913:
48:
888:
900:
994:
1030:") and equal rankings ("bracketing"), though he describes two different methods to handle these cases: a theoretically correct method involving fractions of a vote, and a practical method involving whole numbers (which has the side effect of diminishing the voting power of voters who plump or bracket). This then allows the use of
1319:
In each case where on a voting paper no preference is expressed as between two candidates, half a preference is to be credited to each of the two candidates … For each paper where any number, p, of candidates are placed equal with a preference ranking as first, 1/p is to be credited to each of the
1386:
the way Alaska uses ranked-choice voting also caused the defeat of Begich, whom most Alaska voters preferred to
Democrat Mary Peltola … A candidate popular only with the party's base would be eliminated early in a Total Vote Runoff, leaving a more broadly popular Republican to compete against a
1011:
Nanson's method eliminates those choices from a Borda count tally that are at or below the average Borda count score, then the ballots are retallied as if the remaining candidates were exclusively on the ballot. This process is repeated if necessary until a single winner remains.
1056:
Candidates are voted for on ranked ballots as in the Borda count. Then, the points are tallied in a series of rounds. In each round, the candidate with the fewest points is eliminated, and the points are re-tallied as if that candidate were not on the ballot.
1449:
a small but significant adjustment to the "instant runoff" method … equivalent to a candidate's Borda score, and eliminating sequentially the candidate with the lowest total votes
1508:
In this respect, TVR differs from
Baldwin's method, which without checking whether any candidate has more than 50% of first-place votes would immediately recalculate Borda scores
941:
1678:
1037:
The method can be adapted to multi-winner elections by removing the name of a winner from the ballots and re-calculating, though this just elects the highest-ranked
1650:
2128:
1896:
632:
1159:
to decide whether a given candidate is a
Baldwin winner, i.e., whether there exists an elimination sequence that leaves a given candidate uneliminated.
1155:
to obtain a single winner. For the
Baldwin method, however, at each stage, there might be several candidates with lowest Borda score. In fact, it is
2288:
2024:
1876:
664:
526:
521:
2123:
1901:
1109:
934:
627:
1886:
1671:
309:
1105:. Because Borda always gives any existing Condorcet winner more than the average Borda points, the Condorcet winner will never be eliminated.
833:
2250:
84:
1933:
927:
1363:
1664:
1565:
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828:
2118:
2064:
1125:
818:
568:
539:
479:
1916:
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550:
75:
2044:
613:
255:
240:
225:
1544:
Mattei, Nicholas; Narodytska, Nina; Walsh, Toby (2014-01-01). "How Hard is It to
Control an Election by Breaking Ties?".
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2072:
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856:
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111:
555:
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1966:
1137:
1133:
603:
596:
80:
2143:
2029:
1987:
1906:
1831:
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1725:
1075:
and extended it to support incomplete ballots and equal rankings, by counting fractional points in such cases.
657:
585:
574:
437:
424:
407:
384:
362:
325:
315:
1762:
2168:
2158:
2133:
1949:
1826:
1191:
1117:
1034:-style voting for uninformed voters who merely wish to approve of some candidates and disapprove of others.
783:
637:
320:
2209:
2148:
2011:
1954:
1261:
1187:
1113:
812:
692:
622:
429:
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2034:
1799:
1121:
1090:
962:
720:
560:
444:
250:
229:
161:
139:
912:
778:
1334:"Preferential Voting in Single-member Constituencies, with Special Reference to the Counting of Votes"
2183:
1752:
851:
838:
806:
70:
1266:
2163:
1757:
1333:
1175:
1102:
982:
757:
591:
244:
1081:
This system has been proposed for use in the United States under the name "Total Vote Runoff", by
2204:
1814:
1646:
1591:"Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules"
1571:
1287:
917:
788:
399:
183:
1225:
866:
1631:
1306:
2173:
2082:
2039:
1959:
1881:
1804:
1789:
1747:
1612:
1589:
Davies, Jessica; Katsirelos, George; Narodytska, Nina; Walsh, Toby; Xia, Lirong (2014-12-01).
1561:
1412:
1371:
1279:
1145:
1068:
823:
793:
715:
652:
486:
213:
188:
171:
39:
2214:
1846:
1702:
1687:
1602:
1553:
1521:"Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?"
1271:
1072:
1016:
1005:
958:
904:
861:
752:
740:
454:
330:
156:
150:
132:
121:
116:
104:
65:
27:
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2019:
1997:
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1720:
1698:
1461:
1430:
1355:
1156:
1152:
1082:
1044:
Schwartz in 1986 studied a slight variant of Nanson's rule, in which candidates less than
1031:
1020:
892:
725:
580:
545:
466:
377:
280:
203:
145:
23:
47:
2077:
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1742:
762:
702:
687:
498:
367:
342:
193:
887:
2282:
1821:
1480:
Begich and
Peltola each get half a vote by being tied for second place on this ballot
1291:
1171:
1027:
1002:
771:
471:
259:
97:
60:
35:
993:
1836:
1777:
1575:
1557:
1162:
Both methods are computationally more difficult to manipulate than Borda's method.
511:
275:
268:
198:
1607:
1590:
2219:
1982:
1921:
1841:
1737:
1649:(1928) "Certain hyperspatial partitionings connected with preferential voting",
1552:(ECAI 2014). Amsterdam, the Netherlands, The Netherlands: IOS Press: 1067–1068.
1359:
1086:
955:
389:
347:
290:
235:
1400:
1060:
This method actually predates Nanson's, who notes it was already in use by the
1992:
1928:
1546:
Proceedings of the Twenty-First
European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
1616:
1416:
1375:
1283:
2229:
2224:
1183:
1141:
357:
352:
899:
2049:
1179:
608:
1493:
1465:
1434:
1026:
Nanson's method can be adapted to handle incomplete ballots (including "
1911:
1275:
1078:
The two methods have been confused with each other in some literature.
394:
1307:"The technique of the Nanson preferential majority system of election"
997:
A ranked ballot with incomplete preferences, as illustrated by Nanson.
2199:
1401:"Total Vote Runoff: A Majority-Maximizing Form of Rank Choice Voting"
1023:) then the preference with the smallest majority will be eliminated.
1656:
1364:"Alaska's ranked-choice voting is flawed. But there's an easy fix"
992:
1632:"Australian electoral reform and two concepts of representation"
1338:
Transactions and
Proceedings of the Royal Society of New Zealand
1186:
and in the election of members of the
University Council of the
1660:
1041:
candidates and does not result in proportional representation.
1144:. The Nanson method satisfies and the Baldwin method violates
1230:
Transactions and
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria
1048:
the average Borda count score are eliminated in each round.
965:
procedure to create hybrid election methods that are called
46:
1252:
Niou, Emerson M. S. (1987). "A Note on Nanson's Rule".
1001:
The Nanson method is based on the original work of the
985:, and allow for incomplete ballots and equal rankings.
1151:
Both the Nanson and the Baldwin methods can be run in
1101:
The Nanson method and the Baldwin method satisfy the
2238:
2192:
2096:
2063:
2010:
1975:
1942:
1869:
1860:
1711:
1435:""Total Vote Runoff" tweak to Ranked Choice Voting"
1019:exists, they will be elected. If not, (there is a
1170:Nanson's method was used in city elections in the
1466:"An Additional Detail about "Total Vote Runoff""
1651:Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society
1672:
935:
8:
2129:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
1494:""Total Vote Runoff" & Baldwin's method"
1311:Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria
981:). Both methods are designed to satisfy the
1866:
1679:
1665:
1657:
1405:The University of New Hampshire Law Review
1178:in the 1920s. It was formerly used by the
942:
928:
18:
1606:
1265:
2124:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
1902:Sequential proportional approval voting
1203:
1110:independence of irrelevant alternatives
34:
7:
1247:
1245:
1243:
1219:
1217:
1215:
1213:
1211:
1209:
1207:
1089:, as a way to fix problems with the
1934:Indirect single transferable voting
1093:in U.S. jurisdictions that use it.
1073:a more efficient matrix tabulation
14:
1126:independence of clones criterion
911:
898:
886:
834:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
480:Semi-proportional representation
112:First preference plurality (FPP)
2289:Non-monotonic Condorcet methods
2045:Mixed ballot transferable vote
1558:10.3233/978-1-61499-419-0-1067
1399:Edward B. Foley (2023-03-01).
872:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
829:Moulin's impossibility theorem
794:Conflicting majorities paradox
16:Single-winner electoral system
1:
1097:Satisfied and failed criteria
698:Frustrated majorities paradox
2246:Comparison of voting systems
2088:Satisfaction approval voting
2073:Single non-transferable vote
1892:Proportional approval voting
1608:10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.005
1128:, while they do satisfy the
867:Condorcet dominance theorems
807:Social and collective choice
1852:Graduated majority judgment
533:By mechanism of combination
304:Proportional representation
2305:
2104:Condorcet winner criterion
1795:First-past-the-post voting
1071:in 1926, who incorporated
731:Multiple districts paradox
462:Fractional approval voting
450:Interactive representation
2259:
2251:Voting systems by country
2154:Mutual majority criterion
2109:Condorcet loser criterion
2055:Vote linkage mixed system
1967:Largest remainders method
1694:
1166:Use of Nanson and Baldwin
1138:Condorcet loser criterion
1134:mutual majority criterion
678:Paradoxes and pathologies
527:Mixed-member proportional
522:Mixed-member majoritarian
517:By results of combination
408:Approval-based committees
2144:Majority loser criterion
2030:Additional member system
1988:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
1907:Single transferable vote
1832:Positional voting system
1768:Minimax Condorcet method
1726:Combined approval voting
1108:They do not satisfy the
961:can be combined with an
857:Condorcet's jury theorem
658:Double simultaneous vote
633:Rural–urban proportional
628:Dual-member proportional
590:
579:
546:Parallel (superposition)
438:Fractional social choice
425:Expanding approvals rule
254:
239:
224:
155:
144:
120:
2169:Resolvability criterion
2159:Participation criterion
2134:Later-no-harm criterion
1950:Highest averages method
1595:Artificial Intelligence
1305:Baldwin, J. M. (1926).
1192:University of Melbourne
1118:participation criterion
1067:It was systematized by
784:Tyranny of the majority
561:Fusion (majority bonus)
378:Quota-remainder methods
2210:First-preference votes
2149:Monotonicity criterion
2119:Independence of clones
1822:Simple majoritarianism
1224:Nanson, E. J. (1882).
1188:University of Adelaide
1114:monotonicity criterion
998:
918:Mathematics portal
824:Majority impossibility
813:Impossibility theorems
609:Negative vote transfer
430:Method of equal shares
51:
2114:Consistency criterion
2035:Alternative vote plus
1800:Instant-runoff voting
1320:candidates so placed.
1226:"Methods of election"
1190:. It was used by the
1122:consistency criterion
1091:instant-runoff method
996:
721:Best-is-worst paradox
710:Pathological response
445:Direct representation
98:Single-winner methods
50:
2184:Seats-to-votes ratio
1955:Webster/Sainte-Laguë
1525:www.mail-archive.com
1464:(November 8, 2022).
1433:(November 1, 2022).
1362:(November 1, 2022).
905:Economics portal
852:Median voter theorem
71:Comparative politics
2164:Plurality criterion
1763:Kemeny–Young method
1630:McLean, I. (2002).
1332:Hogben, G. (1913).
1176:Marquette, Michigan
1103:Condorcet criterion
1064:Dialectic Society.
983:Condorcet criterion
893:Politics portal
604:Vote linkage system
575:Seat linkage system
162:Ranked-choice (RCV)
2205:Election threshold
2139:Majority criterion
1815:Supplementary vote
1647:Duncan Sommerville
1276:10.1007/BF00123006
1130:majority criterion
999:
789:Discursive dilemma
748:Lesser evil voting
623:Supermixed systems
326:Largest remainders
184:Round-robin voting
52:
2276:
2275:
2174:Reversal symmetry
2083:Cumulative voting
2065:Semi-proportional
2040:Mixed single vote
2006:
2005:
1882:Mixed single vote
1790:Exhaustive ballot
1753:Copeland's method
1748:Condorcet methods
1688:Electoral systems
1498:Election Law Blog
1470:Election Law Blog
1439:Election Law Blog
1146:reversal symmetry
1069:Joseph M. Baldwin
975:Total Vote Runoff
952:
951:
839:Gibbard's theorem
779:Dominance paradox
716:Perverse response
420:Phragmen's method
286:Majority judgment
214:Positional voting
172:Condorcet methods
40:electoral systems
2296:
2215:Liquid democracy
1867:
1847:Two-round system
1758:Dodgson's method
1681:
1674:
1667:
1658:
1639:
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1356:Foley, Edward B.
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1322:
1302:
1296:
1295:
1269:
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1238:
1237:
1221:
1046:but not equal to
1017:Condorcet winner
1006:Edward J. Nanson
959:electoral system
944:
937:
930:
916:
915:
903:
902:
891:
890:
846:Positive results
741:Strategic voting
638:Majority jackpot
595:
584:
455:Liquid democracy
331:National remnant
321:Highest averages
258:
243:
228:
160:
151:Alternative vote
149:
133:Partisan primary
125:
66:Mechanism design
19:
2304:
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2179:Smith criterion
2092:
2059:
2020:Parallel voting
2002:
1998:Imperiali quota
1971:
1938:
1856:
1810:Contingent vote
1773:Nanson's method
1731:Unified primary
1721:Approval voting
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1368:Washington Post
1360:Maskin, Eric S.
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1303:
1299:
1267:10.1.1.460.8191
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1223:
1222:
1205:
1200:
1168:
1153:polynomial time
1142:Smith criterion
1112:criterion, the
1099:
1083:Edward B. Foley
1062:Trinity College
1054:
1021:Condorcet cycle
991:
948:
910:
909:
897:
885:
877:
876:
843:
819:Arrow's theorem
809:
799:
798:
767:
737:
726:No-show paradox
707:
693:Cloning paradox
683:Spoiler effects
680:
670:
669:
644:
531:
514:
504:
503:
476:
467:Maximal lottery
434:
415:Thiele's method
404:
374:
306:
296:
295:
281:Approval voting
269:Cardinal voting
265:
210:
204:Maximal lottery
168:
100:
90:
17:
12:
11:
5:
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2078:Limited voting
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1805:Coombs' method
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1783:Schulze method
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1260:(2): 191–193.
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1052:Baldwin method
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963:instant-runoff
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688:Spoiler effect
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647:By ballot type
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2157:
2155:
2152:
2150:
2147:
2145:
2142:
2140:
2137:
2135:
2132:
2130:
2127:
2125:
2122:
2120:
2117:
2115:
2112:
2110:
2107:
2105:
2102:
2101:
2099:
2095:
2089:
2086:
2084:
2081:
2079:
2076:
2074:
2071:
2070:
2068:
2066:
2062:
2056:
2053:
2051:
2048:
2046:
2043:
2041:
2038:
2036:
2033:
2031:
2028:
2026:
2023:
2021:
2018:
2017:
2015:
2013:
2009:
1999:
1996:
1994:
1991:
1989:
1986:
1984:
1981:
1980:
1978:
1974:
1968:
1965:
1961:
1958:
1956:
1953:
1952:
1951:
1948:
1947:
1945:
1941:
1935:
1932:
1930:
1927:
1923:
1920:
1918:
1915:
1913:
1910:
1909:
1908:
1905:
1903:
1900:
1898:
1895:
1893:
1890:
1888:
1885:
1883:
1880:
1878:
1875:
1874:
1872:
1868:
1865:
1863:
1859:
1853:
1850:
1848:
1845:
1843:
1840:
1838:
1835:
1833:
1830:
1828:
1825:
1823:
1820:
1816:
1813:
1811:
1808:
1806:
1803:
1802:
1801:
1798:
1796:
1793:
1791:
1788:
1784:
1781:
1779:
1776:
1774:
1771:
1769:
1766:
1764:
1761:
1759:
1756:
1754:
1751:
1750:
1749:
1746:
1744:
1741:
1739:
1736:
1732:
1729:
1727:
1724:
1723:
1722:
1719:
1718:
1716:
1714:
1713:Single-winner
1710:
1706:
1704:
1700:
1693:
1689:
1682:
1677:
1675:
1670:
1668:
1663:
1662:
1659:
1653:28(1):368–82.
1652:
1648:
1645:
1644:
1633:
1626:
1623:
1618:
1614:
1609:
1604:
1600:
1596:
1592:
1585:
1582:
1577:
1573:
1569:
1567:9781614994183
1563:
1559:
1555:
1551:
1547:
1540:
1537:
1526:
1522:
1516:
1513:
1509:
1499:
1495:
1488:
1485:
1481:
1471:
1467:
1463:
1457:
1454:
1450:
1440:
1436:
1432:
1426:
1423:
1418:
1414:
1410:
1406:
1402:
1395:
1392:
1388:
1377:
1373:
1369:
1365:
1361:
1357:
1351:
1348:
1343:
1339:
1335:
1328:
1325:
1321:
1316:
1312:
1308:
1301:
1298:
1293:
1289:
1285:
1281:
1277:
1273:
1268:
1263:
1259:
1255:
1254:Public Choice
1248:
1246:
1244:
1240:
1235:
1231:
1227:
1220:
1218:
1216:
1214:
1212:
1210:
1208:
1204:
1197:
1195:
1193:
1189:
1185:
1181:
1177:
1173:
1165:
1163:
1160:
1158:
1154:
1149:
1147:
1143:
1139:
1135:
1131:
1127:
1123:
1119:
1115:
1111:
1106:
1104:
1096:
1094:
1092:
1088:
1084:
1079:
1076:
1074:
1070:
1065:
1063:
1058:
1051:
1049:
1047:
1042:
1040:
1035:
1033:
1029:
1024:
1022:
1018:
1013:
1009:
1007:
1004:
1003:mathematician
995:
989:Nanson method
988:
986:
984:
980:
976:
973:(also called
972:
968:
967:Nanson method
964:
960:
957:
945:
940:
938:
933:
931:
926:
925:
923:
922:
919:
914:
906:
901:
896:
894:
889:
884:
883:
881:
880:
873:
870:
868:
865:
863:
862:May's theorem
860:
858:
855:
853:
850:
849:
848:
847:
840:
837:
835:
832:
830:
827:
825:
822:
820:
817:
816:
815:
814:
808:
803:
802:
795:
792:
790:
787:
785:
782:
780:
777:
776:
775:
774:
773:
772:majority rule
770:Paradoxes of
764:
761:
759:
756:
754:
751:
749:
746:
745:
744:
743:
742:
732:
729:
728:
727:
724:
722:
719:
717:
714:
713:
712:
711:
704:
701:
699:
696:
694:
691:
689:
686:
685:
684:
679:
674:
673:
666:
663:
659:
656:
655:
654:
651:
650:
649:
648:
639:
636:
634:
631:
629:
626:
625:
624:
621:
615:
612:
610:
607:
606:
605:
602:
598:
593:
589:
587:
582:
578:
577:
576:
573:
572:
571:
570:
566:
562:
559:
557:
554:
552:
549:
547:
544:
543:
542:
541:
536:
535:
534:
528:
525:
523:
520:
519:
518:
513:
512:Mixed systems
508:
507:
500:
497:
493:
490:
489:
488:
485:
484:
483:
482:
481:
473:
472:Random ballot
470:
468:
465:
463:
460:
456:
453:
451:
448:
447:
446:
443:
442:
441:
440:
439:
431:
428:
426:
423:
421:
418:
416:
413:
412:
411:
410:
409:
401:
398:
396:
393:
391:
388:
386:
383:
382:
381:
380:
379:
369:
366:
364:
361:
359:
356:
354:
351:
349:
346:
345:
344:
341:
337:
334:
332:
329:
327:
324:
322:
319:
318:
317:
316:Apportionment
314:
313:
312:
311:
305:
300:
299:
292:
289:
287:
284:
282:
279:
277:
274:
273:
272:
271:
270:
261:
257:
252:
251:Antiplurality
249:
246:
242:
237:
234:
231:
227:
222:
219:
218:
217:
216:
215:
205:
202:
200:
197:
195:
192:
190:
187:
186:
185:
182:
180:
179:Condorcet-IRV
177:
176:
175:
174:
173:
163:
158:
154:
152:
147:
143:
142:
141:
138:
134:
131:
130:
128:
123:
118:
115:
113:
110:
109:
108:
106:
99:
94:
93:
86:
82:
79:
77:
74:
72:
69:
67:
64:
62:
61:Social choice
59:
58:
56:
55:
49:
45:
44:
41:
37:
36:Social choice
33:
29:
25:
21:
20:
2267:
2261:
1877:Mixed-member
1862:Proportional
1837:Score voting
1778:Ranked pairs
1772:
1697:Part of the
1696:
1625:
1598:
1594:
1584:
1549:
1545:
1539:
1528:. Retrieved
1524:
1515:
1507:
1501:. Retrieved
1497:
1492:Foley, Ned.
1487:
1479:
1473:. Retrieved
1469:
1456:
1448:
1442:. Retrieved
1438:
1425:
1408:
1404:
1394:
1385:
1379:. Retrieved
1367:
1350:
1341:
1337:
1327:
1318:
1314:
1310:
1300:
1257:
1253:
1233:
1229:
1194:until 1983.
1169:
1161:
1150:
1107:
1100:
1080:
1077:
1066:
1059:
1055:
1045:
1043:
1038:
1036:
1025:
1014:
1010:
1000:
978:
974:
970:
966:
953:
845:
844:
811:
769:
768:
753:Exaggeration
739:
738:
709:
708:
682:
646:
645:
614:Mixed ballot
569:Compensatory
567:
540:compensatory
537:
532:
516:
478:
477:
436:
435:
406:
405:
376:
375:
363:List-free PR
308:
276:Score voting
267:
266:
212:
211:
199:Ranked pairs
170:
169:
102:
2220:Spoilt vote
1983:Droop quota
1922:Schulze STV
1897:Rural–urban
1842:STAR voting
1738:Borda count
1548:. ECAI'14.
1182:Diocese of
1157:NP-complete
1087:Eric Maskin
956:Borda count
653:Single vote
556:Conditional
551:Coexistence
400:Quota Borda
390:Schulze STV
348:Closed list
291:STAR voting
236:Borda count
2239:Comparison
1993:Hare quota
1943:Allocation
1929:Spare vote
1917:Hare-Clark
1887:Party-list
1530:2019-06-19
1503:2022-11-20
1475:2022-11-09
1462:Foley, Ned
1444:2022-11-09
1431:Foley, Ned
1411:(2): 323.
1381:2022-11-09
1344:: 304–308.
1236:: 197–240.
1198:References
758:Truncation
487:Cumulative
310:Party-list
85:By country
76:Comparison
2230:Unseating
2225:Sortition
1827:Plurality
1703:Economics
1617:0004-3702
1601:: 20–42.
1417:2325-7318
1387:Democrat.
1376:0190-8286
1317:: 42–52.
1292:154538772
1284:0048-5829
1262:CiteSeerX
1184:Melbourne
1008:in 1882.
665:Dual-vote
358:Panachage
353:Open list
343:List type
221:Plurality
117:Two-round
105:plurality
28:Economics
2283:Category
2097:Criteria
2050:Scorporo
1699:politics
1180:Anglican
1174:town of
1140:and the
1124:and the
1032:Approval
1028:plumping
385:Hare STV
24:Politics
22:A joint
2269:Project
1960:D'Hondt
1912:CPO-STV
1870:Systems
1576:1399756
395:CPO-STV
245:Baldwin
194:Schulze
189:Minimax
107:methods
2263:Portal
2200:Ballot
1976:Quotas
1705:series
1615:
1574:
1564:
1415:
1374:
1290:
1282:
1264:
1136:, the
1132:, the
1120:, the
1116:, the
260:Coombs
30:series
2193:Other
2012:Mixed
1635:(PDF)
1572:S2CID
1288:S2CID
1015:If a
597:'MMP'
586:'AMS'
1701:and
1613:ISSN
1562:ISBN
1413:ISSN
1372:ISSN
1280:ISSN
1172:U.S.
1085:and
969:and
954:The
538:Non-
492:SNTV
81:List
38:and
26:and
2025:MMP
1603:doi
1599:217
1554:doi
1550:263
1272:doi
979:TVR
977:or
256:el.
241:el.
230:IRV
226:el.
2285::
2266:—
1611:.
1597:.
1593:.
1570:.
1560:.
1523:.
1506:.
1496:.
1478:.
1468:.
1447:.
1437:.
1409:21
1407:.
1403:.
1384:.
1370:.
1366:.
1358:;
1342:46
1340:.
1336:.
1315:39
1313:.
1309:.
1286:.
1278:.
1270:.
1258:54
1256:.
1242:^
1234:19
1232:.
1228:.
1206:^
1148:.
592:NZ
581:UK
157:US
146:UK
129:)
122:US
1680:e
1673:t
1666:v
1637:.
1619:.
1605::
1578:.
1556::
1533:.
1419:.
1294:.
1274::
1039:n
943:e
936:t
929:v
594::
583::
262:)
253:(
247:)
238:(
232:)
223:(
159::
148::
124::
119:(
87:)
83:(
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
