31:
242:'s interdependent pricing may provide a means for achieving recoupment, and thus may form the basis of a primary-line injury claim. Predatory pricing schemes, in general, are implausible, and are even more improbable when they require
249:
Since there is a high likelihood that any attempt by one oligopolist to discipline a rival by cutting prices will produce an outbreak of competition; and since a predator's present losses fall on it alone, while the later
225:
must show not only changes in market conditions adverse to its interests, as a threshold matter, but must show on the merits that (1) the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs,
408:
318:
72:
299:
246:
among several firms. They are least likely to occur where, as alleged here, the cooperation among firms is tacit, since effective tacit coordination is difficult to achieve.
388:
383:
413:
398:
393:
93:
Brown & Williamson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it did not engage in predatory pricing in violation of §2 of the
214:
35:
230:(2) that the competitor had a reasonable prospect or a "dangerous probability" of recouping its investment in the alleged scheme.
403:
254:
profits must be shared with every other oligopolist in proportion to its market share, including the intended victim.
281:
251:
356:
140:
322:
94:
64:
274:
273:
for predatory price discrimination when recoupment is alleged to take place through supracompetitive
338:
270:
285:
243:
222:
132:
112:
258:
164:
152:
329:
347:
266:
144:
128:
377:
156:
67:
199:
120:
239:
218:
79:
365:
288:
did not create competitive injury in violation of
Robinson-Patman Act.
30:
181:
Kennedy, joined by
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas
315:
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.
210:
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.
54:
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.
24:
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.
409:
United States
Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court
300:
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co.
193:
185:
177:
172:
101:
87:
59:
49:
42:
23:
303:(applying the same analysis to "predatory buying")
8:
20:
280:Competitor's alleged below-cost sales of
217:case in which the court required that an
18:1993 United States Supreme Court case
7:
189:Stevens, joined by White, Blackmun
36:Supreme Court of the United States
14:
389:United States Supreme Court cases
325:209 (1993) is available from:
384:United States antitrust case law
29:
414:History of Louisville, Kentucky
399:United States tobacco case law
394:1993 in United States case law
284:through discriminatory volume
1:
213:, 509 U.S. 209 (1993), was a
269:rule of nonliability under
215:United States Supreme Court
430:
366:Oyez (oral argument audio)
198:
106:
92:
28:
404:Brown & Williamson
95:Sherman Antitrust Act
78:113 S. Ct. 2578; 125
45:Decided June 21, 1993
43:Argued March 29, 1993
357:Library of Congress
271:Robinson-Patman Act
221:plaintiff alleging
141:Sandra Day O'Connor
282:generic cigarettes
244:coordinated action
117:Associate Justices
275:oligopoly pricing
223:predatory pricing
206:
205:
113:William Rehnquist
421:
370:
364:
361:
355:
352:
346:
343:
337:
334:
328:
252:supracompetitive
102:Court membership
33:
32:
21:
429:
428:
424:
423:
422:
420:
419:
418:
374:
373:
368:
362:
359:
353:
350:
344:
341:
335:
332:
326:
310:
295:
259:Justice Kennedy
236:
165:Clarence Thomas
155:
153:Anthony Kennedy
143:
133:John P. Stevens
131:
83:
44:
38:
19:
12:
11:
5:
427:
425:
417:
416:
411:
406:
401:
396:
391:
386:
376:
375:
372:
371:
339:Google Scholar
309:
308:External links
306:
305:
304:
294:
291:
290:
289:
278:
261:, held that:
235:
232:
204:
203:
196:
195:
191:
190:
187:
183:
182:
179:
175:
174:
170:
169:
168:
167:
145:Antonin Scalia
129:Harry Blackmun
118:
115:
110:
104:
103:
99:
98:
90:
89:
85:
84:
77:
61:
57:
56:
51:
50:Full case name
47:
46:
40:
39:
34:
26:
25:
17:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
426:
415:
412:
410:
407:
405:
402:
400:
397:
395:
392:
390:
387:
385:
382:
381:
379:
367:
358:
349:
340:
331:
324:
320:
316:
312:
311:
307:
302:
301:
297:
296:
292:
287:
283:
279:
276:
272:
268:
264:
263:
262:
260:
255:
253:
247:
245:
241:
233:
231:
229:
224:
220:
216:
212:
211:
201:
197:
192:
188:
184:
180:
176:
173:Case opinions
171:
166:
162:
158:
154:
150:
146:
142:
138:
134:
130:
126:
122:
119:
116:
114:
111:
109:Chief Justice
108:
107:
105:
100:
96:
91:
86:
81:
75:
74:
69:
66:
62:
58:
55:
52:
48:
41:
37:
27:
22:
16:
314:
298:
265:There is no
257:Ultimately,
256:
248:
237:
227:
209:
208:
207:
194:Laws applied
160:
157:David Souter
148:
136:
124:
71:
53:
15:
200:Clayton Act
121:Byron White
378:Categories
240:oligopoly
219:antitrust
80:L. Ed. 2d
60:Citations
313:Text of
293:See also
178:Majority
330:Cornell
286:rebates
234:Holding
186:Dissent
88:Holding
369:
363:
360:
354:
351:
348:Justia
345:
342:
336:
333:
327:
267:per se
163:
161:·
159:
151:
149:·
147:
139:
137:·
135:
127:
125:·
123:
321:
277:, but
323:U.S.
73:more
65:U.S.
63:509
319:509
238:An
228:and
82:168
68:209
380::
317:,
202:§2
97:.
76:)
70:(
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.