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184:, about 4,700 men. By October 1944 they had raised the capacity to 4,400 tonnes and by January 1946 to 7,300 tonnes a day. This was possible by the increase in staff from two British, or Indian, officers to twenty seven experienced American railroad men on the same length of line and the introduction of more powerful American and Canadian locomotives. Without the trebling of capacity, the supply of Chinese troops in China would not have been possible once the Japanese attacked India and the Fourteenth Army counterattacked.
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over 600 miles (970 km) from
Calcutta. This was the main supply depot for the Fourteenth Army. If the supplies were destined for the Northern Combat Area or trans-shipment on to China, they had to be sent an additional 200 miles (320 km) to Ledo which is over 800 miles (1,300 km) from
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I remember once saying "Well, that railway's been washed away by floods, put out by bombing, swept away by landslides, closed by train wrecks; there's not much more that can happen to it." But there was. We had an earthquake that buckled the rails and shifted bridges over a hundred miles of
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could be used, but from there supplies had to travel over the already congested metre-gauge railway to
Dimapur. The Southern Front could be reached by a combination of broad-gauge railway, river-steamers and then a metre-gauge railway which ended at
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a day. By the time the
Fourteenth Army was formed in late 1943 this had risen to 2,800 tonnes. Up to Dimapur there were two other options, roads and river which could be used to supplement the rail tonnage. But there was no road to Ledo.
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was not a major concern for the
British Empire forces stationed in Burma as they could be supplied by sea through port in Rangoon (as could Chinese forces in south western China thought supplies passing up the
47:). However, when the Japanese attacked and forced the British back to the Indian Burmese border, the supply of material over the extended lines of communication from Calcutta to the front lines and over
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and perhaps few other) built close to the north east end of the railway, towards the end of the war this was supplemented by the use of the newly built
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forces to retreat into the mountains on the Indian Burma frontier. In doing so, not only did the
Japanese threaten India, but they denied use of the
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To move supplies from the railheads to the Army fronts three all weather roads were constructed in record time during the autumn (fall) of 1943:
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Much of the labour for the two
British roads and for constructing the many airfields was done by the 40,000 labourers contributed by the
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59:. War time expediency, investment and ingenuity increased rail tonnage from around 600 tonnes a day to over 7,300 by January 1946.
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to a ferry at Pandu which is 450 miles (720 km) from
Calcutta. Once ferried across the river the train continued to
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Allied forces in China consisted of Chiang Kai-shek's NRA, and
American units based in China such as those involved in
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Behind this frontier, there was a series of railways in India which were essential to supply the Allied armies with
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The line had been built to serve the tea plantations of Assam and had a peacetime capacity of 600
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a distance of 1,136 miles (1,828 km). For the
Central (Assam) Front the river port at
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The Ledo road in the north which went on to connect to the Burma road and supply China.
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It was possible to reach the
Northern Front by river from Calcutta through the
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From port of Calcutta a broad gauge railway ran for 235 miles (378 km) to
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into China, became a critical issue for the Western Allies and the Chinese
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In early 1944, the American Army provided six battalions of dedicated
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In the initial phase of the war the Japanese advanced north from
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At the start of the War the railways and water communications of
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became critical to the success of the Allied war effort in the
129:. Allied forces in China were supplied by an airlift, over
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Allied lines of communication in South East Asia (1942–43).
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The campaign winning Central Front road from Dimapur to
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to the Western Allies, who had been sending supplies to
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Slim, William (1956), "Chapter IX: The Foundations",
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train. This wandered 215 miles (346 km) up the
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110:. These logistics were not only needed by the
420:, Pan military classics series, London: Pan,
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156:. Here goods had to be tran-shipped on to a
398:Latimer, Jon (2004), "Chapters 8 and 13",
225:The southern road from Dohazari south of
55:(NRA) under the command of Generalissimo
445:South-East Asian theatre of World War II
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191:and then up the main stream of the
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455:History of rail transport in India
386:, London: Cassel, pp. 168–195
26:North-east Indian railways during
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241:who organised and managed them.
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24:The efficient running of the
120:Northern Combat Area Command
98:. They ran from the port of
145:which started close to the
89:National Revolutionary Army
53:National Revolutionary Army
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40:north-east Indian Railways
400:Burma: The Forgotten War'
276:The Stilwell Road (film)
33:South-East Asian Theatre
402:, London: John Murray,
278:featuring Ronald Reagan
271:South East Asia Command
252:Field Marshal Bill Slim
112:British Fourteenth Army
102:to the hill station of
416:Slim, William (2009),
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239:Indian Tea Association
137:, from the airfields (
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450:India in World War II
91:(NRA) by that route.
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310:, pp. 170, 248.
127:Operation Matterhorn
418:Defeat into Victory
384:Defeat into Victory
298:, pp. 169–170.
229:for the advance to
431:(in print edition)
162:Brahmaputra Valley
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85:Chiang Kai-shek
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28:World War II
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193:Brahmaputra
158:metre-gauge
439:Categories
376:References
227:Chittagong
208:railhead.
189:Sunderbans
169:Calcutta.
154:Parbatipur
81:Burma Road
45:Burma Road
366:Slim 1956
354:Slim 1956
342:Slim 1956
327:Slim 1956
308:Slim 1956
296:Slim 1956
197:Dibrugarh
149:in Ledo.
143:Ledo Road
135:Himalayas
96:logistics
260:See also
249:—
206:Dohazari
147:railhead
131:the Hump
100:Calcutta
75:forcing
71:through
49:the Hump
201:Gauhati
166:Dimapur
133:of the
69:Rangoon
63:History
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231:Arakan
220:Imphal
174:tonnes
77:Allied
283:Notes
108:Assam
73:Burma
422:ISBN
404:ISBN
104:Ledo
246:it.
195:to
118:'s
106:in
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334:^
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