141:, and it became an essential component of Nicaraguan development strategy. Cuban aid was more beneficial than most countries' because it came in the form of grants and unconditional loans. (Roberto Perez, 1987) During the Somoza period, Nicaragua had been nearly 90% dependent on the US for assistance. In 1980, Cuban-Nicaraguan aid relations became formalized with the formation of the Mixed Commission for Scientific, Economic and Technical Cooperation. This commission is represented on the Cuban side by the State of Committee for Economic Cooperation and on the Nicaraguan side by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation. New aid agreements were negotiated every year within the framework of the commission. In this context the commission provides a vehicle for Nicaragua to present its various needs and for Cuba to evaluate which ones they can fulfill. From 1979 to 1987, the commission oversaw approximately 300 million dollars (US) in aid to Nicaragua, which according to Prevost does not include
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island. The relationship was made possible because of Cuba's commitment to the strategy of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Once the
Sandinistas assumed power, Cuba gave Nicaragua military advice, as well as aid in education, health care, vocational training and industry building for the impoverished
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dictatorship, DGI involvement in the new
Sandinista government expanded rapidly. An early indication of the central role that the DGI would play in the Cuban-Nicaraguan relationship was a meeting in
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on July 27, 1979, at which diplomatic ties between the two countries were re-established after more than 25 years. Julián López Díaz, a prominent DGI agent, was named Cuban
Ambassador to Nicaragua.
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commented that "of all the countries in Latin
America, the most active work being carried out by us is in Nicaragua." After the successful ouster of the
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leaders and had a strong influence over the organization. In 1969 the DGI had financed and organized an operation to free the jailed
Sandinista leader
51:(DGI) had begun to establish ties with various Nicaraguan revolutionary organizations. By 1970 the DGI had managed to train hundreds of Sandinista
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were strongly influenced by Cuba. The
Sandinista leaders acknowledged that the FSLN owed a great debt to the
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The Soviet Union and
Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional Comparisons
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While the Cubans would like to have helped more in the development of
Nicaragua towards
28:(FSLN) both before and after they took power in 1979. This was prompted by their shared
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The Sword and the Shield: The
Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB
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was hijacked by the FSLN, he was again freed and allowed to travel to Cuba.
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and DGI advisors, initially brought in during the
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Nicaraguan economy. In return, Nicaragua provided Cuba with
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Fauriol, Georges Alfred; Loser, Eva (1 January 1990).
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32:ideologies and resistance to the policies of the
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188:Shultz, Richard H. (12 September 1988).
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215:Andrew, Christopher (September 2000).
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261:Sandinista National Liberation Front
104:and the assistance they gave to the
26:Sandinista National Liberation Front
170:. Transaction Publishers. p.
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166:Cuba: The International Dimension
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108:. Following the more overt US
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219:. Basic Books. p. 385.
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204:– via Google Books.
72:Manuel "Redbeard" Piñeiro
49:Dirección de Inteligencia
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44:Beginning in 1967, the
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76:right-wing
70:DGI chief
61:Costa Rica
126:communist
98:socialism
53:guerrilla
22:Nicaragua
20:assisted
106:Contras
30:Marxist
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131:grains
83:Havana
79:Somoza
46:Cuban
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196:ISBN
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