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practices of employment. Where the employer has failed to keep accurate or adequate records, Justice Murphy argued, the law does not deny recovery on the ground that the employee is unable to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work. Such a ruling, Murphy noted, would create a strong disincentive for employers to keep any records at all and shift the burden back onto the employee. Thus, Murphy concluded that "an employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference."
31:
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that the time clock evidence was reliable. " clocks do not necessarily record the actual time worked by employees," Murphy wrote. Since it took eight minutes for an entire shift to punch in, it would be unfair to credit the first worker in line for eight minutes of work, and the time clocks did not show the time at which employees were compelled to be on the premises or at their workbenches.
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some workers needed as many as eight minutes to reach their workbenches. Upon arriving at their workbench, employees were required to put on aprons or overalls, removed shirts, tape or grease arms, put on finger cots, prepare equipment, turn on switches, open windows, and/or assemble or sharpen tools. Such preparatory activities consumed three to four minutes.
627:
504:"Workweek" is a simple term used by Congress in accordance with the common understanding of it. For this Court to include in it items that have been customarily and generally absorbed in the rate of pay but excluded from measured working time is not justified in the absence of affirmative legislative action.
524:
The word "portal" refers to the workplace door, so "Portal-to-Portal" could be interpreted to mean that all time spent within that door is work time. However, Section 4 of the 1947 Act required that the determination of whether time spent in preliminary or postliminary activities was "work" under the
395:
The district court agreed, with one exception. The court found that the vast majority of employees were ready for work approximately five minutes before the start of work and that it seemed unreasonable that employees would not begin work as they were paid by piece rate. The court fashioned a formula
353:
Employees were given 14 minutes between each shift to punch the time clock, walk to their respective workbench and prepare for work. It took a minimum of eight minutes for all the employees to get by the time clock. The estimated walking time for employees ranged from 30 seconds to three minutes, but
432:
issued the opinion of the Court. The majority held that the court of appeals and the special master had imposed an improper standard of proof on the employees. Section 11(c) of the Act imposed upon the employer, not the worker, the duty to keep proper records of wages, hours and other conditions and
386:
to investigate the case. The special master recommended that the case be dismissed because the employees did not establish by a preponderance of evidence a violation of the Act. The special master concluded that walking time was not traditionally held to be compensable working time in the industry,
440:
Justice Murphy subsequently turned to the facts of the case. On the basis of the factual record, which proved decisive in the case, the court found that work had, in fact, begun and ended at the scheduled hours and that the employees had no basis for a claim in this regard. The court did not find
408:
upheld the district court in part, and overruled the district court in part. The court of appeals upheld the district court and special master by concluding that the employees' claims were not supported by the evidence. However, the court of appeals ruled the district court had erred by assuming
342:
passed the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938. Section 7(a) of the Act defined working time, and required employers to pay overtime wages under certain circumstances. Section 11(c) of the Act requires employers to keep accurate records regarding time on the job. Section 16(b) of the Act
454:
approach. Did the district court need to determine, down to the second, how much time was spent working? He thought not: "Split-second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor
Standards Act." Murphy reasoned, however, that the
503:
There is no evidence that
Congress meant to redefine this common term and to set aside long established contracts or customs which had absorbed in the rate of pay of the respective jobs recognition of whatever preliminary activities might be required of the worker by that particular job....
498:
Burton also argued that
Congress had never intended to redefine the term "workweek" in the Act. Preparatory work was customarily not paid overtime but included in the rate of pay, Burton said. But the majority's ruling rested in a radical redefinition of the term "workweek," Burton claimed.
444:
But the majority held that the employer required workers to be on the premises prior and subsequent to the scheduled working hours. Some of this time was clearly spent on work such as preparatory activities such as putting on aprons, sharpening tools and turning on machinery.
462:
The majority remanded the case to the district court and ordered that the court determine how much time (on average) was spent walking and how much time doing preparatory activities and to fashion an award based only the amount of time engaged in preparatory activity.
357:
Working time was calculated by the employer based on the time cards punched by the clocks. The employer deducted walking and preparatory time from the time cards based on the punched time and assumptions about how long prep work and walking would take on average.
483:
required the court to accept the special master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Burton pointed out that the majority had accepted the special master's findings of fact. How, then, could the court reject the master's findings regarding prep time?
436:
The employer may rebut such claims by producing accurate and adequate records that document the actual work performed. In the absence of such rebutting evidence, the court may award damages to the employee, even though the award is only approximate.
409:
that work would begin before the official start of working time. The court of appeals further held that the burden rested upon the employees to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they did not receive the wages to which they were entitled.
633:
373:
suit under
Section 16(b) of the FLSA alleging that the employer's calculations did not accurately reflect the time actually worked and that they were deprived of the proper amount of overtime compensation.
949:
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the Court again engaged in a fact-specific analysis to conclude that time spent waiting while in protective gear, or time spent walking in protective gear, was compensable working time.
969:
959:
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in affirming the right of pork processing plant workers in using statistics to support their back-wage claims for time spent in donning protective clothing and equipment while at work.
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that the employees had produced no reliable evidence to determine how much time they had lost, and that the employees had not shown that they were forced to wait until starting time.
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350 U.S. 247 (1956), by ruling that activities which were "integral" to work (such as the donning of protective clothing) were compensable under the FLSA and Portal-to-Portal Act.
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that held that preliminary work activities, if controlled by the employer and performed entirely for the employer's benefit, are properly included as working time under
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Unfortunately, the Portal-to-Portal Act was equally unclear as to what constituted contract, custom or practice. The
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the issue in
171:
Preliminary work activities, if controlled by the employer and performed entirely for the employer's benefit, are properly included in the statutory workweek under
350:, were employed at a large, 8-acre (32,000 m) facility. The plant was nearly a quarter-mile in length. The employees' entrance was in the northeast corner.
698:, would not be confirmed as Chief Justice until June 20, 1946. With Justice Jackson not participating in the case, the final vote for the majority was 5-2.
491:
rule, the employees would receive no award. Burton noted that employees had admitted that as little as one minute was spent in preparatory work. Under the
396:
for computing which employees were forced to wait. The district court then entered a judgment against Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co. in the amount of $ 2,415.74.
944:
939:
872:
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954:
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died on April 22, 1946. He had participated in oral argument, but his death precluded participation in a decision. Stone's successor,
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evidence clearly showed that workers did spend a "substantial measure" of time engaged in prep work. This time could be gauged under a
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Murphy dismissed arguments against vagueness in determining the compensatory award by advocating a
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847:
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Mataya, Charles J. "Supremes
Clarify Portal-to-Portal Act?" Findlaw.com. December 21, 2005.
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Nearly 50 years later, the Court again revisited the issue of what constituted "work." In
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to amend the Fair Labor
Standards Act in light of the court's ruling in
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Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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Cummins, H.J. "Tech
Workers Are Pressing the Issue of Dressing."
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Burton would have affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
123:
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About 1,200 workers at the Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. facility in
30:
783:"Supreme Court Upholds Worker Class-Action Suit Against Tyson"
525:
FLSA was to be based solely on contract, custom, or practice.
634:
public domain material from this U.S government document
317:. The decision is known as the "portal to portal case."
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United States Supreme Court cases of the Vinson Court
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List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 328
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479:. Justice Burton argued that Rule 53(e)(2) of the
487:Burton also observed that, under the majority's
343:enables employees to sue to recover lost wages.
259:Murphy, joined by Black, Reed, Douglas, Rutledge
970:Abrogated United States Supreme Court decisions
960:History of labor relations in the United States
562:, writing for the 6-to-2 majority, quoted from
501:
746:, 328 U.S. at 697-98 (Burton, J., dissenting).
8:
309:, 328 U.S. 680 (1946), is a decision by the
849:Justice Frank Murphy and American labor law
54:Anderson, et al. v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
965:Employee compensation in the United States
459:rule, and a satisfactory award fashioned.
20:
558:, No. 14-1146 (March 22, 2016). Justice
873:Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company
603:
821:New York: Harcourt, Brace World, 1963.
495:rule, almost no workers had a claim.
18:1946 United States Supreme Court case
7:
880:Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
670:Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. v. Anderson
648:Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
611:Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
306:Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
120:Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. v. Anderson
105:Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
24:Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
522:Anderson v. Mt Clemens Pottery Co.
36:Supreme Court of the United States
14:
945:United States Supreme Court cases
890:680 (1946) is available from:
866:
625:
576:
481:Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
330:, No. 14-1146 (March 22, 2016).
29:
781:Liptak, Adam (March 22, 2016).
564:Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
550:Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
382:The district court appointed a
327:Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo
322:Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
153:Petition for rehearing denied,
940:1946 in United States case law
516:In 1947, Congress enacted the
406:Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
1:
856:(100 MLR 1900, June 1, 2002).
829:"Portal to Portal For All."
548:The Supreme Court reaffirmed
475:dissented, joined by Justice
320:The Supreme Court reaffirmed
267:Burton, joined by Frankfurter
955:United States labor case law
518:Portal to Portal Act of 1947
412:The workers appealed to the
297:Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947
991:
632:This article incorporates
361:Seven employees and their
812:Minneapolis Star Tribune.
555:Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo
378:Special master's findings
295:
288:
281:
271:
184:
170:
28:
844:St. Antoine, Theodore J.
400:Court of appeals' ruling
377:
315:Fair Labor Standards Act
283:Fair Labor Standards Act
173:Fair Labor Standards Act
975:Macomb County, Michigan
653:60 F. Supp. 146
584:Organized labour portal
391:District court's ruling
348:Mount Clemens, Michigan
43:Argued January 29, 1946
819:No Lamb for Slaughter.
552:in its 2016 ruling in
506:
390:
340:United States Congress
324:in its 2016 ruling in
399:
45:Decided June 10, 1946
757:IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez
675:149 F.2d 461
541:IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez
86:3065; 11 Lab. Cas. (
922:Library of Congress
854:Michigan Law Review
531:Steiner v. Mitchell
78:66 S. Ct. 1187; 90
833:December 16, 1946.
787:The New York Times
734:, 328 U.S. at 692.
722:, 328 U.S. at 690.
710:, 328 U.S. at 687.
692:Harlan Fiske Stone
473:Harold Hitz Burton
219:William O. Douglas
195:Associate Justices
871:Works related to
477:Felix Frankfurter
302:
301:
235:Wiley B. Rutledge
231:Robert H. Jackson
211:Felix Frankfurter
118:1943); reversed,
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243:Harold H. Burton
180:Court membership
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145:706 (1945).
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371:class action
369:) brought a
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290:Abrogated by
277:Laws applied
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226:
223:Frank Murphy
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96:Case history
71:
53:
15:
681: 1945).
659: 1943).
367:Edward Lamb
363:labor union
137:. granted,
82:1515; 1946
934:Categories
805:References
657:E.D. Mich.
493:de minimis
489:de minimis
457:de minimis
451:de minimis
418:certiorari
334:Background
199:Hugo Black
150:Subsequent
116:E.D. Mich.
90:) ¶ 51,233
84:U.S. LEXIS
792:March 22,
512:Aftermath
60:Citations
878:Text of
744:Anderson
732:Anderson
720:Anderson
708:Anderson
679:6th Cir.
570:See also
471:Justice
428:Justice
256:Majority
131:6th Cir.
109:F. Supp.
467:Dissent
424:Holding
264:Dissent
166:Holding
133:1945);
925:
919:
916:
913:Justia
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907:
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239:·
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203:·
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191:vacant
122:, 149
80:L. Ed.
886:
831:Time.
764:
617:
598:Notes
157:
141:
107:, 60
101:Prior
888:U.S.
794:2016
766:U.S.
619:U.S.
404:The
338:The
159:U.S.
143:U.S.
135:cert
124:F.2d
73:more
65:U.S.
63:328
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622:680
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155:329
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88:CCH
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769:21
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