390:, where defendant railroads campaigned for legislation intended to ruin the trucking industry. Even though defendants employed deceptive and unethical means, the Supreme Court held that they were still immune. This is because the Sherman Act is designed to control "business activity" and not "political activity." With this underpinning, the Court stated, " the right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, . . . we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms." The antitrust laws were enacted to regulate private business and do not abrogate the right to petition.
42:
529:
could realistically expect success on the merits." Only if the challenged litigation meets the first prong ("objectively baseless") may a court go on to the next prong, which consists of a determination of whether the litigant's subjective motivation in filing the objectively baseless lawsuit was an attempt to interfere with the business of a competitor.
495:
The
Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test to determine the existence of "sham" litigation. First, such suits must be "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits." If that threshold is met, the court will inquire whether the
426:
Also, parties are immune from liability arising from the antitrust injuries caused by government action which results from the petitioning. Therefore, if its conduct constitutes valid petitioning, the petitioner is immune from antitrust liability whether or not the injuries are caused by the act of
528:
In 1993, the
Supreme Court rejected a purely subjective definition of a "sham" lawsuit, and set out a two-part test. Under the first prong of the test, a lawsuit fits within the "sham" exception to First Amendment immunity only if the lawsuit is objectively baseless in that "no reasonable litigant
354:
Pursuant to this doctrine, immunity extends to attempts to petition all departments of the government. And "if . . . conduct constitutes valid petitioning, the petitioner is immune from antitrust liability whether or not the injuries are caused by the act of petitioning or are caused by government
385:
because "the federal antitrust laws do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government." The antitrust laws are designed for the business world and "are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena." This was evident in
513:
apply where defendants had sought to intervene in licensing proceedings for competitors, because the intervention was not based on a good-faith effort to enforce the law, but was solely for the purpose of harassing those competitors and driving up their costs of doing business. The
520:
of a "sham" proceeding is not the purpose to harm a competitor, but rather the absence of any purpose to actually obtain government action. Thus, initiating an administrative proceeding that one actually hopes to win in order to harm one's competitors is within the ambit of the
306:, private entities are immune from liability under the antitrust laws for attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws, even if the laws they advocate for would have anticompetitive effects. The doctrine is grounded in the
410:
If the restraint directly results from private action there is no immunity. Passive government approval is insufficient. Private parties cannot immunize an anticompetitive agreement merely by subsequently requesting legislative
564:
834:, 365 U.S. at 143 (finding trucking industry plaintiffs' relationships with their customers and the public were hurt by the railroads' petitioning activities, yet the railroads were immune from liability).
310:
protection of political speech, and "upon a recognition that the antitrust laws, 'tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena.'"
371:
doctrine," party who petitions the government for redress generally is immune from antitrust liability." Petitioning is immune from liability even if there is an improper purpose or motive.
104:
855:
gave immunity for any damages stemming from state adoption of requirements for bar admission to petitioners who lobbied for their adoption); 1 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, at P 202c.
969:
941:
822:
See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500 (where the "restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action," there is immunity).
803:
732:
717:
696:
662:
641:
609:
586:
569:
539:
492:
doctrine which holds that using the petitioning process simply as an anticompetitive tool without legitimately seeking a positive outcome to the petitioning destroys immunity.
351:, the Court added that "the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government he right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition."
636:
457:
332:
465:
501:
525:
doctrine, while initiating a similar proceeding that one does not meaningfully intend to win solely to delay one's business competitors is within the sham exception.
343:, the Court held that "no violation of the Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws". Similarly, the Court wrote in
995:
871:, 1995 WL 745832, *6 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that "attempts to protect a valid and incontestable trademark" are privileged under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine);
414:
Private parties may be immunized against liability stemming from antitrust injuries flowing from valid petitioning. This includes two distinct types of actions.
727: (1961) (holding that even if the petitioner's sole purpose was to destroy its competition through passage of legislation, petitioner would be immune);
964:
282:
307:
347:
that "oint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition." Finally, in
1000:
581:
251:
89:
275:
194:
496:
suit demonstrates evidence of a subjective intent to use governmental process to interfere with a competitor's business.
319:
843:
See
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 671 (holding plaintiffs could not recover damages resulting from the state's actions);
123:
58:
268:
892:
848:
918:
896:
688:
668:
887:, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1988) (recognizing applicability of the doctrine to abuse of process and other claims);
884:
168:
973:
945:
807:
736:
721:
700:
645:
613:
590:
573:
449:
256:
406:
immunity, however, depends on the "source, context, and nature of the competitive restraint at issue."
211:
206:
94:
445:
230:
152:
423:
A petitioner may be immune from the antitrust injuries which result from the petitioning itself.
216:
201:
84:
72:
453:
225:
179:
175:
77:
810:
616:
593:
576:
440:
Since its formulation, the doctrine has been extended to confer immunity from a variety of
184:
163:
109:
33:
976:
739:
17:
948:
724:
648:
132:
114:
989:
473:
221:
189:
516:
235:
148:
99:
427:
petitioning or are caused by government action which results from the petitioning.
41:
382:
158:
692:
469:
137:
67:
922:
63:
672:
143:
965:
Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.
729:
Prof'l Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.
565:
Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.
324:
Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.
441:
381:
immunity applies to actions which might otherwise violate the
40:
714:
E.R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.
663:
A.D. Bedell
Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc.
540:
A.D. Bedell
Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc.
845:
Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Assoc.
800:
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.
637:
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited
436:
Expansion of the doctrine beyond the antitrust arena
333:
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited
881:Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells
631:
629:
606:City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
559:
557:
875:, 1999 WL 1074122 (E.D. Va. 1999) (applying the
505:, the United States Supreme Court held that the
502:California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited
873:Virtual Works, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc.
330:. The Court later expanded on the doctrine in
355:action which results from the petitioning."
276:
8:
889:Baltimore Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co.
879:doctrine to tortious interference claims);
283:
269:
29:
244:Enforcement authorities and organizations
959:
957:
903:immunity applies to common law claims).
553:
543:third circuit (2001) (reviews doctrine)
243:
122:
50:
32:
996:United States First Amendment case law
7:
869:Thermos Co. v. Igloo Products Corp.
685:Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp.
484:There is a "sham" exception to the
318:The doctrine was set forth by the
25:
582:United Mine Workers v. Pennington
328:United Mine Workers v. Pennington
252:International Competition Network
851:, 1037 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding
899:(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that
480:Exception for sham proceedings
257:List of competition regulators
1:
27:Principle in US antitrust law
444:claims, including claims of
1001:United States antitrust law
895:, 620 (D.Md. 2000), aff'd,
320:United States Supreme Court
1017:
349:California Motor Transport
124:Anti-competitive practices
90:Herfindahl–Hirschman index
59:History of competition law
18:Noerr-Pennington doctrine
914:Sosa v. DirectTV, Inc.
472:has sent thousands of
464:also protects against
169:Occupational licensing
45:
754:, 499 U.S. at 379-80.
619: (1991), quoting
450:tortious interference
44:
919:437 F.3d 923
669:263 F.3d 239
212:Occupational closure
207:Dividing territories
195:Essential facilities
95:Market concentration
742: (1993) (same).
460:recently held that
893:81 F. Supp. 2d 602
790:, 365 U.S. at 136.
778:, 365 U.S. at 129.
766:, 365 U.S. at 141.
623:, 365 U.S. at 141.
476:threatening suit.
446:unfair competition
231:Regulatory capture
46:
691:, 122 (3d Cir.),
293:
292:
222:Misuse of patents
217:Predatory pricing
202:Exclusive dealing
85:Barriers to entry
73:Coercive monopoly
16:(Redirected from
1008:
980:
961:
952:
932:
926:
916:
910:
904:
901:Noerr–Pennington
877:Noerr–Pennington
862:
856:
841:
835:
829:
823:
820:
814:
797:
791:
785:
779:
773:
767:
761:
755:
749:
743:
710:
704:
682:
676:
666:
658:
652:
633:
624:
603:
597:
561:
523:Noerr–Pennington
507:Noerr–Pennington
499:For example, in
462:Noerr–Pennington
454:abuse of process
285:
278:
271:
176:Product bundling
78:Natural monopoly
30:
21:
1016:
1015:
1011:
1010:
1009:
1007:
1006:
1005:
986:
985:
984:
983:
962:
955:
933:
929:
912:
911:
907:
863:
859:
842:
838:
830:
826:
821:
817:
798:
794:
786:
782:
774:
770:
762:
758:
750:
746:
711:
707:
703:871 (1999).
683:
679:
660:
659:
655:
634:
627:
604:
600:
562:
555:
550:
535:
482:
438:
396:
361:
316:
308:First Amendment
289:
185:Refusal to deal
164:Tacit collusion
110:Relevant market
34:Competition law
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
1014:
1012:
1004:
1003:
998:
988:
987:
982:
981:
953:
927:
905:
857:
836:
824:
815:
792:
780:
768:
756:
744:
705:
677:
653:
625:
598:
552:
551:
549:
546:
545:
544:
534:
531:
481:
478:
474:demand letters
468:claims when a
437:
434:
433:
432:
431:
430:
429:
428:
424:
416:
415:
412:
395:
392:
360:
357:
315:
312:
291:
290:
288:
287:
280:
273:
265:
262:
261:
260:
259:
254:
246:
245:
241:
240:
239:
238:
233:
228:
219:
214:
209:
204:
199:
198:
197:
192:
182:
173:
172:
171:
166:
161:
156:
146:
135:
133:Monopolization
127:
126:
120:
119:
118:
117:
115:Merger control
112:
107:
102:
97:
92:
87:
82:
81:
80:
75:
61:
53:
52:
51:Basic concepts
48:
47:
37:
36:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1013:
1002:
999:
997:
994:
993:
991:
978:
975:
971:
967:
966:
960:
958:
954:
950:
947:
943:
939:
936:
931:
928:
924:
920:
915:
909:
906:
902:
898:
894:
890:
886:
882:
878:
874:
870:
866:
861:
858:
854:
850:
849:107 F.3d 1026
846:
840:
837:
833:
828:
825:
819:
816:
812:
809:
805:
801:
796:
793:
789:
784:
781:
777:
772:
769:
765:
760:
757:
753:
748:
745:
741:
738:
734:
730:
726:
723:
719:
715:
709:
706:
702:
698:
694:
690:
686:
681:
678:
674:
670:
665:
664:
657:
654:
650:
647:
643:
639:
638:
632:
630:
626:
622:
618:
615:
611:
607:
602:
599:
595:
592:
588:
584:
583:
579: (1961);
578:
575:
571:
567:
566:
560:
558:
554:
547:
542:
541:
537:
536:
532:
530:
526:
524:
519:
518:
512:
509:doctrine did
508:
504:
503:
497:
493:
491:
487:
479:
477:
475:
471:
467:
463:
459:
458:Ninth Circuit
455:
451:
447:
443:
435:
425:
422:
421:
420:
419:
418:
417:
413:
409:
408:
407:
405:
401:
398:The scope of
394:Limited scope
393:
391:
389:
384:
380:
376:
372:
370:
366:
358:
356:
352:
350:
346:
342:
337:
335:
334:
329:
325:
321:
313:
311:
309:
305:
303:
299:
286:
281:
279:
274:
272:
267:
266:
264:
263:
258:
255:
253:
250:
249:
248:
247:
242:
237:
234:
232:
229:
227:
223:
220:
218:
215:
213:
210:
208:
205:
203:
200:
196:
193:
191:
190:Group boycott
188:
187:
186:
183:
181:
177:
174:
170:
167:
165:
162:
160:
157:
154:
150:
147:
145:
142:Formation of
141:
140:
139:
136:
134:
131:
130:
129:
128:
125:
121:
116:
113:
111:
108:
106:
103:
101:
98:
96:
93:
91:
88:
86:
83:
79:
76:
74:
71:
70:
69:
65:
62:
60:
57:
56:
55:
54:
49:
43:
39:
38:
35:
31:
19:
979: (1993).
963:
937:
934:
930:
913:
908:
900:
897:237 F.3d 394
888:
885:839 F.2d 155
880:
876:
872:
868:
864:
860:
852:
844:
839:
831:
827:
818:
813: (1988).
799:
795:
787:
783:
775:
771:
763:
759:
751:
747:
728:
713:
708:
689:168 F.3d 119
684:
680:
661:
656:
651: (1972).
635:
620:
605:
601:
596: (1965).
580:
563:
538:
527:
522:
517:sine qua non
515:
510:
506:
500:
498:
494:
489:
485:
483:
461:
439:
403:
399:
397:
387:
378:
374:
373:
368:
364:
362:
353:
348:
344:
340:
338:
331:
327:
323:
317:
301:
297:
296:
294:
236:Rent-seeking
149:Price fixing
100:Market power
925: 2006).
921:, 935 (
675: 2001).
671:, 251 (
383:Sherman Act
159:Bid rigging
990:Categories
968:("PREI"),
695:. denied,
548:References
490:Pennington
404:Pennington
379:Pennington
369:Pennington
363:Under the
345:Pennington
302:Pennington
295:Under the
226:copyrights
105:SSNIP test
865:See, e.g.
832:See Noerr
470:defendant
411:approval.
138:Collusion
68:oligopoly
923:9th Cir.
811:492, 499
617:365, 380
594:657, 670
577:127, 135
533:See also
466:RICO Act
359:Doctrine
304:doctrine
64:Monopoly
673:3d Cir.
314:Origins
144:cartels
977:49, 60
917:,
802:,
740:49, 56
731:,
716:,
667:,
640:,
608:,
456:. The
972:
944:
853:Noerr
806:
788:Noerr
776:Noerr
764:Noerr
735:
720:
699:
644:
621:Noerr
612:
589:
572:
486:Noerr
400:Noerr
388:Noerr
375:Noerr
365:Noerr
341:Noerr
298:Noerr
180:tying
153:cases
974:U.S.
946:U.S.
938:Omni
808:U.S.
752:Omni
737:U.S.
722:U.S.
712:See
701:U.S.
693:cert
646:U.S.
614:U.S.
591:U.S.
574:U.S.
452:and
442:tort
326:and
224:and
178:and
66:and
970:508
949:365
942:499
935:See
804:486
733:508
725:127
718:365
697:528
649:508
642:404
610:499
587:381
570:365
511:not
339:In
322:in
992::
956:^
940:,
891:,
883:,
867:,
847:,
687:,
628:^
585:,
568:,
556:^
448:,
336:.
951:.
488:–
402:–
377:–
367:–
300:–
284:e
277:t
270:v
155:)
151:(
20:)
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