126:. Museveni and the NRM/A were angry that the revolution for which they had fought for four years had been 'hijacked' by the UNLA, which they viewed as having been discredited by gross human rights violations during the second regime of Milton Obote, commonly referred to as 'Obote II'. The talks occasionally degenerated into slanging matches. Museveni denounced previous Ugandan regimes as "primitives" and "backward", initially refusing to negotiate with the "criminal" Military Council. Museveni and the NRM adopted a mercurial negotiating position, changing their demands and reintroducing supposedly resolved issues, leading Okello's team to accuse the NRM of prolonging the discussions unnecessarily. On one occasion, Museveni disappeared to Europe for three days, tabling new demands on his return. Both groups charged each other with maintaining links with soldiers loyal to the former president
146:, integration of the NRA and government forces, and absorption of the NRA leadership into the Military Council. These conditions were never met, however, and the ceasefire broke down almost immediately. Article 17(c) of the agreement called for the establishment of a commission of inquiry into human rights violations in Uganda since independence. This provided a clear disincentive for the UNLA to implement the peace plan, as it was likely that many of its leaders would be implicated in the abuses that had occurred during Obote II. The UNLA was also dismayed by article 7, which prescribed a national army numbering less than 8,500 troops with consequent unemployment for a large percentage of its 15,000 men.
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Whether
Museveni and the NRM/A were ever interested in a negotiated agreement is open to question. There was certainly no unequivocal commitment to such a settlement. Museveni and his allies refused to share power with generals they did not respect, not least while the NRA had the capacity to achieve
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The prospects of a lasting agreement were damaged further by the immediate context of the negotiations. The Kenyan team lacked an in depth knowledge of the situation in Uganda, the key personalities involved and their views, failing to build a meaningful relationship with the parties to the conflict.
110:, as they were possibly suspicious of Nyerere's friendship with the ousted president, Milton Obote. Alternative arrangements were made for discussions presided over by a mutually acceptable Kenyan delegation headed by President
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Tito Okello immediately and publicly invited all parties to the violence in Uganda to join in national reconciliation and nation building. All the major armed groups accepted this invitation, with the exception of the
90:'s NRA rebels were gaining ground, having taken advantage of the chaotic situation in the country, caused by power struggles within the government and a demoralized and disintegrating UNLA.
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was approached by Tito Okello to facilitate a negotiated agreement between the NRM/A and the
Military Council. Museveni and the NRM failed to turn up to the first round of talks in
162:, had direct interests in the outcome of the talks, supporting one or several factions. The presence of these parties and possibly neutral international partners (such as the
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an outright military victory. It is possible that the NRM/A merely used the four-month negotiations to present a positive image to the world and reorganise their forces.
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The arduous negotiations continued from 26 August to 17 December and have been documented by the then
Permanent Secretary in the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
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Uganda, 1979-85: Leadership in
Transition, Jimmy K. Tindigarukayo, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4. (Dec., 1988), pp. 619.
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The negotiations excluded relevant
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86:as Chairman. Meanwhile,
58:1985 Ugandan coup d'état
30:National Resistance Army
68:Bazilio Olara-Okello
211:Lucima et al., 2002
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294:Treaties of Uganda
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