361:(Rotterdam Device, named for where it was captured). Coastal Command's first ASV.III-equipped patrol took place over the Bay of Biscay 1 March. ASV.III made its first U-boat contact on the night of 17 March, but the carrier Wellington suffered a malfunction of its Leigh Light and was unable to press home the attack. The first attack using the system occurred the next night. When ASV.III did enter service, German submariners, right up to Dönitz, began to mistakenly believe British aircraft were homing on emissions from the Metox receiver, which no longer gave warning. Meantime, German scientists were perfecting the
22:
242:
offensive in the Bay of Biscay or to abandon the bombing of German bases by the RAF." "The number of VLR aircraft operating in the North
Atlantic in February was only 18, and no substantial increase was made until after the crisis of March." Nor were night air patrols, recognized as necessary, initiated until the autumn of 1943.
432:, the number of VLRs in Newfoundland finally increased. "Canadians had been pressing hard for Liberators since autumn 1942, against British doubts that the RCAF could employ them effectively, while RCAF, for its part, opposed RAF taking over a job RCAF saw as its own. The commanding officer of 120 Squadron,
336:, head of Coastal Command, countered Bomber Command also risked having it fall in enemy hands, and having the Germans produce a countermeasure against it, before Coastal Command ever got to use it. In the event, this was exactly what happened. The first ASV.III was fitted to a Coastal Command Wellington at
264:. They limited the places U-boats could attack in safety, and (by reducing the ability of shadowing U-boats to find and track convoys) made shipping harder to find, thereby reducing losses. This also helped the convoy escorts, by enabling them to deal with one U-boat at a time. Despite a willingness of
304:
was developed. Though it had to overcome Air
Ministry indifference, and only entered service in June 1941, it proved very successful. This, however, required a large aircraft, such as the Wellington or Liberator, to carry the generator needed to power the light, and most of Coastal Command's aircraft
241:
section, made several proposals, including diverting VLRs from Bomber
Command to Coastal Command. "Despite the strength of Blackett's case, the Admiralty (not to mention the Air Ministry, Bomber Command, and the Americans) believed for some time yet that it could not afford to reduce the heavy air
456:
reduced the hazard of the Gap. After a crisis in March which nearly had
Churchill and the Admiralty abandon convoys altogether, the Mid-Atlantic Gap was finally closed in May 1943, when RCAF VLRs became operational in Newfoundland, by which time the Battle of the Atlantic was largely won.
320:-frequency (10 cm) radar changed that, and the combination of H2S (as ASV.III) and Leigh light proved lethal to U-boats. Harris, however, denied Coastal Command any allocation of H2S systems, claiming Bomber Command needed it to find targets, in preference to
130:, commonly called the VLR Liberator or just VLR. The Liberator B.I proved too vulnerable for bombing missions over Europe, but had excellent range and payload, ideal for A/S patrol. Top priority for these was the U.S. Navy for reconnaissance operations in the
283:
A means of detecting surfaced submarines at night, when they were at their most vulnerable, recharging batteries, and felt most safe, was a top priority for
Coastal Command. ASV gave it to them. The previous AI.II (Mark 2 Airborne Interception) radar became
257:, at a cost of 266 aircraft and crews. They accomplished no damage to the pens nor the submarines within them. Coastal Command strength never reached 266 VLRs. Missions flown against German U-boat building yards had similarly disappointing results.
300:(actually 1.7 m, 176 MHz), mid-VHF band emissions meant however, that a submarine was usually lost in sea return before it came in visual range, at around one mile (1.6 km), by which time it was already diving. In response, the
201:. "...he apparent inadequacy Newfoundland-based air support was highlighted by the early interception of SC 107 and the resultant bitter and costly battle." This led RAF to belatedly move a number of Coastal Command squadrons.
280:, the almost "perpetual fog of the Grand Banks also allowed pack operations to penetrate within a couple of hundred miles of Newfoundland, while aircraft patrolled harmlessly above", and made visual detection impossible.
80:(RAF)'s Coastal Command, when it was created in 1936, was given responsibility for antisubmarine warfare (A/S or ASW) patrol. It was equipped only with small numbers of short-ranged aircraft, the most common being the
448:
meant "a dramatic increase of USAAF Fortresses and medium-range
Liberators" could be based in Newfoundland. 25h Wing flew over the Bay of Biscay, where they sank one U-boat before being redeployed to Morocco.
344:
by
February 1943, while a copy of H2S was lost 2/3 February when a Stirling Pathfinder was shot down over the Netherlands, on only H2S's second operational use. Harris made similar objections to supplying the
356:
As
Coastal Command predicted, the Germans captured the damaged H2S, which would have been next to impossible from a Coastal Command aircraft downed at sea, rather than over land, and Telefunken produced the
214:. As a measure of how valuable they were, after patrols off Canada were added in 1942, only one ship was lost in convoy. Even in mid-1942, Coastal Command only had two squadrons of Liberators and
25:
The Mid-Atlantic gap was an area outside the cover by land-based aircraft; those limits are shown with black arcs (map shows the gap in 1941). Blue dots show destroyed ships of the Allies
96:
routinely got higher priority for the best, longest-ranged aircraft. Only as Bomber
Command transitioned to four-engined aircraft did Coastal Command receive the castoffs, such as
245:
Bomber
Command did not refuse entirely to offer assistance against U-boats. From 14 January 1943 through May, they flew seven thousand sorties against the U-boat pens in
444:, USAAF, with its medium-range B-24s (equipped with H2S, probably built by Canadians), made it possible to free up Coastal Command VLRs without it. The growth in numbers of
353:
units to Coastal Command (which knew it as ASV.IV), again got higher priority, and again saw it fall into German hands, almost exactly a year later, in February 1944.
1249:"Bomber" Harris: The Story of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Arthur Harris, Bt, GCG, OBE, AFC, LLD, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, 1942–1945
440:, RCAF, before 10 May), while 120 Squadron's strength doubled. This still only put all of thirty-eight VLRs over the Mid-Atlantic Gap. The arrival of
428:(USAAF), arranging a trade of B-24s for comparable types. This enabled Slessor to make a deal with him to "borrow" one squadron. After attacks on convoy
436:
Bulloch, confirmed RCAF's ability, and in early March 1943, the number in Newfoundland belatedly increased (though it was not enough to constitute
1266:
1074:
134:, where their long range were equally valuable, but where they generally carried out missions of lower priority than Coastal Command's.
204:
The nine Liberator GR.Is operating over the Atlantic, members of 120 Squadron based in Iceland, were nevertheless a worry to Admiral
1200:
193:, VLRs guided by HF/DF drove off three shadowing U-boats in one day, 16 October. They bettered the performance on 29 October, for
230:
186:
900:
1294:
1289:
219:
911:
382:
designation. While fragile, Naxos worked. However, it entered service the same day as the 10 GHz-emissions H2X (which
288:(Air to Surface Vessel Mark 2) fitted in Coastal Command aircraft. Coastal Command priority for it, however, ranked behind
425:
414:
1157:
341:
277:
101:
305:
were incapable of it, nor were Bomber Command inclined to turn over anything better. Moreover, the Germans developed
904:
486:
272:
Coastal Command would never have attempted, U-boats could trail convoys beginning very soon after departure from
403:
346:
265:
210:
127:
471:
441:
309:, which picked up ASV's radar pulses before it was able to detect a submarine at all, rendering it useless.
261:
100:, which finally had adequate range for A/S patrol. Moreover, Coastal Command's motley assortment of Ansons,
89:
466:
180:
162:
45:
34:
1181:
124:
21:
437:
373:
366:
273:
215:
168:
151:
105:
1116:
1018:
297:
289:
238:
176:
172:
42:
88:(which was obsolete); for a time, shortages of aircraft were so severe, "scarecrow patrols" using
1216:
97:
93:
85:
527:(London: BBC, 1978), p. 204. The United States would use a similar expedient in early 1942.
1262:
1196:
1130:
1070:
329:
325:
234:
491:
321:
285:
113:
1122:. Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Publishers, 1998. (Reprints A. Hilger 1987 edition).
915:
433:
185:
on 12 October 1942. Even then, VLRs proved invaluable in co-operation with shipborne
77:
1169:
The Challenge of War: Britain's scientific and engineering contributions to World War Two
60:
Gap, or just "the Gap". The gap was eventually closed in May 1943, as growing numbers of
453:
445:
421:
205:
147:
138:
117:
65:
61:
33:
is a geographical term applied to an undefended area of the Atlantic Ocean during the
1283:
1254:
1242:
Aircraft versus submarine: the evolution of the anti-submarine aircraft, 1912 to 1972
768:
752:
429:
293:
254:
250:
226:
198:
194:
190:
155:
1140:
333:
143:
109:
38:
260:
Aircraft also had an important indirect role, by preventing even the formation of
908:
1206:
337:
301:
269:
131:
1022:
81:
365:
to create a submersible version for U-boat defense, of the aviation-utilized
350:
317:
313:
57:
175:, only to meet aircraft, and Coastal Command sank two, while in protecting
1228:
North Atlantic run: the Royal Canadian Navy and the battle for the convoys
1134:
606:
North Atlantic Run: the Royal Canadian Navy and the battle for the convoys
481:
476:
1067:
Freedom's Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II,
559:(Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 2003), p. 70.
897:
372:
radar detector for night fighters, the submersible version getting the
246:
1188:. London: Coronet Books, 1979 (reprints 1978 Hamish Hamilton edition).
1152:
Electronic warfare: Element of Strategy and Multiplier of Combat Power
950:
Electronic Warfare: Element of Strategy and Multiplier of Combat Power
218:, and at the first sign of Coastal Command's success against U-boats,
159:
49:
608:(Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 158.
48:(A/S) aircraft. This resulted in heavy merchant shipping losses to
306:
167:
on 11 September 1942, there was exactly one VLR of the RAF's
20:
1274:
The Atlantic Campaign : World War II's great struggle at sea
1017:, p. 143. The same sort of condescension was applied to the
268:(RCAF) aircraft to fly in (perennially bad) conditions off the
222:
sought to have their aircraft used in attacking German cities.
328:, while arguing Coastal Command might lose it to the Germans.
84:(which was obsolete by the start of the Second World War) and
1230:. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1985.
1178:. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 2003.
514:(Shepperton, Surrey, UK: Ian Allan Ltd., 1979), p. 157.
1164:. Toronto: Stoddart, 1990 (reprints 1947 Collins edition).
577:(St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing, 2003), p. 99.
1186:
Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945
108:
were unable to carry the standard 450-pound (200 kg)
386:
could not detect) became operational in Coastal Command.
68:
became available, and as basing problems were addressed.
1193:
The Bombers: The RAF offensive against Germany 1939–1945
197:, driving off five, and seven on 6 November around
1211:
The War in the Air: The Royal Air Force in World War II
116:. (The other aircraft capable of carrying it, the
880:
878:
775:(London: Wordsworth, 1997 ed.), pp. 454–455.
137:VLRs were of particular importance in times when
1035:
1033:
1031:
824:
822:
820:
41:. The region was beyond the reach of land-based
1237:. St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell Publishing, 2003.
1069:pp. 243–244, Random House, New York, NY, 2012.
569:
567:
565:
1056:(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
969:
967:
935:
933:
898:RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary
855:
853:
851:
849:
847:
8:
1251:. Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday, 1985.
1223:. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1976.
1171:. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1970.
551:
549:
547:
545:
543:
541:
539:
537:
535:
533:
16:Area outside airplane range in World War II
56:, as well as the Atlantic Gap, Air Gap,
503:
340:in December 1942, with twelve based at
171:overhead. Fifteen U-boats converged on
424:got control of A/S aircraft from the
398:in May 1944, and was supplemented by
120:, was Bomber Command's crown jewel.)
7:
1276:. New York: Harper & Row, 1988.
1160:., Marshal of the Royal Air Force.
1125:Costello, John, and Hughes, Terry.
952:. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981)
14:
1154:. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981.
278:air-to-surface-vessel (ASV) radar
123:Coastal Command's prize was the
759:(London: Wordsworth, 1997 ed.).
349:-created 3 cm-wavelength
1:
909:Campaign Diary: February 1943
426:United States Army Air Forces
402:, what today would be called
112:; that needed Wellingtons or
64:(Very Long Range models) and
1261:. London: Wordsworth, 1997.
1195:. London: Hutchinson, 1983.
1054:Great Naval Battle of Ottawa
452:Increasing availability of
179:, 120 Squadron's VLRs sank
52:.It is frequently known as
1311:
1213:. New York: Morrow, 1968.
1176:The Battle of the Atlantic
1127:The Battle of the Atlantic
557:The Battle of the Atlantic
1147:. St Albans: Triad, 1978.
1129:. London: Collins, 1977.
905:UK Government Web Archive
1269:(reprints 1985 edition).
1244:. London, Kimber, 1973.
914:21 February 2006 at the
404:radar absorbent material
266:Royal Canadian Air Force
211:Befehlshaber der U-Boote
1182:Jones, R. V., Professor
918:. Accessed 18 July 2008
472:Mid-Ocean Meeting Point
442:25th Antisubmarine Wing
332:backed him up. Marshal
1295:Battle of the Atlantic
1290:Anti-submarine warfare
1235:Battle of the Atlantic
1041:Battle of the Atlantic
1015:Battle of the Atlantic
1002:Battle of the Atlantic
886:Battle of the Atlantic
870:Battle of the Atlantic
830:Battle of the Atlantic
786:Battle of the Atlantic
575:Battle of the Atlantic
512:Coastal Command at War
467:Mid-Ocean Escort Force
231:Patrick M. S. Blackett
35:Battle of the Atlantic
26:
1259:The Right of the Line
991:Ireland, p. 141.
982:Ireland, p. 140.
973:Johnson, p. 231.
961:Johnson, p. 229.
939:Ireland, p. 188.
927:Johnson, p. 230.
859:Johnson, p. 227.
841:Johnson, p. 207.
773:The Right of the Line
757:The Right of the Line
743:Johnson, p. 234.
595:Ireland, p. 124.
406:, under the codename
125:Consolidated Aircraft
24:
708:Milner, p. 224.
586:Ireland, p. 71.
158:was attacked by the
92:were even employed.
1240:Price, Alfred, Dr.
1217:Middlebrook, Martin
1019:Royal Canadian Navy
903:6 July 2007 at the
801:, pp. 140–141.
721:, pp. 224–225.
298:1½-metre wavelength
290:RAF Fighter Command
239:Operations Research
141:was unable to read
98:Vickers Wellingtons
43:RAF Coastal Command
1272:Van der Vat, Dan.
1191:Longmate, Norman.
1174:Ireland, Bernard.
1101:North Atlantic Run
1088:North Atlantic Run
1052:Zimmerman, David.
812:North Atlantic Run
799:North Atlantic Run
732:North Atlantic Run
719:North Atlantic Run
697:North Atlantic Run
684:North Atlantic Run
671:North Atlantic Run
658:North Atlantic Run
645:North Atlantic Run
632:North Atlantic Run
619:North Atlantic Run
555:Ireland, Bernard.
410:("Chimneysweep").
312:The appearance of
233:, Director of the
94:RAF Bomber Command
86:Vickers Vildebeest
27:
1267:978-1-85326-683-6
1075:978-1-4000-6964-4
788:, pp. 98–99.
417:
330:Winston Churchill
1302:
1247:Saward, Dudley.
1162:Bomber Offensive
1158:Harris, Arthur T
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523:Johnson, Brian.
521:
515:
508:
492:Project Habakkuk
415:
413:Just before the
408:Schornsteinfeger
390:was replaced by
296:units. ASV.II's
39:Second World War
31:Mid-Atlantic gap
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916:Wayback Machine
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454:escort carriers
446:escort carriers
434:Squadron Leader
363:Rotterdam Gerät
359:Rotterdam Gerät
78:Royal Air Force
74:
66:escort carriers
17:
12:
11:
5:
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1233:Milner, Marc.
1231:
1226:Milner, Marc.
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1167:Hartcup, Guy.
1165:
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1109:
1106:
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1103:, p. 239.
1092:
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1004:, p. 143.
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888:, p. 144.
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816:
814:, p. 140.
803:
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777:
769:Terraine, John
761:
753:Terraine, John
745:
736:
734:, p. 225.
723:
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701:
699:, p. 158.
688:
686:, p. 188.
675:
673:, p. 180.
662:
660:, p. 176.
649:
647:, p. 173.
636:
634:, p. 171.
623:
621:, p. 161.
610:
604:Milner, Marc.
597:
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579:
573:Milner, Marc.
561:
529:
525:The Secret War
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510:Bowyer, Chaz.
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422:Ernest J. King
139:Bletchley Park
128:Liberator GR.I
118:Avro Lancaster
73:
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62:VLR Liberators
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54:The Black Pit
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334:John Slessor
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229:, Professor
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189:. Defending
181:
169:120 Squadron
163:
144:Kriegsmarine
142:
136:
122:
110:depth charge
75:
53:
30:
28:
18:
438:10 Squadron
302:Leigh light
270:Grand Banks
255:St. Nazaire
206:Karl Dönitz
187:"Huff Duff"
114:Sunderlands
90:Tiger Moths
1284:Categories
1120:Radar Days
1111:References
1023:Royal Navy
420:, Admiral
418:Conference
276:. Without
262:wolf packs
216:Fortresses
208:, who was
82:Avro Anson
1135:464381083
351:H2X radar
318:gigahertz
235:Admiralty
58:Greenland
1099:Milner,
1086:Milner,
1039:Milner,
1013:Milner,
1000:Milner,
912:Archived
901:Archived
884:Milner,
868:Milner,
828:Milner,
810:Milner,
797:Milner,
784:Milner,
730:Milner,
717:Milner,
695:Milner,
682:Milner,
669:Milner,
656:Milner,
643:Milner,
630:Milner,
617:Milner,
487:MAC ship
482:CAM ship
477:GIUK gap
461:See also
367:FuG 350
347:American
342:Chivenor
154:). When
106:Hampdens
102:Whitleys
1021:by the
430:ONS 166
416:TRIDENT
379:Naxos U
338:Defford
274:Halifax
247:Lorient
132:Pacific
72:History
50:U-boats
37:in the
1265:
1221:Convoy
1199:
1145:Bomber
1133:
1073:
400:Stumpf
316:three
286:ASV.II
253:, and
225:After
220:Harris
160:U-boat
148:Enigma
104:, and
498:Notes
396:Tunis
388:Naxos
384:Naxos
369:Naxos
307:Metox
251:Brest
182:U-597
164:U-584
152:Ultra
1263:ISBN
1197:ISBN
1131:OCLC
1071:ISBN
392:FuMB
375:FuMB
326:Oboe
324:and
76:The
29:The
907:,
394:36
322:Gee
314:H2S
292:'s
237:'s
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