1319:
971:
106:
946:
1711:(Score Then Automatic Runoff) is a variant proposed to address some concerns about strategic exaggeration in score voting. Under this system, each voter may assign a score (from 0 to the maximum) to any number of candidates. Of the two highest-scoring candidates, the winner is the one most voters ranked higher. The runoff step was introduced to mitigate the incentive to exaggerate ratings in ordinary score voting.
958:
36:
1545:
1824:
Simplified forms of score voting automatically give skipped candidates the lowest possible score for the ballot they were skipped. Other forms have those ballots not affect the candidate's rating at all. Those forms not affecting the candidates rating frequently make use of quotas. Quotas demand a
1696:
strategy; voters will want to give their least and most favorite candidates a minimum and a maximum score, respectively. The game-theoretical analysis shows that this claim is not fully general, but holds in most cases. Another strategic voting tactic is given by the weighted mean utility theorem,
1700:
Papers have which found that "experimental results support the concept of bias toward unselfish outcomes in large elections." The authors observed what they termed ethical considerations dominating voter behavior as pivot probability decreased. This would imply that larger elections, or those
1719:
Albert
Heckscher was one of the earliest proponents, advocating for a form of score voting he called the "immanent method" in his 1892 dissertation, in which voters assign any number between -1 and +1 to each alternative, simulating their individual deliberation.
1476:
Suppose that 100 voters each decided to grant from 0 to 10 points to each city such that their most liked choice got 10 points, and least liked choice got 0 points, with the intermediate choices getting an amount proportional to their relative distance.
2130:
1704:
How voters precisely grade candidates is a topic that is not fully settled, although experiments show that their behavior depends on the grade scale, its length, and the possibility to give negative grades.
1605:
For comparison, note that traditional first-past-the-post would elect
Memphis, even though most citizens consider it the worst choice, because 42% is larger than any other single city.
1134:
2138:
1087:
using a multi-stage process with multiple rounds of score voting. This may have contributed to the
Republic's longevity, being partly responsible for its status as the longest-lived
999:
2162:
2754:
2097:
2798:
1023:
for single-seat elections. Voters give each candidate a numerical score, and the candidate with the highest average score is elected. Score voting includes the well-known
1609:
would elect the 2nd-worst choice (Knoxville), because the central candidates would be eliminated early (and
Chattanooga voters preferring Knoxville above Nashville). In
1239:
1227:
1935:
2636:
1750:
1307:
3248:
2180:
3016:
690:
1126:
57:
44:
3413:
3144:
2996:
2206:
2039:
722:
584:
579:
3243:
3021:
1644:
1130:
992:
685:
1636:, i.e. a candidate can never lose as a result of voters turning out to support them. This contrasts with most other systems of voting, including
1697:
maximum score for all candidates preferred compared to the expected winners weighted with winning probability and minimum score for all others.
3006:
2791:
1838:
1145:
1100:
367:
1897:
Girard, C. (2010). "Going from Theory to
Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting". In Laslier, Jean-François; Sanver, M. Remzi (eds.).
1277:
891:
3423:
3370:
142:
2285:
Five productions shall be selected using reweighted range voting to become the nominations for final voting for the Visual
Effects award.
3418:
3053:
985:
2231:
2004:
2784:
2612:
1918:
1300:
3388:
886:
2762:
2159:
3238:
3184:
2104:
1652:
876:
626:
597:
537:
3036:
2414:
Feddersen, Timothy; Gailmard, Sean; Sandroni, Alvaro (2009). "Moral Bias in Large
Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence".
1876:
voting rules in which the voter freely grades each candidate on a pre-defined numerical scale. .. also called utilitarian voting
3365:
1724:
1613:, with each voter selecting their top two cities, Nashville would win because of the significant boost from Memphis residents.
608:
133:
3164:
1775:
671:
313:
298:
283:
3207:
3192:
3011:
1293:
929:
549:
472:
393:
3258:
2981:
2971:
2832:
1770:
361:
343:
184:
914:
3408:
3223:
2914:
1035:
805:
788:
755:
735:
519:
507:
477:
278:
236:
169:
613:
49:
3273:
3228:
3174:
3086:
2364:
1837:
Baujard, Antoinette; Igersheim, Herrade; Lebon, Isabelle; Gavrel, Frédéric; Laslier, Jean-François (2014-06-01).
1755:
661:
654:
138:
1253:
surveys and mechanism involving users rating a product or service in terms of "stars" (such as rating movies on
3263:
3149:
3107:
3026:
2951:
2887:
2845:
715:
643:
632:
495:
482:
465:
442:
420:
383:
373:
2882:
1273:
2346:
3428:
3288:
3278:
3253:
3069:
2946:
1633:
1333:
1072:, by measuring how loudly the crowd shouted for different candidates. This has a modern-day analog of using
841:
695:
378:
2653:
Bidrag til Grundlæggelse af en
Afstemningslære: om Methoderne ved Udfindelse af Stemmeflerhed i Parlamenter
2457:
Baujard, Antoinette; Igersheim, Herrade; Lebon, Isabelle; Gavrel, Frédéric; Laslier, Jean-François (2014).
3329:
3268:
3131:
3074:
1839:"Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election"
1629:
1352:
870:
750:
680:
487:
2048:
3233:
3154:
2919:
1637:
1606:
1250:
1047:
778:
618:
502:
308:
287:
219:
197:
970:
836:
1825:
minimum proportion of voters rate that candidate in some way before that candidate is eligible to win.
1731:) with an extra second evaluation step to address some of the criticisms of traditional score voting.
1632:, i.e. raising a candidate's rating can never hurt their chances of winning. Score also satisfies the
3303:
2872:
1887:
James S. Fishkin: The Voice of the People: Public
Opinion & Democracy, Yale University Press 1995
1358:
1346:
909:
896:
864:
128:
2458:
1861:
1318:
3283:
2877:
2277:
1659:
1329:
1216:
815:
649:
302:
3324:
2934:
2750:
2630:
2585:
2439:
2431:
2387:
1976:
1340:
1096:
1080:
975:
846:
457:
241:
2892:
2247:
Using the following Range Voting System, the Green Party of Utah elected a new slate of officers
924:
2047:(Speech). Presidential Address to Public Choice Society. New Orleans, Louisiana. Archived from
3293:
3202:
3159:
3079:
3001:
2924:
2909:
2867:
2618:
2608:
2577:
2328:
1914:
1780:
1141:
881:
851:
773:
710:
544:
271:
246:
229:
97:
3334:
2966:
2822:
2807:
2569:
2473:
2423:
2379:
2318:
2310:
1968:
1906:
1898:
1853:
1689:
1106:
According to Steven J. Brams, approval was used for some elections in 19th century
England.
1043:
1039:
1028:
1020:
962:
919:
810:
798:
512:
388:
214:
208:
190:
179:
174:
162:
123:
85:
1995:
3382:
3298:
3139:
3117:
2929:
2850:
2840:
2818:
2166:
1760:
1745:
1693:
1683:
1610:
1220:
1133:
uses a variant on a three-point scale ("Encourage", "Discourage", and "No Opinion"), with
1024:
950:
783:
638:
603:
524:
435:
338:
261:
203:
81:
2073:
105:
3197:
2902:
2862:
2160:
One of America's Most Famous Towns Becomes First in the Nation to Adopt Approval Voting
1648:
1084:
820:
760:
745:
556:
425:
400:
251:
17:
1701:
perceived as having a wider margin of victory, would result in fewer tactical voters.
945:
3402:
2941:
2589:
1980:
1899:
1663:
829:
529:
317:
155:
118:
93:
2727:
2443:
2131:"The inside Story of How I Lost the Race for the UN Secretary-General's Job in 2006"
1857:
1621:
Score voting allows voters to express preferences of varying strengths, making it a
2897:
2512:"Score Runoff Voting: The New Voting Method that Could Save Our Democratic Process"
2477:
2391:
1667:
1622:
1246:
1073:
569:
326:
256:
2560:
Lagerspetz, Eerik (2014-06-01). "Albert Heckscher on collective decision-making".
1959:
Lines, Marji (1986). "Approval Voting and Strategy Analysis: A Venetian Example".
1076:
in some television shows and the judging processes of some athletic competitions.
1031:), but also lets voters give partial (in-between) approval ratings to candidates.
2651:
2511:
2022:
3339:
3102:
3041:
2961:
2857:
2736:
1910:
1740:
1728:
1708:
1262:
1223:
for the city's local elections, becoming the first US city to adopt the method.
447:
405:
348:
293:
2365:"Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections"
3112:
3048:
2573:
2427:
2383:
2314:
2024:
Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece 1922–1936
1266:
1258:
2622:
2581:
2332:
2207:"This city just approved a new election system never tried before in America"
2098:"The "Wisnumurti Guidelines" for Selecting a Candidate for Secretary-General"
1905:. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. pp. 15–17.
3349:
3344:
2298:
1765:
1325:
1088:
415:
410:
2718:
1242:
are elected based on a three-point scale ("Support", "Neutral", "Oppose").
35:
957:
3169:
1671:
666:
2435:
3031:
2323:
1972:
1788:
452:
2742:
1808:
3319:
1784:
1666:. However, when voters all vote strategically, basing their votes on
1119:
1115:
1092:
1069:
2776:
2283:. 2016. RULE TWENTY-TWO SPECIAL RULES FOR THE VISUAL EFFECTS AWARD.
1095:
legislative elections beginning in 1864, during which time it had a
1727:. Since 2014, the Equal Vote Coalition advocates a variant method (
1602:
Nashville, the capital in real life, likewise wins in the example.
1276:
or reweighted range voting is used to select five nominees for the
1068:
A crude form of score voting was used in some elections in ancient
2536:
1640:, where candidates can be eliminated for having "too many votes".
1114:
Score voting is used to elect candidates who represent parties in
1692:
for well-informed voters is generally identical to their optimal
1997:
Electing the Doge of Venice: analysis of a 13th Century protocol
1254:
2780:
2723:
2667:
2260:"Knowledge (XXG):Arbitration Committee Elections December 2017"
2003:. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium. Venice, Italy.
1334:
All voters want the capital to be as close to them as possible.
29:
2691:
1245:
Non-governmental uses of score voting are common, such as in
104:
2714:
1343:, the largest city, but far from the others (42% of voters)
1332:. The population is concentrated around four major cities.
2732:
2404:
Approval Voting, Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn, 1983
2353:
No. 405 (Marseille, France: Institut d'Économie Publique)
1152:
On a score ballot, the voter scores all the candidates.
1135:
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council
2743:
Simulation of various voting models for close elections
2259:
2232:"Utah Green Party Hosts Dr. Stein; Elects New Officers"
2761:. The Foundation for National Progress. Archived from
2181:"Fargo Becomes First U.S. City to Try Approval Voting"
1144:
in the early 20th century, prior to being replaced by
2491:
1674:
results, the majority-preferred candidate will win.
3358:
3312:
3216:
3183:
3130:
3095:
3062:
2989:
2980:
2831:
2027:. University of California Press. pp. 351–352.
1479:
2459:"How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting"
2755:"The verdict is in: our voting system is a loser"
2739:, a variant of score voting, in the United States
2347:"Strategic approval voting in a large electorate"
2299:"Reflections on Arrow's theorem and voting rules"
1662:, i.e. the method does not always agree with the
1994:Mowbray, Miranda; Gollmann, Dieter (July 2007).
1269:generally rate competitors on a numeric scale.
2363:Nunez, Matias; Laslier, Jean-François (2014).
1751:List of democracy and elections-related topics
1349:, near the center of the state (26% of voters)
1328:is holding an election on the location of its
2792:
1365:The preferences of each region's voters are:
1301:
1046:, and is about as commonly-used worldwide as
993:
8:
3249:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
1219:, passed a local ballot initiative adopting
1272:A multi-winner proportional variant called
1091:in world history. Score voting was used in
2986:
2799:
2785:
2777:
2635:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
1308:
1294:
1150:
1000:
986:
76:
2322:
1723:Currently, score voting is advocated by
1367:
1148:. It is still used for local elections.
60:of all important aspects of the article.
3244:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
3022:Sequential proportional approval voting
2537:"Strategic SRV? - Equal Vote Coalition"
1936:"Adding Up the Costs of Cyberdemocracy"
1800:
1645:independence of irrelevant alternatives
1240:Knowledge (XXG)'s Arbitration Committee
1131:Secretary-General of the United Nations
92:
2628:
1628:Score voting is not vulnerable to the
1361:, far to the northeast (17% of voters)
1146:party-list proportional representation
1140:Proportional score voting was used in
1101:party-list proportional representation
1042:. However, it is used more often than
56:Please consider expanding the lead to
2466:European Journal of Political Economy
2416:The American Political Science Review
2278:"89TH ANNUAL ACADEMY AWARDS OF MERIT"
2010:from the original on October 9, 2022.
1278:Academy Award for Best Visual Effects
1265:stores, etc.). Judged sports such as
1034:Score voting is not as often-used as
7:
2129:Tharoor, Shashi (October 21, 2016).
3054:Indirect single transferable voting
2650:Heckscher, Albert Gottlieb (1892).
2605:Social choice and democratic values
2205:Piper, Kelsey (November 15, 2018).
2041:The Normative Turn in Public Choice
1684:Tactical voting § Score voting
1230:to elect officers, on a 0–9 scale.
1137:holding a veto over any candidate.
1079:Beginning in the 13th century, the
2297:Miller, Nicholas R. (2019-04-01).
2038:Brams, Steven J. (April 1, 2006).
2021:Mavrogordatos, George Th. (1983).
1164:Score each candidate by filling in
25:
1166:a number (0 is worst; 9 is best)
27:Single-winner rated voting system
2719:simplified introductory homepage
2668:"About The Equal Vote Coalition"
2603:Eerik, Lagerspetz (2015-11-26).
1934:Stille, Alexander (2001-06-02).
1647:, meaning it is not affected by
1543:
1317:
969:
956:
944:
892:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
538:Semi-proportional representation
170:First preference plurality (FPP)
34:
3414:Single-winner electoral systems
2724:The Center for Election Science
1858:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.11.003
1813:The Center for Election Science
1725:The Center for Election Science
1355:, somewhat east (15% of voters)
48:may be too short to adequately
3165:Mixed ballot transferable vote
2478:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.09.006
1776:Utilitarian social choice rule
930:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
887:Moulin's impossibility theorem
852:Conflicting majorities paradox
58:provide an accessible overview
1:
756:Frustrated majorities paradox
3366:Comparison of voting systems
3208:Satisfaction approval voting
3193:Single non-transferable vote
3012:Proportional approval voting
2236:Independent Political Report
2179:Moen, Mike (June 10, 2020).
1226:Score voting is used by the
925:Condorcet dominance theorems
865:Social and collective choice
3424:Monotonic electoral systems
2972:Graduated majority judgment
2715:The Center for Range Voting
2169:, accessed November 7, 2018
1911:10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_3
1901:Handbook on Approval Voting
1771:Implicit utilitarian voting
591:By mechanism of combination
362:Proportional representation
3445:
3419:Cardinal electoral systems
3224:Condorcet winner criterion
2915:First-past-the-post voting
1681:
1036:first-preference plurality
789:Multiple districts paradox
520:Fractional approval voting
508:Interactive representation
3379:
3371:Voting systems by country
3274:Mutual majority criterion
3229:Condorcet loser criterion
3175:Vote linkage mixed system
3087:Largest remainders method
2814:
2574:10.1007/s11127-014-0169-z
2428:10.1017/S0003055409090224
2384:10.1007/s00355-013-0728-0
2372:Social Choice and Welfare
2315:10.1007/s11127-018-0524-6
2165:November 7, 2018, at the
1756:Consensus decision-making
1391:
1384:
1377:
1370:
736:Paradoxes and pathologies
585:Mixed-member proportional
580:Mixed-member majoritarian
575:By results of combination
466:Approval-based committees
3264:Majority loser criterion
3150:Additional member system
3108:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
3027:Single transferable vote
2952:Positional voting system
2888:Minimax Condorcet method
2846:Combined approval voting
1783:— similar rule based on
1658:It does not satisfy the
1651:, and is not subject to
915:Condorcet's jury theorem
716:Double simultaneous vote
691:Rural–urban proportional
686:Dual-member proportional
648:
637:
604:Parallel (superposition)
496:Fractional social choice
483:Expanding approvals rule
312:
297:
282:
213:
202:
178:
3289:Resolvability criterion
3279:Participation criterion
3254:Later-no-harm criterion
3070:Highest averages method
2745:Article by Brian Olson.
2728:article on Score Voting
2074:"14. SAEIMAS VÄ’LÄ’Ĺ ANAS"
1643:Score voting satisfies
1634:participation criterion
1280:rated on a 0–10 scale.
1099:; it was replaced with
842:Tyranny of the majority
619:Fusion (majority bonus)
436:Quota-remainder methods
18:Center for Range Voting
3330:First-preference votes
3269:Monotonicity criterion
3239:Independence of clones
2942:Simple majoritarianism
2692:"STAR Voting campaign"
2492:"Equal Vote Coalition"
2345:Laslier, J.-F. (2006)
976:Mathematics portal
882:Majority impossibility
871:Impossibility theorems
667:Negative vote transfer
488:Method of equal shares
109:
3234:Consistency criterion
3155:Alternative vote plus
2920:Instant-runoff voting
2607:. Cham. p. 109.
1607:Instant-runoff voting
1261:, apps in the iOS or
1251:customer satisfaction
1048:instant-runoff voting
779:Best-is-worst paradox
768:Pathological response
503:Direct representation
156:Single-winner methods
108:
3304:Seats-to-votes ratio
3075:Webster/Sainte-Laguë
2733:Equal Vote Coalition
2672:Equal Vote Coalition
2541:Equal Vote Coalition
2110:on February 27, 2008
1630:less-is-more paradox
963:Economics portal
910:Median voter theorem
129:Comparative politics
3284:Plurality criterion
2883:Kemeny–Young method
2749:Mechanic, Michael;
2735:, which promotes a
2351:IDEP Working Papers
2185:Public News Service
1961:Theory and Decision
1660:Condorcet criterion
1638:ranked-choice (RCV)
1228:Green Party of Utah
1217:Fargo, North Dakota
1153:
1027:(used to calculate
1015:, sometimes called
951:Politics portal
662:Vote linkage system
633:Seat linkage system
220:Ranked-choice (RCV)
3325:Election threshold
3259:Majority criterion
2935:Supplementary vote
2751:William Poundstone
1973:10.1007/BF00135090
1151:
1081:Republic of Venice
847:Discursive dilemma
806:Lesser evil voting
681:Supermixed systems
384:Largest remainders
242:Round-robin voting
110:
3409:Electoral systems
3396:
3395:
3294:Reversal symmetry
3203:Cumulative voting
3185:Semi-proportional
3160:Mixed single vote
3126:
3125:
3002:Mixed single vote
2910:Exhaustive ballot
2873:Copeland's method
2868:Condorcet methods
2808:Electoral systems
1846:Electoral Studies
1781:Majority judgment
1600:
1599:
1474:
1473:
1396:
1389:
1382:
1375:
1336:The options are:
1234:Non-political use
1213:
1212:
1142:Swedish elections
1127:selection process
1097:many-party system
1044:Condorcet methods
1010:
1009:
897:Gibbard's theorem
837:Dominance paradox
774:Perverse response
478:Phragmen's method
344:Majority judgment
272:Positional voting
230:Condorcet methods
98:electoral systems
75:
74:
16:(Redirected from
3436:
3335:Liquid democracy
2987:
2967:Two-round system
2878:Dodgson's method
2801:
2794:
2787:
2778:
2773:
2771:
2770:
2702:
2701:
2699:
2698:
2688:
2682:
2681:
2679:
2678:
2664:
2658:
2657:
2647:
2641:
2640:
2634:
2626:
2600:
2594:
2593:
2568:(3–4): 327–339.
2557:
2551:
2550:
2548:
2547:
2533:
2527:
2526:
2524:
2523:
2508:
2502:
2501:
2499:
2498:
2488:
2482:
2481:
2463:
2454:
2448:
2447:
2411:
2405:
2402:
2396:
2395:
2369:
2360:
2354:
2343:
2337:
2336:
2326:
2294:
2288:
2287:
2282:
2274:
2268:
2267:
2256:
2250:
2249:
2244:
2243:
2228:
2222:
2221:
2219:
2217:
2202:
2196:
2195:
2193:
2191:
2176:
2170:
2157:
2151:
2150:
2148:
2146:
2141:on July 21, 2019
2137:. Archived from
2126:
2120:
2119:
2117:
2115:
2109:
2103:. Archived from
2102:
2094:
2088:
2087:
2085:
2084:
2070:
2064:
2063:
2061:
2059:
2053:
2046:
2035:
2029:
2028:
2018:
2012:
2011:
2009:
2002:
1991:
1985:
1984:
1956:
1950:
1949:
1947:
1946:
1931:
1925:
1924:
1904:
1894:
1888:
1885:
1879:
1878:
1873:
1872:
1866:
1860:. Archived from
1843:
1834:
1828:
1827:
1821:
1820:
1805:
1550:
1547:
1546:
1480:
1394:
1387:
1380:
1373:
1368:
1321:
1310:
1303:
1296:
1208:
1194:
1179:
1154:
1040:two-round system
1029:approval ratings
1021:electoral system
1002:
995:
988:
974:
973:
961:
960:
949:
948:
904:Positive results
799:Strategic voting
696:Majority jackpot
653:
642:
513:Liquid democracy
389:National remnant
379:Highest averages
316:
301:
286:
218:
209:Alternative vote
207:
191:Partisan primary
183:
124:Mechanism design
77:
70:
67:
61:
38:
30:
21:
3444:
3443:
3439:
3438:
3437:
3435:
3434:
3433:
3399:
3398:
3397:
3392:
3375:
3354:
3308:
3299:Smith criterion
3212:
3179:
3140:Parallel voting
3122:
3118:Imperiali quota
3091:
3058:
2976:
2930:Contingent vote
2893:Nanson's method
2851:Unified primary
2841:Approval voting
2827:
2810:
2805:
2768:
2766:
2748:
2711:
2706:
2705:
2696:
2694:
2690:
2689:
2685:
2676:
2674:
2666:
2665:
2661:
2649:
2648:
2644:
2627:
2615:
2602:
2601:
2597:
2559:
2558:
2554:
2545:
2543:
2535:
2534:
2530:
2521:
2519:
2510:
2509:
2505:
2496:
2494:
2490:
2489:
2485:
2461:
2456:
2455:
2451:
2413:
2412:
2408:
2403:
2399:
2367:
2362:
2361:
2357:
2344:
2340:
2296:
2295:
2291:
2280:
2276:
2275:
2271:
2264:Knowledge (XXG)
2258:
2257:
2253:
2241:
2239:
2230:
2229:
2225:
2215:
2213:
2204:
2203:
2199:
2189:
2187:
2178:
2177:
2173:
2167:Wayback Machine
2158:
2154:
2144:
2142:
2128:
2127:
2123:
2113:
2111:
2107:
2100:
2096:
2095:
2091:
2082:
2080:
2072:
2071:
2067:
2057:
2055:
2054:on May 31, 2010
2051:
2044:
2037:
2036:
2032:
2020:
2019:
2015:
2007:
2000:
1993:
1992:
1988:
1958:
1957:
1953:
1944:
1942:
1933:
1932:
1928:
1921:
1896:
1895:
1891:
1886:
1882:
1870:
1868:
1864:
1841:
1836:
1835:
1831:
1818:
1816:
1807:
1806:
1802:
1797:
1761:Decision making
1746:Cardinal voting
1737:
1717:
1694:approval voting
1690:voting strategy
1686:
1680:
1653:Arrow's theorem
1649:spoiler effects
1619:
1611:approval voting
1548:
1544:
1484:
1393:
1386:
1379:
1372:
1315:
1314:
1286:
1274:Thiele's method
1236:
1221:approval voting
1206:
1192:
1177:
1165:
1158:
1112:
1066:
1061:
1056:
1025:approval voting
1006:
968:
967:
955:
943:
935:
934:
901:
877:Arrow's theorem
867:
857:
856:
825:
795:
784:No-show paradox
765:
751:Cloning paradox
741:Spoiler effects
738:
728:
727:
702:
589:
572:
562:
561:
534:
525:Maximal lottery
492:
473:Thiele's method
462:
432:
364:
354:
353:
339:Approval voting
327:Cardinal voting
323:
268:
262:Maximal lottery
226:
158:
148:
71:
65:
62:
55:
43:This article's
39:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
3442:
3440:
3432:
3431:
3429:Utilitarianism
3426:
3421:
3416:
3411:
3401:
3400:
3394:
3393:
3380:
3377:
3376:
3374:
3373:
3368:
3362:
3360:
3356:
3355:
3353:
3352:
3347:
3342:
3337:
3332:
3327:
3322:
3316:
3314:
3310:
3309:
3307:
3306:
3301:
3296:
3291:
3286:
3281:
3276:
3271:
3266:
3261:
3256:
3251:
3246:
3241:
3236:
3231:
3226:
3220:
3218:
3214:
3213:
3211:
3210:
3205:
3200:
3198:Limited voting
3195:
3189:
3187:
3181:
3180:
3178:
3177:
3172:
3167:
3162:
3157:
3152:
3147:
3142:
3136:
3134:
3128:
3127:
3124:
3123:
3121:
3120:
3115:
3110:
3105:
3099:
3097:
3093:
3092:
3090:
3089:
3084:
3083:
3082:
3077:
3066:
3064:
3060:
3059:
3057:
3056:
3051:
3046:
3045:
3044:
3039:
3034:
3024:
3019:
3014:
3009:
3004:
2999:
2993:
2991:
2984:
2978:
2977:
2975:
2974:
2969:
2964:
2959:
2954:
2949:
2944:
2939:
2938:
2937:
2932:
2927:
2925:Coombs' method
2917:
2912:
2907:
2906:
2905:
2903:Schulze method
2900:
2895:
2890:
2885:
2880:
2875:
2865:
2863:Bucklin voting
2860:
2855:
2854:
2853:
2848:
2837:
2835:
2829:
2828:
2815:
2812:
2811:
2806:
2804:
2803:
2796:
2789:
2781:
2775:
2774:
2753:(2007-01-02).
2746:
2740:
2730:
2721:
2710:
2709:External links
2707:
2704:
2703:
2683:
2659:
2642:
2613:
2595:
2552:
2528:
2503:
2483:
2449:
2422:(2): 175–192.
2406:
2397:
2378:(2): 313–340.
2355:
2338:
2309:(1): 113–124.
2289:
2269:
2251:
2223:
2197:
2171:
2152:
2121:
2089:
2065:
2030:
2013:
1986:
1967:(2): 155–172.
1951:
1940:New York Times
1926:
1919:
1889:
1880:
1829:
1809:"Score Voting"
1799:
1798:
1796:
1793:
1792:
1791:
1778:
1773:
1768:
1763:
1758:
1753:
1748:
1743:
1736:
1733:
1716:
1713:
1679:
1676:
1618:
1615:
1598:
1597:
1592:
1591:170 (17 Ă— 10)
1589:
1586:
1583:
1580:
1576:
1575:
1570:
1567:
1566:150 (15 Ă— 10)
1564:
1561:
1558:
1554:
1553:
1540:
1537:
1534:
1533:260 (26 Ă— 10)
1531:
1528:
1524:
1523:
1518:
1515:
1512:
1509:
1508:420 (42 Ă— 10)
1506:
1502:
1501:
1498:
1495:
1492:
1489:
1486:
1472:
1471:
1470:
1469:
1466:
1463:
1460:
1453:
1452:
1451:
1448:
1445:
1442:
1435:
1434:
1433:
1430:
1427:
1424:
1417:
1416:
1415:
1412:
1409:
1406:
1398:
1397:
1390:
1383:
1376:
1363:
1362:
1356:
1350:
1344:
1313:
1312:
1305:
1298:
1290:
1289:
1285:
1282:
1257:, products at
1235:
1232:
1211:
1210:
1203:
1200:
1199:3: Candidate C
1196:
1195:
1189:
1186:
1185:2: Candidate B
1182:
1181:
1175:
1172:
1171:1: Candidate A
1168:
1167:
1162:
1160:
1122:(parliament).
1111:
1108:
1085:Doge of Venice
1065:
1062:
1060:
1057:
1055:
1052:
1008:
1007:
1005:
1004:
997:
990:
982:
979:
978:
966:
965:
953:
940:
937:
936:
933:
932:
927:
922:
917:
912:
900:
899:
894:
889:
884:
879:
868:
863:
862:
859:
858:
855:
854:
849:
844:
839:
824:
823:
821:Turkey-raising
818:
813:
808:
794:
793:
792:
791:
781:
776:
764:
763:
761:Center squeeze
758:
753:
748:
746:Spoiler effect
739:
734:
733:
730:
729:
726:
725:
720:
719:
718:
705:By ballot type
701:
700:
699:
698:
693:
688:
678:
677:
676:
675:
674:
669:
659:
658:
657:
646:
623:
622:
621:
616:
611:
606:
588:
587:
582:
573:
568:
567:
564:
563:
560:
559:
557:Limited voting
554:
553:
552:
533:
532:
527:
522:
517:
516:
515:
510:
491:
490:
485:
480:
475:
461:
460:
455:
450:
445:
431:
430:
429:
428:
426:Localized list
423:
418:
413:
408:
398:
397:
396:
394:Biproportional
391:
386:
381:
365:
360:
359:
356:
355:
352:
351:
346:
341:
336:
322:
321:
306:
291:
267:
266:
265:
264:
259:
254:
249:
239:
225:
224:
223:
222:
211:
198:Instant-runoff
195:
194:
193:
185:Jungle primary
172:
161:Single vote -
159:
154:
153:
150:
149:
147:
146:
136:
131:
126:
121:
115:
112:
111:
101:
100:
90:
89:
73:
72:
52:the key points
42:
40:
33:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3441:
3430:
3427:
3425:
3422:
3420:
3417:
3415:
3412:
3410:
3407:
3406:
3404:
3391:
3390:
3385:
3384:
3378:
3372:
3369:
3367:
3364:
3363:
3361:
3357:
3351:
3348:
3346:
3343:
3341:
3338:
3336:
3333:
3331:
3328:
3326:
3323:
3321:
3318:
3317:
3315:
3311:
3305:
3302:
3300:
3297:
3295:
3292:
3290:
3287:
3285:
3282:
3280:
3277:
3275:
3272:
3270:
3267:
3265:
3262:
3260:
3257:
3255:
3252:
3250:
3247:
3245:
3242:
3240:
3237:
3235:
3232:
3230:
3227:
3225:
3222:
3221:
3219:
3215:
3209:
3206:
3204:
3201:
3199:
3196:
3194:
3191:
3190:
3188:
3186:
3182:
3176:
3173:
3171:
3168:
3166:
3163:
3161:
3158:
3156:
3153:
3151:
3148:
3146:
3143:
3141:
3138:
3137:
3135:
3133:
3129:
3119:
3116:
3114:
3111:
3109:
3106:
3104:
3101:
3100:
3098:
3094:
3088:
3085:
3081:
3078:
3076:
3073:
3072:
3071:
3068:
3067:
3065:
3061:
3055:
3052:
3050:
3047:
3043:
3040:
3038:
3035:
3033:
3030:
3029:
3028:
3025:
3023:
3020:
3018:
3015:
3013:
3010:
3008:
3005:
3003:
3000:
2998:
2995:
2994:
2992:
2988:
2985:
2983:
2979:
2973:
2970:
2968:
2965:
2963:
2960:
2958:
2955:
2953:
2950:
2948:
2945:
2943:
2940:
2936:
2933:
2931:
2928:
2926:
2923:
2922:
2921:
2918:
2916:
2913:
2911:
2908:
2904:
2901:
2899:
2896:
2894:
2891:
2889:
2886:
2884:
2881:
2879:
2876:
2874:
2871:
2870:
2869:
2866:
2864:
2861:
2859:
2856:
2852:
2849:
2847:
2844:
2843:
2842:
2839:
2838:
2836:
2834:
2833:Single-winner
2830:
2826:
2824:
2820:
2813:
2809:
2802:
2797:
2795:
2790:
2788:
2783:
2782:
2779:
2765:on 2008-02-09
2764:
2760:
2756:
2752:
2747:
2744:
2741:
2738:
2734:
2731:
2729:
2725:
2722:
2720:
2716:
2713:
2712:
2708:
2693:
2687:
2684:
2673:
2669:
2663:
2660:
2655:
2654:
2646:
2643:
2638:
2632:
2624:
2620:
2616:
2614:9783319232614
2610:
2606:
2599:
2596:
2591:
2587:
2583:
2579:
2575:
2571:
2567:
2563:
2562:Public Choice
2556:
2553:
2542:
2538:
2532:
2529:
2517:
2513:
2507:
2504:
2493:
2487:
2484:
2479:
2475:
2471:
2467:
2460:
2453:
2450:
2445:
2441:
2437:
2433:
2429:
2425:
2421:
2417:
2410:
2407:
2401:
2398:
2393:
2389:
2385:
2381:
2377:
2373:
2366:
2359:
2356:
2352:
2348:
2342:
2339:
2334:
2330:
2325:
2320:
2316:
2312:
2308:
2304:
2303:Public Choice
2300:
2293:
2290:
2286:
2279:
2273:
2270:
2266:. 2018-03-28.
2265:
2261:
2255:
2252:
2248:
2237:
2233:
2227:
2224:
2212:
2208:
2201:
2198:
2186:
2182:
2175:
2172:
2168:
2164:
2161:
2156:
2153:
2140:
2136:
2135:OPEN Magazine
2132:
2125:
2122:
2106:
2099:
2093:
2090:
2079:
2078:sv2022.cvk.lv
2075:
2069:
2066:
2050:
2043:
2042:
2034:
2031:
2026:
2025:
2017:
2014:
2006:
1999:
1998:
1990:
1987:
1982:
1978:
1974:
1970:
1966:
1962:
1955:
1952:
1941:
1937:
1930:
1927:
1922:
1920:9783642028380
1916:
1912:
1908:
1903:
1902:
1893:
1890:
1884:
1881:
1877:
1867:on 2021-04-10
1863:
1859:
1855:
1851:
1847:
1840:
1833:
1830:
1826:
1814:
1810:
1804:
1801:
1794:
1790:
1786:
1782:
1779:
1777:
1774:
1772:
1769:
1767:
1764:
1762:
1759:
1757:
1754:
1752:
1749:
1747:
1744:
1742:
1739:
1738:
1734:
1732:
1730:
1726:
1721:
1714:
1712:
1710:
1706:
1702:
1698:
1695:
1691:
1685:
1677:
1675:
1673:
1669:
1665:
1664:majority rule
1661:
1656:
1654:
1650:
1646:
1641:
1639:
1635:
1631:
1626:
1624:
1616:
1614:
1612:
1608:
1603:
1596:
1593:
1590:
1587:
1584:
1581:
1578:
1577:
1574:
1571:
1569:119 (17 Ă— 7)
1568:
1565:
1563:104 (26 Ă— 4)
1562:
1559:
1556:
1555:
1552:
1541:
1538:
1535:
1532:
1530:168 (42 Ă— 4)
1529:
1526:
1525:
1522:
1519:
1516:
1513:
1510:
1507:
1504:
1503:
1499:
1496:
1493:
1490:
1487:
1482:
1481:
1478:
1467:
1464:
1461:
1459:
1456:
1455:
1454:
1449:
1446:
1443:
1441:
1438:
1437:
1436:
1431:
1428:
1425:
1423:
1420:
1419:
1418:
1413:
1410:
1407:
1405:
1402:
1401:
1400:
1399:
1392:17% of voters
1385:15% of voters
1378:26% of voters
1371:42% of voters
1369:
1366:
1360:
1357:
1354:
1351:
1348:
1345:
1342:
1339:
1338:
1337:
1335:
1331:
1327:
1324:Suppose that
1322:
1320:
1311:
1306:
1304:
1299:
1297:
1292:
1291:
1288:
1283:
1281:
1279:
1275:
1270:
1268:
1264:
1260:
1256:
1252:
1248:
1247:Likert scales
1243:
1241:
1233:
1231:
1229:
1224:
1222:
1218:
1204:
1201:
1198:
1197:
1190:
1187:
1184:
1183:
1176:
1173:
1170:
1169:
1163:
1161:
1156:
1155:
1149:
1147:
1143:
1138:
1136:
1132:
1128:
1123:
1121:
1117:
1109:
1107:
1104:
1102:
1098:
1094:
1090:
1086:
1082:
1077:
1075:
1071:
1063:
1059:Political use
1058:
1053:
1051:
1049:
1045:
1041:
1037:
1032:
1030:
1026:
1022:
1018:
1014:
1003:
998:
996:
991:
989:
984:
983:
981:
980:
977:
972:
964:
959:
954:
952:
947:
942:
941:
939:
938:
931:
928:
926:
923:
921:
920:May's theorem
918:
916:
913:
911:
908:
907:
906:
905:
898:
895:
893:
890:
888:
885:
883:
880:
878:
875:
874:
873:
872:
866:
861:
860:
853:
850:
848:
845:
843:
840:
838:
835:
834:
833:
832:
831:
830:majority rule
828:Paradoxes of
822:
819:
817:
814:
812:
809:
807:
804:
803:
802:
801:
800:
790:
787:
786:
785:
782:
780:
777:
775:
772:
771:
770:
769:
762:
759:
757:
754:
752:
749:
747:
744:
743:
742:
737:
732:
731:
724:
721:
717:
714:
713:
712:
709:
708:
707:
706:
697:
694:
692:
689:
687:
684:
683:
682:
679:
673:
670:
668:
665:
664:
663:
660:
656:
651:
647:
645:
640:
636:
635:
634:
631:
630:
629:
628:
624:
620:
617:
615:
612:
610:
607:
605:
602:
601:
600:
599:
594:
593:
592:
586:
583:
581:
578:
577:
576:
571:
570:Mixed systems
566:
565:
558:
555:
551:
548:
547:
546:
543:
542:
541:
540:
539:
531:
530:Random ballot
528:
526:
523:
521:
518:
514:
511:
509:
506:
505:
504:
501:
500:
499:
498:
497:
489:
486:
484:
481:
479:
476:
474:
471:
470:
469:
468:
467:
459:
456:
454:
451:
449:
446:
444:
441:
440:
439:
438:
437:
427:
424:
422:
419:
417:
414:
412:
409:
407:
404:
403:
402:
399:
395:
392:
390:
387:
385:
382:
380:
377:
376:
375:
374:Apportionment
372:
371:
370:
369:
363:
358:
357:
350:
347:
345:
342:
340:
337:
335:
332:
331:
330:
329:
328:
319:
315:
310:
309:Antiplurality
307:
304:
300:
295:
292:
289:
285:
280:
277:
276:
275:
274:
273:
263:
260:
258:
255:
253:
250:
248:
245:
244:
243:
240:
238:
237:Condorcet-IRV
235:
234:
233:
232:
231:
221:
216:
212:
210:
205:
201:
200:
199:
196:
192:
189:
188:
186:
181:
176:
173:
171:
168:
167:
166:
164:
157:
152:
151:
144:
140:
137:
135:
132:
130:
127:
125:
122:
120:
119:Social choice
117:
116:
114:
113:
107:
103:
102:
99:
95:
94:Social choice
91:
87:
83:
79:
78:
69:
59:
53:
51:
46:
41:
37:
32:
31:
19:
3387:
3381:
2997:Mixed-member
2982:Proportional
2957:Score voting
2956:
2898:Ranked pairs
2817:Part of the
2816:
2767:. Retrieved
2763:the original
2759:Mother Jones
2758:
2726:includes an
2695:. Retrieved
2686:
2675:. Retrieved
2671:
2662:
2656:(in Danish).
2652:
2645:
2604:
2598:
2565:
2561:
2555:
2544:. Retrieved
2540:
2531:
2520:. Retrieved
2518:. 2016-12-08
2515:
2506:
2495:. Retrieved
2486:
2469:
2465:
2452:
2419:
2415:
2409:
2400:
2375:
2371:
2358:
2350:
2341:
2306:
2302:
2292:
2284:
2272:
2263:
2254:
2246:
2240:. Retrieved
2238:. 2017-06-27
2235:
2226:
2214:. Retrieved
2210:
2200:
2188:. Retrieved
2184:
2174:
2155:
2143:. Retrieved
2139:the original
2134:
2124:
2114:November 30,
2112:. Retrieved
2105:the original
2092:
2081:. Retrieved
2077:
2068:
2056:. Retrieved
2049:the original
2040:
2033:
2023:
2016:
1996:
1989:
1964:
1960:
1954:
1943:. Retrieved
1939:
1929:
1900:
1892:
1883:
1875:
1869:. Retrieved
1862:the original
1849:
1845:
1832:
1823:
1817:. Retrieved
1815:. 2015-05-21
1812:
1803:
1722:
1718:
1707:
1703:
1699:
1688:Ideal score
1687:
1657:
1642:
1627:
1623:rated voting
1620:
1604:
1601:
1594:
1588:90 (15 Ă— 6)
1585:52 (26 Ă— 2)
1572:
1560:84 (42 Ă— 2)
1557:Chattanooga
1542:
1539:85 (17 Ă— 5)
1536:90 (15 Ă— 6)
1520:
1494:Chattanooga
1485:City Choice
1475:
1462:Chattanooga
1457:
1439:
1426:Chattanooga
1421:
1411:Chattanooga
1403:
1364:
1323:
1316:
1287:
1271:
1244:
1237:
1225:
1214:
1139:
1124:
1113:
1105:
1083:elected the
1078:
1067:
1033:
1017:range voting
1016:
1013:Score voting
1012:
1011:
903:
902:
869:
827:
826:
811:Exaggeration
797:
796:
767:
766:
740:
704:
703:
672:Mixed ballot
627:Compensatory
625:
598:compensatory
595:
590:
574:
536:
535:
494:
493:
464:
463:
434:
433:
421:List-free PR
366:
334:Score voting
333:
325:
324:
270:
269:
257:Ranked pairs
228:
227:
160:
63:
47:
45:lead section
3340:Spoilt vote
3103:Droop quota
3042:Schulze STV
3017:Rural–urban
2962:STAR voting
2858:Borda count
2737:STAR voting
2324:11603/20937
2190:December 3,
1852:: 131–145.
1787:instead of
1741:Borda count
1709:STAR voting
1582:0 (42 Ă— 0)
1517:0 (17 Ă— 0)
1514:0 (15 Ă— 0)
1511:0 (26 Ă— 0)
1483:Voter from/
1440:Chattanooga
1388:Center-East
1353:Chattanooga
1263:Google Play
1238:Members of
1159:Candidates
1074:clapometers
711:Single vote
614:Conditional
609:Coexistence
458:Quota Borda
448:Schulze STV
406:Closed list
349:STAR voting
294:Borda count
66:August 2024
3403:Categories
3359:Comparison
3113:Hare quota
3063:Allocation
3049:Spare vote
3037:Hare-Clark
3007:Party-list
2769:2008-02-04
2697:2019-09-02
2677:2018-03-29
2546:2017-04-05
2522:2017-04-05
2497:2017-04-05
2242:2017-09-14
2083:2024-04-30
1945:2009-10-03
1871:2019-12-22
1819:2016-12-10
1682:See also:
1617:Properties
1579:Knoxville
1527:Nashville
1497:Knoxville
1491:Nashville
1465:Nashville
1447:Nashville
1444:Knoxville
1429:Knoxville
1414:Knoxville
1408:Nashville
1267:gymnastics
1180:①②③④⑤⑥⑦⑧⑨
1103:in 1923.
1064:Historical
816:Truncation
545:Cumulative
368:Party-list
143:By country
134:Comparison
3350:Unseating
3345:Sortition
2947:Plurality
2823:Economics
2631:cite book
2623:930703262
2590:155023975
2582:0048-5829
2472:: 14–28.
2333:1573-7101
1981:121512308
1766:Democracy
1458:Knoxville
1422:Nashville
1359:Knoxville
1347:Nashville
1326:Tennessee
1215:In 2018,
1191:⓪①②③④⑤⑥⑦⑧
1089:democracy
723:Dual-vote
416:Panachage
411:Open list
401:List type
279:Plurality
175:Two-round
163:plurality
86:Economics
50:summarize
3217:Criteria
3170:Scorporo
2819:politics
2717:and its
2444:55173201
2436:27798496
2163:Archived
2145:March 6,
2005:Archived
1789:averages
1735:See also
1715:Advocacy
1678:Strategy
1672:election
1670:or past
1625:system.
1505:Memphis
1488:Memphis
1468:Memphis
1450:Memphis
1432:Memphis
1395:Far-East
1374:Far-West
1157:Governor
1129:for the
1019:, is an
443:Hare STV
82:Politics
80:A joint
3389:Project
3080:D'Hondt
3032:CPO-STV
2990:Systems
2392:5738643
2216:July 8,
1785:medians
1668:polling
1404:Memphis
1341:Memphis
1330:capital
1284:Example
1205:⓪①②③④⑤⑥
1110:Current
1038:or the
453:CPO-STV
303:Baldwin
252:Schulze
247:Minimax
165:methods
3383:Portal
3320:Ballot
3096:Quotas
2825:series
2621:
2611:
2588:
2580:
2516:IVN.us
2442:
2434:
2390:
2331:
2058:May 8,
1979:
1917:
1500:Total
1381:Center
1259:Amazon
1120:Saeima
1116:Latvia
1070:Sparta
318:Coombs
88:series
3313:Other
3132:Mixed
2586:S2CID
2462:(PDF)
2440:S2CID
2432:JSTOR
2388:S2CID
2368:(PDF)
2281:(PDF)
2108:(PDF)
2101:(PDF)
2052:(PDF)
2045:(PDF)
2008:(PDF)
2001:(PDF)
1977:S2CID
1865:(PDF)
1842:(PDF)
1795:Notes
1093:Greek
1054:Usage
655:'MMP'
644:'AMS'
2821:and
2637:link
2619:OCLC
2609:ISBN
2578:ISSN
2329:ISSN
2218:2020
2192:2020
2147:2019
2116:2007
2060:2010
1915:ISBN
1729:STAR
1255:IMDb
1249:for
1125:The
596:Non-
550:SNTV
139:List
96:and
84:and
3145:MMP
2570:doi
2566:159
2474:doi
2424:doi
2420:103
2380:doi
2319:hdl
2311:doi
2307:179
2211:Vox
1969:doi
1907:doi
1854:doi
1595:312
1573:457
1551:603
1521:420
1209:⑧⑨
1118:'s
314:el.
299:el.
288:IRV
284:el.
3405::
3386:—
2757:.
2670:.
2633:}}
2629:{{
2617:.
2584:.
2576:.
2564:.
2539:.
2514:.
2470:55
2468:.
2464:.
2438:.
2430:.
2418:.
2386:.
2376:42
2374:.
2370:.
2349:,
2327:.
2317:.
2305:.
2301:.
2262:.
2245:.
2234:.
2209:.
2183:.
2133:.
2076:.
1975:.
1965:20
1963:.
1938:.
1913:.
1874:.
1850:34
1848:.
1844:.
1822:.
1811:.
1655:.
1050:.
650:NZ
639:UK
215:US
204:UK
187:)
180:US
2800:e
2793:t
2786:v
2772:.
2700:.
2680:.
2639:)
2625:.
2592:.
2572::
2549:.
2525:.
2500:.
2480:.
2476::
2446:.
2426::
2394:.
2382::
2335:.
2321::
2313::
2220:.
2194:.
2149:.
2118:.
2086:.
2062:.
1983:.
1971::
1948:.
1923:.
1909::
1856::
1549:Y
1309:e
1302:t
1295:v
1207:❼
1202:→
1193:âťľ
1188:→
1178:â“ż
1174:→
1001:e
994:t
987:v
652::
641::
320:)
311:(
305:)
296:(
290:)
281:(
217::
206::
182::
177:(
145:)
141:(
68:)
64:(
54:.
20:)
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
