316:(Montenegro) on 25 Dec 1942. One of his tasks was to improve the relations with MihailoviÄ by informing him of events outside the country (esp. in North Africa) and how these had largely been responsible for the meagre flow of aid so far. He was also to convince MihailoviÄ to fit into the overall Allied strategy of being regional communications centre should the Allies be forced to evacuate the Middle East. In his earliest communications, Bailey concurred with Hudson's opinion on the impossibility of reconciling MihailoviÄ and the partisans or his collaboration with anti-Axis groups in Croatia, who were not under his command. He also reported that about 4,000 professed communists led by Tito had proclaimed an
320:, supported by another 10,000 fighters who could potentially switch their support to MihailoviÄ later. Given the irreconcilability of the two groups, Bailey proposed partisans move to Croatia, leaving all Serbian-majority areas to MihailoviÄ's command. That way the two armies should have little to fight over and would focus on fighting the Axis instead. He warned that MihailoviÄ would accept the loss of British support in pursuit of the liquidation of partisans in Serbian territory. The Foreign Office realised that the plan could lead to the breakup of Yugoslavia after the war, and it was never put in action.
186:
submit to his command. He also believed in biding his time until his movement was strong enough to destroy the communists, resist the
Germans without the fear of reprisals or the Anglo-American allies had invaded the region. Tito, on the other hand, demanded an immediate fight against the occupiers, no subordination but common operational activities with chetniks or at the worst - their promise that they would leave partisans alone in their war against the Germans. The talks failed.
336:, Muslims and Croats - in that order" - and only when he had dealt with them, he would turn his attention to the Germans and the Italians. Bailey reacted on the spot and later reported the content of the speech to London which caused a major furore between the British Government, YGE and MihailoviÄ whose list of priorities was in reverse order of what was expected. This led to a near-complete breakdown of the relationship between the British mission and MihailoviÄ.
145:"Colonel MihailoviÄ is receiving orders to refrain from sabotage except against railway tracks, locomotives, etc., where explosives are not needed, so that the population will not be too exposed to reprisals. The group has been ordered to confine itself for the time being to preparations and collecting material with the aim of coordinated and well-organized action at a moment which will be ordered later."
256:"In general, the partisan organization is miles ahead of MihailoviÄ's, and, after chasing each other round Yugoslavia, the final scene will probably take place in Belgrade. MihailoviÄ intends to set up a military dictatorship after the war, and this had been accepted by the Montenegrin leaders since the communist withdrawal from this region (in the spring of 1942)."
201:, reporting that "partisans are stronger" and have "no confidence in Yugoslav officers who were responsible for the collapse". He also stated that MihailoviÄ would "first liquidate partisans with British arms, before turning seriously to the Germans". Shortly afterwards, he left MihailoviÄ's HQ to visit Tito at Užice, just as the Germans had attacked the city in
439:
valleys. MihailoviÄ had agreed, but the request was withdrawn at the last moment. At the same time
Churchill had access to intercepted highly secretive German messages and thus knew that the partisans continually resisted and fought. On 10 Dec 1943, he declared that he wanted MihailoviÄ removed by
327:
in
Eastern Serbia, and pass agents onto other countries. It turned out that Hudson's standing with MihailoviÄ was much better than he had anticipated. Unfortunately, Bailey's inability to pause BBC broadcasts praising the partisan resistance, or to increase the supply drops (affected by the lack of
189:
On 29 Oct 1941 MihailoviÄ sent a telegram asking for help "while the weather is good" so he could form an army corps "in a short time" and gave the impression that an offensive against the
Germans was imminent. At the same time, spurred by his advisers, especially the two new arrivals, he instigated
418:
this was the first significant and overt anti-German action by
MihailoviÄ's troops since the beginning of the war, although in Bosnia rather than Serbia as originally planned. BBC broadcast attributed successes of Mokra Gora and ViÅ”egrad raids to partisans, further angering MihailoviÄ, who returned
285:
Once satisfied that the final victory is certain, MihailoviÄ will join the 'grand finale' against the Axis, until then he is capable of coming to secret understandings with either
Italians on Germans. I do not know whether MihailoviÄ has an agreement with the Axis involving his inactivity in Serbia
281:
Chetniks in Serbia could organize derailments at points where the
Germans would not be able to take reprisals on Serb villages, but no serious attempts have been made to investigate the possibilities of this. The poor sabotage results are due to lack of willingness on MihailoviÄ's part and the lack
379:
Over the next few months, the situation remained complex. MihailoviÄ continued to collaborate with the
Italians and remained focused on fighting the partisans. His troops refrained from attacking the Axis for fear of reprisals and he was still unhappy about the lack of British aid. Partisans, on
248:
In Aug 1942, Lieut Lofts and two
British W/T operators arrived in order to provide more regular and secure communications with Cairo and London. This enabled both MihailoviÄ and Hudson to make their cases separately. The former ignored questions about partisans' strength and locations and refused
452:
Sgt Veljko DragiÄeviÄ, who had offered to stay with the
Montenegrin partisans in Sep 1941, had been persuaded not to do so. His hosts were worried that his officers would think that they had brainwashed him. Instead, he joined them two months later and eventually became a Communications Chief at
448:
As ordered, both Bailey and Hudson left MihailoviÄ's HQ for Cairo via Bari. Bailey travelled via MihailoviÄ's sympathisers to the coast and was evacuated on 14/15 Feb 1944, Hudson who travelled via partisan's town of Berane left on 28 Mar 1944. Their withdrawal from the region meant the end of
295:
In addition to enhanced communication channels, towards the end of 1942, the SOE sent a high ranking official (Head of SOE Balkan section) Col S.W. (Bill) Bailey to co-ordinate all SOE activities in the region (including Albania, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) and report on the military value of
140:
movement who had been sending un-encrypted radio messages. It was at this time that the two different approaches to resistance and its timelines between the communist partisans and nationalist chetniks became apparent. On 13 Oct 1941 LalatoviÄ and OstojiÄ sent the message to Malta (in French):
213:
and then decided to return to MihailoviÄ at Ravna Gora on 8 Dec 1941. His host, who reported him missing to London on 1 Dec 1941 was about to withdraw towards Montenegro. He refused to see Hudson and denied him the use of radio communications, finally leaving him behind as a lone fugitive in
185:
In BrajiÄi, Hudson was a bystander during the talks between MihailoviÄ and Tito, and had realised that the two cannot reconcile easily. MihailoviÄ, encouraged by the reports of OstojiÄ and LalatoviÄ that he had the official backing of the YGE, and promise of British aid, demanded the partisans
193:
Fearing the escalation of conflict between the two groups, and worried that the military aid would be used to fight partisans rather than the Germans, on 13 Nov 1941 Hudson asked for it to be suspended unless MihailoviÄ attempted to incorporate all anti-fascist elements under his command. He
331:
Finally, at a christening in Lipovo, on 28th Feb 1943, MihailoviÄ made a speech highly critical of "perfidious Albion", requiring the Serbs to fight to the last, without adequate aid, his only source of supply being the Italian occupiers. He stated that his main enemies were the "partisans,
159:"The communists who are well organized are now leading an action in Montenegro. They want everybody to unite in the fight against the occupying authorities. Numerous national elements are standing on one side and are waiting. Must urge on nationalists to organize for the struggle."
278:, whom he has secretly promoted and supported financially and endorses his policy of collaboration with the Italians. Sabotage against Italians would lead to reprisals and termination of their support and food supplies. MihailoviÄ insists that the Italians will collapse shortly.
182:, their commander-in-chief. Shortly afterwards Hudson moved to MihailoviÄ's HQ at the village of BrajiÄi near Suvobor. His host was aware of his reports favourable of Montenegrin partisans and threatened to break off relations in case Hudson intended to go to Užice again.
270:(Commander-in-chief of the Middle East Command) to sabotage Axis communications, MihailoviÄ refused to act. Finally, after living in the country for over a year, on 15 Nov 1942, Hudson sent a considered summary on the situation:
380:
the other hand, continued to fight Germans, Italians, Ustashe, Chetniks and others, while professing their commitment to the Soviet cause. The British government then decided to back both sides with equal support, sending a senior officer to each HQ, Brigadier
344:
In Mar 1943, as the Axis troops and their collaborators pushed partisan forces from BihaÄ in North-west Bosnia to Herzegovina in the south, MihailoviÄ left his HQ to take direct command, and spent the next few weeks in Kalinovik, Konjic and
430:
and told them that the British intended to ask MihailoviÄ to carry out certain specific military operations and that a failure to accede to this request would stop British aid. The task was to destroy railway bridges in the
299:
Similar to Hudson, Bailey was a mining engineer with pre-war experience in Yugoslavia. In early 1942, he was on a mission to the USA and Canada, together with Capt William Stuart from the SIS (who later became co-chief of
296:
chetnik movement as a whole. He was also to persuade MihailoviÄ to undertake active sabotage, study his political intentions and propose how British policy of creating a united resistance front could be implemented.
97:
Capt Hudson was a 31 year-old consultant mining engineer who had lived in Serbia for several years before the war. He was fluent in the language and had valuable experience of conditions there. Maj LalatoviÄ was a
70:
and the Royal Government left for exile in London together with the SOE agents posted in the country. Disjointed snippets of news of uprisings, resistance and civilian suffering were reaching both British and
304:
and was killed during German bombardment of Tito's HQ in May 1943), trying to recruit Yugoslav ex-pats for potential engagement in the Balkans. Many of the recruits already had military experience in the
194:
volunteered to go to Užice to assist and asked the British Government to influence partisan leadership to work under MihailoviÄ's command via Radio Moscow message which was broadcast shortly afterwards.
403:
HQ, its commander General Oxilia agreed with MihailoviÄ's representative and Bailey to come over to Allies' cause together with his troops and arms. Tito's 2nd Proletarian Division, led by
120:
and taken to RadovÄe north of Podgorica. Using one of the two available radio sets, they reported to the SOE W/T station in Malta on 26 Sep 1941 that they were met by a local band, led by
174:
The mission was accompanied by JovanoviÄ and Mitar BakiÄ - another senior Montenegrin communist, and via partisan held territories in Sandžak and Western Morava valley reached
349:. On 6 Apr 1943, Bailey reported that chetniks were openly collaborating with the Italians in FoÄa area and that MihailoviÄ had refused all access to the British mission.
971:
245:
in Jun 1942. The following few months, Hudson spent inspecting local chetnik units and reported on their commanders' frequent collaboration with the Italian occupiers.
986:
981:
249:
to take sabotage action on the Belgrade-NiÅ” railway while trying to conceal his collaboration with the Italians while the latter was preparing the 'tell all' report.
407:, arrived shortly afterwards and persuaded Oxilia to join the partisan side instead. This was seen as a great loss of reputation, arms and territory by MihailoviÄ.
323:
Overall, early reports indicated that Bailey got off to a good start with MihailoviÄ, who agreed to receive British sub-missions to his regional commands, such as
440:
the end of the year. Two months later, on 25 Feb 1944, he sent a message to Tito informing him that the British missions were being withdrawn from MihailoviÄ.
267:
352:
Around the same time, the Axis defeat at Stalingrad and North Africa, made the collaboration with resistance groups in the Balkans more important. British PM
229:
to discover what had become of him. Sadly, Atherton was killed two months later, and it was Hudson who ended up investigating his "rescuer's" murder instead.
241:. Hudson accepted and traveled mainly in Italian run lorries. London was informed of his survival, promoted him to the rank of Major and awarded him the
364:
and ease the delivery of military aid and in Apr 1943 sub-missions with MihailoviÄ's commanders throughout Serbia were established. On 27 May 1943,
282:
of energy. It should be made clear to MihailoviÄ that continued support to him from the BBC is dependent on his readiness to undertake sabotage.
34:
with the objective to discover what was happening in Yugoslavia and co-ordinate all forces of resistance there. The mission also included three
933:
895:
190:
chetnik attacks on partisans near Užice on 2 Nov 1941. One week later, on 9 Nov 1941, he received the first British aid sortie from Malta.
86:, lack of available aircraft and distance from the Egyptian airfields, it was decided that the infiltration would be done by a submarine.
976:
79:, Head of the SOE Balkan section, instructed Hudson to contact all resistance, regardless of national, religious or political belief.
31:
952:
914:
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458:
385:
221:
surviving mainly on potatoes and fully dependent on local population. Worried about his fate, in Feb 1942, the SOE organised
400:
454:
414:
allowing Maj Archie Jack to blow up a large railway bridge nearby. Together with blowing up of four railway bridges at
373:
222:
72:
63:
23:
381:
361:
242:
66:
in April 1941 had caught Yugoslav government and the army unprepared. Within a fortnight, the army had capitulated,
419:
to his previous priorities of fighting partisans and ignoring the occupiers and the British Liaison Officers (BLOs).
217:
Cut off from the outside world, Hudson made his way to southern Serbia and spent the following four winter months in
94:, then Secretary of State for India, stated that it was his father's intercession that made a submarine available.
324:
110:
75:
who realised that they needed a more comprehensive picture and had arranged for a direct mission to the region.
99:
76:
109:(Montenegro) via Greece to Cairo in April 1941. Maj OstojiÄ was on the General Staff of the RYA who escorted
328:
serviceable long-range aircraft and poor weather) meant that the relationship began to deteriorate quickly.
392:
83:
67:
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133:
368:, the first dedicated mission to partisans' HQ was dropped at the height of a large German offensive
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106:
39:
35:
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Around the same time, in Apr 1942, MihailoviÄ contacted Hudson and asked him to join his HQ in
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Armstrong was present on 5 Oct 1943 when MihailoviÄ's troops overtook the German garrison in
226:
202:
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51:
125:
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376:) representatives, Bailey's had Capt Mansfield, and Deakin's had Lieut M.O. Benson.
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27:
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Three days later, Hudson, on his way to Serbia, sent the following telegram:
128:. On 9 Oct 1941 Hudson received a signal from Cairo (via Malta) to move to
91:
46:
the wireless transmitter (W/T) operator. The group boarded the submarine
218:
206:
175:
137:
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129:
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On 20 Nov 1941 Hudson was present at chetnik-partisan negotiations in
396:
309:, and were sent to Britain, and later to Cairo for further training.
372:
which aimed to destroy them. Both missions by now had American (
210:
178:
around 25 Oct 1941 where they met partisan leadership including
170:
Locating local resistance leaders and attempts at reconciliation
16:
World War II Special Operations Executive Mission to Yugoslavia
869:
Special Operations Europe, Scenes from the Anti-Nazi War
395:
and saw the two armies' behaviour in its aftermath. At
461:, the German raid on the town of Drvar on 25 May 1944.
205:
on 29 Nov 1941. He followed partisans' withdrawal via
113:
to Greece in April 1941 and then travelled onto Cairo.
457:. Sadly, both he and his wife were killed during the
164:
Bullseye telegram, No 25, 16 Oct 1941, Deakin, p. 131
102:
officer who had flown with a squadron of planes from
116:
Once disembarked, the party were picked up by local
286:
or their anti-communist drive in North West Bosnia.
26:mission to Yugoslavia since its occupation by the
947:. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
909:. London: Martin Secker & Warburg Limited.
449:Operation Bullseye after two and a half years.
254:
157:
143:
38:officers from Montenegro: Maj Mirko LalatoviÄ,
132:in Western Serbia and deliver safe ciphers to
8:
422:On 8 Nov 1943, the British Foreign Minister
58:Background, logistics and the first contacts
274:MihailoviÄ is dependent on local commander
54:on the Montenegrin coast on 20th Sep 1941.
426:met King Peter II and the new Yugoslav PM
391:The two brigadiers arrived at the time of
972:Eastern European theatre of World War II
926:Tito and the rise and fall of Yugoslavia
312:Bailey parachuted to MihailoviÄ's HQ at
982:Special Operations Executive operations
469:
62:The quick and intense Axis Blitzkrieg
7:
252:In early Sep 1942, Hudson reported:
987:United KingdomāYugoslavia relations
945:Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans
907:Wartime With Tito and the Partisans
73:Yugoslav Government-in-Exile (YGE)
24:Special Operations Executive (SOE)
14:
243:Distinguished Service Order (DSO)
266:Even after the direct appeal by
928:. London: Faber and Faber Ltd.
890:. London: Faber and Faber Ltd.
871:. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd.
318:'independent republic' at BihaÄ
209:mountain range, all the way to
100:Royal Yugoslav Air Force (RYAF)
22:was the code-name of the first
90:, an SOE agent and the son of
1:
233:Rapprochement with MihailoviÄ
360:bombers to add to the four
82:Given the pressures of the
1003:
977:Yugoslavia in World War II
943:Williams, Heather (2003).
886:Deakin, F. W. D. (2011).
325:Mission Greenwood-Rootham
36:Royal Yugoslav Army (RYA)
905:Djilas, Milovan (1980).
867:Davidson, Basil (1980).
268:General Harold Alexander
30:forces. It was led by
924:West, Richard (2009).
888:The Embattled Mountain
459:Operation Rƶsselsprung
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167:
153:
84:North African campaign
77:Col S.W. (Bill) Bailey
764:Williams, pp. 160-162
755:Williams, pp. 150-152
737:Williams, pp. 110-111
719:Williams, pp. 100-101
692:Williams, pp. 130-133
340:Switching the support
50:in Malta and reached
44:Sgt Veljko DragiÄeviÄ
32:Capt D.T. Bill Hudson
791:Williams, pp.167-176
455:Supreme Headquarters
386:Brig Fitzroy Maclean
227:Maj Terence Atherton
134:Col Draža MihailoviÄ
64:Operation Punishment
40:Maj Zaharije OstojiÄ
701:Williams, pp. 91-93
548:Deakin, pp. 128-129
512:Williams, pp. 39-44
503:Williams, pp. 53-56
827:Williamson, p. 199
401:Venezia Division's
384:to MihailoviÄ and
20:Operation Bullseye
935:978-0-571-25581-8
897:978-0-571-27644-8
393:Italian surrender
382:Charles Armstrong
370:Operation Schwarz
366:Operation Typical
356:had obtained ten
354:Winston Churchill
307:Spanish Civil War
302:Operation Typical
291:Mission expansion
214:peasant clothes.
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906:
887:
868:
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485:West, p. 109
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88:Julian Amery
81:
61:
19:
18:
399:, place of
111:Prince Paul
48:HMS Triumph
966:Categories
465:References
416:Mokra Gora
362:Liberators
92:L.S. Amery
388:to Tito.
225:, led by
118:partisans
412:ViŔegrad
334:Ustashas
259:ā
219:Ivanjica
207:Zlatibor
162:ā
148:ā
136:and his
52:Petrovac
861:Sources
358:Halifax
239:Sandžak
138:Chetnik
130:Suvobor
951:
932:
913:
894:
875:
437:Morava
397:Berane
428:PuriÄ
199:ÄaÄak
176:Užice
104:NikŔi
949:ISBN
930:ISBN
911:ISBN
892:ISBN
873:ISBN
453:the
435:and
433:Ibar
347:FoÄa
211:Uvac
42:and
28:Axis
374:OSS
968::
957:.
938:.
919:.
900:.
881:.
107:Ä
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