Battle of Cassinga - Knowledge (XXG)

1032:(SADF) intelligence reports had ascertained that SWAPO – and probably its advisers – was lulled into a false sense of security because of Cassinga's distance from the Namibian border to the south. South African military intelligence briefings before the event indicated no awareness of any nearby supportive infantry or armoured units to support the base against a ground assault, and although SWAPO had been constructing a system of integrated defensive trenches and firing points for wheeled/tracked AFVs and AAA units, they were not then prepared for a joint-arms airborne attack. The SADF had not previously demonstrated any such capability, giving military analysts no reason to suspect that such an option was available to the SADF planners. The planners therefore believed that they could conduct a surprise attack on the base using only a lightly-armed airborne force. Earlier in that year, SAAF 12 Squadron had commenced training for a low-level strike role, utilising anti-personnel weapons such as 1762:

to see the armoured vehicles, the paratroopers could hear their engines and gunfire, and could see trees being flattened in their path barely 200 metres (660 ft) away. In a desperate attempt to prevent the Cuban tanks from firing at the vulnerable helicopters and the assembling SA troops waiting to be picked up, the Buccaneer pilot dived his aircraft dangerously low, nearly hitting trees as he flew close over the top of the tanks in mock attacks, disorienting the crews and forcing them to break off their developing attack on the Parabats' positions. There were several holes in the airframe, including one on the armoured front visor glass, needing swift patching by groundcrew after landing, refuelling and re-arming.

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from the border and deep inside Angola. This meant that any conventional assault force would have to fight its way in and out, and would almost certainly have given advance warning to the PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia – SWAPO's armed wing) soldiers in Cassinga, allowing them and leaders like Jerobeum 'Dimo' Amaambo (the PLAN commander-in-chief, then resident in Cassinga) and Greenwell Matongo to escape. Cassinga furthermore was located on a small hill, flanked by a river on its West side, and open fields in other directions, factors that combined to give any defenders the advantage.

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Area (HAA), where the helicopters used in the operation could refuel. On board the two helicopters were Commandant James Kriel, the commander of the South African Air Force's Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT) and his signaller, as well as Major James Hills, commander of Bravo Company, 1 Bn, along with one ten-man section from the two Hawk Groups he would be using to protect the HAA. Also in the two helicopters were six 200-litre drums of helicopter fuel, and, to the consternation of Hills, the Chief of the South African Army, Lieutenant-General

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mode of "kill or be killed", in which preventing the deaths of the civilians in the trenches was allegedly impossible. Though a number of civilians were killed in those trenches, as the paratroopers moved forward encountered less and less civilians until nearer the guns all those in the trenches, male and female, were wearing SWAPO's Cuban-style uniforms. In the meantime, 9 Platoon had entered the trenches from the north, though were making slow progress as they came under the attention of the gunners.

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for a detachment of 'African police' with one truck. In debriefs, when questioned by commanders and aircrew of the 2 strike components, Canberras and Buccaneers, he insisted that the Cuban formation being just some 15 km to the south at Techamutete was 'a complete surprise and must have been deployed there in recent days'. Certainly, no photo reconnaissance over that village/road junction was ordered, but could easily have been included in the later Canberra PR overflights of Cassinga.

865:, who accompanied Hamaambo when the village was first occupied, the first Namibian inhabitants of Cassinga consisted entirely of trained PLAN combatants. Not long after the establishment of the PLAN camp at Cassinga, it began to function also as a transit camp for Namibian exiles. The Angolan government allocated the abandoned village to SWAPO in 1976 to cope with the influx of thousands of refugees from South West Africa, estimated in May 1978 to total 3,000 to 4,000 people. 76: 1091:, refers to Cassinga as "a large SWAPO base located 260 km north of the border. It is the operational military headquarters of SWAPO from where all operations against SWA are planned and their execution co-ordinated. From this base all supplies and armaments are provided to the bases further forward. Here training also takes place. In short, it is probably the most important SWAPO base in Angola. The nearest Cuban base is 15 km South of Alpha." 1542:' balls, designed to bounce up to 10 metres (33 ft) into the air before detonating. A zone of some 800 metres by 500 metres was carpeted, each aircraft having its own 'bomb line'. The weapons were devastatingly effective against the assembled groupings below, causing most of SWAPO's casualties on the day, and also destroying vehicles, POL ("Petroleum Oil Lubricants", military acronym for flammable liquids) storage tanks and soft buildings. 1770:

left behind. The helicopters flew a total of four low passes looking for paratroopers, when one of the helicopter pilots spotted a Cuban tank appearing from the bushes. He warned the other Puma pilot, who was able to bank away just in time so that the tank round missed the aircraft. No paratroopers were found and the two Pumas returned to the HAA. The dismantling of the HAA continued throughout the rest of the day.

3633: 3623: 1124: 1237:, believing it was long and wide enough to drop the paratroopers, when in fact it wasn't. This 'scale error' also mispositioned the 'Warning' and 'Drop' points on the run-in to drop. Compounding this error, the pilot of the lead aircraft was momentarily distracted by the effects of the bombing, and issued the 'jump' signal a few seconds late. The net effect was that many paratroopers overshot their intended 1370: 1673:

possibility. Brigadier Du Plessis insisted on extracting all the troops immediately, however Colonel Breytenbach wanted to secure the LZ first. A compromise was agreed whereby half the paratroopers would move to the LZ where 12 Puma helicopters would extract them, while the remainder would continue clearing operations, as well as to collect any and all documents of intelligence value.

1433: 1719:(HLZ) east of Cassinga where Breytenbach was organising the remaining paratroopers for final extraction. In the face of the oncoming armoured column, Breytenbach ordered a thin defensive line, but realised the lightly armed paratroopers stood little chance against the armoured vehicles and prepared to fall-back into the bush to an emergency LZ while calling urgently for air support. 1806:, and in the face of a SWAPO propaganda campaign that labelled the event a massacre. Despite inflicting heavy casualties, the SADF did not kill or capture Dimo Amaambo or any other senior SWAPO leaders. The SADF casualties were low for such an attack, an important factor in South Africa where the public was intolerant of high casualty rates: Three soldiers were killed, one was 187: 1626: 83: 1704:

uncoordinated and disorganised. It wasn't made initially clear to the commander of the helicopter extraction force quite what the problem – and the sudden urgency – was. Furthermore, two engineers, whose role was to destroy enemy equipment, departed in the first wave with all the demolition fuses before all the equipment had been disabled.

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treating the worst of the injured. Overall, three paratroopers had been killed, and eleven wounded, two of them critically. In addition, a fourth paratrooper was found to be missing, presumed killed. It was later assumed that he had drowned after being dropped in the river during the parachute jump, or that his parachute had malfunctioned.

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responsible for the co-ordination of all PLAN actions in Southern Angola, including incursions into South West Africa/Namibia. A headquarters such as Cassinga was second in importance only to Lubango, which was the overall SWAPO military headquarters in Angola. Aside from the system of trenches and bunkers, defensive equipment included two

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Africa for interrogation, had to be released to lighten the aircraft. Some excess equipment and ammunition was also dumped from the overloaded helicopters. A final barrage of fire from the paratroopers stalled the closing Cuban armour just sufficiently long enough to complete the extraction of the assembled paratroops.

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The Angolans were first to publish details of the attack, followed shortly thereafter by SWAPO press statements that supported and elaborated on the Angolan account. They described the base as a refugee camp and claimed the SADF had slaughtered 600 defenceless refugees. The bodies were buried in two

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According to General Geldenhuys the raid was a "jewel of military craftmanship", but politically it was a disaster for the apartheid regime. A media campaign had been carefully prepared well in advance of the operation and media releases managed in order to create an impression that SADF intervention

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Because of the disorganisation with the first wave of helicopters, there was nearly not enough space for all the remaining paratroopers and prisoners on the second wave. In the ensuing chaos and panic to scramble aboard the helicopters, 40 SWAPO prisoners, intended to be taken back to South West

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The Buccaneer ran out of ammunition at this point, but this coincided with the arrival of the 17 helicopters to extract the remaining paratroopers in the second wave. The helicopters' arrival betrayed the position of the LZ to the remaining Cuban forces, who began to advance on the area. While unable

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Upon entering the trenches, the men from D-Company were surprised to find a number of civilians, whom they later asserted were being used as human shields by the guerrillas hiding inside. The guerrillas opened fire on the paratroopers, leading the paratroopers to enter what they described later as a

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Immediately after the Canberras came the Buccaneers, from the west, who flew their dive-bombing runs along a generally east–west axis. Photography from the cockpit of one of the aircraft showed the graphic lines of the preceding "Alpha" bomb strikes, was released to the SA press the following day. Of

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However ten minutes after taking off, two of the Puma helicopters were directed to return to Cassinga, as it was feared that some of the paratroopers might have been left behind. They spotted a group of people huddled together, but closer inspection revealed that they were the prisoners who had been

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engagement as D-Company paratroopers were mistakenly fired upon by their fellow soldiers from B-Company, which by then had reached the base, but there were no casualties. After completing the assault of the engineer complex, D-Company moved south to set up a stop-line and prevent any guerrillas from

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where they had problems linking up. The resultant confusion caused numerous delays, ruining the schedule of the 'drop-to-contact' plan, and much of the advantage of surprise. The disastrous drop also meant that it would be nearly an hour before C-Company was able to move into position on the eastern

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became airborne and settled into a holding pattern just south of the border. At the same time, a flight of two Puma helicopters, under the command of Major John Church, took off from 'a jungle night-stop' to fly to a clearing 22 km east of Cassinga in order to set up a Helicopter Administration

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operations. Their strength was estimated at 144 in October 1977, and was a major contributing factor in the choice of air rather than a ground assault. In briefing the strike aircrew, the SAAF Chief of Staff Intelligence was specific that there was no known military formation within 80 miles, except

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imagery, some to be used in the preparation of photo-strip maps for the Tactical Low Flying (TLF) legs that the various aircraft types would undertake – there being inadequate conventional mapping of much of the region – and additional and up-to-date detailed imagery of the Cassinga environs for the

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was specifically tasked to take photographs and instructed to focus on images supporting the South African cause; bodies were only to be photographed with weapons by their side. Negative images, such as suffering victims, were to be avoided. Nevertheless, in spite of these instructions, pictures of

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According to an Angolan government white paper, the official toll of the Cassinga Raid was a total of 624 dead and 611 injured civilians as well as combatants. Among the dead were 167 women and 298 teenagers and children. Since many of the combatants were female or teenagers and many combatants did

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Brigadier Du Plessis at this time informed Colonel Breytenbach of a radio interception, indicating that the Cuban force at Techamutete was deploying. The SADF had been given explicit operational instructions to avoid conflict with the Cubans, but delays on the part of SADF now made that a distinct

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The two independent rifle platoons, No.9 and No.11, were dropped quite accurately to the north. They immediately went into action, moving through a tented camp to the north-west of Cassinga, beyond the bombed areas. Resistance was fierce but short-lived, and a total of 54 bodies were counted by the

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Because of the secrecy involved in the operation, and the commitment of most of the professional "permanent force" troops and "national servicemen" conscripts of 1 Bn in other operations, it was decided to use 2 and 3 Parachute Battalions (2 Bn & 3 Bn), both reserve or "Citizen Force" units, in

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The planners for the operation were faced with a significant problem. While the Chetequera and Dombondola complexes were only around 35 km from the border with South West Africa/Namibia (then under South African control), therefore making conventional assault possible, Cassinga was 260 km

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According to SADF intelligence, "Logistic planning and the provision of supplies, weapons and ammunition to insurgents operating in central and eastern Ovamboland were undertaken from Cassinga", which they learned from PLAN POWs was codenamed "Moscow". Medical treatment of the seriously wounded as

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After the fall of the guns, all major resistance in Cassinga ended. The odd sniper and corners of light resistance were all that remained, and the mopping up process was soon finished. The paratroopers immediately set up the Bn HQ and Regimental Aid-Post (RAP) next to the SWAPO hospital, and began

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By 09h00, A and B Companies had regrouped and were ready to commence the main assault on Cassinga. Instead of attacking eastwards as initially planned, the two companies attacked the base in a northerly direction. Initially, they encountered very little resistance, though this changed dramatically

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Of the four main paratrooper companies, D-Company had experienced the most accurate drop, though they were still 500 m from their intended drop zone. Regrouping quickly, they moved to attack structures which had been identified in the aerial reconnaissance photos as engineering buildings. However,

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The MAOT set up their radios and navigational beacons at the HAA, by now code-named Whisky-Three, and signalled the all-clear for the rest of the force, consisting of the rest of the Hawk Group protection element (31 paratroopers), six medical personnel, two more members of the MAOT and eighty-six

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PLAN combatants at Cassinga were aware of the overflights, and in a letter dated 10 April 1978, the camp's commander Hamaambo expressed concerns to his superiors about an "imminent invasion intention of our enemy of our camp in Southern Angola". In response to the reconnaissance flights, defenses

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B12s in spring of 1978. These photos showed newly built military infrastructure including concreted 'drive-in' bunkers for armoured fighting vehicles covering approach roads, zigzag trenches surrounding the base, foxholes for machine guns/mortar crews – and the highly characteristic 'star-shaped'

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The position of SWAPO and all the organizations and governments that were supporting it by 1978 benefited from the moral outrage incited by a "surprise attack" on a "refugee camp." In the aftermath of the raid, SWAPO received unprecedented support in the form of humanitarian aid sent to its exile

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After the attack aircraft had finished their bombing runs the six transports, which had been holding in wait to the east, commenced their formation run towards Cassinga at an altitude of 200 feet (60 m). Shortly before reaching the base, the six aircraft climbed to 600 feet (180 m), the drop

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findings, a self-defence unit posted at Cassinga consisted of approximately 300 male and female PLAN cadres (other source: approximately 300 to 600). The military section of Cassinga was easily partitioned from the non-military sections. The overall commander of PLAN in town was Dimo Amaambo, who

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armoured personnel carriers in the process, but then had to return to Grootfontein air force base to re-arm and refuel, leaving about 200 of the remaining paratroopers temporarily unprotected. All that stood between them and the advancing armoured column were the 22 men of the anti-tank platoon,

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At 15h00, one of the Mirage IIIs returned to Cassinga, and once again strafed the Cuban vehicles that were still on the road, setting at least one of them alight. It was replaced at 15h30 by another aircraft and a Buccaneer which proceeded to destroy more of the vehicles and a building. About a

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It is clear that from the SADF’s perspective, Kassinga was a military facility rather than essentially a refugee camp or refugee transit facility, as SWAPO has always claimed. The photographic evidence shown to the Commission at the SADF archives suggests a military dimension to the camp. This

909:. During the intelligence-gathering portion of the planning for Operation Bruilof, the SADF concluded that the small town of Cassinga was the principal medical, training and control centre for the guerrillas in the region, and one of SWAPO's two regional HQ's (the other being further north at 1722:

The initial success of the SADF assault now looked like turning into a disaster with the imminent prospect of being overrun by Cuban armoured forces, 150 miles (240 km) into enemy territory. General Viljoen, who until this time had been wearing his rank and beret, removed and hid them.

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At this time however, there was a serious breakdown in the South Africans' command and control, and a number of fundamental errors were made. The shuttle of helicopters to and from Whiskey-Three, the HAA, as well as the order in which paratroopers were embarked, was improvised and initially

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After a combination of the attack through the trenches and the mortar fire, the guns were silenced. The toll was an acceptable one for the South Africans; there were at least 95 SWAPO fighters dead inside the trenches and around the guns. Three paratroopers had been killed.

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Another Buccaneer arrived at 16h45, surprised some Cubans moving through the ruins and destroyed a T-34 tank and some anti-aircraft guns in the process, while further Mirage and Buccaneer strikes at 17h10 and 18h35 destroyed another tank and other equipment.

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height, and lined up for the drop. However, required visual 'tracking and distance' co-ordination markers were obscured by smoke from the bombing run, the drop zone (DZ) box scaling and drop point distances were incorrect – due to the reconnaissance

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attack from the north. Each of the four Canberras – flying in loose 'line abreast' at 500 feet (150 m) and 300 knots – dropped 300 Rhodesian-designed "Alpha" fragmentation bombs, which were small 10-kilogram (22 lb) finless bombs like

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cannot, however, be taken as conclusive evidence that Kassinga was a military base. In the context of the ongoing war in Angola, some defensive fortification of any SWAPO facility, whether civilian or military, would have been standard practice

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against guerilla forces based in Mozambique, and modeled their raid on many of the same principles. Though a risky plan it was decided that the element of surprise would outweigh the disadvantage of not having supporting armour on the ground.

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side of the camp and seal off the escape routes and as a result a number of top PLAN commanders, including Dimo Amaambo and Greenwell Matongo (two principal targets of the attack) escaped (with Amaambo later becoming the first head of the

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The SADF shelved the plan for Operation Bruilof and planning for a new operation, Operation Reindeer, began. Reindeer was composed of three main actions; the airborne assault on Cassinga, a mechanised assault on the Chetaquera complex at

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on 6 May condemning South Africa for "the armed invasion of Angola carried out on 4 May 1978". The Council condemned apartheid and the continued occupation of Southwest Africa and commended Angola for its support of the Namibian people.

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was at the request of the SWA administration, and to counter negative reports on South African military actions and claims of killing innocent civilians. This campaign included the fabrication and distortion of SWAPO actions. One of the

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the total of thirty-two 1000 lb (450 kg) conventional bombs dropped by the four Buccaneers on the identified 'hard points', 24 scored direct hits, causing an immense amount of damage. Finally, the two Mirage IIIs conducted a

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their communications networks at the appropriate time. The successful jamming of the SWAPO, Angolan and Cuban communications network is one of the reasons for the late reaction by either of the latter two in responding to the attack.

850:, an abandoned Angolan mining town that was located about halfway to the battlefront at the Namibian border. The town had about twenty buildings that previously served the local iron-ore mine as warehouses, accommodation and offices. 1221:

and Buccaneer target planning purposes. Particular attention was paid to identifying units of AAA deployed in/near the target complex. It was during this phase that a serious error was made, with potentially disastrous consequences.

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The result was that by nightfall nearly the entire Cuban battalion had been destroyed, killing around 150 Cuban soldiers, accounting for that country's biggest single-day casualty rate during its military involvement in Angola.

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HQ. The units under his command were the Composite Parachute Battalion under Colonel Breytenbach that was composed of A, B, C and D companies (all under-strength), an independent rifle platoon, a mortar platoon and an anti-tank

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failing to maintain effective timing-adjustment during the 200-nautical-mile (370 km) low-level approach phase. This made no difference to the intended effect. As the bombing had been timed to coincide with SWAPO's daily

1758:, with his ground crews and maintenance spares. The Buccaneer pilot was being fired on continually by a towed 14.5 mm anti-aircraft gun, at which he had to make two passes before he was able to destroy it with rockets. 1512:, giving the all-clear for the paratrooper drop, as well as being a radio-relay aircraft (known as "Telstar duty" in the SAAF). It would later be forced to withdraw due to sustained anti-aircraft fire. At around 07h50 two 1158:

An Airborne Reserve under Captain Wesley de Beer, consisting of a company from 2 Bn airborne in a C.160 to be used in the event of reinforcements being required, and the Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT) under Commandant

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14.5 mm multi-barrel anti-aircraft guns used in the ground role. This brought both companies to a complete halt, as they were unable to move under the accurate, and close, fire of the guns, and the Buccaneer on

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PLAN, the armed wing of SWAPO, was a guerrilla army and therefore did not have a traditional command and control structure. As such, it is impossible to determine a composition of units inside Cassinga. According to

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The debate over whether Cassinga was a military camp or a refugee camp (or both) continues to rage. Weapons and military installations were present and documented at the camp. In 1998 the South African

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was elected president. Veterans of the various South African parachute battalions still privately celebrate Cassinga Day in remembrance both of the extent of the victory and of those who died that day.

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air force base. The Mirages' cannons were unable to destroy any tanks, but the sole Buccaneer destroyed at least two tanks, an anti-aircraft position and a number of other vehicles with its 68 mm

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were improved through the creation of a secondary camp north of the main camp, the addition of more trenches, the digging of holes for the protection of food provisions, and provision of AAA weapons.

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mass graves at Cassinga; pictures of one of the mass graves was used extensively for propaganda purposes, and for many people therefore became the imagery that they associated with the event.

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told reporters "They’ve claimed to have withdrawn and have not left any South African troops in Angola. So we hope it’s just a transient strike in retaliation, and we hope it’s all over".

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reported of a "well-run and well-organized" camp but "ill-equipped" to cope with the rapid refugee increase in early 1978. The Cubans, who set up a base at nearby Techamutete when they

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In the end, Colonel Breytenbach ordered the commander of D-Company to take some men and work up towards the guns by attacking the trenches to the west of Cassinga. He also ordered the

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just south of the border so as to be available to drop reinforcements during the battle. The remaining six transports continued on towards a holding point some miles east of Cassinga.

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and ten Puma helicopters. The HAA was then completed, and the 17 helicopters refuelled and waited for the call to extract the paratroopers after the completion of the attack.

1730:(FAC) amongst the paratroopers began to direct the three aircraft in strikes against the advancing Cuban armour. The Mirage IIIs, with their 30 mm cannons, destroyed 10 1440:

The first to move on the morning of the attack were the paratroopers of the Composite Para Bn, who got up at 04h00 and began fitting their weapons, equipment and parachutes.

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aircraft flying over the SWA/Namibia border with Angola. The purpose of this latter aircraft was to both intercept all Angolan, Cuban and SWAPO radio transmissions, before

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The Helicopter Administration Area (HAA) protection force under Major James Hills, consisting of two Hawk Groups (10-man sections of rapid-reaction paratroopers) from 1 Bn;

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not wear uniforms, the exact number of civilians among the dead could not be established. A secret report to the SWAPO Central Committee listed 582 dead and 400 wounded.

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concreted base structure for a S-75/SA-2 'Guideline' missile battery and its radar/command vehicle. Also identifiable from the imagery was a civilian single-decker bus.

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once the paratroopers neared the centre of the base. Heavy sniper fire was directed at the paratroopers from a number of trees inside the base, they were subjected to

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well as the repair of equipment and the assembly of newly trained insurgents on their way to bases in the East and West Cunene Provinces all took place in Cassinga."

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A complete Angolan tank brigade relief force, arriving at dusk, was too late to have any impact and found only scenes of destruction at what had once been Cassinga.

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during the assault on these buildings several of them exploded, perhaps due to ammunition stores within, injuring several paratroopers. There was also a brief

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using their RPG-7s. They also killed approximately 40 of the Cuban troops before making their 'fighting retreat' back along the road towards the Helicopter

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The South Africans declared the attack on Cassinga to be a great military success, even though disaster was so closely averted by the intervention of the

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The defence-suppression bombing attack by the Canberras was two minutes late, occurring at 08h02 instead of 08h00 as originally planned, because the lead

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At 14h20, when the Cuban AFVs were already in sight of the beleaguered paratroopers, a Buccaneer and two Mirage IIIs arrived overhead. An experienced

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errors – and the drop was a shambles with nearly all the paratroopers being dropped off-target, some on the West side of the river and some into tall

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By the beginning of 1978 SWAPO had improved its organisation and gained strength in Owambo and the Eastern Caprivi, UNITA was under pressure from the

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fire, and some SWAPO guerrillas had regrouped, using houses as cover from which to fire at the paratroopers, critically wounding two paratroopers.

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readings being clearly visible in the original reconnaissance photographs. Consequently, the air force planners overestimated the size of the

3496: 2940: 2919: 2662: 2495: 3124: 1939: 1163:, which consisted of five SAAF personnel to set up and run the HAA. All the paratroopers were equipped with a folding stock version of the 1029: 3374: 1691:, T-34 tanks and other vehicles advancing slowly up the road from Techamutete. It immediately opened fire on the column, destroying three 3290: 3237: 1387: 1148: 1144:

The entire operation was run by Major General Ian Gleeson, who commanded the SWA Tactical HQ (set up specially for Operation Reindeer).

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on 23 August 1978, during which 10 soldiers were killed and 10 injured as a result of a direct hit on their barracks by an 82 mm

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kilometre south of Cassinga, the Buccaneer attacked another column of vehicles, coming under heavy anti-aircraft fire in the process.

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armoured personnel carriers, seven trucks and four anti-aircraft guns, accompanied by around 400 troops. This unit was known to SADF

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carrying eight 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs each, as well as a sixth carrying seventy-two 68 mm rockets, and lastly four

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Enduring Suffering: The Cassinga Massacre of Namibian Exiles in 1978 and the Conflicts Between Survivors' Memories and Testimonies

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the operation. However, the need for secrecy meant not enough Citizen Force soldiers could be called up to fill both Parachute

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on the parade ground, most of the people in the camp were assembled in the open when the Canberras initiated their low-level

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SADF photographs by Mike McWilliams included pictures of bodies without weapons, and pictures of dead SADF paratroopers.

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23 mm gun, and around one or two ZSU 12.7 mm guns. These were capable of being used in a ground attack role.

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By now the attack was two hours behind schedule, with the first helicopter extractions having been planned for 10h00.

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escaping via that route. It also dispatched the anti-tank platoon to lay a tank ambush on the road to Techamutete.

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was hesitant to authorise the operation, fearing an international backlash, but on 2 May 1978 the Prime Minister,

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Meanwhile, the Cuban column advanced directly into the ambush that the paratroopers had set for them. The lead

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platoons before they took up their position along the northern end of the base to seal off that escape route.

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during the morning. The Canberras and Buccaneers were used for a later strike on the Chetequera complex.

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The SADF decided to mount a large airborne assault on Cassinga (by now code-named "Alpha"), supported by

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bomb. Sixteen guerrillas were killed in a SADF follow-up operation 250 kilometres (160 mi) into

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At around 13h00, Colonel Breytenbach was informed by one of the Buccaneers on CAS duty that the Cuban

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The original Portuguese name used the spelling "Cassinga", while SWAPO used the spelling "Kassinga".

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However, the paratroopers faced their greatest challenge when they were fired upon by a number of

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air-to-air missiles and their 30 mm cannons fitted with high-explosive fragmentation shells.

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Overall control of the airborne forces was given to Brigadier M.J. du Plessis, who commanded the

1102:, finally approved the operation. The date of 4 May was specifically chosen as it was after the 889: 814: 806: 756: 728: 677: 525: 518: 497: 476: 2754: 2482:

Visions of Freedom Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991

1554:. All the aircraft except for the solitary Buccaneer on CAS duty then flew back to air bases in 906: 1711:

tank was destroyed by one of the anti-tank mines, while the paratroopers destroyed four of the

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ended so as to "avoid making lives difficult for those countries favourable to South Africa".

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occupied Cassinga some weeks after they began using it as a stopover point; according to both

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took off and began flying towards Cassinga. Its role in the operation was to be an airborne

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At 06h00 the eight transport aircraft carrying the paratroopers became airborne. Two of the

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duty could not conduct a strike on the guns for fear of hitting the paratroopers close by.

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The nearest Cuban military presence was 15 km south of Cassinga, at the village of

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and then field training in the area surrounding the derelict Rheinholdtskop farm on the

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Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa

1966: 1840: 1836: 1605: 1456: 1261: 1045: 854: 234: 2618: 3553: 3232: 3116: 2759: 2587: 1956: 1928: 1917: 1751: 1716: 1567: 1485: 1249: 1186: 1099: 1084: 1073: 217: 206: 168: 3006: 2969: 2930: 2890: 2652: 2582: 17: 2952:

Battle for Cassinga: South Africa's Controversial Cross-Border Raid, Angola 1978

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air force base, where their support teams and material had been ferried up from

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rocket launchers and five anti-tank mines which they had planted in the road.

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transport aircraft. The helicopter component of the operation consisted of 13

1470:, carrying the reserve company of 116 paratroopers, peeled off and entered a 1351:, who had intercepted their radio traffic, and were also aware of their anti- 1318: 1304: 1000: 986: 956: 942: 118: 104: 3217: 1810:

presumed dead (landed in river, failed to emerge), and eleven were wounded.

1525: 1238: 1234: 1230: 1218: 1133: 905:, wherein the SADF envisaged attacking six SWAPO targets around the town of 3071: 876:, provided logistical support to the SWAPO administration at Cassinga. 376: 1882:

camps and offers from governments to educate Namibians in their countries.

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defence-suppression strikes – and an assault on the Dombondola complex at

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Exile History: An Ethnography of the SWAPO Camps and the Namibian Nation

2608:"The Battle for Cassinga: Conflicting Narratives and Contested Meanings" 1455:. The heavily laden 'Buccs' could fly only at medium altitude, so their 3583: 2974:

Special Bulletin of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO)

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One crew from the Canberra squadron was tasked with acquiring further

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The Buccaneer had spotted an advancing column of around 30 assorted

27:

Controversial South African airborne attack on a SWAPO military base

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bodies without weapons and of dead SADF paratroopers were taken.

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200-litre drums of helicopter fuel, all on board a fleet of five

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B-12 bombers, each carrying 300 Alpha anti-personnel bombs; five

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at SWAPO inside Angola, even though subsequent actions would be

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on some of the maps that were used in the planning, despite the

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The air attack component provided by the SAAF consisted of four

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SADF veterans' site covering their point of view of the battle

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air force base, the Canberras, Buccaneers and C-130/C-160s to

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on 4 May 1978. Conducted as one of the three major actions of

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624 dead and 611 wounded in total (Angolan government claim)

2773:"Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report" 2007:

The border referred to here is the Namibian–Angolan border.

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The South African Air Force contribution consisted of four

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fighter aircraft took off, heading straight for Cassinga.

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launched Operation Revenge, a retaliatory bombardment of

3011:. Namibia: SWAPO. Dept. of Information and Publicity. 2521:"SA to Say Sorry for Celebrating Defence Force Raid". 2327: 2325: 1060:

as a cover story, the army initiated a call up of the

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Dzinesa, Gwinyayi; Rupiya, Martin (20 October 2005).

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was moving up the road from Techamutete to Cassinga.

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The Cassinga Event: An Investigation of the Records

2096: 2094: 1979:List of operations of the South African Border War 1241:, many landing beyond the river – and some in it. 842:combatants regularly travelled south by road from 2484:. University of North Carolina Press. p. 62. 2092: 2090: 2088: 2086: 2084: 2082: 2080: 2078: 2076: 2074: 2993:(1). Cape Town: Centre for Humanities Research, 2830:Borderstrike! South Africa into Angola 1975–1980 2498:. Commonwealth Secretariat. 2004. Archived from 2379: 2343: 2304: 2292: 2256: 2244: 2232: 2220: 2184: 2172: 2065: 1036:. The South Africans knew about the success of 901:The attack on Cassinga grew out of the plan for 2709:A General's Story: From an Era of War and Peace 1893: 1879: 1821:for the next ten years, i.e. that of launching 371:582 dead and 400 wounded in total (SWAPO claim) 34: 1910:United Nations Security Council Resolution 428 3087: 2268: 392: 8: 3594:South Africa and weapons of mass destruction 1734:before running low on fuel and returning to 924:to conduct aerial photo-reconnaissance with 2791:Shigwedha, Vilho Amukwaya (December 2011). 3487:United Nations Transition Assistance Group 3094: 3080: 3072: 2456:"Complaint by Angola Against South Africa" 2355: 1938:Official celebration of this event by the 1923:After independence, the new government of 1558:(Namibia) to refuel and re-arm to provide 1550:run on the target, using their 30 mm 1083:A top secret document prepared by General 399: 385: 377: 31: 3005:; Sellström, Tor; Nekaya, Joseph (1995). 2367: 2280: 1410:Learn how and when to remove this message 2537: 2442: 2430: 2418: 2391: 2208: 2196: 2148: 2136: 2124: 868:Two days before the South African raid, 2981:Williams, Christian A (November 2010). 2331: 2160: 2037: 2000: 1244:Playing a supporting role was a single 1127:Airborne forces committed to the battle 795:South West Africa People's Organization 2800:(PhD). University of the Western Cape. 2406: 1908:to address the council before issuing 3497:1989 Namibian parliamentary elections 2807:"Cassinga Riddle Lingers 34 Years on" 2778:. Department of Justice, South Africa 2112: 1649:platoon to begin attacking the guns. 1283:14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns, one 1225:Air-photo interpreters put the wrong 797:(SWAPO) military camp at the town of 7: 2755:"Let's Review Our National Holidays" 1942:ended only in 1996, two years after 1817:, Cassinga set the strategy for the 1392:adding citations to reliable sources 2769:Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2316: 2100: 1889:Truth and Reconciliation Commission 3040:Attack on Cassinga – the beginning 1863:One of the mass graves at Cassinga 1504:Also at around 07h00 the solitary 1451:, followed at 05h43 by the faster 1204:fighter aircraft, armed only with 1087:for the then Minister of Defence, 920:over Angola at the time, allowing 853:A group of PLAN guerrillas led by 789:was a controversial South African 25: 2606:Baines, Gary (18 February 2008). 2581:Mongudhi, Tileni (12 June 2015). 293:5 Transall C-160 transport planes 291:4 C-130 Hercules transport planes 3632: 3631: 3622: 3621: 3238:Ovamboland People's Organization 3177:Internal resistance to apartheid 2895:. Cape Town: Saayman and Weber. 2657:. National Archives of Namibia. 2630:"Battle of Cassinga Still Rages" 1368: 295:13 Aerospatiale Puma helicopters 259: 247: 228: 216: 205: 185: 174: 161: 82: 81: 74: 3222:Bantustans in South West Africa 2855:Williams, Christian A. (2009). 1379:needs additional citations for 1104:United Nations Security Council 2995:University of the Western Cape 2685:Institute for Security Studies 2562:State House's Nashandi resigns 2552:in The Namibian, 1 August 2005 1252:Strikemaster fitted out as an 1064:(reserve units similar to the 1: 3604:Southern Africa Freedom Trail 2864:(PhD). University of Michigan 2805:Smillie, Shaun (7 May 2012). 1562:if required – the Mirages to 874:intervened in the war in 1975 859:Charles "Ho Chi Minh" Namoloh 3286:Cuban intervention in Angola 3203:South African administration 2707:Geldenhuys, Jannie (1995). 2651:Heywood, Annemarie (1994). 1030:South African Defence Force 1021:by a light infantry force. 95:Battle of Cassinga (Angola) 3709: 3258:Battle of Omugulugwombashe 2914:. Manie Grove Publishing. 2827:Steenkamp, Willem (1983). 1829:rather than air assaults. 1754:forward air force base by 887: 828: 297:6 Super Frelon helicopters 3688:May 1978 events in Africa 3673:1978 in South West Africa 3617: 3574:End Conscription Campaign 3417:Battle of Cuito Cuanavale 3399:Aeroflot An-12 shoot-down 2976:. Stockholm: SWAPO. 1978. 2950:McWilliams, Mike (2011). 2910:Breytenbach, Jan (2008). 2833:. Just Done Productions. 2480:Gleijeses, Piero (2013). 2269:Dzinesa & Rupiya 2005 863:Mwetufa "Cabral" Mupopiwa 420: 367: 332: 274: 240: 198: 154: 47: 39: 3569:Democratic International 3408:Operation Alpha Centauri 3228:Decolonisation of Africa 3198:German South West Africa 3103:South African Border War 3008:Kassinga: A Story Untold 2727:McGill Alexander, Edward 2571:New Era, 16 October 2009 1750:that was ferried to the 831:South African Border War 811:South African Border War 411:South African Border War 42:South African Border War 3564:Constructive engagement 3491:Australian contribution 3375:Angola–Cuba Declaration 1629:ZPU-2 anti-aircraft gun 1138:Colonel Jan Breytenbach 1054:South African Air Force 3637:Battles and operations 3447:Operation Excite/Hilti 3233:Old Location shootings 3062:TRC Episode 84, Part 7 1898: 1884: 1864: 1855:Political consequences 1728:Forward Air Controller 1630: 1594:Namibian Defence Force 1447:bombers took off from 1437: 1128: 884:South African planning 199:Commanders and leaders 130:SWAPO Base at Cassinga 3609:Western Contact Group 3559:Cuba–Angola airbridge 2935:. Paternoster Press. 2929:Kobo, Joseph (1994). 2567:16 March 2012 at the 2380:McGill Alexander 2003 2344:McGill Alexander 2003 2305:McGill Alexander 2003 2293:McGill Alexander 2003 2257:McGill Alexander 2003 2245:McGill Alexander 2003 2233:McGill Alexander 2003 2221:McGill Alexander 2003 2185:McGill Alexander 2003 2173:McGill Alexander 2003 2066:McGill Alexander 2003 1904:invited SWAPO-leader 1862: 1813:According to General 1628: 1620:B-10 recoilless rifle 1435: 1126: 1114:Composition of forces 1070:1 Parachute Battalion 977:– that also involved 333:Casualties and losses 313:3,000–4,000 refugees 289:4 Mirage III fighters 284:Canberra B-12 bombers 146:South African victory 119:15.11750°S 16.08639°E 3668:1978 in South Africa 3589:Operation IA Feature 3452:Brazzaville Protocol 3291:Turnhalle Convention 2583:"Cassinga forgotten" 2502:on 27 September 2007 1891:also concluded that 1870:parachute battalions 1678:mechanised battalion 1477:At about 06h30, the 1436:SAAF Canberra bomber 1388:improve this article 1214:photo-reconnaissance 916:The SAAF still held 354:17 BTR-152 destroyed 287:5 Buccaneer fighters 3678:Airborne operations 3394:Operation Wallpaper 3310:Settlement Proposal 3208:Bondelswarts affair 2932:Waiting in the Wing 2771:(29 October 1998). 2694:on 27 February 2008 2496:"Namibia Key Facts" 1927:declared 4 May as " 1823:pre-emptive strikes 1696:armed only with 10 1443:At 05h19, the four 1314: / 1058:Exercise Kwiksilver 996: / 957:17.1287°S 14.8938°E 952: / 350:150 soldiers killed 124:-15.11750; 16.08639 114: / 3658:Battle of Cassinga 3442:Operation Displace 3324:Operation Saffraan 3304:Battle of Cassinga 3300:Operation Reindeer 3281:Operation Savannah 3051:Attack on Cassinga 2599:General references 2550:Ex-MP Kamanya dies 2211:, pp. 51, 61. 1865: 1631: 1535:fragmentation bomb 1438: 1129: 1094:The South African 1001:17.333°S 14.8334°E 890:Operation Reindeer 835:Starting in 1976, 815:South African Army 807:Operation Reindeer 781:also known as the 779:Battle of Cassinga 305:300–600 guerrillas 35:Battle of Cassinga 3683:Conflicts in 1978 3645: 3644: 3457:Tripartite Accord 3423:Operation Moduler 3389:Operation Magneto 3352:Operation Kerslig 3333:Operation Sceptic 3319:Operation Rekstok 3172:Angolan Civil War 3165:Related conflicts 3003:Ya Nangolo, Mvula 2942:978-0-85009-669-9 2921:978-0-620-40614-7 2732:The Cassinga Raid 2711:. Jonathan Ball. 2664:978-0-86976-350-6 2615:Rhodes University 2445:, pp. 36–38. 2421:, pp. 61–62. 2199:, pp. 50–51. 2175:, pp. 52–53. 2163:, pp. 15–22. 2151:, pp. 38–39. 1995:Explanatory notes 1951:Notable survivors 1935:in South Africa. 1808:missing in action 1560:close air support 1556:South West Africa 1461:close air support 1420: 1419: 1412: 1319:15.2332°S 16.04°E 1149:Parachute Brigade 1108:South West Africa 1066:US National Guard 962:-17.1287; 14.8938 903:Operation Bruilof 787:Kassinga Massacre 774: 773: 375: 374: 150: 149: 18:Cassinga Massacre 16:(Redirected from 3700: 3635: 3634: 3625: 3624: 3502:Caprivi conflict 3471:Operation Merlyn 3462:Oshakati bombing 3437:Operation Packer 3428:Operation Hooper 3361:Operation Askari 3342:Operation Protea 3096: 3089: 3082: 3073: 3063: 3052: 3041: 3022: 2998: 2977: 2965: 2946: 2925: 2906: 2892:Forged in Battle 2887:Breytenbach, Jan 2873: 2871: 2869: 2863: 2851: 2849: 2847: 2823: 2821: 2819: 2801: 2799: 2787: 2785: 2783: 2777: 2764: 2763:. 27 April 2007. 2750: 2748: 2746: 2737: 2722: 2703: 2701: 2699: 2693: 2687:. Archived from 2678: 2668: 2647: 2645: 2643: 2625: 2624:on 18 July 2011. 2623: 2617:. Archived from 2612: 2593: 2592: 2578: 2572: 2559: 2553: 2547: 2541: 2535: 2529: 2528: 2518: 2512: 2511: 2509: 2507: 2492: 2486: 2485: 2477: 2471: 2470: 2468: 2466: 2452: 2446: 2440: 2434: 2428: 2422: 2416: 2410: 2404: 2395: 2389: 2383: 2377: 2371: 2365: 2359: 2353: 2347: 2341: 2335: 2329: 2320: 2314: 2308: 2302: 2296: 2290: 2284: 2278: 2272: 2266: 2260: 2254: 2248: 2242: 2236: 2230: 2224: 2223:, p. 51-52. 2218: 2212: 2206: 2200: 2194: 2188: 2187:, p. 50,55. 2182: 2176: 2170: 2164: 2158: 2152: 2146: 2140: 2134: 2128: 2122: 2116: 2110: 2104: 2098: 2069: 2063: 2026: 2023: 2017: 2014: 2008: 2005: 1989:Operation Vanity 1815:Constand Viljoen 1510:observation post 1491:Constand Viljoen 1415: 1408: 1404: 1401: 1395: 1372: 1364: 1338: 1337: 1335: 1334: 1333: 1331: 1326: 1325: 1320: 1315: 1312: 1311: 1310: 1307: 1020: 1019: 1017: 1016: 1015: 1013: 1008: 1007: 1006:-17.333; 14.8334 1002: 997: 994: 993: 992: 989: 976: 975: 973: 972: 971: 969: 964: 963: 958: 953: 950: 949: 948: 945: 744:Oshakati Bombing 415: 414: 412: 401: 394: 387: 378: 352:3 T-34 destroyed 320:144–400 soldiers 309:1 ZU-23-2 AA gun 264: 263: 262: 252: 251: 250: 233: 232: 231: 221: 220: 212:Constand Viljoen 210: 209: 191: 189: 188: 179: 178: 177: 167: 165: 164: 138: 137: 135: 134: 133: 131: 126: 125: 120: 115: 112: 111: 110: 107: 85: 84: 78: 49: 48: 32: 21: 3708: 3707: 3703: 3702: 3701: 3699: 3698: 3697: 3693:Battles in 1978 3648: 3647: 3646: 3641: 3613: 3537: 3533:Fort Klapperkop 3511: 3507:Bicesse Accords 3475: 3384:Operation Argon 3347:Operation Daisy 3276:Alvor Agreement 3267:Alcora Exercise 3242: 3213:1946 referendum 3186: 3160: 3105: 3100: 3061: 3050: 3039: 3030: 3025: 3019: 3001: 2980: 2968: 2962: 2949: 2943: 2928: 2922: 2909: 2903: 2885: 2881: 2879:Further reading 2876: 2867: 2865: 2861: 2854: 2845: 2843: 2841: 2826: 2817: 2815: 2804: 2797: 2790: 2781: 2779: 2775: 2767: 2753: 2744: 2742: 2735: 2725: 2719: 2706: 2697: 2695: 2691: 2676: 2671: 2665: 2650: 2641: 2639: 2628: 2621: 2610: 2605: 2601: 2596: 2580: 2579: 2575: 2569:Wayback Machine 2560: 2556: 2548: 2544: 2536: 2532: 2520: 2519: 2515: 2505: 2503: 2494: 2493: 2489: 2479: 2478: 2474: 2464: 2462: 2454: 2453: 2449: 2441: 2437: 2429: 2425: 2417: 2413: 2405: 2398: 2390: 2386: 2378: 2374: 2366: 2362: 2356:Geldenhuys 1995 2354: 2350: 2342: 2338: 2330: 2323: 2315: 2311: 2303: 2299: 2291: 2287: 2279: 2275: 2271:, p. 2009. 2267: 2263: 2255: 2251: 2243: 2239: 2231: 2227: 2219: 2215: 2207: 2203: 2195: 2191: 2183: 2179: 2171: 2167: 2159: 2155: 2147: 2143: 2135: 2131: 2123: 2119: 2111: 2107: 2099: 2072: 2064: 2039: 2035: 2030: 2029: 2024: 2020: 2015: 2011: 2006: 2002: 1997: 1984:Operation Eland 1975: 1962:Monica Nashandi 1953: 1857: 1796: 1776: 1670: 1615: 1580: 1522: 1472:holding pattern 1468:Transall C-160s 1430: 1425: 1416: 1405: 1399: 1396: 1385: 1373: 1362: 1329: 1327: 1324:-15.2332; 16.04 1323: 1321: 1317: 1316: 1313: 1308: 1305: 1303: 1301: 1300: 1293: 1271: 1121: 1116: 1080:Training Area. 1042:Operation Dingo 1038:Operation Eland 1011: 1009: 1005: 1003: 999: 998: 995: 990: 987: 985: 983: 982: 967: 965: 961: 959: 955: 954: 951: 946: 943: 941: 939: 938: 918:air superiority 892: 886: 833: 827: 817:'s first major 775: 770: 700:Cuito Cuanavale 444:Alcora Exercise 416: 410: 408: 407: 405: 362: 360: 355: 353: 351: 349: 341: 339: 327: 325: 324:17 BTR-152 APCs 323: 321: 319: 314: 312: 311:1–2 ZSU AA guns 310: 308: 307:2 ZPU-4 AA guns 306: 304: 296: 294: 292: 290: 288: 286: 281: 269: 260: 258: 248: 246: 229: 227: 215: 214: 204: 186: 184: 183: 175: 173: 162: 160: 129: 127: 123: 121: 117: 116: 113: 108: 105: 103: 101: 100: 99: 98: 97: 96: 93: 92: 91: 90: 86: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 3706: 3704: 3696: 3695: 3690: 3685: 3680: 3675: 3670: 3665: 3663:1978 in Angola 3660: 3650: 3649: 3643: 3642: 3640: 3639: 3629: 3618: 3615: 3614: 3612: 3611: 3606: 3601: 3591: 3586: 3581: 3576: 3571: 3566: 3561: 3556: 3551: 3545: 3543: 3542:Related topics 3539: 3538: 3536: 3535: 3530: 3525: 3519: 3517: 3513: 3512: 3510: 3509: 3504: 3499: 3494: 3483: 3481: 3477: 3476: 3474: 3473: 3464: 3459: 3454: 3449: 3444: 3439: 3430: 3425: 3420: 3410: 3401: 3396: 3391: 3386: 3377: 3372: 3370:Lusaka Accords 3363: 3354: 3349: 3344: 3335: 3326: 3321: 3312: 3307: 3293: 3288: 3283: 3278: 3269: 3260: 3250: 3248: 3244: 3243: 3241: 3240: 3235: 3230: 3225: 3215: 3210: 3205: 3200: 3194: 3192: 3188: 3187: 3185: 3184: 3179: 3174: 3168: 3166: 3162: 3161: 3159: 3158: 3153: 3148: 3138: 3128: 3113: 3111: 3107: 3106: 3101: 3099: 3098: 3091: 3084: 3076: 3070: 3069: 3058: 3047: 3036: 3029: 3028:External links 3026: 3024: 3023: 3017: 2999: 2978: 2966: 2961:978-1907677397 2960: 2954:. Helion Ltd. 2947: 2941: 2926: 2920: 2907: 2901: 2882: 2880: 2877: 2875: 2874: 2852: 2839: 2824: 2802: 2788: 2765: 2751: 2723: 2717: 2704: 2669: 2663: 2648: 2626: 2602: 2600: 2597: 2595: 2594: 2573: 2554: 2542: 2530: 2527:. 6 June 1996. 2513: 2487: 2472: 2447: 2435: 2423: 2411: 2396: 2384: 2372: 2370:, p. 223. 2368:Shigwedha 2011 2360: 2348: 2346:, p. 179. 2336: 2321: 2309: 2307:, p. 146. 2297: 2295:, p. 145. 2285: 2283:, p. 205. 2281:Steenkamp 1983 2273: 2261: 2249: 2247:, p. 176. 2237: 2235:, p. 126. 2225: 2213: 2201: 2189: 2177: 2165: 2153: 2141: 2129: 2117: 2105: 2070: 2036: 2034: 2031: 2028: 2027: 2018: 2009: 1999: 1998: 1996: 1993: 1992: 1991: 1986: 1981: 1974: 1971: 1970: 1969: 1964: 1959: 1952: 1949: 1944:Nelson Mandela 1902:United Nations 1856: 1853: 1795: 1792: 1775: 1772: 1756:C-130 Hercules 1742:air-to-ground 1669: 1666: 1614: 1611: 1579: 1578:Parachute drop 1576: 1540:10-Pin Bowling 1521: 1518: 1449:AFB Waterkloof 1429: 1426: 1424: 1421: 1418: 1417: 1376: 1374: 1367: 1361: 1358: 1292: 1289: 1270: 1267: 1210: 1209: 1190: 1179:C.160 Transall 1175:C-130 Hercules 1171: 1170:assault rifle. 1156: 1153: 1145: 1120: 1117: 1115: 1112: 888:Main article: 885: 882: 829:Main article: 826: 823: 772: 771: 769: 768: 761: 754: 747: 740: 733: 726: 725: 724: 717: 710: 696: 693:Alpha Centauri 689: 686:Southern Cross 682: 675: 668: 661: 654: 647: 640: 633: 628: 621: 614: 607: 600: 593: 586: 579: 572: 565: 558: 551: 544: 537: 530: 523: 516: 508: 507: 503: 502: 495: 488: 487: 486: 474: 467: 460: 459: 458: 446: 440: 439: 435: 434: 426: 425: 421: 418: 417: 406: 404: 403: 396: 389: 381: 373: 372: 365: 364: 343: 335: 334: 330: 329: 298: 277: 276: 272: 271: 256: 243: 242: 241:Units involved 238: 237: 225: 201: 200: 196: 195: 171: 157: 156: 152: 151: 148: 147: 144: 140: 139: 94: 88: 87: 80: 79: 73: 72: 71: 63: 61: 57: 56: 53: 45: 44: 37: 36: 26: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 3705: 3694: 3691: 3689: 3686: 3684: 3681: 3679: 3676: 3674: 3671: 3669: 3666: 3664: 3661: 3659: 3656: 3655: 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3170: 3169: 3167: 3163: 3157: 3154: 3152: 3149: 3146: 3142: 3139: 3136: 3132: 3129: 3126: 3122: 3118: 3115: 3114: 3112: 3108: 3104: 3097: 3092: 3090: 3085: 3083: 3078: 3077: 3074: 3068: 3064: 3059: 3057: 3053: 3048: 3046: 3042: 3037: 3035: 3032: 3031: 3027: 3020: 3014: 3010: 3009: 3004: 3000: 2996: 2992: 2988: 2984: 2979: 2975: 2971: 2967: 2963: 2957: 2953: 2948: 2944: 2938: 2934: 2933: 2927: 2923: 2917: 2913: 2908: 2904: 2902:0-7971-0025-3 2898: 2894: 2893: 2888: 2884: 2883: 2878: 2860: 2859: 2853: 2842: 2840:1-920169-00-8 2836: 2832: 2831: 2825: 2814: 2813: 2808: 2803: 2796: 2795: 2789: 2774: 2770: 2766: 2762: 2761: 2756: 2752: 2741: 2734: 2733: 2729:(July 2003). 2728: 2724: 2720: 2714: 2710: 2705: 2690: 2686: 2682: 2675: 2670: 2666: 2660: 2656: 2655: 2649: 2638:. 19 May 2007 2637: 2636: 2631: 2627: 2620: 2616: 2609: 2604: 2603: 2598: 2590: 2589: 2584: 2577: 2574: 2570: 2566: 2563: 2558: 2555: 2551: 2546: 2543: 2540:, p. 29. 2539: 2538:Williams 2009 2534: 2531: 2526: 2525: 2517: 2514: 2501: 2497: 2491: 2488: 2483: 2476: 2473: 2461: 2457: 2451: 2448: 2444: 2443:Williams 2009 2439: 2436: 2433:, p. 62. 2432: 2431:Williams 2009 2427: 2424: 2420: 2419:Williams 2009 2415: 2412: 2408: 2403: 2401: 2397: 2394:, p. 52. 2393: 2392:Williams 2009 2388: 2385: 2382:, p. 21. 2381: 2376: 2373: 2369: 2364: 2361: 2358:, p. 93. 2357: 2352: 2349: 2345: 2340: 2337: 2333: 2328: 2326: 2322: 2319:, p. 52. 2318: 2313: 2310: 2306: 2301: 2298: 2294: 2289: 2286: 2282: 2277: 2274: 2270: 2265: 2262: 2259:, p. 84. 2258: 2253: 2250: 2246: 2241: 2238: 2234: 2229: 2226: 2222: 2217: 2214: 2210: 2209:Williams 2009 2205: 2202: 2198: 2197:Williams 2009 2193: 2190: 2186: 2181: 2178: 2174: 2169: 2166: 2162: 2157: 2154: 2150: 2149:Williams 2009 2145: 2142: 2139:, p. 37. 2138: 2137:Williams 2009 2133: 2130: 2127:, p. 33. 2126: 2125:Williams 2009 2121: 2118: 2114: 2109: 2106: 2102: 2097: 2095: 2093: 2091: 2089: 2087: 2085: 2083: 2081: 2079: 2077: 2075: 2071: 2067: 2062: 2060: 2058: 2056: 2054: 2052: 2050: 2048: 2046: 2044: 2042: 2038: 2032: 2022: 2019: 2013: 2010: 2004: 2001: 1994: 1990: 1987: 1985: 1982: 1980: 1977: 1976: 1972: 1968: 1967:Dimo Hamaambo 1965: 1963: 1960: 1958: 1955: 1954: 1950: 1948: 1945: 1941: 1936: 1934: 1930: 1926: 1921: 1919: 1916:US President 1914: 1911: 1907: 1903: 1897: 1892: 1890: 1883: 1878: 1874: 1871: 1861: 1854: 1852: 1850: 1846: 1842: 1841:Caprivi Strip 1838: 1837:Katima Mulilo 1834: 1830: 1828: 1824: 1820: 1816: 1811: 1809: 1805: 1800: 1793: 1791: 1788: 1784: 1780: 1774:15h00 – 18h00 1773: 1771: 1767: 1763: 1759: 1757: 1753: 1749: 1745: 1741: 1737: 1733: 1729: 1724: 1720: 1718: 1714: 1710: 1705: 1701: 1699: 1694: 1690: 1686: 1681: 1679: 1674: 1668:12h00 – 15h00 1667: 1665: 1662: 1658: 1654: 1650: 1648: 1643: 1641: 1636: 1627: 1623: 1621: 1613:09h00 – 12h00 1612: 1610: 1607: 1601: 1597: 1595: 1590: 1586: 1577: 1575: 1573: 1569: 1565: 1561: 1557: 1553: 1549: 1543: 1541: 1536: 1532: 1527: 1519: 1517: 1515: 1511: 1507: 1502: 1500: 1494: 1492: 1487: 1484: 1480: 1475: 1473: 1469: 1464: 1462: 1458: 1457:true airspeed 1454: 1450: 1446: 1441: 1434: 1428:Air movements 1427: 1423:04h00 – 09h00 1422: 1414: 1411: 1403: 1400:February 2011 1393: 1389: 1383: 1382: 1377:This section 1375: 1371: 1366: 1365: 1359: 1357: 1354: 1350: 1346: 1342: 1336: 1299:, located at 1298: 1290: 1288: 1286: 1282: 1277: 1268: 1266: 1263: 1259: 1255: 1251: 1247: 1242: 1240: 1236: 1232: 1228: 1223: 1220: 1215: 1207: 1203: 1199: 1195: 1191: 1188: 1187:Super Frelons 1184: 1180: 1176: 1172: 1169: 1166: 1162: 1157: 1154: 1150: 1146: 1143: 1142: 1141: 1139: 1135: 1125: 1118: 1113: 1111: 1109: 1105: 1101: 1097: 1092: 1090: 1086: 1081: 1079: 1075: 1071: 1067: 1063: 1062:Citizen Force 1059: 1055: 1050: 1047: 1046:Selous Scouts 1043: 1039: 1035: 1034:cluster bombs 1031: 1026: 1022: 1018: 980: 974: 934: 930: 927: 923: 919: 914: 912: 908: 904: 899: 897: 891: 883: 881: 877: 875: 871: 866: 864: 860: 856: 855:Dimo Hamaambo 851: 849: 845: 841: 838: 832: 824: 822: 820: 816: 813:, it was the 812: 808: 804: 800: 796: 792: 788: 784: 783:Cassinga Raid 780: 767: 766: 762: 760: 759: 755: 753: 752: 748: 746: 745: 741: 739: 738: 734: 732: 731: 727: 723: 722: 718: 716: 715: 711: 709: 708: 704: 703: 702: 701: 697: 695: 694: 690: 688: 687: 683: 681: 680: 676: 674: 673: 669: 667: 666: 662: 660: 659: 655: 653: 652: 648: 646: 645: 641: 639: 638: 634: 632: 629: 627: 626: 622: 620: 619: 615: 613: 612: 608: 606: 605: 601: 599: 598: 594: 592: 591: 587: 585: 584: 580: 578: 577: 573: 571: 570: 566: 564: 563: 559: 557: 556: 552: 550: 549: 545: 543: 542: 538: 536: 535: 531: 529: 528: 524: 522: 521: 517: 515: 514: 510: 509: 505: 504: 501: 500: 496: 494: 493: 489: 485: 482: 481: 480: 479: 475: 473: 472: 468: 466: 465: 461: 457: 454: 453: 452: 451: 447: 445: 442: 441: 437: 436: 433: 432: 431:Blouwildebees 428: 427: 423: 422: 419: 413: 402: 397: 395: 390: 388: 383: 382: 379: 370: 366: 358: 347: 344: 337: 336: 331: 317: 302: 299: 285: 279: 278: 273: 267: 257: 255: 245: 244: 239: 236: 235:Dimo Hamaambo 226: 224: 219: 213: 208: 203: 202: 197: 194: 182: 172: 170: 159: 158: 153: 145: 142: 141: 136: 77: 70: 66: 62: 59: 58: 54: 51: 50: 46: 43: 38: 33: 30: 19: 3554:Cassinga Day 3549:32 Battalion 3528:Freedom Park 3523:Heroes' Acre 3466: 3432: 3412: 3403: 3379: 3365: 3356: 3337: 3328: 3314: 3303: 3295: 3271: 3262: 3253: 3117:South Africa 3110:Participants 3007: 2990: 2986: 2973: 2951: 2931: 2912:Eagle Strike 2911: 2891: 2866:. Retrieved 2857: 2844:. Retrieved 2829: 2816:. Retrieved 2810: 2793: 2780:. Retrieved 2760:The Namibian 2758: 2743:. Retrieved 2731: 2708: 2696:. Retrieved 2689:the original 2680: 2653: 2640:. Retrieved 2633: 2619:the original 2588:The Namibian 2586: 2576: 2557: 2545: 2533: 2522: 2516: 2504:. Retrieved 2500:the original 2490: 2481: 2475: 2463:. 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