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Anonymous veto network

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1040: 789: 404: 23:(or AV-net) is a multi-party secure computation protocol to compute the boolean-OR function. It was first proposed by Feng Hao and Piotr Zieliński in 2006. This protocol presents an efficient solution to the 213: 721: 784: 664: 1035:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle x_{1}\cdot y_{1}\,+\,x_{1}\cdot y_{2}\,+\,x_{3}\cdot y_{3}\;=\;x_{1}\cdot (-x_{2}\,-\,x_{3})\,+\,x_{2}\cdot (x_{1}\,-\,x_{3})\,+\,x_{3}\cdot (x_{1}\,+\,x_{2})\;=\;0} 607: 555: 478: 249: 511: 282: 432: 160: 132: 106: 84: 62: 301: 1106: 165: 1101: 669: 734: 731:
The protocol is designed by combining random public keys in such a structured way to achieve a vanishing effect. In this case,
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if they want to send a "0" bit (no veto), or a random value if they want to send a "1" bit (veto).
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The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability
1043: 289: 1042:. A similar idea, though in a non-public-key context, can be traced back to 399:{\displaystyle g^{y_{i}}=\prod _{j<i}g^{x_{j}}/\prod _{j>i}g^{x_{j}}} 1083: 666:. On the other hand, if one or more participants vetoed, each will have 30:
A related protocol that securely computes a boolean-count function is
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Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop on Security Protocols
284:. A detailed description of a method for such proofs is found in 108:
in which the discrete logarithm problem is hard. For example, a
208:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle x_{i}\,\in _{R}\,\mathbb {Z} _{q}} 716:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle \prod g^{c_{i}y_{i}}\;\neq \;1} 779:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle \sum {x_{i}\cdot y_{i}}\;=\;0} 659:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle \prod g^{c_{i}y_{i}}\;=\;1} 1086:
Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1, No, 1, pp. 65-75, 1988
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For example, if there are three participants, then 737: 672: 615: 566: 519: 490: 440: 418: 304: 261: 221: 168: 146: 118: 92: 70: 48: 134:participants, the protocol executes in two rounds. 1034: 778: 715: 658: 601: 549: 505: 472: 426: 398: 276: 243: 207: 154: 126: 100: 78: 56: 602:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle \prod g^{c_{i}y_{i}}} 295:After this round, each participant computes: 8: 550:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle c_{i}\;=\;x_{i}} 473:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle g^{c_{i}y_{i}}} 1027: 1023: 877: 873: 771: 767: 708: 704: 651: 647: 535: 531: 1014: 1009: 1005: 999: 983: 978: 974: 965: 960: 956: 950: 934: 929: 925: 916: 911: 907: 901: 882: 867: 854: 849: 845: 839: 826: 821: 817: 811: 798: 791: 760: 747: 742: 736: 696: 686: 681: 671: 639: 629: 624: 614: 590: 580: 575: 565: 560:After round 2, each participant computes 540: 525: 518: 496: 489: 461: 451: 446: 439: 417: 388: 383: 367: 358: 350: 345: 329: 314: 309: 303: 267: 260: 232: 227: 220: 198: 194: 193: 191: 185: 180: 174: 167: 145: 117: 91: 69: 47: 1058: 215:and publishes the ephemeral public key 16:Multi-party secure computation protocol 244:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle g^{x_{i}}} 609:. If no one vetoed, each will obtain 7: 506:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle c_{i}} 277:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle x_{i}} 42:All participants agree on a group 14: 1067:A 2-round anonymous veto protocol 513:. Here, the participants chose 1020: 992: 971: 943: 922: 891: 484:for the proof of the exponent 427:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle i} 255:for the proof of the exponent 155:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle i} 127:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle n} 101:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle q} 79:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle g} 57:{\displaystyle \scriptstyle G} 1: 1048:Dining cryptographers problem 112:can be used. For a group of 25:Dining cryptographers problem 1046:'s original solution to the 1123: 1107:Zero-knowledge protocols 1102:Public-key cryptography 162:selects a random value 1065:F. Hao, P. Zieliński. 1036: 780: 717: 660: 603: 551: 507: 474: 428: 400: 278: 245: 209: 156: 128: 102: 80: 58: 21:anonymous veto network 1037: 781: 718: 661: 604: 552: 508: 475: 429: 401: 279: 246: 210: 157: 129: 103: 81: 59: 19:In cryptography, the 790: 735: 670: 613: 564: 517: 488: 482:zero-knowledge proof 438: 416: 302: 259: 253:zero-knowledge proof 219: 166: 144: 116: 90: 68: 46: 727:The protocol design 412:: each participant 140:: each participant 1032: 1031: 776: 775: 713: 712: 656: 655: 599: 598: 547: 546: 503: 502: 470: 469: 424: 423: 396: 378: 340: 274: 273: 241: 240: 205: 204: 152: 151: 124: 123: 98: 97: 76: 75: 54: 53: 363: 325: 64:with a generator 32:open vote network 1114: 1087: 1080: 1074: 1063: 1041: 1039: 1038: 1033: 1019: 1018: 1004: 1003: 988: 987: 970: 969: 955: 954: 939: 938: 921: 920: 906: 905: 887: 886: 872: 871: 859: 858: 844: 843: 831: 830: 816: 815: 803: 802: 785: 783: 782: 777: 766: 765: 764: 752: 751: 722: 720: 719: 714: 703: 702: 701: 700: 691: 690: 665: 663: 662: 657: 646: 645: 644: 643: 634: 633: 608: 606: 605: 600: 597: 596: 595: 594: 585: 584: 556: 554: 553: 548: 545: 544: 530: 529: 512: 510: 509: 504: 501: 500: 479: 477: 476: 471: 468: 467: 466: 465: 456: 455: 433: 431: 430: 425: 405: 403: 402: 397: 395: 394: 393: 392: 377: 362: 357: 356: 355: 354: 339: 321: 320: 319: 318: 283: 281: 280: 275: 272: 271: 251:together with a 250: 248: 247: 242: 239: 238: 237: 236: 214: 212: 211: 206: 203: 202: 197: 190: 189: 179: 178: 161: 159: 158: 153: 133: 131: 130: 125: 107: 105: 104: 99: 85: 83: 82: 77: 63: 61: 60: 55: 1122: 1121: 1117: 1116: 1115: 1113: 1112: 1111: 1092: 1091: 1090: 1081: 1077: 1064: 1060: 1056: 1010: 995: 979: 961: 946: 930: 912: 897: 878: 863: 850: 835: 822: 807: 794: 788: 787: 756: 743: 733: 732: 729: 692: 682: 677: 668: 667: 635: 625: 620: 611: 610: 586: 576: 571: 562: 561: 536: 521: 515: 514: 492: 486: 485: 457: 447: 442: 436: 435: 414: 413: 384: 379: 346: 341: 310: 305: 300: 299: 263: 257: 256: 228: 223: 217: 216: 192: 181: 170: 164: 163: 142: 141: 114: 113: 88: 87: 86:of prime order 66: 65: 44: 43: 40: 17: 12: 11: 5: 1120: 1118: 1110: 1109: 1104: 1094: 1093: 1089: 1088: 1075: 1057: 1055: 1052: 1030: 1026: 1022: 1017: 1013: 1008: 1002: 998: 994: 991: 986: 982: 977: 973: 968: 964: 959: 953: 949: 945: 942: 937: 933: 928: 924: 919: 915: 910: 904: 900: 896: 893: 890: 885: 881: 876: 870: 866: 862: 857: 853: 848: 842: 838: 834: 829: 825: 820: 814: 810: 806: 801: 797: 774: 770: 763: 759: 755: 750: 746: 741: 728: 725: 711: 707: 699: 695: 689: 685: 680: 676: 654: 650: 642: 638: 632: 628: 623: 619: 593: 589: 583: 579: 574: 570: 543: 539: 534: 528: 524: 499: 495: 464: 460: 454: 450: 445: 422: 407: 406: 391: 387: 382: 376: 373: 370: 366: 361: 353: 349: 344: 338: 335: 332: 328: 324: 317: 313: 308: 270: 266: 235: 231: 226: 201: 196: 188: 184: 177: 173: 150: 122: 96: 74: 52: 39: 36: 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 1119: 1108: 1105: 1103: 1100: 1099: 1097: 1085: 1082:David Chaum. 1079: 1076: 1072: 1068: 1062: 1059: 1053: 1051: 1049: 1045: 1028: 1024: 1015: 1011: 1006: 1000: 996: 989: 984: 980: 975: 966: 962: 957: 951: 947: 940: 935: 931: 926: 917: 913: 908: 902: 898: 894: 888: 883: 879: 874: 868: 864: 860: 855: 851: 846: 840: 836: 832: 827: 823: 818: 812: 808: 804: 799: 795: 772: 768: 761: 757: 753: 748: 744: 739: 726: 724: 709: 705: 697: 693: 687: 683: 678: 674: 652: 648: 640: 636: 630: 626: 621: 617: 591: 587: 581: 577: 572: 568: 558: 541: 537: 532: 526: 522: 497: 493: 483: 462: 458: 452: 448: 443: 420: 411: 389: 385: 380: 374: 371: 368: 364: 359: 351: 347: 342: 336: 333: 330: 326: 322: 315: 311: 306: 298: 297: 296: 293: 291: 287: 268: 264: 254: 233: 229: 224: 199: 186: 182: 175: 171: 148: 139: 135: 120: 111: 110:Schnorr group 94: 72: 50: 37: 35: 34:(or OV-net). 33: 28: 26: 22: 1078: 1070: 1061: 730: 559: 409: 408: 294: 137: 136: 41: 29: 20: 18: 1044:David Chaum 38:Description 1096:Categories 1054:References 434:publishes 990:⋅ 958:− 941:⋅ 909:− 895:− 889:⋅ 861:⋅ 833:⋅ 805:⋅ 754:⋅ 740:∑ 706:≠ 675:∏ 618:∏ 569:∏ 365:∏ 327:∏ 183:∈ 1073:, 2006. 410:Round 2 138:Round 1 480:and a 288:  372:> 334:< 290:8235 286:RFC 1098:: 1069:. 1050:. 723:. 292:. 27:. 1029:0 1025:= 1021:) 1016:2 1012:x 1007:+ 1001:1 997:x 993:( 985:3 981:x 976:+ 972:) 967:3 963:x 952:1 948:x 944:( 936:2 932:x 927:+ 923:) 918:3 914:x 903:2 899:x 892:( 884:1 880:x 875:= 869:3 865:y 856:3 852:x 847:+ 841:2 837:y 828:1 824:x 819:+ 813:1 809:y 800:1 796:x 773:0 769:= 762:i 758:y 749:i 745:x 710:1 698:i 694:y 688:i 684:c 679:g 653:1 649:= 641:i 637:y 631:i 627:c 622:g 592:i 588:y 582:i 578:c 573:g 542:i 538:x 533:= 527:i 523:c 498:i 494:c 463:i 459:y 453:i 449:c 444:g 421:i 390:j 386:x 381:g 375:i 369:j 360:/ 352:j 348:x 343:g 337:i 331:j 323:= 316:i 312:y 307:g 269:i 265:x 234:i 230:x 225:g 200:q 195:Z 187:R 176:i 172:x 149:i 121:n 95:q 73:g 51:G

Index

Dining cryptographers problem
open vote network
Schnorr group
zero-knowledge proof
RFC
8235
zero-knowledge proof
David Chaum
Dining cryptographers problem
A 2-round anonymous veto protocol
The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability
Categories
Public-key cryptography
Zero-knowledge protocols

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