also saw the MIM as being small and ineffective therefore created a more radical MNLF, which had longer-lasting and more significant effects in Philippines till today.
225:
care for their plight prior the
Jabidah Massacre. According to the statistics of a census, Alpha Report, conducted by the Manila-based Filipinas Foundation, the results of the survey showed that more than half interviewed opposed the secession idea and about another quarter were uncommitted which effectively meant that the MIM only had the support of a quarter of the some 4 million Muslims in the region. The MIM never managed to become a popular movement as it was limited to only publications of documents and communiques that were released by the press.
212:
their desires to secede from the
Republic of the Philippines and join the new Islamic state”. Within three months of the issuance of the manifesto, Matalam had changed the policy to provide equal rights to Christian inhabitants and subsequently, further mellowed his demand and only sought for a statehood under a federal system. He changed the name of the MIM to Mindanao Independence Movement in an effort to reassure Christian settlers that they are not excluded from the movement and would be accorded equal rights as the Muslims.
181:
not show concern for the plight of the Muslim natives but were more concerned over their own statuses. Underlying such pretext by the Muslim leaders, the formation of the MIM was regarded as an avenue for leaders like
Matalam to gain recognition for his leadership which he would otherwise not be able to achieve. His efforts paid off when Marcos appointed him as Presidential Adviser on Muslim Affairs. Matalam allegedly used the outrage of Muslims due to the Jabidah episode to gain personal ends.
251:(rats) who were trained and systematic in attacking Muslims and were backed by Christian mayors to ensure that political power is kept by Christians in the wake of the upcoming 1971 elections. Other scholars have argued that the anti-Moro Ilaga Movement was actually in response to the declaration of the MIM as the Christians were "frightened". In response to the attacks by the Ilagas, the Blackshirts and Barracudas (the private army of
255:, a Muslim congressman of the Nationalista party) were formed and trained to engage in gang warfare against the Ilagas. The Blackshirts were allegedly backed financially by Matalam to mobilize fighting squads to launch attacks against Christians but this claim cannot be proven. During this period, one notable incident would be the
224:
Albeit riding on the wave of Muslim dissent against the government, the MIM failed to garner support of the Muslim masses. The
Muslims did not see how the MIM could be a tool to help them achieve betterment of their lives considering that the leaders of the movement were the exact leaders who did not
313:
The MIM was argued to be the precursor of the MNLF. In response to the sectarian violence, Nur
Misuari convened a conference to discuss the situation of the Muslims in south. This conference was attended by the trainees of the camp on Pangkor Island and also members of the youth wing of the MIM. The
241:
The declaration of the MIM provided opportunity for the blossom of armed gangs who received political respectability in their fight towards an independent
Islamic state. The MIM also provoked thoughts of self-discovery among the Muslims to oppose the ruling government and this provocation has led to
144:
besetting the
Muslims in Philippines. The occurrence of the Jabidah massacre was timely in that it provided the basis for the call of Muslim solidarity in the Philippines to fight against the government's negligence in the plight of the Muslims. The massacre was regarded to have provided the impetus
297:
accused the Manila government of genocide and persecution of Muslim minorities in the
Philippines and was determined to provide material aid to the Muslims in Philippines, and this was also supported by other Arab countries. The sectarian violence between the Ilagas and Barracudas had turned into a
221:
Matalam reasoned that he "accepted the position as a gesture of sportsmanship on his part as the leader of the more than four million Muslims in the Philippines". This suggests that the Jabidah Massacre was less an impetus as compared to his own personal drivers to declare the formation of the MIM.
180:
Another group of scholars analysed that the declaration of the MIM was a façade by the Muslims leaders to show their concern after failing to improve living standards of the Muslims. Prior to the Jabidah massacre and against the backdrop of economic repression in Mindanao, local datus allegedly did
176:
agent intensified his resentment toward the Philippines government. Despite sending emissaries to Manila seeking justice, the officers involved in the killing were not convicted. Coupled with the dissent of being thrown out of power by the Christian settlers, Matalam felt that the Manila government
220:
Just after 5 months of declaring the MIM Manifesto and demanding for an independent state from the Philippines, Matalam changed his position. On 11 October 1968, he met President Ferdinand Marcos, who appointed Matalam as his adviser on Muslim Affairs. In a statement issued by the MIM secretariat,
194:
In the first document issued by Matalam on 1 May 1968 which he termed as the Manifesto, he sought to establish an Islamic state, which would be known as ‘The Republic of Mindanao and Sulu’, that embodies the Islamic ideals and heritage and is therefore independent from the Philippines. The Islamic
211:
On 26 August 1968, Matalam issued a Declaration of Policy stating that the independent Islamic state shall “extend and guarantee full and equal citizenship and fair representation in all its institutions, provisional or permanent, on all non-Muslims inhabitants of the said islands who make known
164:
Although some scholars observed that the MIM was formed because Muslim political leaders felt that the government was not doing enough for the Muslims, others have argued that the declaration of the MIM was made to regain political power and not to address the plight of Muslims in Philippines.
120:
The Muslims were alienated by the Philippines government and felt threatened by Christian economic and political domination in their own homeland. This resorted in some Muslim groups to turn to extortion and violence to protect their own land and refrain from being displaced. Such efforts of
82:, Datu Udtog Matalam, a former governor of Cotabato, issued a Manifesto for the declaration of the Muslim Independent Movement that sought for an independent Muslim state from the Philippines comprising Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan regions. The organization was later renamed as the
160:
Leveraging on the dissatisfaction of the Muslims fired by the Jabidah Massacre and their disadvantaged plight under the Marcos government, former governor of Cotabato province, Matalam, initiated an open movement for secession of the Muslim state through the formation of the MIM.
157:, Datu Udtog Matalam governed Cotabato unchallenged. He was revered as a religious leader and was also an anti-Japanese guerrilla hero during the World War II. He was voted as the governor of the province for 5 times and had kept Cotabato out of trouble created by others.
203:(practices). He added that the Muslims are ready to self-govern with sufficient trained men in all fields. Matalam regarded the MIM as the "concerted voice, organized solely as an instrument for the realisation of their (the Muslims’) cherished dreams and aspirations."
1242:
121:“integration” had led to the crystallisation of the Moro identity as the Muslims’ identity with the Filipino nation declined rapidly due to the threat in economic and social Muslim life.
132:
suffered a loss in prestige as they could no longer control the Muslim lands. These politicians lost much of the capabilities they had possessed initially to manage the Muslim populace.
1619:
290:, one of the prominent people of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), had met with Matalam and Salipada Pendatun to organize the training camp on the island of Pangkor.
169:, and was allegedly forced to retire from office by national party politics, and was therefore motivated to regain political power through the declaration of the MIM.
128:) were also voted out during the polls as Christians, who made up a significant majority of the voters, preferred the Christian politicians over them. These local
173:
1258:
270:
Matalam went to Kuala Lumpur in April 1969 to meet the delegations of the Conference of Muslim States to appeal for assistance to support his cause but it was
140:
The alleged massacre took place in March 1968 which took the lives of Muslim army recruits and subsequently awakened the Muslim intellectuals to realise the
228:
The MIM was disintegrated in 1972 with the surrender of Matalam in December with many of its members consequentially and subsequently rallying the MNLF.
172:
Separately, other scholars suggested that it was more personal than political for Matalam to declare the MIM, proposing that the killing of his son by a
109:, with its favorable location below the typhoon belt and its rich mineral resources, naturally attracted foreign capital to the area. This prompted then
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259:
in June 1971 which claimed the lives of Muslims in a mosque in Manili when unarmed Muslims were shot by government officials and Christian civilians.
924:
1624:
1609:
390:
Werning, Rainer (2009). "Southern Philippines: Bitter Legacies of a Long-Lasting War". In Graf, Arndt; Kreuzer, Peter; Werning, Rainer (eds.).
1482:
947:
1614:
1548:
525:
Rajaretnam, M. (1978). "Some Observations on Martial Law in the Philippines: The Dilemmas of a Developing State". In Rajaretnam, M. (ed.).
89:
Although the MIM was not long-lasting, its impacts were far-reaching as it is argued to be the key factor that led to the formation of the
1062:
262:
Significantly, the MIM produced a boom of gunmen who may not be politically driven but rather content with only robbery and plundering.
302:
1445:
666:
Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand and Western Burma / Myanmar
377:
Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand and Western Burma/Myanmar
298:
religious conflict as Muslim governments (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Libya) promised to send aid to the Muslims in Philippines.
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90:
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After the Manili massacre, Libya presented the matter before the UN Subcommittee for Human Rights in August 1971. President
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for the declaration of the MIM which is considered one of the triggers of the Moro armed struggle in the long-run.
408:
Rodell, Paul A. (2005). "The Philippines and the Challenges of International Terrorism". In Smith, Paul J. (ed.).
1415:
1056:
962:
458:
Rüland, Jürgen (2006). "Ethnic Conflict, Separatism and Terrorism". In Hoadley, Stephen; Rüland, Jürgen (eds.).
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to retrieve unauthorized weapons and ban all political organizations to control the Muslims in the south.
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was turning its back on him which spurred him to retaliate by declaring for an independent Muslim state.
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1218:
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Documents issued by the MIM can be found in the appendixes of Glang's Secession or Integration? (1969)
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1409:
1355:
1230:
1563:
1330:
1306:
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432:. Office of the President and College of Public Affairs, Mindanao State University. pp. 91–93.
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Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability
279:
17:
1433:
1367:
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874:
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86:(still MIM) to assure non-Muslims in Cotabato that they are included in the envisioned state.
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Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines
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The pressure from the Muslim countries was partially used to justify Marcos's declaration of
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Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines
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Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines
114:
79:
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1131:
985:
719:"The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines"
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110:
718:
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of the MIM who provided the critical link to external sponsors such as Malaysia where
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1114:
933:
798:
271:
153:
During the 1950s and most of 1960s, prior to the resettlement of the Christians into
857:
Noble, Lela Garner (1976). "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines".
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who were angered by Operation Merdeka sponsored the training of 90 Muslim youths in
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141:
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1074:
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The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative
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As an effect of the resettlement, traditional Muslim leaders (also referred as
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1155:
1050:
829:
Aristocrats of the Malay Race: A History of the Bangsa Moro in the Philippines
777:
Utrecht, Ernst (1975). "The Separatist Movement in the Southern Philippines".
47:
Seek independence for Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan regions from the Philippines
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154:
106:
878:
745:
245:
In March 1970, a gun battle in Upi, Cotabato, exposed the existence of
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737:
75:(MIM) was a secessionist political organization in the Philippines.
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247:
894:
Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Regression in the Islamic World
967:
902:
812:
May, R. J. (1981). "The Philippines". In Ayoob, Mohammed (ed.).
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190:
Manifesto, constitution and by-laws and a note to the President
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The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics
527:
Trends in the Philippines II: Proceedings and Background Paper
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Philippine campaign against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
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Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics
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Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics
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Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics
165:
Matalam was betrayed by his own brother-in-law, Congressman
359:. National Defence International College. pp. 184–187.
357:
A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia
278:, then Chief Minister of Sabah, and then Prime Minister
844:
Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative
686:. Institute for Popular Democracy. pp. 112–113.
462:. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. p. 233.
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766:. Frank Cass and Company Limited. pp. 168–169.
571:. University of California Press. pp. 143–149.
529:. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. p. 16.
512:
The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines
59:
51:
43:
35:
846:. Ateneo de Manila University Press. p. 123.
587:Wurfel, David (1988). Kahin, George McT. (ed.).
443:Wurfel, David (1988). Kahin, George McT. (ed.).
1620:Defunct organizations based in the Philippines
1489:2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
606:. Filipinas Foundation, Inc. pp. 117–118.
477:. University of California Press. p. 137.
918:
604:The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900–1972
8:
896:. Lynne Richner Publishers, Inc. p. 95.
706:. Oxford University Press. pp. 142–143.
499:. Oxford University Press. pp. 130–134.
30:
27:Secessionist organization in the Philippines
392:Conflict in Moro Land: Prospects for Peace?
1483:2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
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1011:
925:
911:
903:
394:. Universiti Sains Malaysia. pp. 6–8.
29:
831:. Mindanao State University. p. 166.
1259:Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines
591:. Cornell University Press. p. 156.
589:Filipino Politics: Development and Decay
445:Filipino Politics: Development and Decay
648:. Oxford University Press. p. 152.
447:. Cornell University Press. p. 31.
337:. New Day Publishers. pp. 190–192.
335:Muslim Filipinos - Heritage and Horizon
322:
309:Continuation of the Moro armed struggle
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174:National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
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113:since the mid-1950s and subsequently
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1549:Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
668:. Lexington Books. pp. 253–258.
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379:. Lexington Books. pp. 267–268.
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78:On 1 May 1968, two months after the
1063:Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
814:The Politics of Islamic Reassertion
55:Secessionist political organization
631:Muslim Secessation or Integration?
549:Muslim Secessation or Integration?
31:Muslim Independence Movement (MIM)
25:
18:Muslim Independence Movement (MIM)
1446:Mindanao State University bombing
412:. M. E. Sharpe. pp. 125–127.
827:Marohomsalic, Nasser A. (1995).
242:subsequent violent encounters.
1518:Eastern Sabah Security Command
1022:Moro National Liberation Front
842:Abinales, Patricio N. (2010).
91:Moro National Liberation Front
84:Mindanao Independence Movement
1:
1625:Factions of the Moro conflict
1610:Separatism in the Philippines
1569:Cross border attacks in Sabah
1533:Joint Peace and Security Team
1528:International Monitoring Team
1440:Datu Paglas market occupation
1028:Moro Islamic Liberation Front
1559:Bangsamoro Autonomous Region
1513:AFP Eastern Mindanao Command
1508:AFP Western Mindanao Command
1096:Pro-autonomy or independence
1034:MNLF Executive Council of 15
1015:Pro-autonomy or independence
717:Islam, Syed Serajul (1998).
428:Muslim, Macapado A. (1994).
73:Muslim Independence Movement
1615:Islamism in the Philippines
1523:Eastern Sabah Security Zone
892:Hafez, Mohammed M. (2003).
762:Heraclides, Alexis (1991).
682:Gutierrez, Eric U. (2000).
567:McKenna, Thomas M. (1988).
473:McKenna, Thomas M. (1988).
237:Increase in armed conflicts
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1477:1996 Final Peace Agreement
1265:Basilan beheading incident
1069:Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao
816:. Croom Helm. p. 219.
791:10.1177/030639687501600404
514:. Mizan Press. p. 45.
115:President Ferdinand Marcos
1398:Central Mindanao bombings
1057:Ansar Khalifa Philippines
702:George, T. J. S. (1980).
644:George, T. J. S. (1980).
629:Glang, Alunan C. (1969).
547:Glang, Alunan C. (1969).
495:George, T. J. S. (1980).
460:Asian Security Reassessed
333:Gowing, Peter G. (1979).
111:President Ramon Magsaysay
510:Majul, Cesar A. (1985).
1428:Jolo Cathedral bombings
1386:Zamboanga City bombings
1247:Battle of Camp Abubakar
602:Tan, Samuel K. (1977).
1554:Bangsamoro Organic Law
1465:1976 Tripoli Agreement
1374:Dos Palmas kidnappings
355:Gross, Max L. (2007).
266:International pressure
1392:SuperFerry 14 bombing
1283:Zamboanga City crisis
1180:Hamsiraji Marusi Sali
1168:Jainal Antel Sali Jr.
664:Yegar, Moshe (2002).
375:Yegar, Moshe (2002).
102:Internal colonization
1584:Proclamation No. 216
1501:and peace monitoring
1416:Bukidnon bus bombing
1410:Maguindanao massacre
1356:Ozamiz Ferry Bombing
1331:Ungkaya Pukan clash
1231:Pata Island massacre
1564:Bangsamoro Republik
1362:Sipadan kidnappings
1341:Incidents involving
1307:Battle of Tipo-Tipo
1289:Operation Darkhorse
1277:Lahad Datu standoff
633:. pp. 102–122.
32:
1471:1987 Jeddah Accord
1422:Davao City bombing
1368:Rizal Day bombings
1138:Khadaffy Janjalani
998:Palimbang massacre
199:(Muslim laws) and
149:Datu Udtog Matalam
65:Datu Udtog Matalam
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1404:Mindanao bombings
1350:Lahad Datu ambush
1295:Battle of Basilan
1271:Cotabato conflict
1253:Misuari rebellion
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1144:Ameril Umbra Kato
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551:. pp. 26–28.
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1177:
1171:
1165:
1159:
1153:
1147:
1141:
1135:
1128:
1126:
1122:
1121:
1119:
1118:
1112:
1106:
1099:
1097:
1090:
1086:
1085:
1082:
1081:
1079:
1078:
1072:
1066:
1060:
1054:
1047:
1045:
1041:
1040:
1038:
1037:
1031:
1025:
1018:
1016:
1009:
1005:
1004:
1002:
1001:
995:
992:Tacub massacre
989:
983:
977:
972:
971:
970:
960:
955:
950:
944:
942:
938:
937:
932:
930:
929:
922:
915:
907:
900:
899:
884:
865:(3): 405–424.
849:
834:
819:
804:
785:(4): 387–403.
779:Race and Class
769:
751:
732:(5): 441–456.
709:
689:
671:
651:
636:
618:
609:
594:
574:
554:
532:
517:
502:
480:
465:
450:
435:
415:
397:
382:
362:
340:
321:
319:
316:
310:
307:
267:
264:
238:
235:
233:
230:
217:
214:
208:
207:Amended policy
205:
191:
188:
186:
183:
150:
147:
137:
134:
103:
100:
98:
95:
67:
66:
63:
60:
57:
56:
53:
49:
48:
45:
41:
40:
37:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1637:
1626:
1623:
1621:
1618:
1616:
1613:
1611:
1608:
1607:
1605:
1590:
1587:
1585:
1582:
1580:
1577:
1575:
1572:
1570:
1567:
1565:
1562:
1560:
1557:
1555:
1552:
1550:
1547:
1546:
1544:
1540:
1534:
1531:
1529:
1526:
1524:
1521:
1519:
1516:
1514:
1511:
1509:
1506:
1505:
1503:
1497:
1490:
1487:
1484:
1481:
1478:
1475:
1472:
1469:
1466:
1463:
1462:
1460:
1458:
1457:Peace process
1454:
1447:
1444:
1441:
1438:
1435:
1434:Jolo bombings
1432:
1429:
1426:
1423:
1420:
1417:
1414:
1411:
1408:
1405:
1402:
1399:
1396:
1393:
1390:
1387:
1384:
1381:
1378:
1375:
1372:
1369:
1366:
1363:
1360:
1357:
1354:
1351:
1348:
1347:
1345:
1339:
1332:
1329:
1326:
1323:
1320:
1319:Bohol clashes
1317:
1314:
1313:Butig clashes
1311:
1308:
1305:
1302:
1299:
1296:
1293:
1290:
1287:
1284:
1281:
1278:
1275:
1272:
1269:
1266:
1263:
1260:
1257:
1254:
1251:
1248:
1244:
1241:
1238:
1237:Ipil massacre
1235:
1232:
1229:
1226:
1223:
1220:
1217:
1214:
1211:
1210:
1208:
1204:
1193:
1190:
1187:
1184:
1181:
1178:
1175:
1172:
1169:
1166:
1163:
1160:
1157:
1154:
1151:
1150:Albader Parad
1148:
1145:
1142:
1139:
1136:
1133:
1130:
1129:
1127:
1123:
1116:
1115:Murad Ebrahim
1113:
1110:
1107:
1104:
1101:
1100:
1098:
1094:
1091:
1087:
1076:
1073:
1070:
1067:
1064:
1061:
1058:
1055:
1052:
1049:
1048:
1046:
1042:
1035:
1032:
1029:
1026:
1023:
1020:
1019:
1017:
1013:
1010:
1006:
999:
996:
993:
990:
987:
984:
981:
978:
976:
973:
969:
966:
965:
964:
961:
959:
956:
954:
951:
949:
946:
945:
943:
939:
935:
934:Moro conflict
928:
923:
921:
916:
914:
909:
908:
905:
895:
888:
885:
880:
876:
872:
868:
864:
860:
853:
850:
845:
838:
835:
830:
823:
820:
815:
808:
805:
800:
796:
792:
788:
784:
780:
773:
770:
765:
758:
756:
752:
747:
743:
739:
735:
731:
727:
720:
713:
710:
705:
698:
696:
694:
690:
685:
678:
676:
672:
667:
660:
658:
656:
652:
647:
640:
637:
632:
625:
623:
619:
613:
610:
605:
598:
595:
590:
583:
581:
579:
575:
570:
563:
561:
559:
555:
550:
543:
541:
539:
537:
533:
528:
521:
518:
513:
506:
503:
498:
491:
489:
487:
485:
481:
476:
469:
466:
461:
454:
451:
446:
439:
436:
431:
424:
422:
420:
416:
411:
404:
402:
398:
393:
386:
383:
378:
371:
369:
367:
363:
358:
351:
349:
347:
345:
341:
336:
329:
327:
323:
317:
315:
308:
306:
304:
299:
296:
291:
289:
285:
284:Pulau Pangkor
281:
277:
273:
272:Rashid Lucman
265:
263:
260:
258:
254:
250:
249:
243:
236:
231:
229:
226:
222:
215:
213:
206:
204:
202:
198:
189:
184:
182:
178:
175:
170:
168:
162:
158:
156:
148:
146:
143:
135:
133:
131:
127:
122:
118:
116:
112:
108:
101:
96:
94:
92:
87:
85:
81:
76:
74:
64:
58:
54:
50:
46:
42:
38:
34:
19:
1174:Ahmed Santos
1111:(MNLF EC-15)
1036:(MNLF EC-15)
1008:Rebel groups
953:Gun cultures
893:
887:
862:
858:
852:
843:
837:
828:
822:
813:
807:
782:
778:
772:
763:
729:
726:Asian Survey
725:
712:
703:
683:
665:
645:
639:
630:
612:
603:
597:
588:
568:
548:
526:
520:
511:
505:
496:
474:
468:
459:
453:
444:
438:
429:
409:
391:
385:
376:
356:
334:
312:
300:
292:
276:Tun Mustapha
269:
261:
253:Ali Dimaporo
246:
244:
240:
227:
223:
219:
210:
200:
196:
193:
185:The movement
179:
171:
163:
159:
152:
139:
129:
125:
123:
119:
105:
88:
83:
77:
72:
70:
1579:Moro people
1376:(2000–2001)
1261:(2002–2015)
1103:Nur Misuari
1075:Maute group
303:martial law
288:Nur Misuari
1604:Categories
1186:Omar Maute
1156:Abu Sabaya
1051:Abu Sayyaf
948:Drug abuse
318:References
97:Background
61:Key people
39:1 May 1968
1343:civilians
1206:Incidents
1125:Islamists
1044:Islamists
799:143474439
286:in 1969.
1589:Refugees
1245:and the
1109:Mus Sema
155:Cotabato
107:Mindanao
93:(MNLF).
1089:Leaders
958:Poverty
941:Prelude
879:2755496
746:2645502
197:shariah
142:problem
44:Purpose
36:Founded
1491:(MILF)
1485:(MILF)
1479:(MNLF)
1473:(MNLF)
1467:(MNLF)
1448:(2023)
1442:(2021)
1436:(2020)
1430:(2019)
1424:(2016)
1418:(2014)
1412:(2009)
1406:(2009)
1400:(2006)
1394:(2004)
1388:(2002)
1382:(2001)
1370:(2000)
1364:(2000)
1358:(2000)
1352:(1985)
1333:(2022)
1327:(2017)
1321:(2017)
1315:(2016)
1309:(2016)
1303:(2015)
1297:(2014)
1291:(2014)
1285:(2013)
1279:(2013)
1273:(2008)
1267:(2007)
1255:(2001)
1249:(2000)
1239:(1995)
1233:(1981)
1227:(1977)
1221:(1974)
1215:(1862)
1146:(BIFF)
1117:(MILF)
1105:(MNLF)
1065:(BIFF)
1030:(MILF)
1024:(MNLF)
1000:(1974)
994:(1971)
988:(1971)
982:(1968)
975:Piracy
963:Racism
877:
797:
744:
248:Ilagas
232:Impact
52:Method
1574:Ilaga
1182:(ASG)
1176:(RSM)
1170:(ASG)
1164:(ASG)
1158:(ASG)
1152:(ASG)
1140:(ASG)
1134:(ASG)
1071:(KIM)
1059:(AKP)
1053:(ASG)
875:JSTOR
795:S2CID
742:JSTOR
722:(PDF)
130:datus
1194:(MG)
1188:(MG)
1077:(MG)
968:Rido
201:adat
126:datu
71:The
867:doi
787:doi
734:doi
1606::
873:.
863:49
861:.
793:.
783:16
781:.
754:^
740:.
730:38
728:.
724:.
692:^
674:^
654:^
621:^
577:^
557:^
535:^
483:^
418:^
400:^
365:^
343:^
325:^
926:e
919:t
912:v
881:.
869::
801:.
789::
748:.
736::
20:)
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