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issues around civilian and political control of the army and found a "lack of clear definitions...". Surprisingly, they could not find a clear statement of civilian control over the military. They argued that the Basic Law: The
Cabinet (1968) implied authority when it stated that the Cabinet has authority over all areas not covered by other legislation. Later critics argued that the Cabinet's authority stemmed from the IDF Order (1948), which authorised the Minister of Defence to set up the army. Further questions arose over hundreds of orders issued by Chiefs of Staff since 1948 without authorisation from the Minister of Defence. These discoveries led to the swift enactment of Basic Law: The Army (1975). Its main clause stated:
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421:. Page 358:" was one of the architects of what was known as 'the concept.' Simply stated, the concept laid down first that the Arabs were not ready for an all-out war with Israel. Though they had the ability to launch a limited war, they knew perfectly well that Israel would not feel bound by the rules of that game, and a limited war would quickly escalate into a general one. Second, Zeira's concept laid down, that if there was to be a war, it would be a short one. The third assumption was that in an overall war, the Arabs would be quickly defeated."
152:, his deputy Brigadier Aryeh Shalev, the head of the Egyptian Department Lt Colonel Yona Bendman, and the chief intelligence officer in the Southern Command Lt Colonel David Gedalia. The report also was critical of what it called the "concept" in military intelligence thinking. The "concept" was based on the assumption that Egypt would only attack if it had the air power to take on the
156:. Military intelligence also thought that Syria would only attack if Egypt did. In the absence of any upgrading of Egypt's air force, the directorate concluded there was no threat of imminent war. This assumption led to complacency and evidence being ignored. For example, on 1 October and again on 3 October 1973, Lieutenant
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The findings of the
Agranat Commission have been the focus of sharp debate among the Israeli public up until today. Particular criticism relates to its exoneration of the country's political leadership, especially Defense Minister Dayan. According to the Report: "As long as he accepts the opinions of
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For details about the
Agranat Commission Report in general, and the imprint it has left on Israeli collective memory in particular, see Nadav G. Molchadsky, “The Agranat Commission Report and the Making of the Israeli Memory of the Yom Kippur War,” in Nadav G. Molchadsky(2015), History in the Public
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In practice, the controversy about the report's absence of criticism of Moshe Dayan led to a strengthening of the Chief of Staff's position since he could argue that if the Chief of Staff had sole responsibility, it must be the Chief of Staff's decision. The Chief of Staff was now a regular attendee
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was forced to resign. The second part was published on 10 July 1974 and contained the reasons for the conclusions of the first report. The final part of the report was published on 30 January 1975. One consequence of the
Commission's investigation was the "Basic Law: The Army (1975)", clarifying the
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gave a newspaper interview in which he was quoted as saying that he would disobey orders that he felt were against the interests of the State or his subordinates. This caused so much public concern that Sharon was asked to appear before the
Commission, which accepted his testimony that the quote was
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The final part of the report was published on 30 January 1975. The completed report was 1,500 pages long, with 746 pages devoted to the fighting in the south and 311 to the northern front. Forty-two pages were made public, the remainder being classified. Besides the IDF's failures, it looked at the
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The
Commission was critical of the standard of everyday discipline in the IDF: "Discipline is indivisible. For example, a soldier who becomes accustomed in time of peace not to observe the minor rules, such as in matters of personal appearance, without being alerted to this failure by his superior
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As a response to the
Commission's criticism of using military intelligence as the sole route for analysis of information, the Foreign Ministry established a Research and Planning Department. Despite this, five years later the 29th Comptroller's Report into the conduct of the IDF during
327:, 25 January 1974. "When I receive an order, I treat it according to three values: the first, and most important, is the good of the state. The state is the supreme thing. The second value is my obligation to my subordinates, and the third value is my obligation to my superiors."
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After his dismissal, Elazar maintained that had he been given more of the information, he would have mobilized the IDF sooner. This only confirmed the
Commission's criticisms about the reliance on a single avenue for intelligence analysis. Elazar died two years later aged 50.
261:, head of the National Security Council, wrote: "Both the proscription against considering intent and the concentration on the prevention of threats—two central messages of the Agranat Commission —frustrated and delayed the rebuilding and preparedness of the IDF for years."
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Further criticism responds to the
Commission's recommendations, stemming from the failure of military intelligence to assess the Arab states' intent, that the IDF should not consider the intentions of hostile states, but rather their capacity for war. Thirty years later,
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The intelligence information for the days preceding the Yom Kippur War on the enemy's moves and intentions to launch the war, the evaluation of this information, and the decisions taken by the responsible military and civil authorities in response
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should be dismissed. After his departure, Gonen argued that he had only been in the post for a few months and that the command had been neglected by his predecessor Ariel Sharon. The
Commission also found the Chief of Staff
130:
The commission's report was published in three parts. The interim report, released 1 April 1974, called for the dismissal of a number of senior officers in the IDF and caused such controversy that Prime Minister
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Stewart, page 359: "At the end of the war, Chief of Staff Elazar claimed that 'some two hundred cables' from Israeli agents around the world indicating that war was imminent never reached him."
102:
The general deployment of the IDF in case of war, its state of readiness during the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, and its operations up to the containment of the enemy.
346:
Courtroom: Commissions of Inquiry and Struggles over the History and Memory of Israeli Traumas, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles), pp. 119-164.
94:. The Committee sat for 140 sessions, during which they listened to the testimony of 58 witnesses. It was established on 21 November 1973 with a remit to investigate:
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The new law still left some issues unresolved, such as who appointed a Chief of Staff and whether the Chief of Staff was the most senior officer in the army.
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160:, order of battle intelligence officer for the Southern Command, gave his superior Lt Colonel Gadalia documents indicating Egypt's war preparations.
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walked out of the cabinet with Elazar. Thousands of demonstrators took to the streets. Nine days after the publication of the Interim Report,
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responsible, but it refused to give an opinion on the responsibility of the Minister of Defense
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The Yom Kippur intelligence failure after fifty years: what lessons can be learned?
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On 31 December 1973, elections that had been delayed by the war took place.
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officer, will in the end be negligent in carrying out operational orders."
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government to investigate the circumstances leading to the outbreak of the
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The Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict
183:'s words "The conclusions ... did not seem to accord with the narrative"
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The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East
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39:—the first phase in a war in which 2,812 Israeli soldiers were killed.
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when Israel was found unprepared for the Egyptian attack against the
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This report caused public uproar and unhappiness in the army. In
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his advisers, he does not bear any personal responsibility."
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Between Battle and Ballots: Israeli Military in politics
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The supreme commander of the Army is the Chief of Staff.
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The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East
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Recording and transcription of the Agranat Commission
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The Minister responsible is the Minister of Defense.
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The Army is subject to the authority of the Cabinet.
148:: The Chief of Military Intelligence Major General
117:and one of the Likud founders, Reserve General
191:announced the resignation of her government.
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35:and a simultaneous attack by Syria in the
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583:Frankel, page 117. Published May 1979.
241:, a member of the Agranat Commission.
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281:. Thames and Hudson, 1980. Page 271.
634:Intelligence and National Security
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75:. Its other members were Justice
647:Agranat Commission lexicon entry
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388:Frankel, page 271. Shlaim, Avi
323:. 1983. Page 118. Interview in
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