Knowledge (XXG)

Certification path validation algorithm

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In the standardized algorithm, the following steps are performed for each certificate in the path, starting from the trust anchor. If any check fails on any certificate, the algorithm terminates and path validation fails. (This is an explanatory summary of the scope of the algorithm, not a rigorous
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is present in the relying party's web browser. In a bridged PKI, a certificate chain starting with a user at Company A might lead to Company A's CA certificate, then to a bridge CA, then to company B's CA certificate, then to company B's trust anchor, which a relying party at company B could trust.
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to make an informed trust decision when presented with any certificate that is not already explicitly trusted. For example, in a hierarchical PKI, a certificate chain starting with a web server certificate might lead to a small CA, then to an intermediate CA, then to a large CA whose
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Policy constraints and basic constraints are checked, to ensure that any explicit policy requirements are not violated and that the certificate is a CA certificate, respectively. This step is crucial in preventing some
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If this procedure reaches the last certificate in the chain, with no name constraint or policy violations or any other error condition, then the certificate path validation algorithm terminates successfully.
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Name constraints are checked, to make sure the subject name is within the permitted subtrees list of all previous CA certificates and not within the excluded subtrees list of any previous CA certificate;
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are checked against the permissible OIDs as of the previous certificate, including any policy mapping equivalencies asserted by the previous certificate;
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certificates, given a certificate path. (Path discovery, the actual construction of a path, is not covered.) The algorithm takes the following inputs:
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The path length is checked to ensure that it does not exceed any maximum path length asserted in this or a previous certificate;
35:(PKI). A path starts with the Subject certificate and proceeds through a number of intermediate certificates up to a trusted 114: 224: 32: 219: 142: 124:
The issuer name is checked to ensure that it equals the subject name of the previous certificate in the path;
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The key usage extension is checked to ensure that is allowed to sign certificates; and
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Indicators whether policy mapping is allowed and how/when/whether the "any" policy
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The current date/time is checked against the validity period of the certificate;
63: 24: 182:(May 2008), chapter 6., a standardized path validation algorithm for 121:, or some other mechanism, to ensure the certificate is not revoked; 84:
object identifiers (OIDs) acceptable to the relying party (or any);
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Any other critical extensions are recognized and processed.
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defines a standardized path validation algorithm for
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The public key algorithm and parameters are checked;
87:The trust anchor of the certificate path; and 8: 200:New Tricks For Defeating SSL In Practice 168: 21:certification path validation algorithm 16:Test for a valid public key certificate 99:reproduction of the detailed steps.) 74:The certificate path to be evaluated; 7: 46:Path validation is necessary for a 14: 39:, typically issued by a trusted 1: 206:DC Briefings 2009 conference. 27:which verifies that a given 256: 225:Delegated Path Validation 143:man in the middle attacks 33:public key infrastructure 220:Delegated Path Discovery 240:Cryptographic protocols 113:is checked, whether by 31:is valid under a given 77:The current date/time; 41:certificate authority 94:is to be tolerated. 132:certificate policy 82:certificate policy 196:Moxie Marlinspike 111:revocation status 247: 207: 193: 187: 173: 37:root certificate 29:certificate path 255: 254: 250: 249: 248: 246: 245: 244: 230: 229: 216: 211: 210: 194: 190: 174: 170: 165: 17: 12: 11: 5: 253: 251: 243: 242: 232: 231: 228: 227: 222: 215: 212: 209: 208: 188: 167: 166: 164: 163:External links 161: 156: 155: 152: 149: 146: 138: 128: 125: 122: 107: 104: 96: 95: 88: 85: 78: 75: 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 252: 241: 238: 237: 235: 226: 223: 221: 218: 217: 213: 205: 201: 197: 192: 189: 186:certificates. 185: 181: 177: 172: 169: 162: 160: 153: 150: 147: 144: 139: 136: 133: 130:The asserted 129: 126: 123: 120: 116: 112: 108: 105: 102: 101: 100: 93: 89: 86: 83: 79: 76: 73: 72: 71: 69: 65: 61: 57: 54: 49: 48:relying party 44: 42: 38: 34: 30: 26: 22: 191: 171: 157: 97: 80:The list of 58: 53:trust anchor 45: 28: 20: 18: 204:Black Hat 25:algorithm 234:Category 214:See also 23:is the 178:  62:  43:(CA). 184:X.509 68:X.509 180:5280 135:OIDs 119:OCSP 109:The 64:5280 19:The 176:RFC 115:CRL 92:OID 60:RFC 236:: 202:, 198:, 117:, 145:;

Index

algorithm
public key infrastructure
root certificate
certificate authority
relying party
trust anchor
RFC
5280
X.509
certificate policy
OID
revocation status
CRL
OCSP
certificate policy
OIDs
man in the middle attacks
RFC
5280
X.509
Moxie Marlinspike
New Tricks For Defeating SSL In Practice
Black Hat
Delegated Path Discovery
Delegated Path Validation
Category
Cryptographic protocols

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