478:
273:, also a member of the Partisan Supreme Headquarters, and Ott was involved on the German side. On the day of the second prisoner exchange, the Partisans delivered a letter addressed to Glaise-Horstenau which apparently explained that the Partisans were "an independent armed force with military discipline and not an agglomeration of bands", and "proposed mutual application of the rules of international law, especially in regard to prisoners and wounded, a regular exchange of prisoners, and a sort of armistice between the two sides". Glaise-Horstenau, Kasche and others wanted to continue exchanging prisoners as a means of obtaining intelligence, and also wanted a
463:
camp-followers to their villages after they are disarmed; no executions of leading
Partisans on our part... It is my opinion that this possibility should be pursued since secession from the enemy of this fighting force highly regarded in world opinion would be very important. In fact, the Tito Partisans are, in their masses, not Communists and in general have not committed extraordinary excesses in their battles and in the treatment of prisoners and the population. I refer to previous written reports and also to my conversation with State Secretary
33:
359:
319:
582:
503:
armistice had increased, and emphasised that he considered this a significant development. By this time, Đilas and
Velebit had returned to Zagreb, where they reiterated that the Partisans wanted recognition as a regular belligerent, and emphasised the futility of continued fighting. They effectively asked to be left alone to fight the Chetniks. According to Pavlowitch, it is not clear which side posed the question of what the Partisans would do if the
195:'s intelligence organisation. The captured group had been identifying new sources of metal and timber for the Germans, but Ott had also been tasked by the Abwehr with making contact with the Partisans. Following their capture, Ott told his captors that he had an important message to deliver to Partisan headquarters, and after he had been taken there he suggested to the Partisans that his group be exchanged for Partisans held by the Germans in jails in
641:, but stated that he would not have disclosed the details of the negotiations if it had not already been known through Roberts' book. In 1978, Tito admitted that the negotiations occurred, but characterised their purpose as "solely to obtain German recognition of belligerent status for the Partisans". In 1985, after Tito's death, Leković was able to publish the results of his investigation that had started in 1967, in
637:. The thrust of the Yugoslav complaint was that the book equated the Partisans with the Chetniks. Roberts denied this, stating that his book did not equate the two or accept the Partisan mythology of the Partisans as a "liberation movement" or the Chetniks as "traitorous collaborators". The book also identified Đilas as the main negotiator. In 1977, Đilas confirmed his involvement in his book
572:
German–Partisan prisoner exchanges re-commenced in late 1943, but became the responsibility of the
Partisan Chief Headquarters for Croatia rather than Partisan Supreme Headquarters. Initially these were organised by Stilinović, then by Dr. Josip Brnčić, before Boris Bakrač took over the role. Between
515:
Von
Ribbentrop responded on 29 March, prohibiting all further contact with the Partisans and inquiring about what evidence Kasche had gathered to support his optimistic conclusions. When told of the talks with the Partisans, Hitler apparently responded, "One does not negotiate with rebels—rebels must
490:
and were then flown to Zagreb on 25 March in a military aircraft. These negotiations were with German representatives supervised by Ott, apparently on all the points discussed at Gornji Vakuf, and the
Partisans made it clear to the Germans that their proposals did not amount to an offer of surrender.
462:
Under circumstances possibility exists that Tito will demonstratively turn his back on Moscow and London who left him in the lurch. The wishes of the
Partisans are: Fight against the Chetniks in the Sandžak, thereafter return to their villages and pacification in Croatian and Serbian areas; return of
531:
Kasche further stated that it would be useful from a military perspective if the
Partisans were allowed to fight the Chetniks without German interference, and counselled against trying to fight the Partisans and the Chetniks at the same time. On 30 March, Đilas had returned to Partisan headquarters
349:
by the
Partisans. Due to their desperate situation at this stage of Case White, and their need to delay the Axis in order to cross the Neretva river before the Germans struck, they decided to use the recently captured German officer to initiate negotiations. The German historians Ladislaus Hory and
354:
concluded that at this critical period, Tito was also concerned that by the end of the war the attrition to his
Partisan forces would be such that Mihailović's Chetniks would be more powerful. They suggest that Tito may have been willing to agree to a truce with the Germans in order to destroy the
516:
be shot". On 31 March, Kasche responded with a further telegram, saying that there had been no direct contact with Tito, and contradicted his earlier telegram by stating that the contacts had been strictly about prisoner exchanges. Kasche stated that Tito had abided by his promises thus far, and:
253:
with the
Partisans might be possible, and were thinking of more than prisoner exchanges when they gave Ott the task of making contact with the Partisans. The number of Germans in Partisan custody had been increasing, and this made some sort of prisoner swap agreement more likely. These agreements
511:
because they did not want to communicate with London. Their determination to fight the British if they landed was because they believed that the British would try to thwart their objective of seizing power in Yugoslavia. The Partisans also believed that the British were clandestine supporters of
502:
Kasche had not received a reply to his telegram of 17 March, so he sent a further telegram to von Ribbentrop on 26 March. In it he advised that two Partisan representatives had arrived in Zagreb for negotiations, and named them using their aliases. He pointed out that the Partisan interest in an
146:
and Germans during the war. Roberts denied this, but added that the book did not accept the mythology of the Partisans as a "liberation movement" or the Chetniks as "traitorous collaborators". Subsequently, accounts of the negotiations were published by Yugoslav historians and the main Yugoslav
573:
March 1944 and May 1945, Bakrač attended about 40 meetings with German representatives, 25 of which were in Zagreb under agreements for safe conduct. On the German side, Ott continued to play a leading role. These negotiations resulted in the exchange of between 600 and 800 Partisans in total.
520:
I think the Partisan question is misjudged by us. Our fight therefore has been practically without success anywhere. It should be based more on political and less on military means. Complete victory over the Partisans is unattainable militarily or through police measures. Military measures can
521:
destroy clearly defined areas of revolt, security measures can discover communications and serve to finish off Partisans and their helpers. The extent of success depends on troops and time available. If both are scarce the possibility of political solutions should not be rejected out of hand.
457:
approved an informal ceasefire while the talks continued. On 17 March, Kasche reported on the negotiations to the Reich Foreign Ministry, requesting approval to continue discussions, and asking for instructions. The following is an extract from Kasche's telegram:
568:
in Moscow, but when they realised more was being discussed and demanded an explanation, Tito was taken aback. He responded that he was not getting any external support, and needed to look after the interests of captured Partisans and refugees.
425:
stated that Partisan Supreme Headquarters believed that, given the circumstances, there was no reason for the Germans to attack the Partisans, and it would be in the interests of both if hostilities stopped and areas of responsibilities were
485:
According to Roberts, it is clear that the next phase of negotiations was intended to go beyond prisoner exchanges, as the prisoner of war negotiator Stilinović was not involved. Đilas and Velebit were passed through the German lines to
622:(Views on the Past, Present and Future of the Croatian Nation), published in London. In 1967, the Yugoslav historian Mišo Leković was officially commissioned to produce a full report on the talks. In 1969, Ivan Avakumović published his
215:. He advised Glaise-Horstenau that Tito was willing to exchange the eight Germans for ten Partisans who were being held by the Germans, Italians and NDH authorities. Glaise-Horstenau contacted the commander of the Italian 2nd Army,
118:
offensive was launched in mid-May 1943. Prisoner exchanges, which had been occurring between the Germans and Partisans for some months prior, re-commenced in late 1943 and continued until the end of the war.
564:. When Bailey's report arrived in London on 22 March, it was not taken seriously. Italian military intelligence also became aware of the talks. Tito himself mentioned the prisoner exchanges to the
507:
were to land in Yugoslavia without Partisan authorisation. Đilas and Velebit said they would fight them as well as the Germans. They stated that their propaganda had been slanted towards the
142:. The objections centred on claims that Roberts was effectively equating the German–Partisan negotiations with the collaboration agreements concluded by various Chetnik leaders with the
269:
Continuing negotiations between the Germans and Partisan headquarters resulted in a further prisoner exchange on 17 November 1942. The second of these was negotiated by Stilinović and
491:
Velebit met personally with Glaise-Horstenau, as the Austrian had known Velebit's father, a Yugoslav general. After this first visit to Zagreb, Velebit visited Partisan commanders in
277:
with the Partisans to allow the Germans to exploit the mineral resources of the NDH without disruption. In particular, they wanted to minimise disruption in the NDH south of the
633:
which included information about the German–Partisan negotiations of March 1943. The publishing of the book disturbed the Yugoslav government, which lodged a complaint with the
1332:
512:
Chetnik collaboration. Đilas and Velebit further stated that the Chetniks would not fight the British because such a landing was exactly what they were waiting for.
605:(The Secret Front, the Organisation, People and Activities of the German Secret Service) in 1950. There was another mention in a book published in German in 1956,
122:
Details of the negotiations were little known by historians until the 1970s, despite being mentioned by several authors from 1949 on. The key Partisan negotiator,
383:
618:(The Croats: The Fateful Path of a South Slav People). Ilija Jukić obtained evidence from German Foreign Ministry sources, which he included in his 1965 book
1500:
1818:
1368:
398:(using the alias of Miloš Marković); and Velebit (using the alias of Dr. Vladimir Petrović). The German negotiators were led by the commander of the
239:, sent a telegram to the Reich Foreign Ministry advising of the proposed exchange and asked the Ministry to intercede with the Italians. In his book
1833:
1325:
504:
135:
1474:
1789:
419:
identified their prisoners and indicated who they wanted in exchange, emphasising that they wanted to complete the exchange as soon as possible;
290:
1796:
1300:
1252:
1225:
1092:
1068:
1044:
976:
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said that if the Germans accepted the Partisan proposal, especially in regard to the wounded and captured, the Partisans would reciprocate;
1843:
1760:
1318:
399:
1692:
338:
1770:
1724:
634:
206:
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offensive. Throughout that offensive, Partisan Supreme Headquarters engaged the Germans in negotiations to gain time to cross the
1828:
1765:
1572:
540:. Velebit remained in Zagreb to complete a further task: he successfully arranged the release of a detained Slovenian communist,
337:
River. In late February or early March 1943, the Partisans captured a German officer and about 25 soldiers, who joined about 100
110:. The negotiations were accompanied by an informal ceasefire that lasted about six weeks before being called off on orders from
565:
477:
262:
and Livno, where 38 Partisans and family members were exchanged for one senior German officer who had been captured during the
467:. Request instructions. In talks with Casertano and Lorković I found that the above development would be treated positively.
556:
Mihailović was the first to receive reports of contact between the Germans and Partisans, and passed them on to his British
499:
passing on orders for the suspension of attacks on the Germans and their rail communications, and the release of prisoners.
374:, the three Partisans tasked with the negotiations show the importance that the Partisans placed on the outcome. They were:
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1395:
395:
255:
72:
481:
In late March 1943, Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop prohibited any further negotiations with the Partisans.
1743:
557:
537:
160:
68:
282:
1823:
1490:
1363:
225:, who had most of the identified Partisan prisoners in his custody. On 14 August, the German ambassador to the NDH,
1838:
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1708:
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1385:
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561:
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244:
212:
127:
49:
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1410:
1355:
293:
322:
Partisans with captured German major Arthur Strecker, who was offered in exchange for captured partisans.
107:
1577:
1551:
1415:
1264:"Making Deals with the Enemy: Partisan–German Contacts and Prisoner Exchanges in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945"
408:
1609:
1567:
1546:
1435:
1430:
1032:
645:(The March Negotiations 1943). In 1989, Popović gave his version of events in Aleksandar Nenadović's
611:
231:
318:
98:
offensive. They were used by the Partisans to delay the Axis forces while the Partisans crossed the
1650:
187:. The leader of the captured group was a mining engineer, Hans Ott, who was also an officer of the
156:
114:. The short-term advantage gained by the Partisans through the negotiations was lost when the Axis
58:
362:
Milovan Đilas was the main Partisan delegate for the negotiations at both Gornji Vakuf and Zagreb.
1640:
1582:
1515:
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176:
143:
76:
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1405:
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1040:
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999:
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454:
379:
180:
164:
88:
1635:
1614:
1505:
1275:
1236:
964:
598:
586:
387:
270:
236:
123:
626:(Mihailović according to German documents), which used captured German military documents.
593:
The negotiations were first mentioned publicly in 1949 when Stephen Clissold published his
32:
1541:
1425:
1078:
496:
403:
371:
346:
263:
172:
139:
1604:
1510:
1495:
987:
351:
226:
581:
1812:
1630:
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449:
249:
1467:
607:
603:
Die Geheime Front, Organisation, Personen und Aktionen des deutschen Geheimdienstes
508:
412:
367:
286:
222:
111:
80:
64:
545:
358:
17:
1058:
327:
301:
179:
captured a group of eight Germans from the civil and military engineering group
92:
37:
304:. As a result of Hitler's opposition, this Partisan proposal was not answered.
1536:
1531:
1279:
541:
330:
313:
115:
95:
1310:
1200:
1158:
1124:
1179:
1024:
589:. Roberts' book, published in 1973, drew the ire of the Yugoslav government.
433:
391:
192:
84:
1141:
1003:
971:. Translated by Michael B. Petrovich. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
533:
439:
required a signature from their higher headquarters on any final agreement.
300:, as they were afraid it would give the Partisans the status of a regular
492:
487:
334:
217:
103:
99:
200:
196:
188:
258:. On 5 September, a prisoner swap was completed in an area between
203:, where he met with the German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia,
1063:(3rd ed.). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Duke University Press.
580:
476:
390:, a member of the Partisan Supreme Headquarters and member of the
357:
317:
259:
184:
31:
1153:. translated by R.H. Stevens. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
326:
From 20 January 1943, the Partisans had been hard-pressed by the
846:
844:
657:(Secrets and Traps of the Second World War) the following year.
278:
1314:
653:(Vladimir Velebit: Witness to History) in 2001, and in his own
649:(Conversations with Koča), followed by Velebit in Mira Šuvar's
544:, who was Tito's wife and the mother of his two-year-old son,
102:
River, and to allow the Partisans to focus on attacking their
1172:
Views on the Past, Present and Future of the Croatian Nation
1168:
Pogledi na prošlost: sadašnjost i budućnost Hrvatskog naroda
875:
873:
871:
816:
814:
812:
810:
797:
795:
620:
Pogledi na prošlost, sadašnjost i budućnost hrvatskog naroda
429:
stated that they considered the Chetniks their main enemies;
1174:] (in Serbo-Croatian). London: Unidentified publisher.
734:
732:
719:
717:
715:
713:
683:
681:
415:
representative. In their written statement, the Partisans:
254:
were initially led by Marijan Stilinović on behalf of the
1084:
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks
1037:
Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia
904:
902:
900:
831:
829:
998:] (in German). Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.
931:
929:
700:
698:
696:
1151:
The Secret Front: The Story of Nazi Political Espionage
134:
in 1973. Roberts' book was met with protests from the
1193:
The Croats: The Fateful Path of the South Slav People
1134:
Whirlwind: An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power
595:
Whirlwind: An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power
1189:
Die Kroaten. Der Schicksalsweg eines Südslawenvolkes
1149:
Hoettl, Wilhelm (1953). Colvin, Ian Goodhope (ed.).
616:
Die Kroaten. Der Schicksalsweg eines Südslawenvolkes
1733:
1717:
1701:
1685:
1669:
1623:
1560:
1524:
1483:
1348:
1087:. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
1019:] (in Serbo-Croatian). Belgrade: Narodna knj.
1119:] (in Serbo-Croatian). London: Oslobodjenje.
532:with 12 more Partisans that had been held in the
40:river in the Independent State of Croatia in 1943
345:officers and 600 soldiers already being held as
63:'March negotiations') were held between
27:March 1943 ceasefire and prisoner exchange talks
518:
460:
366:The negotiations commenced on 11 March 1943 in
247:argued that the Abwehr considered some sort of
1326:
1295:] (in Serbo-Croatian). Zagreb: Prometej.
8:
1501:Chetnik sabotage of Axis communication lines
443:Popović returned to report to Tito, and the
243:, published in 1973, the former US diplomat
204:
83:. The negotiations – focused on obtaining a
1247:] (in Serbo-Croatian). Zagreb: Razlog.
1220:] (in Serbo-Croatian). Zagreb: Globus.
774:
631:Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941–1945
241:Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941–1945
132:Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941–1945
1333:
1319:
1311:
1060:Tito, Mihailović and the Allies: 1941–1945
879:
850:
820:
801:
786:
762:
750:
738:
723:
687:
1293:Secrets and Traps of the Second World War
436:should apply during the negotiations; and
1117:Mihailović according to German Documents
992:Der Kroatische Ustascha-Staat, 1941–1945
199:. On that basis, Ott was sent to Zagreb
1039:. New York: Columbia University Press.
935:
920:
908:
891:
862:
835:
704:
672:
665:
1491:Operations Southeast Croatia and Ozren
1568:Operations Kugelblitz and Schneesturm
1113:Mihailović prema nemačkim dokumentima
947:
624:Mihailović prema nemačkim dokumentima
46:German–Yugoslav Partisan negotiations
36:Yugoslav Partisans wading across the
7:
1369:June uprising in eastern Herzegovina
1245:Vladimir Velebit: Witness to History
996:The Croatian Ustaše State, 1941–1945
1475:Karadak-Gollak Uprising (1941–1951)
1360:Uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1289:Tajne i zamke Drugog svjetskog rata
1241:Vladimir Velebit: svjedok historije
1136:. New York: Philosophical Library.
655:Tajne i zamke Drugog svjetskog rata
651:Vladimir Velebit: svjedok historije
1693:World War II in Yugoslav Macedonia
411:, one of his staff officers and a
25:
1725:World War II in the Slovene Lands
1834:1943 in international relations
1195:] (in German). Koln: Graz.
597:. This was closely followed by
585:Walter Roberts broadcasting on
1790:Factions in the Yugoslav Front
1:
396:Communist Party of Yugoslavia
382:veteran and commander of the
370:. According to the historian
256:Partisan Supreme Headquarters
1819:Germany–Yugoslavia relations
1797:People of the Yugoslav Front
558:Special Operations Executive
538:Jasenovac concentration camp
283:Zagreb–Belgrade railway line
161:Independent State of Croatia
91:– were conducted during the
69:Independent State of Croatia
1364:May 1941 Sanski Most revolt
1017:The March Negotiations 1943
629:In 1973, Roberts published
218:Generale designato d'Armata
155:In August 1942, during the
53:
1860:
1844:Yugoslavia in World War II
1709:Kosovo during World War II
1342:World War II in Yugoslavia
1287:Velebit, Vladimir (2002).
1132:Clissold, Stephen (1949).
311:
1779:
1396:Battle of Banja Koviljača
1280:10.5893/19498489.10.02.01
1187:Kiszling, Rudolf (1956).
1111:Avakumović, Ivan (1969).
560:liaison officer, Colonel
169:Nezavisna Država Hrvatska
1013:Martovski pregovori 1943
643:Martovski pregovori 1943
384:1st Proletarian Division
1829:Germany in World War II
1646:Battle of Lijevče Field
1262:Trifković, Gaj (2013).
1218:Conversations with Koča
1208:Nenadović, Aleksandar;
775:Hory & Broszat 1964
400:717th Infantry Division
213:Edmund Glaise-Horstenau
1677:Zagreb in World War II
1573:Operation Rösselsprung
1448:Uprising in Montenegro
1356:Invasion of Yugoslavia
1011:Leković, Mišo (1985).
635:US Department of State
590:
552:Reaction and aftermath
529:
482:
475:
363:
323:
294:Joachim von Ribbentrop
291:Reich Foreign Minister
207:General der Infanterie
205:
168:
41:
1593:Battle of Jelova Gora
1588:Operation Draufgänger
1166:Jukić, Ilija (1965).
1033:Pavlowitch, Stevan K.
584:
480:
447:Commander South-East
361:
321:
235:(Lieutenant General)
211:(Lieutenant General)
126:, was first named in
79:in March 1943 during
35:
1547:Operation Kugelblitz
1459:Uprising in Croatia
1431:Operation Mihailovic
339:Croatian Home Guards
73:Supreme Headquarters
1651:Battle of Zelengora
1411:Battle of Trešnjica
865:, pp. 109–110.
853:, pp. 161–162.
789:, pp. 244–245.
777:, pp. 143–144.
753:, pp. 236–243.
675:, pp. 106–107.
157:Partisan Long March
87:and establishing a
54:Martovski pregovori
1824:Yugoslav Partisans
1641:Sarajevo Operation
1583:Belgrade offensive
1578:Operation Rübezahl
1552:Battle of Višegrad
1516:Operation Kopaonik
1463:Croatian Partisans
1453:Battle of Pljevlja
1386:Uprising in Serbia
1268:Global War Studies
1055:Roberts, Walter R.
591:
483:
364:
324:
308:March negotiations
296:were opposed to a
266:in December 1942.
177:Yugoslav Partisans
77:Yugoslav Partisans
67:commanders in the
42:
18:March negotiations
1839:March 1943 events
1806:
1805:
1734:Strategic bombing
1656:Battle of Poljana
1391:Battle of Loznica
1374:Siege of Rogatica
1302:978-953-6460-30-4
1254:978-953-6985-00-5
1237:Velebit, Vladimir
1227:978-86-343-0582-1
1214:Razgovori s Kočom
1094:978-0-8047-0857-9
1070:978-0-8223-0773-0
1046:978-1-85065-895-5
986:Hory, Ladislaus;
978:978-0-15-694712-1
647:Razgovori s Kočom
453:(Senior General)
432:proposed that an
380:Spanish Civil War
281:River and on the
232:Obergruppenführer
221:(acting General)
181:Organisation Todt
159:west through the
89:prisoner exchange
62:
16:(Redirected from
1851:
1636:Mostar operation
1615:Battle of Batina
1600:Kosovo Operation
1506:Kozara Offensive
1335:
1328:
1321:
1312:
1306:
1283:
1258:
1231:
1204:
1183:
1162:
1145:
1128:
1098:
1079:Tomasevich, Jozo
1074:
1050:
1028:
1007:
982:
951:
945:
939:
933:
924:
918:
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906:
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760:
754:
748:
742:
736:
727:
721:
708:
702:
691:
685:
676:
670:
587:Voice of America
527:
526:Siegfried Kasche
473:
472:Siegfried Kasche
409:Benignus Dippold
407:(Major General)
347:prisoners of war
271:Vladimir Velebit
237:Siegfried Kasche
210:
108:Draža Mihailović
57:
21:
1859:
1858:
1854:
1853:
1852:
1850:
1849:
1848:
1809:
1808:
1807:
1802:
1775:
1729:
1713:
1697:
1681:
1665:
1661:Battle of Odžak
1619:
1610:Battle of Tuzla
1556:
1542:Siege of Turjak
1520:
1479:
1426:Operation Uzice
1406:Mačva operation
1401:Attack on Šabac
1344:
1339:
1309:
1303:
1286:
1261:
1255:
1234:
1228:
1207:
1186:
1165:
1148:
1131:
1110:
1106:
1104:Further reading
1101:
1095:
1077:
1071:
1053:
1047:
1031:
1010:
988:Broszat, Martin
985:
979:
963:
959:
954:
946:
942:
934:
927:
919:
915:
907:
898:
890:
886:
880:Pavlowitch 2007
878:
869:
861:
857:
851:Pavlowitch 2007
849:
842:
834:
827:
821:Tomasevich 1975
819:
808:
802:Pavlowitch 2007
800:
793:
787:Tomasevich 1975
785:
781:
773:
769:
763:Tomasevich 1975
761:
757:
751:Tomasevich 1975
749:
745:
739:Tomasevich 1975
737:
730:
724:Tomasevich 1975
722:
711:
703:
694:
688:Pavlowitch 2007
686:
679:
671:
667:
663:
612:Rudolf Kiszling
579:
554:
528:
525:
474:
471:
404:Generalleutnant
372:Jozo Tomasevich
316:
310:
264:Battle of Livno
173:Josip Broz Tito
153:
140:Josip Broz Tito
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
1857:
1855:
1847:
1846:
1841:
1836:
1831:
1826:
1821:
1811:
1810:
1804:
1803:
1801:
1800:
1793:
1786:
1784:
1780:
1777:
1776:
1774:
1773:
1768:
1763:
1758:
1753:
1752:
1751:
1746:
1737:
1735:
1731:
1730:
1728:
1727:
1721:
1719:
1715:
1714:
1712:
1711:
1705:
1703:
1699:
1698:
1696:
1695:
1689:
1687:
1683:
1682:
1680:
1679:
1673:
1671:
1667:
1666:
1664:
1663:
1658:
1653:
1648:
1643:
1638:
1633:
1627:
1625:
1621:
1620:
1618:
1617:
1612:
1607:
1605:Battle of Knin
1602:
1597:
1596:
1595:
1590:
1580:
1575:
1570:
1564:
1562:
1558:
1557:
1555:
1554:
1549:
1544:
1539:
1534:
1528:
1526:
1522:
1521:
1519:
1518:
1513:
1511:Operation Alfa
1508:
1503:
1498:
1496:Operation Trio
1493:
1487:
1485:
1481:
1480:
1478:
1477:
1472:
1471:
1470:
1465:
1457:
1456:
1455:
1445:
1444:
1443:
1438:
1433:
1428:
1423:
1418:
1413:
1408:
1403:
1398:
1393:
1383:
1382:
1381:
1376:
1371:
1366:
1358:
1352:
1350:
1346:
1345:
1340:
1338:
1337:
1330:
1323:
1315:
1308:
1307:
1301:
1284:
1259:
1253:
1232:
1226:
1205:
1184:
1163:
1146:
1129:
1107:
1105:
1102:
1100:
1099:
1093:
1075:
1069:
1051:
1045:
1029:
1008:
983:
977:
965:Đilas, Milovan
960:
958:
955:
953:
952:
950:, p. 231.
940:
925:
923:, p. 111.
913:
911:, p. 110.
896:
884:
882:, p. 162.
867:
855:
840:
838:, p. 109.
825:
823:, p. 245.
806:
804:, p. 161.
791:
779:
767:
765:, p. 243.
755:
743:
741:, p. 246.
728:
726:, p. 244.
709:
707:, p. 107.
692:
690:, p. 159.
677:
664:
662:
659:
578:
577:Historiography
575:
553:
550:
523:
469:
465:von Weizsäcker
455:Alexander Löhr
441:
440:
437:
430:
427:
423:
420:
352:Martin Broszat
309:
306:
245:Walter Roberts
152:
149:
147:protagonists.
138:government of
128:Walter Roberts
106:rivals led by
50:Serbo-Croatian
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1856:
1845:
1842:
1840:
1837:
1835:
1832:
1830:
1827:
1825:
1822:
1820:
1817:
1816:
1814:
1799:
1798:
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1787:
1785:
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1781:
1778:
1772:
1769:
1767:
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1757:
1754:
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1745:
1742:
1741:
1739:
1738:
1736:
1732:
1726:
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1716:
1710:
1707:
1706:
1704:
1700:
1694:
1691:
1690:
1688:
1684:
1678:
1675:
1674:
1672:
1668:
1662:
1659:
1657:
1654:
1652:
1649:
1647:
1644:
1642:
1639:
1637:
1634:
1632:
1631:Syrmian Front
1629:
1628:
1626:
1622:
1616:
1613:
1611:
1608:
1606:
1603:
1601:
1598:
1594:
1591:
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1586:
1585:
1584:
1581:
1579:
1576:
1574:
1571:
1569:
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1563:
1559:
1553:
1550:
1548:
1545:
1543:
1540:
1538:
1535:
1533:
1530:
1529:
1527:
1523:
1517:
1514:
1512:
1509:
1507:
1504:
1502:
1499:
1497:
1494:
1492:
1489:
1488:
1486:
1482:
1476:
1473:
1469:
1466:
1464:
1461:
1460:
1458:
1454:
1451:
1450:
1449:
1446:
1442:
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1437:
1434:
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1429:
1427:
1424:
1422:
1419:
1417:
1414:
1412:
1409:
1407:
1404:
1402:
1399:
1397:
1394:
1392:
1389:
1388:
1387:
1384:
1380:
1377:
1375:
1372:
1370:
1367:
1365:
1362:
1361:
1359:
1357:
1354:
1353:
1351:
1347:
1343:
1336:
1331:
1329:
1324:
1322:
1317:
1316:
1313:
1304:
1298:
1294:
1290:
1285:
1281:
1277:
1273:
1269:
1265:
1260:
1256:
1250:
1246:
1242:
1238:
1235:Šuvar, Mira;
1233:
1229:
1223:
1219:
1215:
1211:
1210:Popović, Koča
1206:
1202:
1198:
1194:
1190:
1185:
1181:
1177:
1173:
1169:
1164:
1160:
1156:
1152:
1147:
1143:
1139:
1135:
1130:
1126:
1122:
1118:
1114:
1109:
1108:
1103:
1096:
1090:
1086:
1085:
1080:
1076:
1072:
1066:
1062:
1061:
1056:
1052:
1048:
1042:
1038:
1034:
1030:
1026:
1022:
1018:
1014:
1009:
1005:
1001:
997:
993:
989:
984:
980:
974:
970:
966:
962:
961:
956:
949:
944:
941:
938:, p. xv.
937:
932:
930:
926:
922:
917:
914:
910:
905:
903:
901:
897:
894:, p. 25.
893:
888:
885:
881:
876:
874:
872:
868:
864:
859:
856:
852:
847:
845:
841:
837:
832:
830:
826:
822:
817:
815:
813:
811:
807:
803:
798:
796:
792:
788:
783:
780:
776:
771:
768:
764:
759:
756:
752:
747:
744:
740:
735:
733:
729:
725:
720:
718:
716:
714:
710:
706:
701:
699:
697:
693:
689:
684:
682:
678:
674:
669:
666:
660:
658:
656:
652:
648:
644:
640:
636:
632:
627:
625:
621:
617:
613:
610:
609:
604:
600:
599:Wilhelm Höttl
596:
588:
583:
576:
574:
570:
567:
563:
559:
551:
549:
547:
543:
539:
535:
522:
517:
513:
510:
506:
500:
498:
494:
489:
479:
468:
466:
459:
456:
452:
451:
450:Generaloberst
446:
438:
435:
431:
428:
424:
421:
418:
417:
416:
414:
410:
406:
405:
401:
397:
393:
389:
388:Milovan Đilas
385:
381:
377:
373:
369:
360:
356:
353:
348:
344:
340:
336:
332:
329:
320:
315:
307:
305:
303:
299:
298:modus vivendi
295:
292:
288:
284:
280:
276:
275:modus vivendi
272:
267:
265:
261:
257:
252:
251:
250:modus vivendi
246:
242:
238:
234:
233:
228:
224:
220:
219:
214:
209:
208:
202:
198:
194:
190:
186:
182:
178:
174:
170:
166:
162:
158:
150:
148:
145:
141:
137:
133:
129:
125:
124:Milovan Đilas
120:
117:
113:
109:
105:
101:
97:
94:
90:
86:
82:
78:
74:
70:
66:
60:
55:
51:
47:
39:
34:
30:
19:
1795:
1788:
1468:Srb uprising
1292:
1288:
1271:
1267:
1244:
1240:
1217:
1213:
1192:
1188:
1171:
1167:
1150:
1133:
1116:
1112:
1083:
1059:
1036:
1016:
1012:
995:
991:
968:
943:
936:Roberts 1987
921:Roberts 1987
916:
909:Roberts 1987
892:Leković 1985
887:
863:Roberts 1987
858:
836:Roberts 1987
782:
770:
758:
746:
705:Roberts 1987
673:Roberts 1987
668:
654:
650:
646:
642:
638:
630:
628:
623:
619:
615:
608:Generalmajor
606:
602:
594:
592:
571:
555:
530:
519:
514:
509:Soviet Union
501:
495:and eastern
484:
461:
448:
444:
442:
413:Hitler Youth
402:
376:Koča Popović
368:Gornji Vakuf
365:
325:
297:
287:Adolf Hitler
274:
268:
248:
240:
230:
223:Mario Roatta
216:
154:
131:
121:
112:Adolf Hitler
81:World War II
45:
43:
29:
1274:(2): 6–37.
562:Bill Bailey
302:belligerent
1813:Categories
1537:Case Black
1532:Case White
1436:Novi Pazar
957:References
948:Đilas 1980
546:Aleksandar
542:Herta Haas
355:Chetniks.
331:Case White
314:Case White
312:See also:
151:Background
116:Case Black
96:Case White
1756:Podgorica
1740:Belgrade
1686:Macedonia
1201:561733310
1159:561000022
1125:223439211
1057:(1987) .
661:Footnotes
566:Comintern
445:Wehrmacht
434:armistice
392:Politburo
341:, and 15
201:on parole
193:Wehrmacht
85:ceasefire
1783:see also
1761:Sarajevo
1718:Slovenia
1421:Kraljevo
1416:Kruševac
1239:(2001).
1212:(1989).
1180:15718221
1081:(1975).
1035:(2007).
1025:15013409
990:(1964).
967:(1980).
524:—
493:Slavonia
488:Sarajevo
470:—
171:, NDH),
165:Croatian
144:Italians
136:Yugoslav
71:and the
38:Mrežnica
1670:Croatia
1441:Sjenica
1142:1163108
1004:5417800
969:Wartime
639:Wartime
505:British
426:agreed;
394:of the
343:Italian
335:Neretva
104:Chetnik
100:Neretva
75:of the
61:
1771:Zagreb
1702:Serbia
1299:
1251:
1224:
1199:
1178:
1157:
1140:
1123:
1091:
1067:
1043:
1023:
1002:
975:
534:Ustaše
497:Bosnia
197:Zagreb
191:, the
189:Abwehr
65:German
1766:Zadar
1379:Olovo
1291:[
1243:[
1216:[
1191:[
1170:[
1115:[
1015:[
994:[
536:-run
260:Duvno
185:Livno
183:near
1749:1944
1744:1941
1624:1945
1561:1944
1525:1943
1484:1942
1349:1941
1297:ISBN
1249:ISBN
1222:ISBN
1197:OCLC
1176:OCLC
1155:OCLC
1138:OCLC
1121:OCLC
1089:ISBN
1065:ISBN
1041:ISBN
1021:OCLC
1000:OCLC
973:ISBN
328:Axis
289:and
279:Sava
93:Axis
59:lit.
44:The
1276:doi
614:'s
601:'s
175:'s
1815::
1272:10
1270:.
1266:.
928:^
899:^
870:^
843:^
828:^
809:^
794:^
731:^
712:^
695:^
680:^
548:.
386:;
378:,
285:.
227:SA
167::
130:'
56:,
52::
1334:e
1327:t
1320:v
1305:.
1282:.
1278::
1257:.
1230:.
1203:.
1182:.
1161:.
1144:.
1127:.
1097:.
1073:.
1049:.
1027:.
1006:.
981:.
229:-
163:(
48:(
20:)
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