382:, the US proposal for an invasion of France, which was scheduled for later that year. Churchill wrote: "If we could gain possession of these airfields and establish an equal force there, not only would the northern sea route to Russia be kept open, but we should have set up a second front on a small scale from which it would be most difficult to eject us. If the going was good we could advance slowly southward, unrolling the Nazi map of Europe from the top". As a preliminary, six squadrons of British fighters would be based at
31:
218:, with the intention of providing a platform from which Germany could be bombed or even invaded. The verdict of the JPS on the plan, code named Operation Dynamite, which was presented in a report dated 19 May 1941, was that bomber bases in Norway would have few advantages over those already established in England and that the sea crossing from Norway to Germany was too heavily dominated by enemy forces. The JPS thought that the capture of
448:, asking him on no account to allow the use of Canadian troops in Norway. He told Alanbrooke that he had had a "ghastly weekend, kept up all hours of the night until he did not know which way he was facing". When Churchill cabled King to ask if McNaughton could be sent to Moscow to solicit Soviet assistance for Jupiter, King refused on the grounds that Jupiter was not realistic and that McNaughton had no confidence in it.
359:
312:
on, we would continually be in trouble riding him off mad plans to go back to Norway. Why he wanted to go back and what he was going to do there, even if he did succeed in capturing
Trondheim, we never found out". On 12 October, Brooke was required to present a detailed plan for the Norway invasion, now code named Operation Ajax, which he had compiled with Admiral Sir
444:
September, much to his annoyance. Churchill then summoned McNaughton to
Chequers to discuss his report, hoping to coerce him into agreement. Forewarned by Brooke, McNaughton prevaricated but agreed to examine the "Trondheim operation", though afterwards he sent a telegram to the Canadian Prime Minister,
483:
Alanbrooke commented that they never found out why
Churchill "wanted to go back (to Norway) and what he was going to do there, even if he did succeed in capturing Trondheim. The only reason he ever gave was that Hitler had unrolled the map of Europe starting with Norway, and he would start rolling it
443:
in the operation, hoping to circumvent the Chiefs of Staff. McNaughton and his staff spent some time compiling a revision of
Operation Jupiter, concluding that it would only be possible if the weather conditions were fortunate. The report was finished on 7 August but Churchill did not see it until 14
414:
Both the Joint
Planning Staff and the Chiefs of Staff Committee failed to find any virtue in Churchill's revised plan. In a memo dated 8 June 1942, they restated their objections based mainly on insufficient air cover, this time compounded by the autumn and winter weather in which the operation was
311:
were also in attendance. Brooke recorded that "We sat up til 2.15 am discussing the problem and I did my best to put the PM off the plan" and that they "Resumed discussion at 11 am and went on till 1 pm, I think PM is beginning to weaken on the plan". Brooke was mistaken and later wrote: "From then
324:(who was to command it). Churchill complained that it was not a plan but a "masterly treatise" on the difficulties of the venture. Churchill avoided the main reason (lack of air support) during two hours of interrogation; raising details such as why he foresaw frosts (as stated in the
402:. Churchill thought that surprise could be achieved by the invasion transports being disguised as an Arctic convoy and that the troops could be accommodated on board the same ships during the winter. He claimed that careful planning could avoid an "undue strain" being put upon the
328:) and why would it take 24 hours to go from A to B (because of enemy resistance and removing road blocks). According to one account (but not mentioned by Brooke) Brooke suddenly relented and agreed to mount the expedition on the condition that the navy could take the fleet into
475:
and was responsible for the
Overlord planning. Morgan's report pointed out the difficulties of an invasion of Norway compared to an invasion of Normandy and that preparing for Jupiter would inevitably impact on the preparations for Overlord. The failure of Roosevelt and the
332:
in support, but the elderly Pound merely shook his head and ended the discussion. Churchill again asked the Joint
Planning Staff to reconsider Ajax without reference to Brooke or Paget, but the JPS, and the Chiefs of Staff, supported Brooke's conclusions, citing the lack of
349:
during his visit to Moscow in
December 1941. Code named Operation Marrow, the project was abandoned in the following month, when the Soviets withdrew their support on the grounds that the Finnish intelligence service had discovered the details of it.
238:. Hinting that this might be a joint Anglo-Soviet operation, the idea was again put to the JPS, who stated that they were averse to the proposal because of the large naval and air commitment required. Churchill was not discouraged and wrote to the
378:, the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In that document, Churchill explained his objectives for the proposed operation, which he considered was of "high strategic and political importance" and should be considered as an alternative to
188:
to suspect that the
British intended a full-scale invasion there; accordingly the German garrison had been increased from 150,000 to 250,000 men by June 1942. The German naval and air assets based in Norway were well placed to attack the British
242:
suggesting that "we should attempt the liberation of Norway at the earliest possible moment". The
Germans had been aggressively pushing the bounds of Swedish neutrality at that time, and the Chiefs of Staff felt that the occupation of
172:, the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, which commenced on 9 April 1940. An under-equipped and under-trained Anglo-French force was sent to oppose the invasion and despite some moderate success in the north of Norway, the
423:
and a protégé of Churchill's, who unexpectedly wrote to the director of naval planning, saying that Jupiter was "impractical" and that no further time should be spent on the project. Mountbatten was already involved with
142:, the plan was opposed by all the senior British and Allied commanders, who considered it impractical because of insufficient air support and of limited value. The scheme was eventually abandoned in favour of the
1019:
247:
might allow them to render assistance to Sweden if required. However, further study revealed that the resources for such a campaign were not available without compromising home defence or operations in the
234:'s first wartime message to Churchill on 18 July 1941, in which he requested that Britain mount two offensives against the coast of German-held Europe, one in northern France and the other in the
176:
forced a total Allied withdrawal which had been completed by 8 June, followed by the surrender of all Norwegian forces two days later. Brought to power on 10 May 1940 by the failure of the
264:, the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, wrote in his diary of his exasperation with Churchill and his Norway scheme which he considered was "not merely dangerous but useless".
1024:
181:
1014:
432:, a joint American-Canadian commando unit, to be inserted by air into the Norwegian mountains; however, it seems that there was never any serious plan to link the two operations.
249:
35:
The German airfields at Petsamo (Finland) and Porsanger (Norway), the objectives of the May 1942 plan for Operation Jupiter. Note that the post-1947 national borders are shown.
459:, a plan for a giant aircraft carrier made from a mixture of ice and sawdust, might solve the air cover issue. He managed to get Jupiter inserted into resolution of the
292:
252:. In a meeting on 24 September, Churchill refused to accept the report prepared by the Chiefs of Staff, and they reluctantly agreed to pass the matter on to General Sir
480:
to agree to Jupiter finally sealed the fate of the plan, and Alanbrooke hoped on 25 September 1942 that he was "giving up the idea of the North Norway attack".
271:
on 3 October 1941, that a messenger had arrived at midnight with orders to prepare a plan to attack Trondheim in one week and that he was to go to
296:
134:. The first versions of the plan were code named Operation Dynamite, Operation Ajax and Operation Marrow. Devised and vigorously promoted by Sir
905:
268:
139:
915:
280:
990:
969:
948:
886:
844:
155:
487:
However Churchill raised it again as late as January 1944. Instead of an actual invasion, the Allies implemented Operation Solo I, a
927:
865:
823:
275:, the prime minister's country house, that evening to discuss the idea over dinner. Accordingly, Brooke together with General Sir
420:
455:
on several occasions, and did so again on 27 July 1943. Churchill managed to keep the Jupiter idea alive, even suggesting that
375:
257:
190:
56:
495:, the invasion of north Africa, by creating the impression that troops based in Scotland were preparing to invade Norway.
440:
1009:
429:
159:
222:
might prove useful, but that German air power in Norway was "sufficient to make a successful invasion improbable".
239:
472:
435:
Churchill was again rebuffed by the Chiefs of Staff in a meeting on 6 July. Churchill then approached General
180:, Churchill believed that Scandinavia was of great strategic importance and authorised a series of successful
460:
169:
362:
Churchill with the Chiefs of Staff, who had strongly resisted the Norwegian invasion plans from the outset.
379:
317:
211:
127:
477:
467:, should that not prove possible. As a final ploy, Churchill referred Jupiter to Lieutenant-General Sir
542:
452:
345:
A joint Anglo-Soviet offensive into Arctic Norway and Finland was proposed to Lieutenant General Sir
91:
468:
391:
387:
488:
464:
177:
44:
986:
980:
965:
959:
944:
923:
901:
882:
876:
861:
855:
840:
819:
436:
416:
308:
143:
135:
938:
878:
Of Courage and Determination: The First Special Service Force, "The Devil's Brigade," 1942–44
834:
456:
399:
173:
131:
30:
214:(JPS) to consider an amphibious assault on the Norwegian coast, followed by the capture of
492:
334:
329:
304:
425:
358:
300:
288:
1003:
445:
366:
Not deterred by his earlier rebuttal, Churchill set out his "constructive plan" in a
346:
321:
261:
231:
406:. As instructed, the Chiefs of Staff referred the memo to the Joint Planning Staff.
390:
on the north coast of Finland would be the site of an initial seaborne assault by a
284:
194:
185:
253:
403:
367:
313:
814:
Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Lord (2001). Danchev, Alex; Todman, Daniel (eds.).
415:
expected to be carried out. Weight was added to the argument by Vice Admiral
71:
58:
276:
244:
219:
383:
272:
165:
395:
123:
235:
119:
101:
To protect Arctic convoys and liberate Norway from German occupation
210:
Even before the Soviet entry into the war, Churchill had asked the
357:
215:
164:
In 1940, British and French plans to prevent exports of Swedish
836:
D-day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion
230:
The idea for an attack on northern Norway might be traced to
184:
on German installations in Norway in 1941 and 1942, leading
193:, which began taking supplies to the northern ports of the
118:
was a plan originating in 1941 for an invasion of northern
1020:
Cancelled military operations involving the United Kingdom
491:
designed to draw attention away from the preparations for
386:
in Russia. Abandoning the idea of taking Trondheim,
982:
British Policy and Strategy Towards Norway, 1941–45
451:Churchill had discussed the Operation Jupiter with
105:
97:
87:
50:
40:
23:
857:The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate: Volume IV
260:, for further consideration. Lieutenant General
1025:Military history of Norway during World War II
1015:Cancelled military operations of World War II
374:dated 1 May 1942, addressed to Major General
8:
789:
777:
738:
627:
606:
510:
463:in August 1943, as an alternative plan to
20:
593:
591:
961:Churchill, the Greatest Briton Unmasked
875:Horn, Bernd; Wyczynski, Michel (2013).
503:
168:from Norwegian ports were preempted by
543:"A 5-Minute History of Arctic Convoys"
439:to get him to agree to the use of his
471:, who was the Chief of Staff to the
7:
860:. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
140:Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
281:Chief of the Imperial General Staff
156:Timeline of the Norwegian Campaign
14:
940:Grand Strategies in War and Peace
898:The Story of the Second World War
29:
896:Commager, Henry Steele (2004).
702:Horn and Wyczynski 2013, p. 301
410:Criticism and final abandonment
258:Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces
937:Kennedy, Paul M., ed. (1992).
854:Churchill, Winston S. (1950).
398:would capture the airfield at
1:
337:or any hope of achieving it.
16:WWII military operation plan
675:Churchill 1950, pp. 312–313
430:First Special Service Force
160:German occupation of Norway
1041:
979:Mann, Christopher (2012).
291:and Air Chief Marshal Sir
153:
943:. Yale University Press.
316:, Air Chief Marshall Sir
240:Chiefs of Staff Committee
28:
618:Knight 2008, pp. 108–109
484:up again from Norway."
473:Supreme Allied Commander
964:. David & Charles.
267:Brooke recorded in his
985:. Palgrave Macmillan.
958:Knight, Nigel (2008).
394:-sized force, while a
380:Operation Sledgehammer
363:
318:William Sholto Douglas
297:Chief of the Air Staff
109:Plan abandoned in 1944
922:. Atheneum New York.
833:Barber, Mary (2009).
816:War Diaries 1939–1945
549:. Imperial War Museum
478:Joint Chiefs of Staff
361:
250:Mediterranean theatre
881:. Toronto: Dundurn.
792:, pp. 187, 410.
768:Mann 2012, pp. 77–78
741:, pp. 191, 285.
720:Mann 2012, pp. 80–81
693:Mann 2012, pp. 77–78
666:Mann 2012, pp. 74–75
657:Mann 2012, pp. 73–74
630:, pp. 189, 190.
585:Mann 2012, pp. 68–69
567:Mann 2012, pp. 67–68
453:Franklin D Roosevelt
376:Hastings "Pug" Ismay
212:Joint Planning Staff
170:Operation Weserübung
92:British Armed Forces
1010:Cancelled invasions
839:. Stackpole Books.
729:Knight 2008, p. 111
639:Knight 2008, p. 110
576:Kennedy 1992, p. 55
541:Plant, Alex (ed.).
522:Commager 2004, p. 9
421:Combined Operations
197:in September 1941.
68: /
801:Barber 2009, p. 44
531:Barber 2009, p. 43
465:Operation Overlord
364:
307:and Leader of the
206:Operation Dynamite
178:Norwegian Campaign
45:Amphibious assault
907:978-1-57488-741-9
818:. Phoenix Press.
461:Quebec Conference
437:Andrew McNaughton
428:, a plan for the
417:Louis Mountbatten
372:Operation Jupiter
201:Preliminary plans
144:Normandy landings
136:Winston Churchill
116:Operation Jupiter
113:
112:
72:69.667°N 19.000°E
24:Operation Jupiter
1032:
996:
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954:
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871:
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793:
787:
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760:
759:Mann 2012, p. 85
757:
751:
750:Mann 2012, p. 78
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742:
736:
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721:
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711:Mann 2012, p. 78
709:
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694:
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685:
684:Mann 2012, p. 76
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648:Mann 2012, p. 73
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597:Mann 2012, p. 70
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559:
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532:
529:
523:
520:
514:
508:
469:Frederick Morgan
457:Project Habakkuk
341:Operation Marrow
320:and General Sir
174:Battle of France
132:Second World War
83:
82:
80:
79:
78:
73:
69:
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21:
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978:
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790:Alanbrooke 2001
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778:Alanbrooke 2001
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772:
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739:Alanbrooke 2001
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628:Alanbrooke 2001
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607:Alanbrooke 2001
605:
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584:
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571:
566:
562:
552:
550:
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539:
535:
530:
526:
521:
517:
511:Alanbrooke 2001
509:
505:
501:
493:Operation Torch
419:, the Chief of
412:
400:Porsanger Fjord
356:
343:
335:air superiority
330:Trondheim Fjord
305:Lord Privy Seal
228:
208:
203:
162:
152:
88:Planned by
76:
74:
70:
67:
62:
59:
57:
55:
54:
36:
17:
12:
11:
5:
1038:
1036:
1028:
1027:
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1012:
1002:
1001:
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992:978-0230210226
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971:978-0715328538
970:
955:
950:978-0300056662
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928:
912:
906:
893:
888:978-1459709645
887:
872:
866:
851:
846:978-0811735346
845:
830:
824:
809:
806:
804:
803:
794:
782:
780:, p. 325.
770:
761:
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731:
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704:
695:
686:
677:
668:
659:
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641:
632:
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599:
587:
578:
569:
560:
547:www.iwm.org.uk
533:
524:
515:
502:
500:
497:
489:deception plan
441:Canadian Corps
426:Project Plough
411:
408:
355:
354:The final plan
352:
342:
339:
301:Clement Attlee
293:Charles Portal
289:First Sea Lord
283:, Admiral Sir
227:
226:Operation Ajax
224:
207:
204:
202:
199:
191:Arctic convoys
182:commando raids
151:
148:
111:
110:
107:
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102:
99:
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85:
84:
77:69.667; 19.000
52:
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37:
34:
26:
25:
15:
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10:
9:
6:
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929:0-689-11267-X
925:
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916:Fraser, David
913:
909:
903:
900:. Brassey's.
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894:
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879:
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867:0-395-41058-4
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548:
544:
537:
534:
528:
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513:, p. 18.
512:
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481:
479:
474:
470:
466:
462:
458:
454:
449:
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446:McKenzie King
442:
438:
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431:
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405:
401:
397:
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389:
385:
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369:
360:
353:
351:
348:
347:Archibald Nye
340:
338:
336:
331:
327:
323:
322:Bernard Paget
319:
315:
310:
306:
302:
298:
294:
290:
286:
282:
278:
274:
270:
265:
263:
262:Henry Pownall
259:
255:
251:
246:
241:
237:
233:
232:Joseph Stalin
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223:
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128:Allied forces
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551:. Retrieved
546:
536:
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518:
506:
486:
482:
450:
434:
413:
388:Petsamo area
371:
365:
344:
326:Climate Book
325:
309:Labour Party
285:Dudley Pound
266:
229:
209:
195:Soviet Union
186:Adolf Hitler
163:
115:
114:
18:
553:26 February
256:, then the
254:Alan Brooke
130:during the
75: /
1004:Categories
920:Alanbrooke
499:References
404:Home Fleet
368:memorandum
314:John Tovey
154:See also:
150:Background
277:John Dill
269:war diary
245:Trondheim
220:Stavanger
98:Objective
918:(1982).
392:division
384:Murmansk
273:Chequers
166:iron ore
51:Location
808:Sources
396:brigade
370:headed
124:Finland
106:Outcome
63:19°00′E
60:69°40′N
989:
968:
947:
926:
904:
885:
864:
843:
822:
303:, the
295:, the
287:, the
236:Arctic
138:, the
120:Norway
987:ISBN
966:ISBN
945:ISBN
924:ISBN
902:ISBN
883:ISBN
862:ISBN
841:ISBN
820:ISBN
555:2017
299:and
216:Oslo
158:and
122:and
41:Type
126:by
1006::
590:^
545:.
279:,
146:.
995:.
974:.
953:.
932:.
910:.
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870:.
849:.
828:.
557:.
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