1082:
924:
59:
899:
1563:
911:
3093:
In
Highest median, Ranked Pairs, and Schulze voting, there is always a regret-free, semi-honest ballot for any voter, holding all other ballots constant and assuming they know enough about how others will vote. Under such circumstances, there is always at least one way for a voter to participate
1037:
At the end of this procedure, all cycles will be eliminated, leaving a unique winner who wins all of the remaining one-on-one matchups. The lack of cycles means that candidates can be ranked directly based on the matchups that have been left behind.
3152:
Rather than crossing out near-ties, step 3 is sometimes described as going down the list and confirming ("locking in") the largest victories that do not create a cycle, then ignoring any victories that are not
3115:
A randomly chosen ballot determines winner. This and closely related methods are of mathematical interest and included here to demonstrate that even unreasonable methods can pass voting method criteria.
3079:
Majority
Judgment fails the mutual majority criterion, but satisfies the criterion if the majority ranks the mutually favored set above a given absolute grade and all others below that grade.
1568:
In this example, Nashville is the winner using the ranked-pairs procedure. Nashville is followed by
Chattanooga, Knoxville, and Memphis in second, third, and fourth places respectively.
999:—a rock-paper-scissors-like sequence A > B > C > A—the cycle is broken by dropping the "weakest" elections in the cycle, i.e. the ones that are closest to being tied.
952:
1464:
The votes are then sorted. The largest majority is "Chattanooga over
Knoxville"; 83% of the voters prefer Chattanooga. Thus, the pairs from above would be sorted this way:
3344:
1558:
Every "lock in" would add another arrow to the graph showing the relationship between the candidates. Here is the final graph (where arrows point away from the winner).
3070:
Majority
Judgment may elect a candidate uniquely least-preferred by over half of voters, but it never elects the candidate uniquely bottom-rated by over half of voters.
1587:
and some other systems, Memphis would have won the election by having the most people, even though
Nashville won every simulated pairwise election outright. Using
1070:
3794:
1732:
1664:
1644:
3562:
3061:. For this to hold, in some elections, some voters must use less than their full voting power despite having meaningful preferences among viable candidates.
643:
3964:
3690:
3542:
675:
537:
532:
3789:
3567:
1742:
1738:
1656:
1640:
1636:
945:
638:
3124:
Where a winner is randomly chosen from the candidates, sortition is included to demonstrate that even non-voting methods can pass some criteria.
3552:
3337:
3106:
A variant of
Minimax that counts only pairwise opposition, not opposition minus support, fails the Condorcet criterion and meets later-no-harm.
320:
3057:
Approval voting, score voting, and majority judgment satisfy IIA if it is assumed that voters rate candidates independently using their own
844:
3959:
3916:
1667:(ISDA). It says that if one candidate (X) wins an election, and a new alternative (Y) is added, X will win the election if Y is not in the
95:
3599:
938:
3330:
1063:
839:
3784:
3730:
3261:
1624:
829:
579:
550:
490:
3582:
3911:
561:
86:
3934:
3710:
624:
266:
251:
236:
3753:
3738:
3557:
3222:
1056:
882:
502:
425:
346:
3804:
3527:
3517:
3378:
1604:
314:
296:
137:
867:
1392:
indicates voters who preferred the candidate listed in the row caption to the candidate listed in the column caption
1389:
indicates voters who preferred the candidate listed in the column caption to the candidate listed in the row caption
3954:
3769:
3460:
3040:
2944:
1584:
992:
758:
741:
708:
688:
472:
460:
430:
231:
189:
122:
566:
3819:
3774:
3720:
3632:
1710:
1620:
614:
607:
91:
3809:
3695:
3653:
3572:
3497:
3433:
3391:
1705:
668:
596:
585:
448:
435:
418:
395:
373:
336:
326:
3428:
1591:
in this example would result in
Knoxville winning even though more people preferred Nashville over Knoxville.
3834:
3824:
3799:
3615:
3492:
3036:
3028:
1758:
1632:
1096:
794:
648:
331:
3875:
3814:
3677:
3620:
1753:
1748:
1608:
1115:
988:
823:
703:
633:
440:
3779:
3700:
3465:
3024:
2313:
1788:
1628:
1588:
1033:
the election; this will be the election(s) in the cycle with the smallest margin of victory (near-ties).
731:
571:
455:
261:
240:
172:
150:
923:
789:
3849:
3418:
2153:
1775:
1121:
1109:
862:
849:
817:
81:
1081:
3829:
3423:
3293:
3020:
2365:
2205:
1893:
1616:
1092:
768:
602:
255:
3870:
3480:
3203:
1103:
973:
928:
799:
410:
194:
3438:
2471:
877:
3839:
3748:
3705:
3625:
3547:
3470:
3455:
3413:
3195:
2417:
2101:
1945:
1012:
996:
834:
804:
726:
663:
497:
224:
199:
182:
50:
3880:
3512:
3368:
3353:
3270:
3187:
2681:
2523:
1715:
1577:
981:
915:
872:
763:
751:
465:
341:
167:
161:
143:
132:
127:
115:
76:
38:
17:
1555:
In this case, no cycles are created by any of the pairs, so every single one is locked in.
3928:
3844:
3685:
3663:
3475:
3396:
3386:
3364:
3058:
1840:
1726:
1721:
1612:
1600:
1026:
903:
736:
591:
556:
477:
388:
291:
214:
156:
34:
58:
3743:
3448:
3408:
2733:
2257:
2049:
1019:
773:
713:
698:
509:
378:
353:
204:
898:
3948:
3487:
3299:
3207:
3032:
2575:
1769:
1763:
1679:
The following table compares ranked pairs with other single-winner election methods:
1660:
995:; if such a candidate exists, they are immediately elected. Otherwise, if there is a
977:
782:
482:
270:
108:
71:
46:
3234:
991:, where the one-on-one margins of victory for each candidate are compared to find a
3502:
2786:
522:
286:
279:
1532:
The pairs are then locked in order, skipping any pairs that would create a cycle:
3316:
3885:
3648:
3587:
3507:
3403:
2892:
1997:
400:
358:
301:
246:
3275:
3256:
3658:
3594:
3199:
1576:
In the example election, the winner is
Nashville. This would be true for any
3895:
3890:
2839:
1668:
1562:
1088:
1030:
368:
363:
3311:
3094:
without grading any less-preferred candidate above any more-preferred one.
1663:. However, the method adheres to a less strict property, sometimes called
910:
3715:
1700:
619:
3577:
3191:
405:
3305:
1025:
Going down the list, check whether adding each matchup would create a
3865:
3223:"A New Monotonic and Clone-Independent Single-Winner Election Method"
3175:
3322:
3326:
3016:
3014:
3012:
3010:
3008:
3006:
3004:
1097:
All voters want the capital to be as close to them as possible.
3257:"The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs"
1647:, meaning it is likely to roughly satisfy IIA "in practice."
57:
3312:
A margin-based PHP Implementation of
Tideman's Ranked Pairs
1106:, the largest city, but far from the others (42% of voters)
1095:. The population is concentrated around four major cities.
3176:"Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules"
1011:
Consider each pair of candidates round-robin style, and
3053:
3051:
3049:
1022:) margin of victory, going from largest to smallest.
3904:
3858:
3762:
3729:
3676:
3641:
3608:
3535:
3526:
3377:
1242:
1401:First, list every pair, and determine the winner:
3102:
3100:
1112:, near the center of the state (26% of voters)
1091:is holding an election on the location of its
3338:
1641:local independence of irrelevant alternatives
1128:The preferences of each region's voters are:
1064:
946:
8:
3795:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
3294:Descriptions of ranked-ballot voting methods
1665:independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
1645:independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
1685:Comparison of single-winner voting systems
3532:
3345:
3331:
3323:
1683:
1403:
1071:
1057:
1007:The ranked pairs procedure is as follows:
953:
939:
29:
3274:
3227:Voting matters (www.votingmatters.org.uk)
3089:
3087:
3085:
1671:. ISDA implies the Condorcet criterion.
1466:
1130:
1013:calculate the pairwise margin of victory
3790:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
3568:Sequential proportional approval voting
3166:
3145:
3000:
2994:
1657:independence of irrelevant alternatives
1651:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
45:
1637:independent of irrelevant alternatives
1494:Nashville (68%) vs. Chattanooga (32%)
1478:Chattanooga (83%) vs. Knoxville (17%)
1455:Chattanooga (83%) vs. Knoxville (17%)
1439:Nashville (68%) vs. Chattanooga (32%)
1240:The results are tabulated as follows:
1124:, far to the northeast (17% of voters)
1603:, the ranked pairs method passes the
7:
1510:Memphis (42%) vs. Chattanooga (58%)
1486:Nashville (68%) vs. Knoxville (32%)
1447:Nashville (68%) vs. Knoxville (32%)
1423:Memphis (42%) vs. Chattanooga (58%)
3600:Indirect single transferable voting
3317:Rust implementation of Ranked Pairs
1635:. While ranked pairs is not fully
1518:Memphis (42%) vs. Knoxville (58%)
1502:Memphis (42%) vs. Nashville (58%)
1431:Memphis (42%) vs. Knoxville (58%)
1415:Memphis (42%) vs. Nashville (58%)
25:
3233:. McDougall Trust. Archived from
1015:for each in a one-on-one matchup.
3262:Constitutional Political Economy
3221:Schulze, Markus (October 2003).
1625:independence of clones criterion
1561:
1542:Lock Nashville over Chattanooga.
1536:Lock Chattanooga over Knoxville.
1080:
922:
909:
897:
845:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
491:Semi-proportional representation
123:First preference plurality (FPP)
3965:Single-winner electoral systems
1376:
1370:
1364:
1359:
1351:
1343:
1337:
1332:
1324:
1318:
1310:
1305:
1297:
1291:
1285:
1278:
1271:
1266:
1261:
1256:
1118:, somewhat east (15% of voters)
3711:Mixed ballot transferable vote
1548:Lock Chattanooga over Memphis.
1539:Lock Nashville over Knoxville.
883:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
840:Moulin's impossibility theorem
805:Conflicting majorities paradox
27:Single-winner electoral system
1:
3174:Tideman, T. N. (1987-09-01).
709:Frustrated majorities paradox
3912:Comparison of voting systems
3754:Satisfaction approval voting
3739:Single non-transferable vote
3558:Proportional approval voting
1551:Lock Knoxville over Memphis.
1545:Lock Nashville over Memphis.
993:majority-preferred candidate
878:Condorcet dominance theorems
818:Social and collective choice
18:Maximize Affirmed Majorities
3960:Monotonic Condorcet methods
3518:Graduated majority judgment
3255:Munger, Charles T. (2022).
987:Ranked pairs begins with a
544:By mechanism of combination
315:Proportional representation
3981:
3770:Condorcet winner criterion
3461:First-past-the-post voting
3276:10.1007/s10602-022-09382-w
2998:
1244:Pairwise election results
742:Multiple districts paradox
473:Fractional approval voting
461:Interactive representation
3925:
3917:Voting systems by country
3820:Mutual majority criterion
3775:Condorcet loser criterion
3721:Vote linkage mixed system
3633:Largest remainders method
3360:
3300:Example JS implementation
3180:Social Choice and Welfare
3023:is incompatible with the
1627:. Ranked pairs fails the
1621:Condorcet loser criterion
1154:
1147:
1140:
1133:
689:Paradoxes and pathologies
538:Mixed-member proportional
533:Mixed-member majoritarian
528:By results of combination
419:Approval-based committees
3810:Majority loser criterion
3696:Additional member system
3654:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
3573:Single transferable vote
3498:Positional voting system
3434:Minimax Condorcet method
3392:Combined approval voting
868:Condorcet's jury theorem
669:Double simultaneous vote
644:Rural–urban proportional
639:Dual-member proportional
601:
590:
557:Parallel (superposition)
449:Fractional social choice
436:Expanding approvals rule
265:
250:
235:
166:
155:
131:
3835:Resolvability criterion
3825:Participation criterion
3800:Later-no-harm criterion
3616:Highest averages method
1633:participation criterion
1018:Sort the pairs by the (
795:Tyranny of the majority
572:Fusion (majority bonus)
389:Quota-remainder methods
3876:First-preference votes
3815:Monotonicity criterion
3785:Independence of clones
3488:Simple majoritarianism
1609:monotonicity criterion
989:round-robin tournament
929:Mathematics portal
835:Majority impossibility
824:Impossibility theorems
620:Negative vote transfer
441:Method of equal shares
62:
3780:Consistency criterion
3701:Alternative vote plus
3466:Instant-runoff voting
3306:Pair Ranking Ruby Gem
3021:Condorcet's criterion
1661:ranked voting systems
1639:, it still satisfies
1629:consistency criterion
1589:instant-runoff voting
732:Best-is-worst paradox
721:Pathological response
456:Direct representation
109:Single-winner methods
61:
3850:Seats-to-votes ratio
3621:Webster/Sainte-Laguë
1776:No favorite betrayal
916:Economics portal
863:Median voter theorem
82:Comparative politics
3830:Plurality criterion
3429:Kemeny–Young method
2945:Tideman alternative
1686:
1655:Ranked pairs fails
1617:Condorcet criterion
1615:(which implies the
1585:first-past-the-post
1245:
904:Politics portal
615:Vote linkage system
586:Seat linkage system
173:Ranked-choice (RCV)
3871:Election threshold
3805:Majority criterion
3481:Supplementary vote
3192:10.1007/BF00433944
1684:
1605:majority criterion
1243:
980:first proposed by
800:Discursive dilemma
759:Lesser evil voting
634:Supermixed systems
337:Largest remainders
195:Round-robin voting
63:
3955:Electoral systems
3942:
3941:
3840:Reversal symmetry
3749:Cumulative voting
3731:Semi-proportional
3706:Mixed single vote
3672:
3671:
3548:Mixed single vote
3456:Exhaustive ballot
3419:Copeland's method
3414:Condorcet methods
3354:Electoral systems
3132:
3131:
1659:, like all other
1525:
1524:
1462:
1461:
1458:Chattanooga: 83%
1386:
1385:
1237:
1236:
1159:
1152:
1145:
1138:
1099:The options are:
963:
962:
850:Gibbard's theorem
790:Dominance paradox
727:Perverse response
431:Phragmen's method
297:Majority judgment
225:Positional voting
183:Condorcet methods
51:electoral systems
16:(Redirected from
3972:
3881:Liquid democracy
3533:
3513:Two-round system
3424:Dodgson's method
3347:
3340:
3333:
3324:
3281:
3280:
3278:
3252:
3246:
3245:
3243:
3242:
3218:
3212:
3211:
3171:
3154:
3150:
3125:
3122:
3116:
3113:
3107:
3104:
3095:
3091:
3080:
3077:
3071:
3068:
3062:
3055:
3044:
3041:sincere favorite
3018:
2842:
2813:
2769:
2664:
2578:
2457:
2432:
2296:
2286:
2270:
2266:
1888:Approvals
1867:
1778:
1772:
1766:
1749:Cloneproof
1745:
1735:
1729:
1718:
1716:Condorcet winner
1687:
1675:Comparison table
1578:Condorcet method
1565:
1513:Chattanooga 58%
1481:Chattanooga 83%
1467:
1426:Chattanooga 58%
1404:
1246:
1157:
1150:
1143:
1136:
1131:
1084:
1073:
1066:
1059:
982:Nicolaus Tideman
974:tournament-style
955:
948:
941:
927:
926:
914:
913:
902:
901:
857:Positive results
752:Strategic voting
649:Majority jackpot
606:
595:
466:Liquid democracy
342:National remnant
332:Highest averages
269:
254:
239:
171:
162:Alternative vote
160:
144:Partisan primary
136:
77:Mechanism design
30:
21:
3980:
3979:
3975:
3974:
3973:
3971:
3970:
3969:
3945:
3944:
3943:
3938:
3921:
3900:
3854:
3845:Smith criterion
3758:
3725:
3686:Parallel voting
3668:
3664:Imperiali quota
3637:
3604:
3522:
3476:Contingent vote
3439:Nanson's method
3397:Unified primary
3387:Approval voting
3373:
3356:
3351:
3319:by Cory Dickson
3290:
3285:
3284:
3254:
3253:
3249:
3240:
3238:
3220:
3219:
3215:
3173:
3172:
3168:
3163:
3158:
3157:
3151:
3147:
3142:
3136:
3134:
3133:
3128:
3123:
3119:
3114:
3110:
3105:
3098:
3092:
3083:
3078:
3074:
3069:
3065:
3056:
3047:
3019:
3002:
1782:
1722:Condorcet loser
1711:Mutual majority
1697:
1695:
1694:
1692:
1677:
1653:
1613:Smith criterion
1601:voting criteria
1597:
1574:
1530:
1399:
1254:
1251:
1239:
1156:
1149:
1142:
1135:
1078:
1077:
1049:
1044:
1029:. If it would,
1005:
997:Condorcet cycle
959:
921:
920:
908:
896:
888:
887:
854:
830:Arrow's theorem
820:
810:
809:
778:
748:
737:No-show paradox
718:
704:Cloning paradox
694:Spoiler effects
691:
681:
680:
655:
542:
525:
515:
514:
487:
478:Maximal lottery
445:
426:Thiele's method
415:
385:
317:
307:
306:
292:Approval voting
280:Cardinal voting
276:
221:
215:Maximal lottery
179:
111:
101:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
3978:
3976:
3968:
3967:
3962:
3957:
3947:
3946:
3940:
3939:
3926:
3923:
3922:
3920:
3919:
3914:
3908:
3906:
3902:
3901:
3899:
3898:
3893:
3888:
3883:
3878:
3873:
3868:
3862:
3860:
3856:
3855:
3853:
3852:
3847:
3842:
3837:
3832:
3827:
3822:
3817:
3812:
3807:
3802:
3797:
3792:
3787:
3782:
3777:
3772:
3766:
3764:
3760:
3759:
3757:
3756:
3751:
3746:
3744:Limited voting
3741:
3735:
3733:
3727:
3726:
3724:
3723:
3718:
3713:
3708:
3703:
3698:
3693:
3688:
3682:
3680:
3674:
3673:
3670:
3669:
3667:
3666:
3661:
3656:
3651:
3645:
3643:
3639:
3638:
3636:
3635:
3630:
3629:
3628:
3623:
3612:
3610:
3606:
3605:
3603:
3602:
3597:
3592:
3591:
3590:
3585:
3580:
3570:
3565:
3560:
3555:
3550:
3545:
3539:
3537:
3530:
3524:
3523:
3521:
3520:
3515:
3510:
3505:
3500:
3495:
3490:
3485:
3484:
3483:
3478:
3473:
3471:Coombs' method
3463:
3458:
3453:
3452:
3451:
3449:Schulze method
3446:
3441:
3436:
3431:
3426:
3421:
3411:
3409:Bucklin voting
3406:
3401:
3400:
3399:
3394:
3383:
3381:
3375:
3374:
3361:
3358:
3357:
3352:
3350:
3349:
3342:
3335:
3327:
3321:
3320:
3314:
3309:
3308:by Bala Paranj
3303:
3302:by Asaf Haddad
3297:
3296:by Rob LeGrand
3289:
3288:External links
3286:
3283:
3282:
3269:(3): 434–444.
3247:
3213:
3186:(3): 185–206.
3165:
3164:
3162:
3159:
3156:
3155:
3144:
3143:
3141:
3138:
3130:
3129:
3127:
3126:
3117:
3108:
3096:
3081:
3072:
3063:
3059:absolute scale
3045:
2999:
2997:
2993:
2992:
2991:Ranking
2989:
2986:
2983:
2980:
2977:
2974:
2971:
2968:
2965:
2962:
2959:
2956:
2953:
2950:
2947:
2941:
2940:
2937:
2934:
2931:
2928:
2925:
2922:
2919:
2916:
2913:
2910:
2907:
2904:
2901:
2898:
2895:
2889:
2888:
2885:
2882:
2879:
2876:
2873:
2870:
2867:
2864:
2861:
2858:
2855:
2852:
2849:
2846:
2843:
2836:
2835:
2832:
2829:
2826:
2823:
2820:
2817:
2814:
2810:
2807:
2804:
2801:
2798:
2795:
2792:
2789:
2783:
2782:
2781:Ranking
2779:
2776:
2773:
2770:
2766:
2763:
2760:
2757:
2754:
2751:
2748:
2745:
2742:
2739:
2736:
2730:
2729:
2726:
2723:
2720:
2717:
2714:
2711:
2708:
2705:
2702:
2699:
2696:
2693:
2690:
2687:
2684:
2678:
2677:
2676:Ranking
2674:
2671:
2668:
2665:
2661:
2658:
2655:
2652:
2649:
2646:
2643:
2640:
2637:
2634:
2631:
2625:
2624:
2621:
2618:
2615:
2612:
2609:
2606:
2603:
2600:
2597:
2594:
2591:
2588:
2585:
2582:
2579:
2572:
2571:
2568:
2565:
2562:
2559:
2556:
2553:
2550:
2547:
2544:
2541:
2538:
2535:
2532:
2529:
2526:
2520:
2519:
2518:Ranking
2516:
2513:
2510:
2507:
2504:
2501:
2498:
2495:
2492:
2489:
2486:
2483:
2480:
2477:
2474:
2468:
2467:
2466:Ranking
2464:
2461:
2458:
2454:
2451:
2448:
2445:
2442:
2439:
2436:
2433:
2429:
2426:
2423:
2420:
2414:
2413:
2412:Ranking
2410:
2407:
2404:
2401:
2398:
2395:
2392:
2389:
2386:
2383:
2380:
2377:
2374:
2371:
2368:
2362:
2361:
2360:Ranking
2358:
2355:
2352:
2349:
2346:
2343:
2340:
2337:
2334:
2331:
2328:
2325:
2322:
2319:
2316:
2314:Instant-runoff
2310:
2309:
2306:
2303:
2300:
2297:
2293:
2290:
2287:
2283:
2280:
2277:
2274:
2271:
2267:
2263:
2260:
2258:Highest median
2254:
2253:
2252:Ranking
2250:
2247:
2244:
2241:
2238:
2235:
2232:
2229:
2226:
2223:
2220:
2217:
2214:
2211:
2208:
2202:
2201:
2200:Ranking
2198:
2195:
2192:
2189:
2186:
2183:
2180:
2177:
2174:
2171:
2168:
2165:
2162:
2159:
2156:
2150:
2149:
2148:Ranking
2146:
2143:
2140:
2137:
2134:
2131:
2128:
2125:
2122:
2119:
2116:
2113:
2110:
2107:
2104:
2098:
2097:
2096:Ranking
2094:
2091:
2088:
2085:
2082:
2079:
2076:
2073:
2070:
2067:
2064:
2061:
2058:
2055:
2052:
2046:
2045:
2044:Ranking
2042:
2039:
2036:
2033:
2030:
2027:
2024:
2021:
2018:
2015:
2012:
2009:
2006:
2003:
2000:
1994:
1993:
1992:Ranking
1990:
1987:
1984:
1981:
1978:
1975:
1972:
1969:
1966:
1963:
1960:
1957:
1954:
1951:
1948:
1942:
1941:
1940:Ranking
1938:
1935:
1932:
1929:
1926:
1923:
1920:
1917:
1914:
1911:
1908:
1905:
1902:
1899:
1896:
1890:
1889:
1886:
1883:
1880:
1877:
1874:
1871:
1868:
1864:
1861:
1858:
1855:
1852:
1849:
1846:
1843:
1837:
1836:
1833:
1830:
1827:
1824:
1821:
1818:
1815:
1812:
1809:
1806:
1803:
1800:
1797:
1794:
1791:
1789:Anti-plurality
1785:
1784:
1779:
1773:
1767:
1761:
1756:
1754:Monotone
1751:
1746:
1736:
1730:
1724:
1719:
1713:
1708:
1706:Majority loser
1703:
1698:
1693:
1690:
1682:
1681:
1676:
1673:
1652:
1649:
1599:Of the formal
1596:
1593:
1573:
1570:
1553:
1552:
1549:
1546:
1543:
1540:
1537:
1529:
1526:
1523:
1522:
1521:Knoxville 58%
1519:
1515:
1514:
1511:
1507:
1506:
1505:Nashville 58%
1503:
1499:
1498:
1497:Nashville 68%
1495:
1491:
1490:
1489:Nashville 68%
1487:
1483:
1482:
1479:
1475:
1474:
1471:
1460:
1459:
1456:
1452:
1451:
1450:Nashville 68%
1448:
1444:
1443:
1442:Nashville 68%
1440:
1436:
1435:
1434:Knoxville 58%
1432:
1428:
1427:
1424:
1420:
1419:
1418:Nashville 58%
1416:
1412:
1411:
1408:
1398:
1395:
1394:
1393:
1390:
1384:
1383:
1381:
1375:
1369:
1363:
1357:
1356:
1350:
1348:
1342:
1336:
1330:
1329:
1323:
1317:
1315:
1309:
1303:
1302:
1296:
1290:
1284:
1282:
1276:
1275:
1270:
1265:
1260:
1255:
1252:
1249:
1235:
1234:
1233:
1232:
1229:
1226:
1223:
1216:
1215:
1214:
1211:
1208:
1205:
1198:
1197:
1196:
1193:
1190:
1187:
1180:
1179:
1178:
1175:
1172:
1169:
1161:
1160:
1153:
1146:
1139:
1126:
1125:
1119:
1113:
1107:
1076:
1075:
1068:
1061:
1053:
1052:
1048:
1045:
1043:
1040:
1035:
1034:
1023:
1016:
1004:
1001:
961:
960:
958:
957:
950:
943:
935:
932:
931:
919:
918:
906:
893:
890:
889:
886:
885:
880:
875:
870:
865:
853:
852:
847:
842:
837:
832:
821:
816:
815:
812:
811:
808:
807:
802:
797:
792:
777:
776:
774:Turkey-raising
771:
766:
761:
747:
746:
745:
744:
734:
729:
717:
716:
714:Center squeeze
711:
706:
701:
699:Spoiler effect
692:
687:
686:
683:
682:
679:
678:
673:
672:
671:
658:By ballot type
654:
653:
652:
651:
646:
641:
631:
630:
629:
628:
627:
622:
612:
611:
610:
599:
576:
575:
574:
569:
564:
559:
541:
540:
535:
526:
521:
520:
517:
516:
513:
512:
510:Limited voting
507:
506:
505:
486:
485:
480:
475:
470:
469:
468:
463:
444:
443:
438:
433:
428:
414:
413:
408:
403:
398:
384:
383:
382:
381:
379:Localized list
376:
371:
366:
361:
351:
350:
349:
347:Biproportional
344:
339:
334:
318:
313:
312:
309:
308:
305:
304:
299:
294:
289:
275:
274:
259:
244:
220:
219:
218:
217:
212:
207:
202:
192:
178:
177:
176:
175:
164:
151:Instant-runoff
148:
147:
146:
138:Jungle primary
125:
114:Single vote -
112:
107:
106:
103:
102:
100:
99:
89:
84:
79:
74:
68:
65:
64:
54:
53:
43:
42:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3977:
3966:
3963:
3961:
3958:
3956:
3953:
3952:
3950:
3937:
3936:
3931:
3930:
3924:
3918:
3915:
3913:
3910:
3909:
3907:
3903:
3897:
3894:
3892:
3889:
3887:
3884:
3882:
3879:
3877:
3874:
3872:
3869:
3867:
3864:
3863:
3861:
3857:
3851:
3848:
3846:
3843:
3841:
3838:
3836:
3833:
3831:
3828:
3826:
3823:
3821:
3818:
3816:
3813:
3811:
3808:
3806:
3803:
3801:
3798:
3796:
3793:
3791:
3788:
3786:
3783:
3781:
3778:
3776:
3773:
3771:
3768:
3767:
3765:
3761:
3755:
3752:
3750:
3747:
3745:
3742:
3740:
3737:
3736:
3734:
3732:
3728:
3722:
3719:
3717:
3714:
3712:
3709:
3707:
3704:
3702:
3699:
3697:
3694:
3692:
3689:
3687:
3684:
3683:
3681:
3679:
3675:
3665:
3662:
3660:
3657:
3655:
3652:
3650:
3647:
3646:
3644:
3640:
3634:
3631:
3627:
3624:
3622:
3619:
3618:
3617:
3614:
3613:
3611:
3607:
3601:
3598:
3596:
3593:
3589:
3586:
3584:
3581:
3579:
3576:
3575:
3574:
3571:
3569:
3566:
3564:
3561:
3559:
3556:
3554:
3551:
3549:
3546:
3544:
3541:
3540:
3538:
3534:
3531:
3529:
3525:
3519:
3516:
3514:
3511:
3509:
3506:
3504:
3501:
3499:
3496:
3494:
3491:
3489:
3486:
3482:
3479:
3477:
3474:
3472:
3469:
3468:
3467:
3464:
3462:
3459:
3457:
3454:
3450:
3447:
3445:
3442:
3440:
3437:
3435:
3432:
3430:
3427:
3425:
3422:
3420:
3417:
3416:
3415:
3412:
3410:
3407:
3405:
3402:
3398:
3395:
3393:
3390:
3389:
3388:
3385:
3384:
3382:
3380:
3379:Single-winner
3376:
3372:
3370:
3366:
3359:
3355:
3348:
3343:
3341:
3336:
3334:
3329:
3328:
3325:
3318:
3315:
3313:
3310:
3307:
3304:
3301:
3298:
3295:
3292:
3291:
3287:
3277:
3272:
3268:
3264:
3263:
3258:
3251:
3248:
3237:on 2020-07-11
3236:
3232:
3228:
3224:
3217:
3214:
3209:
3205:
3201:
3197:
3193:
3189:
3185:
3181:
3177:
3170:
3167:
3160:
3149:
3146:
3139:
3137:
3121:
3118:
3112:
3109:
3103:
3101:
3097:
3090:
3088:
3086:
3082:
3076:
3073:
3067:
3064:
3060:
3054:
3052:
3050:
3046:
3042:
3038:
3037:later-no-help
3034:
3033:later-no-harm
3030:
3029:participation
3026:
3022:
3017:
3015:
3013:
3011:
3009:
3007:
3005:
3001:
2995:
2990:
2987:
2984:
2981:
2978:
2975:
2972:
2969:
2966:
2963:
2960:
2957:
2954:
2951:
2948:
2946:
2943:
2942:
2938:
2935:
2932:
2929:
2926:
2923:
2920:
2917:
2914:
2911:
2908:
2905:
2902:
2899:
2896:
2894:
2891:
2890:
2886:
2883:
2880:
2877:
2874:
2871:
2868:
2865:
2862:
2859:
2856:
2853:
2850:
2847:
2844:
2841:
2838:
2837:
2833:
2830:
2827:
2824:
2821:
2818:
2815:
2811:
2808:
2805:
2802:
2799:
2796:
2793:
2790:
2788:
2785:
2784:
2780:
2777:
2774:
2771:
2767:
2764:
2761:
2758:
2755:
2752:
2749:
2746:
2743:
2740:
2737:
2735:
2732:
2731:
2727:
2724:
2721:
2718:
2715:
2712:
2709:
2706:
2703:
2700:
2697:
2694:
2691:
2688:
2685:
2683:
2680:
2679:
2675:
2672:
2669:
2666:
2662:
2659:
2656:
2653:
2650:
2647:
2644:
2641:
2638:
2635:
2632:
2630:
2627:
2626:
2622:
2619:
2616:
2613:
2610:
2607:
2604:
2601:
2598:
2595:
2592:
2589:
2586:
2583:
2580:
2577:
2576:Random ballot
2574:
2573:
2569:
2566:
2563:
2560:
2557:
2554:
2551:
2548:
2545:
2542:
2539:
2536:
2533:
2530:
2527:
2525:
2522:
2521:
2517:
2514:
2511:
2508:
2505:
2502:
2499:
2496:
2493:
2490:
2487:
2484:
2481:
2478:
2475:
2473:
2470:
2469:
2465:
2462:
2459:
2455:
2452:
2449:
2446:
2443:
2440:
2437:
2434:
2430:
2427:
2424:
2421:
2419:
2416:
2415:
2411:
2408:
2405:
2402:
2399:
2396:
2393:
2390:
2387:
2384:
2381:
2378:
2375:
2372:
2369:
2367:
2364:
2363:
2359:
2356:
2353:
2350:
2347:
2344:
2341:
2338:
2335:
2332:
2329:
2326:
2323:
2320:
2317:
2315:
2312:
2311:
2307:
2304:
2301:
2298:
2294:
2291:
2288:
2284:
2281:
2278:
2275:
2272:
2268:
2264:
2261:
2259:
2256:
2255:
2251:
2248:
2245:
2242:
2239:
2236:
2233:
2230:
2227:
2224:
2221:
2218:
2215:
2212:
2209:
2207:
2204:
2203:
2199:
2196:
2193:
2190:
2187:
2184:
2181:
2178:
2175:
2172:
2169:
2166:
2163:
2160:
2157:
2155:
2152:
2151:
2147:
2144:
2141:
2138:
2135:
2132:
2129:
2126:
2123:
2120:
2117:
2114:
2111:
2108:
2105:
2103:
2100:
2099:
2095:
2092:
2089:
2086:
2083:
2080:
2077:
2074:
2071:
2068:
2065:
2062:
2059:
2056:
2053:
2051:
2048:
2047:
2043:
2040:
2037:
2034:
2031:
2028:
2025:
2022:
2019:
2016:
2013:
2010:
2007:
2004:
2001:
1999:
1996:
1995:
1991:
1988:
1985:
1982:
1979:
1976:
1973:
1970:
1967:
1964:
1961:
1958:
1955:
1952:
1949:
1947:
1944:
1943:
1939:
1936:
1933:
1930:
1927:
1924:
1921:
1918:
1915:
1912:
1909:
1906:
1903:
1900:
1897:
1895:
1892:
1891:
1887:
1884:
1881:
1878:
1875:
1872:
1869:
1865:
1862:
1859:
1856:
1853:
1850:
1847:
1844:
1842:
1839:
1838:
1834:
1831:
1828:
1825:
1822:
1819:
1816:
1813:
1810:
1807:
1804:
1801:
1798:
1795:
1792:
1790:
1787:
1786:
1780:
1777:
1774:
1771:
1770:Later-no-help
1768:
1765:
1764:Later-no-harm
1762:
1760:
1759:Participation
1757:
1755:
1752:
1750:
1747:
1744:
1740:
1737:
1734:
1731:
1728:
1725:
1723:
1720:
1717:
1714:
1712:
1709:
1707:
1704:
1702:
1699:
1689:
1688:
1680:
1674:
1672:
1670:
1666:
1662:
1658:
1650:
1648:
1646:
1642:
1638:
1634:
1630:
1626:
1622:
1618:
1614:
1610:
1606:
1602:
1594:
1592:
1590:
1586:
1581:
1579:
1571:
1569:
1566:
1564:
1559:
1556:
1550:
1547:
1544:
1541:
1538:
1535:
1534:
1533:
1527:
1520:
1517:
1516:
1512:
1509:
1508:
1504:
1501:
1500:
1496:
1493:
1492:
1488:
1485:
1484:
1480:
1477:
1476:
1472:
1469:
1468:
1465:
1457:
1454:
1453:
1449:
1446:
1445:
1441:
1438:
1437:
1433:
1430:
1429:
1425:
1422:
1421:
1417:
1414:
1413:
1409:
1406:
1405:
1402:
1396:
1391:
1388:
1387:
1382:
1380:
1374:
1368:
1362:
1358:
1355:
1349:
1347:
1341:
1335:
1331:
1328:
1322:
1316:
1314:
1308:
1304:
1301:
1295:
1289:
1283:
1281:
1277:
1274:
1269:
1264:
1259:
1248:
1247:
1241:
1230:
1227:
1224:
1222:
1219:
1218:
1217:
1212:
1209:
1206:
1204:
1201:
1200:
1199:
1194:
1191:
1188:
1186:
1183:
1182:
1181:
1176:
1173:
1170:
1168:
1165:
1164:
1163:
1162:
1155:17% of voters
1148:15% of voters
1141:26% of voters
1134:42% of voters
1132:
1129:
1123:
1120:
1117:
1114:
1111:
1108:
1105:
1102:
1101:
1100:
1098:
1094:
1090:
1087:Suppose that
1085:
1083:
1074:
1069:
1067:
1062:
1060:
1055:
1054:
1051:
1047:The situation
1046:
1041:
1039:
1032:
1028:
1024:
1021:
1017:
1014:
1010:
1009:
1008:
1002:
1000:
998:
994:
990:
985:
983:
979:
978:ranked voting
975:
971:
967:
956:
951:
949:
944:
942:
937:
936:
934:
933:
930:
925:
917:
912:
907:
905:
900:
895:
894:
892:
891:
884:
881:
879:
876:
874:
873:May's theorem
871:
869:
866:
864:
861:
860:
859:
858:
851:
848:
846:
843:
841:
838:
836:
833:
831:
828:
827:
826:
825:
819:
814:
813:
806:
803:
801:
798:
796:
793:
791:
788:
787:
786:
785:
784:
783:majority rule
781:Paradoxes of
775:
772:
770:
767:
765:
762:
760:
757:
756:
755:
754:
753:
743:
740:
739:
738:
735:
733:
730:
728:
725:
724:
723:
722:
715:
712:
710:
707:
705:
702:
700:
697:
696:
695:
690:
685:
684:
677:
674:
670:
667:
666:
665:
662:
661:
660:
659:
650:
647:
645:
642:
640:
637:
636:
635:
632:
626:
623:
621:
618:
617:
616:
613:
609:
604:
600:
598:
593:
589:
588:
587:
584:
583:
582:
581:
577:
573:
570:
568:
565:
563:
560:
558:
555:
554:
553:
552:
547:
546:
545:
539:
536:
534:
531:
530:
529:
524:
523:Mixed systems
519:
518:
511:
508:
504:
501:
500:
499:
496:
495:
494:
493:
492:
484:
483:Random ballot
481:
479:
476:
474:
471:
467:
464:
462:
459:
458:
457:
454:
453:
452:
451:
450:
442:
439:
437:
434:
432:
429:
427:
424:
423:
422:
421:
420:
412:
409:
407:
404:
402:
399:
397:
394:
393:
392:
391:
390:
380:
377:
375:
372:
370:
367:
365:
362:
360:
357:
356:
355:
352:
348:
345:
343:
340:
338:
335:
333:
330:
329:
328:
327:Apportionment
325:
324:
323:
322:
316:
311:
310:
303:
300:
298:
295:
293:
290:
288:
285:
284:
283:
282:
281:
272:
268:
263:
262:Antiplurality
260:
257:
253:
248:
245:
242:
238:
233:
230:
229:
228:
227:
226:
216:
213:
211:
208:
206:
203:
201:
198:
197:
196:
193:
191:
190:Condorcet-IRV
188:
187:
186:
185:
184:
174:
169:
165:
163:
158:
154:
153:
152:
149:
145:
142:
141:
139:
134:
129:
126:
124:
121:
120:
119:
117:
110:
105:
104:
97:
93:
90:
88:
85:
83:
80:
78:
75:
73:
72:Social choice
70:
69:
67:
66:
60:
56:
55:
52:
48:
47:Social choice
44:
40:
36:
32:
31:
19:
3933:
3927:
3543:Mixed-member
3528:Proportional
3503:Score voting
3444:Ranked pairs
3443:
3363:Part of the
3362:
3266:
3260:
3250:
3239:. Retrieved
3235:the original
3230:
3226:
3216:
3183:
3179:
3169:
3148:
3135:
3120:
3111:
3075:
3066:
2996:Table Notes
2728:Single mark
2629:Ranked pairs
2628:
2623:Single mark
2570:Single mark
2366:Kemeny–Young
1835:Single mark
1678:
1654:
1598:
1582:
1575:
1567:
1560:
1557:
1554:
1531:
1463:
1400:
1378:
1372:
1366:
1360:
1353:
1345:
1339:
1333:
1326:
1320:
1312:
1306:
1299:
1293:
1287:
1279:
1272:
1267:
1262:
1257:
1238:
1225:Chattanooga
1220:
1202:
1189:Chattanooga
1184:
1174:Chattanooga
1166:
1127:
1086:
1079:
1050:
1036:
1006:
986:
969:
966:Ranked Pairs
965:
964:
856:
855:
822:
780:
779:
764:Exaggeration
750:
749:
720:
719:
693:
657:
656:
625:Mixed ballot
580:Compensatory
578:
551:compensatory
548:
543:
527:
489:
488:
447:
446:
417:
416:
387:
386:
374:List-free PR
319:
287:Score voting
278:
277:
223:
222:
210:Ranked pairs
209:
181:
180:
113:
3886:Spoilt vote
3649:Droop quota
3588:Schulze STV
3563:Rural–urban
3508:STAR voting
3404:Borda count
3025:consistency
1334:Chattanooga
1268:Chattanooga
1203:Chattanooga
1151:Center-East
1116:Chattanooga
664:Single vote
567:Conditional
562:Coexistence
411:Quota Borda
401:Schulze STV
359:Closed list
302:STAR voting
247:Borda count
3949:Categories
3905:Comparison
3659:Hare quota
3609:Allocation
3595:Spare vote
3583:Hare-Clark
3553:Party-list
3241:2021-02-02
3161:References
3153:locked-in.
2654:LIIA Only
2391:LIIA Only
1623:, and the
1228:Nashville
1210:Nashville
1207:Knoxville
1192:Knoxville
1177:Knoxville
1171:Nashville
976:system of
769:Truncation
498:Cumulative
321:Party-list
96:By country
87:Comparison
3896:Unseating
3891:Sortition
3493:Plurality
3369:Economics
3208:122758840
3200:1432-217X
3043:criteria.
2840:Sortition
2524:Plurality
1733:Smith-IIA
1691:Criterion
1669:Smith set
1361:Knoxville
1307:Nashville
1273:Knoxville
1263:Nashville
1221:Knoxville
1185:Nashville
1122:Knoxville
1110:Nashville
1089:Tennessee
1031:cross out
1003:Procedure
984:in 1987.
676:Dual-vote
369:Panachage
364:Open list
354:List type
232:Plurality
128:Two-round
116:plurality
39:Economics
3763:Criteria
3716:Scorporo
3365:politics
2154:Copeland
1841:Approval
1701:Majority
1631:and the
1595:Criteria
1231:Memphis
1213:Memphis
1195:Memphis
1158:Far-East
1137:Far-West
1020:absolute
396:Hare STV
35:Politics
33:A joint
3935:Project
3626:D'Hondt
3578:CPO-STV
3536:Systems
2939:Scores
2834:Scores
2734:Schulze
2418:Minimax
2308:Scores
2206:Dodgson
2050:Bucklin
1894:Baldwin
1781:Ballot
1619:), the
1572:Summary
1473:Winner
1410:Winner
1280:Memphis
1258:Memphis
1167:Memphis
1104:Memphis
1093:capital
1042:Example
972:) is a
406:CPO-STV
256:Baldwin
205:Schulze
200:Minimax
118:methods
3929:Portal
3866:Ballot
3642:Quotas
3371:series
3206:
3198:
3039:, and
2682:Runoff
2472:Nanson
2102:Coombs
1696:Method
1611:, the
1607:, the
1583:Under
1144:Center
271:Coombs
41:series
3859:Other
3678:Mixed
3204:S2CID
3140:Notes
2887:None
2787:Score
1998:Borda
1946:Black
1783:type
1727:Smith
1470:Pair
1407:Pair
1397:Tally
1027:cycle
608:'MMP'
597:'AMS'
3367:and
3196:ISSN
2973:Yes
2967:Yes
2964:Yes
2961:Yes
2958:Yes
2955:Yes
2952:Yes
2949:Yes
2924:Yes
2909:Yes
2900:Yes
2893:STAR
2884:Yes
2881:Yes
2878:Yes
2875:Yes
2872:Yes
2866:Yes
2831:Yes
2828:Yes
2822:Yes
2819:Yes
2816:Yes
2765:Yes
2762:Yes
2756:Yes
2753:Yes
2750:Yes
2747:Yes
2744:Yes
2741:Yes
2738:Yes
2722:Yes
2719:Yes
2698:Yes
2689:Yes
2686:Yes
2660:Yes
2657:Yes
2651:Yes
2648:Yes
2645:Yes
2642:Yes
2639:Yes
2636:Yes
2633:Yes
2620:Yes
2617:Yes
2614:Yes
2611:Yes
2608:Yes
2605:Yes
2602:Yes
2564:Yes
2561:Yes
2558:Yes
2555:Yes
2528:Yes
2491:Yes
2488:Yes
2485:Yes
2482:Yes
2479:Yes
2476:Yes
2450:Yes
2422:Yes
2397:Yes
2388:Yes
2385:Yes
2382:Yes
2379:Yes
2376:Yes
2373:Yes
2370:Yes
2354:Yes
2351:Yes
2342:Yes
2330:Yes
2324:Yes
2321:Yes
2318:Yes
2305:Yes
2302:Yes
2292:Yes
2289:Yes
2262:Yes
2219:Yes
2210:Yes
2185:Yes
2176:Yes
2173:Yes
2170:Yes
2167:Yes
2164:Yes
2161:Yes
2158:Yes
2145:Yes
2118:Yes
2112:Yes
2109:Yes
2106:Yes
2090:Yes
2081:Yes
2060:Yes
2057:Yes
2054:Yes
2038:Yes
2032:Yes
2029:Yes
2014:Yes
2005:Yes
1977:Yes
1962:Yes
1959:Yes
1953:Yes
1950:Yes
1913:Yes
1910:Yes
1907:Yes
1904:Yes
1901:Yes
1898:Yes
1885:Yes
1882:Yes
1876:Yes
1873:Yes
1870:Yes
1845:Yes
1832:Yes
1823:Yes
1820:Yes
1796:Yes
1743:LIIA
1643:and
1528:Lock
1379:17%
1377:83%
1373:32%
1371:68%
1367:58%
1365:42%
1354:83%
1352:17%
1346:32%
1344:68%
1340:58%
1338:42%
1327:68%
1325:32%
1321:68%
1319:32%
1313:58%
1311:42%
1300:42%
1298:58%
1294:42%
1292:58%
1288:42%
1286:58%
549:Non-
503:SNTV
92:List
49:and
37:and
3691:MMP
3271:doi
3188:doi
2988:No
2985:No
2982:No
2979:No
2976:No
2970:No
2936:No
2933:No
2930:No
2927:No
2921:No
2918:No
2915:No
2912:No
2906:No
2903:No
2897:No
2869:No
2863:No
2860:No
2857:No
2854:No
2851:No
2848:No
2845:No
2825:No
2812:Yes
2809:No
2806:No
2803:No
2800:No
2797:No
2794:No
2791:No
2778:No
2775:No
2772:No
2759:No
2725:No
2716:No
2713:No
2710:No
2707:No
2704:No
2701:No
2695:No
2692:No
2673:No
2670:No
2667:No
2599:No
2596:No
2593:No
2590:No
2587:No
2584:No
2581:No
2567:No
2552:No
2549:No
2546:No
2543:No
2540:No
2537:No
2534:No
2531:No
2515:No
2512:No
2509:No
2506:No
2503:No
2500:No
2497:No
2494:No
2463:No
2460:No
2453:No
2447:No
2444:No
2441:No
2438:No
2435:No
2431:Yes
2428:No
2425:No
2409:No
2406:No
2403:No
2400:No
2394:No
2357:No
2348:No
2345:No
2339:No
2336:No
2333:No
2327:No
2299:No
2285:Yes
2282:No
2279:No
2276:No
2273:No
2265:Yes
2249:No
2246:No
2243:No
2240:No
2237:No
2234:No
2231:No
2228:No
2225:No
2222:No
2216:No
2213:No
2197:No
2194:No
2191:No
2188:No
2182:No
2179:No
2142:No
2139:No
2136:No
2133:No
2130:No
2127:No
2124:No
2121:No
2115:No
2093:No
2087:No
2084:No
2078:No
2075:No
2072:No
2069:No
2066:No
2063:No
2041:No
2035:No
2026:No
2023:No
2020:No
2017:No
2011:No
2008:No
2002:No
1989:No
1986:No
1983:No
1980:No
1974:No
1971:No
1968:No
1965:No
1956:No
1937:No
1934:No
1931:No
1928:No
1925:No
1922:No
1919:No
1916:No
1879:No
1866:Yes
1863:No
1860:No
1857:No
1854:No
1851:No
1848:No
1829:No
1826:No
1817:No
1814:No
1811:No
1808:No
1805:No
1802:No
1799:No
1793:No
1739:IIA
267:el.
252:el.
241:IRV
237:el.
3951::
3932:—
3267:34
3265:.
3259:.
3231:17
3229:.
3225:.
3202:.
3194:.
3182:.
3178:.
3099:^
3084:^
3048:^
3035:,
3031:,
3027:,
3003:^
2768:No
2663:No
2456:No
2295:No
2269:No
1580:.
970:RP
603:NZ
592:UK
168:US
157:UK
140:)
133:US
3346:e
3339:t
3332:v
3279:.
3273::
3244:.
3210:.
3190::
3184:4
1741:/
1253:B
1250:A
1072:e
1065:t
1058:v
968:(
954:e
947:t
940:v
605::
594::
273:)
264:(
258:)
249:(
243:)
234:(
170::
159::
135::
130:(
98:)
94:(
20:)
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
