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rejects the idea that volitions or impulses of the will may be inferred to necessarily connect to the actions they produce by way of some sense of the power of the will. He reasons that, 1. if we knew the nature of this power, then the mind-body divide would seem totally unmysterious to us; 2. if we had immediate knowledge of this mysterious power, then we would be able to intuitively explain why it is that we can control some parts of our bodies (e.g., our hands or tongues), and not others (e.g., the liver or heart); 3. we have no immediate knowledge of the powers which allow an impulse of volition to create an action (e.g., of the "muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits" which are the immediate cause of an action). (Hume 1974:353-354) He produces like arguments against the notion that we have knowledge of these powers as they affect the mind alone. (Hume 1974:355-356) He also argues in brief against the idea that causes are mere
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notes that this "inferential" ability that animals have is not through reason, but custom alone. Hume concludes that there is an innate faculty of instincts which both beasts and humans share, namely, the ability to reason experimentally (through custom). Nevertheless, he admits, humans and animals differ in mental faculties in a number of ways, including: differences in memory and attention, inferential abilities, ability to make deductions in a long chain, ability to grasp ideas more or less clearly, the human capacity to worry about conflating unrelated circumstances, a sagely prudence which arrests generalizations, a capacity for a greater inner library of analogies to reason with, an ability to detach oneself and scrap one's own biases, and an ability to converse through language (and thus gain from the experience of others' testimonies). (Hume 1974:385, footnote 17.)
501:). Hume believes that all disputes on the subject have been merely verbal arguments—that is to say, arguments which are based on a lack of prior agreement on definitions. He first shows that it is clear that most events are deterministic, but human actions are more controversial. However, he thinks that these too occur out of necessity since an outside observer can see the same regularity that he would in a purely physical system. To show the compatibility of necessity and liberty, Hume defines liberty as the ability to act on the basis of one's will e.g. the capacity to will one's actions but not to will one's will. He then shows (quite briefly) how determinism and free will are compatible notions, and have no bad consequences on ethics or moral life.
416:"The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of skepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined skeptic in the same condition as other mortals."
307:. In this thought-experiment, he asks us to imagine a man who has experienced every shade of blue except for one (see Fig. 1). He predicts that this man will be able to divine the color of this particular shade of blue, despite the fact that he has never experienced it. This seems to pose a serious problem for the empirical account, though Hume brushes it aside as an exceptional case by stating that one may experience a novel idea that itself is derived from combinations of previous impressions. (Hume 1974:319)
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claim that there was a solar eclipse in the year 1600, then though we might at first naively regard that as in violation of natural laws, we'd come to accept it as a fact. But if every historian were to assert that Queen
Elizabeth was observed walking around happy and healthy after her funeral, and then interpreted that to mean that they had risen from the dead, then we'd have reason to appeal to natural laws in order to dispute their interpretation. (Hume 1974:400-402)
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this provides a villain with an opportunity to manipulate others. Third, he thinks that those who hold onto the miraculous have tended towards barbarism. Finally, since testimonies tend to conflict with one another when it comes to the miraculous—that is, one man's religious miracle may be contradicted by another man's miracle—any testimony relating to the fantastic is self-denunciating. (Hume 1974:393-398)
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thoughts. He emphasizes in this section, by way of warning, that philosophers with nuanced thoughts will likely be cast aside in favor of those whose conclusions more intuitively match popular opinion. However, he insists, precision helps art and craft of all kinds, including the craft of philosophy.
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And there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of human testimony, also based on experience. If a) testimonies conflict one another, b) there are a small number of witnesses, c) the speaker has no integrity, d) the speaker is overly hesitant or bold, or e) the speaker is known to have motives for
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Hume insists that the conclusions of the
Enquiry will be very powerful if they can be shown to apply to animals and not just humans. He believed that animals were able to infer the relation between cause and effect in the same way that humans do: through learned expectations. (Hume 1974:384) He also
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psychology. This point of view has been subject to severe criticism in the research of the 20th century. Still, testing on the subject has been somewhat divided. Testing on certain animals like cats have concluded that they do not possess any faculty which allow their minds to grasp an insight into
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He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer... a
Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all
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Hume offers his friend an objection: if we see an unfinished building, then can't we infer that it has been created by humans with certain intentions, and that it will be finished in the future? His friend concurs, but indicates that there is a relevant disanalogy that we can't pretend to know the
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There is one final criterion that Hume thinks gives us warrant to doubt any given testimony, and that is f) if the propositions being communicated are miraculous. Hume understands a miracle to be any event which contradicts the laws of nature. He argues that the laws of nature have an overwhelming
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of occurring, and brings about a higher degree of subjective expectation in the viewer. By "chance", he means all those particular comprehensible events which the viewer considers possible in accord with the viewer's experience. However, further experience takes these equal chances, and forces the
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Still, Hume takes care to warn that historians are generally to be trusted with confidence, so long as their reports on facts are extensive and uniform. However, he seems to suggest that historians are as fallible at interpreting the facts as the rest of humanity. Thus, if every historian were to
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Moreover, he stresses that talk of the miraculous has no surface validity, for four reasons. First, he explains that in all of history there has never been a miracle which was attested to by a wide body of disinterested experts. Second, he notes that human beings delight in a sense of wonder, and
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The first section of the last chapter is well organized as an outline of various skeptical arguments. The treatment includes the arguments of atheism, Cartesian skepticism, "light" skepticism, and rationalist critiques of empiricism. Hume shows that even light skepticism leads to crushing doubts
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True to his empirical thesis, Hume tells the reader that, though testimony does have some force, it is never quite as powerful as the direct evidence of the senses. That said, he provides some reasons why we may have a basis for trust in the testimony of persons: because a) human memory can be
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By "necessary connection", Hume means the power or force which necessarily ties one idea to another. He rejects the notion that any sensible qualities are necessarily conjoined, since that would mean we could know something prior to experience. Unlike his predecessors, Berkeley and Locke, Hume
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In the first section of the
Enquiry, Hume provides a rough introduction to philosophy as a whole. For Hume, philosophy can be split into two general parts: natural philosophy and the philosophy of human nature (or, as he calls it, "moral philosophy"). The latter investigates both actions and
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Hume accepts that ideas may be either the product of mere sensation or of the imagination working in conjunction with sensation. According to Hume, the creative faculty makes use of (at least) four mental operations that produce imaginings out of sense-impressions. These operations are
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Hume continues his application of epistemology to theology by an extended discussion on heaven and hell. The brunt of this chapter allegedly narrates the opinions, not of Hume, but of one of Hume's anonymous friends, who again presents them in an imagined speech by the philosopher
343:. The former, he tells the reader, are proved by demonstration, while the latter are given through experience. (Hume 1974:322) In explaining how matters of fact are entirely a product of experience, he dismisses the notion that they may be arrived at through
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about the world which - while they ultimately are philosophically justifiable - may only be combated through the non-philosophical adherence to custom or habit. He ends the section with his own reservations towards
Cartesian and Lockean epistemologies.
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Next, Hume discusses the distinction between impressions and ideas. By "impressions", he means sensations, while by "ideas", he means memories and imaginings. According to Hume, the difference between the two is that ideas are less
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The criteria Hume lists in his examination of the validity of human testimony are roughly upheld in modern social psychology, under the rubric of the communication-persuasion paradigm. Supporting literature includes: the work of
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cause and effect. However, it has been shown that some animals, like chimpanzees, were able to generate creative plans of action to achieve their goals, and thus would seem to have a causal insight which transcends mere custom.
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relatively tenacious; and b) because people are inclined to tell the truth, and ashamed of telling falsities. Needless to say, these reasons are only to be trusted to the extent that they conform to experience. (Hume 1974:389)
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imagination to observe that certain chances arise more frequently than others. These gentle forces upon the imagination cause the viewer to have strong beliefs in outcomes. This effect may be understood as another case of
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He shows how a satisfying argument for the validity of experience can be based neither on demonstration (since "it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change") nor experience (since that would be a
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In the second part, he provides an account of beliefs. He explains that the difference between belief and fiction is that the former produces a certain feeling of confidence which the latter doesn't. (Hume 1974:340)
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body of evidence behind them, and are so well demonstrated to everyone's experience, that any deviation from those laws necessarily flies in the face of all evidence. (Hume 1974:391-392)
401:, which human nature forces us to take seriously. This is also, presumably, the "principle" that organizes the connections between ideas. Indeed, one of the many famous passages of the
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When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask,
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In this chapter, Hume discusses how thoughts tend to come in sequences, as in trains of thought. He explains that there are at least three kinds of associations between ideas:
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than impressions. For example, the idea of the taste of an orange is far inferior to the impression (or sensation) of actually eating one. Writing within the tradition of
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that must account for the various sorts of connections that exist between ideas. However, he does not immediately show what this principle might be. (Hume 1974:320-321)
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contents of the mind of God, while we can know the designs of other humans. Hume seems essentially persuaded by his friend's reasoning. (Hume 1974:412-414)
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Having dispensed with these alternative explanations, he identifies the source of our knowledge of necessary connections as arising out of
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skepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full force and vigor. We need only ask such a skeptic,
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In the first part, Hume discusses how the objects of inquiry are either "relations of ideas" or "matters of fact", which is roughly the
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reasoning. For Hume, every effect only follows its cause arbitrarily—they are entirely distinct from one another. (Hume 1974:324)
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proceeds by a series of incremental steps, separated into chapters which logically succeed one another. After expounding his
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In part two, Hume inquires into how anyone can justifiably believe that experience yields any conclusions about the world:
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Reprinted from 1777 edition, Third
Edition, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford, Sect. XII, Part III, p.165.
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The next topic which Hume strives to give treatment is that of the reliability of human testimony, and of the role that
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the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked,
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until a 1757 edition came up with the now-familiar name. It was a revision of an earlier effort, Hume's
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this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication." (Hume 1974:328)
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This short chapter begins with the notions of probability and chance. For him, "probability" means a
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This book has proven highly influential, both in the years that would immediately follow and today.
152:, published anonymously in London in 1739–40. Hume was disappointed with the reception of the
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lying, then the epistemologist has reason to be skeptical of the speaker's claims. (Hume 1974:390)
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human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail." (Hume 1974:426)
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A Bibliography of David Hume and of
Scottish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson to Lord Balfour
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In the second section he returns to the topic of hard skepticism by sharply denouncing it.
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According to Hume, we assume that experience tells us something about the world because of
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do not appear. However, more vital propositions, such as Hume's argument for the role of
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No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
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points to it as the book which woke him from his self-described "dogmatic slumber." The
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What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation?
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Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?
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He concludes the volume by setting out the limits of knowledge once and for all. "
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4. Sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding (in two parts)
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Enquiries concerning Human
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observation of constant conjunction of certain impressions across many instances
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However, Hume admits that there is one objection to his account: the problem of
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taking past experience and using it to predict the future. (Hume 1974:346-348)
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What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches?
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is on the topic of the incorrigibility of human custom. In
Section XII,
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Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?
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What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact?
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New York: Harcourt. Cited from: Passer, Michael et al. (2003).
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In Locke's terminology, this was known as the division between
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12. Of the academical or skeptical philosophy (in three parts)
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The "custom" view of learning can in many ways be likened to
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A version of this work, slightly edited for easier reading
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in different kinds of persuasion; and examinations of the
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What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?
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587:"For here is the chief and most confounding objection to
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distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions
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First
Canadian Edition. McGraw-Hill: Toronto. p. 267.
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7. Of the idea of necessary connection (in two parts)
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11. Of a particular providence and of a future state
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5. Sceptical solution of these doubts (in two parts)
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Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence
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Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding
561:. His friend argues that, though it is possible to
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Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding
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466:, a view associated with the philosopher
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183:in a theory of knowledge, are retained.
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936:Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary
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950:Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
729:Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
485:Here Hume tackles the problem of how
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295:Fig. 1. The Missing Shade of Blue
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683:(1 ed.). London: A. Millar
366:it may be replied in one word,
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805:: Mirrored at eBooks@Adelaide
964:The History of Great Britain
563:trace a cause from an effect
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819:public domain audiobook at
505:9. Of the reason of animals
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766:Kohler, Wolfgang. (1925).
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227:2. Of the origin of ideas
618:Critiques and rejoinders
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489:may be reconciled with
264:(as with the case of a
16:1748 book by David Hume
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957:The History of England
865:hosted at infidels.org
768:The mentality of apes.
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455:Nicolas Malebranche
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520:Of Miracles
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647:References
368:experience
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140:David Hume
134:empiricist
108:Wikisource
56:Philosophy
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976:Criticism
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499:free will
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346:a priori
286:dividing
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44:Language
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863:Enquiry
687:28 June
487:liberty
403:Enquiry
258:centaur
250:unicorn
208:Enquiry
202:Content
192:Enquiry
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