Cambodian Marine Corps - Knowledge (XXG)

425:(ANK) territorial companies to the MNK; two additional battalions – 9th BFM and 10th BFM – began to be formed in October. Initially intended solely for static defence, the BFMs deployment now paralleled the ANK, with the Marines being used more aggressively as intervention forces on offensive operations in conjunction with MNK riverine forces. By August 1974, all marine battalions were required to keep at least one of its rifle companies totally outfitted and ready to be deployed as a quick mobile intervention force ( 395:(MNK) Fleet Command to rapidly expand the CFMK to ten battalions in October, but only four BFMs totalling 3,000 men were fully operational by the end of the year. During the first three years of the war the Marines remained a small static defence force – by March 1972 the MNK Marine Corps' strength had decreased to 2,400 men after the disbandment of 2nd BFM, which reduced the number of its battalions from four to three. They were still tasked with protecting the MNK main riverine base at Chrui Chhangwar and the 66: 30: 522:. It was to be the final amphibious operation of the Cambodian Marine Corps – despite their best efforts, the weakened BFMs posted in the Mekong Special Zone bore the brunt of the Khmer Rouge offensive and resistance crumbled, with desertions reportedly becoming rampant. By February 17, the MNK Fleet Command abandoned any attempts to re-open the lower Mekong and Bassac corridors, and with the loss of 54: 505:) comparable to that paid by the ANK. This led to frequent desertions from the ranks of the BFMs and forced some of its members to leave their posts to moonlight on second jobs. Although the attribution of combat bonuses and the distribution of free rice did much to restore morale in the BFMs on several occasions, it did not completely stop the desertions, and the problem was never rectified. 594:) and Brigades or even a single Marine Division. The BFMs were autonomous light infantry units that often operated independently from each other, though two or more companies from different battalions could be assembled to form temporary combat task-forces in amphibious assault operations, such as during the battles of 574:

model into a battalion headquarters (HQ), three company HQs and three rifle companies. In reality however, the BFMs rarely matched this proposed organization, with most battalions actually falling below strength – some units fielded three incomplete rifle companies (with an average strength of 507

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in the namesake adjoining lake, though 10th BFM had yet to be filled by the year's end. Employed extensively in the offensive role for nearly a year and a half, by September 1974 the Cambodian Marines were starting to show signs of heavy strain. Casualties and manpower shortages seriously affected

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During the last three months of the War, the MNK Marine Corps reached a strength of 6,500 men on twelve battalions, and aggressiveness and greatly increased mobility characterized their operations. The MNK riverine forces and the Marines conducted on January 18, 1975, Operation "Sailor", a

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or CFM for short) was raised with a strength of just 150 Marines trained and led by Lt. Chum, subsequently enlarged to 200 men by 1969. They were never used in their intended amphibious role, being assigned primarily with guarding the MRK headquarters and main naval facilities at the

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This situation lasted until early 1973, when the MNK was once again authorized to double the strength of its Marine Corps, including an ambitious expansion to thirty battalions though the actual number of BFMs never came close. In May of that year, 2nd BFM was re-activated at

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on April 1, the strangulation of the Cambodian Capital was completed. The remaining Marine battalions were pulled back to Phnom Penh to help defending the city and the respective MNK riverine base at Chrui Chhangwar, while others withdrew to the

375:– BFM). Raised for static defence and designated respectively 1st BFM and 2nd BFM, each battalion had an authorized strength of 607 men. Two further battalions – 3rd BFM and 4th BFM – were in the process of being formed by the time of the 455:

By December 1973 the MNK Marine Corps aligned eight fully operational battalions: 1st BFM and 3rd BFM were at Ream and 4th BFM was allocated at Chrui Chhangwar, whilst the other four – 2nd, 6th, 7th, and 8th BFMs – were deployed in the

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near the south Vietnamese border, followed by the creation of four new battalions at Chrui Chhangwar – 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th BFMs – after a concerted recruiting effort and by the transfer of 3,000 soldiers from recently disbanded

1226: 445:; they also patrolled the coastline and continued to provide harbour security to both military and civilian sea and river ports. In addition, the Marines provided cadre personnel for the new 272:– GIM) consisting of two marine commando companies totalling 200 men, envisaged to be used on amphibious operations. The GIM never surpassed the planning stage however, though a MRK officer, 1231: 497:

their tactical deployment, resulting in poor discipline and low morale. Due to budgetary restraints, the Marines received insufficient rice rations and were denied hazardous duty pay (

367:. Late that same year, the 200-strong CFM was amalgamated with 1,014 ex-Royal Khmer Army troops recently transferred to the MRK to form the nucleus of two new marine rifle battalions ( 602:. The Cambodian Marine Corps had no organic armour, artillery, motor transport, medical or engineer support units, so Marine battalions were completely reliant on the MNK, the 433:– FIM) for emergencies at all times. The BFMs fought as an interdiction force along most of the country's major waterways by spearheading amphibious assaults to secure 319:

The MRK naval infantry branch was officially established in 1960 but initial progress was slow – it was not until 1965 that a single marine rifle company (

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to 418 men), while others had two full-strength companies (365 to 312 men) or consisted of a single, understrength company that could field just 118 men.

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Only a few Marines and their civilian dependents managed to escape on April 17 from Ream with the vessels of the MNK Sea Patrol Force that reached

403:. During this period, at least one BFM comprising 493 men was sent in October 1972 to South Vietnam to be trained by US Marine advisors under the 1221: 1150: 570:

The basic unit of the Cambodian Marine Corps was the battalion or BFM comprising 577 to 607 men, theoretically organized according to the

81: 59: 1075: 1081: 1078: 622: 583: 1136: 1178: 1122: 1108: 1065: 1051: 480:

corridors; meanwhile, 5th BFM was still undergoing training at Chrui Chhangwar. That same month, 9th BFM was brought to strength at

1211: 740: 404: 730: 335: 559: 1216: 720: 626: 136: 407:(UITG); as for the remaining BFMs however, their training took place in Cambodia, at the Chrui Chhangwar naval base. 735: 579: 131: 725: 493: 172: 168: 481: 376: 783: 618: 176: 710: 446: 256:

The origins of the Cambodian Marines can be traced back to December 1955, when the Royal Khmer Navy (

705: 603: 595: 422: 417: 392: 388: 329: 245: 233: 146: 102: 550:, their bodies dumped into shallow graves dug in forest areas or were sent to be 're-educated' in 610:(KAF) for river and road transport, casualty evacuation and air, armoured and artillery support. 489: 184: 1174: 1160: 1146: 1132: 1118: 1104: 1061: 1047: 745: 285: 201: 205: 715: 638: 293: 180: 97: 29: 630: 607: 587: 528: 498: 485: 461: 426: 400: 396: 368: 320: 301: 277: 265: 257: 237: 229: 555: 309: 86: 71: 1131:(Marine Corps Vietnam Operational Historical Series), Marine Corps Association, 1990. 1205: 586:(VNMC), the Cambodian Marines were never consolidated into Regiments, Half-Brigades ( 542:

on May 9; their comrades at the Chrui Chhangwar riverine base who surrendered to the

1074:, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C. 1980. – available online at 646: 642: 547: 477: 209: 476:), a MNK tactical area and special military zone that run along the lower Mekong- 578:

There were no major, long-standing formations above battalion level. Unlike the

571: 551: 543: 539: 515: 442: 523: 519: 364: 273: 150: 350: 337: 637:– EMG). Instead, it answered directly to the MNK Chief of Naval Operations, 535: 434: 546:

were not so fortunate. They were reportedly rounded up and either shot by

264:– MRK) Fleet Command began drawing plans to raise a Naval Infantry Group ( 449: 313: 289: 113: 621:(VNN) belonged operationally to the Joint General Staff (JGS) of the 599: 438: 1196: 625:

as part of their General Reserve, the CFMK was not placed under the

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forces from a few strategic islands in the Mekong located close to

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and conducting clearing operations on islands located in the lower

614: 1145:, Men-at-arms series 458, Osprey Publishing Ltd, Oxford 2010. 1060:, Men-at-arms series 209, Osprey Publishing Ltd, London 1989. 1191: 1159:, Weapon series 57, Osprey Publishing Ltd, Oxford 2017. 1044: