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Cheff v. Mathes

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267:, which could not be sustained in later years. Maremont, an owner of an automotive parts manufacturing business, approached Cheff in 1957 to discuss the possibility of a merger between the two companies. Cheff was not interested in a business combination. Rebuffed, Maremont purchased 6% of Holland stock on the open market. Cheff ordered an investigation of Maremont, and learned that Maremont had engaged in corporate takeovers and liquidation of several companies. (At the resulting trial, Cheff would testify that Maremont was not well regarded among local area businessmen.) Cheff and Maremont met a second time, by which time Maremont owned 11% of Holland Stock. Maremont told Cheff that Holland's door-to-door sales tactic was obsolete and should be abandoned in favor of a wholesaler marketing strategy. 90: 24: 307:"The question then presented is whether or not satisfied the burden of proof of showing reasonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed by the presence of the Maremont stock ownership. It is important to remember that the directors satisfy their burden by showing good faith and reasonable investigation; the directors will not be penalized for an honest mistake of judgment, if the judgment appeared reasonable at the time the decision was made." 489: 299:. In the case of Holland Furnace, the board's purchase of shares with corporate funds prevented a hostile takeover (which could have been in the best interest of the company) while also maintaining their control of the company. Thus, the court had to decide whether the Board was so conflicted that they should not be afforded Business Judgment Rule protection. 333:
mention is that Holland's fortunes suffered another reversal - this one fatal. Holland's sales were in excess of $ 31 million in 1958, but dropped to $ 1.1 million by 1965. That year, Holland stock reached a high of $ 1.63 per share, compared to a closing price of $ 11–1/8 per share in October 1957.
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The court held that the directors were protected by the business judgment rule, because they held a good faith belief that Maremont posed a threat to Holland's continued existence. Testimony established the board's understanding of Maremont's reputation for acquiring businesses and liquidating them,
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Upon learning of Maremont's plans, Cheffs and Holland's board of directors agreed that Maremont posed a threat to Holland's continued existence. Holland's board would claim that Maremont's threat caused many of Holland's employees to quit in anticipation of the threatened takeover. With the stated
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Holland Furnace Company manufactured home furnaces. The company's marketing strategy involved door-to-door sales, which employed a large workforce. This model, if not unique to Holland Furnace, was nevertheless unusual. From the standpoint of Arnold Maremont, a businessman who had been purchasing
255:.) Sales representatives for Holland would go door to door posing as official inspectors. Claiming to be employed by the homeowner's utility or by the local government, these salesmen would disassemble the furnace, refusing to reassemble it for lack of spare parts. Holland's core business lay in 319:
Therefore, after Delaware's holding in this case, a director could rebut any inference of a conflict of interest, and remain protected by the business judgment rule, if they showed that they held a good faith belief that they were pursuing a "business purpose" that would benefit the corporation.
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Cheff-Landwehr family group had effective control over the company, with 18.5% of Holland stock. Cheff, a family member, was Holland's Chief Executive Officer. From 1948-1956, Holland's sales declined by 25%. Management attributed the sharp drop to a boom in sales following
328:
The court's findings mention - and minimize - the FTC investigation of Holland Furnace. The court, endorsing Holland's board, also notes that Holland's downward sales-trend reversed itself in 1957, the year that Maremont was bought out. What the court does
360:, Mr. Cheff testified as to Maremont's reputation, that: "Throughout the whole of the Kalamazoo-Battle Creek area, and Detroit too, where I spent considerable time, he is well known and not highly regarded by any stretch." 111:
P. T. Cheff, Katharine N. Cheff, Edgar P. Landwehr v. Anne J. Mathes and Harry Lewis v. Robert H. Trenkamp, George Spatta, Ralph C. Boalt, John D. Ames, Motor Products Corporation and Holland Furnace Company.
353:, Seventh Circuit. Ultimately, Holland Furnace and Mr. Cheff were held in contempt for violating the order by continuing to engage in unfair trade practices. Mr. Cheff went to jail for 6 months. 247:
Holland Furnace stock, it was unprofitable. These practices also implicated Holland Furnace in charges of unfair trade practices. (An investigation of these practices by the
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authorized the repurchase of Maremont's holdings of Holland stock at a price above the prevailing market stock price. Essentially, the board authorized the payment of
295:. While the business judgment rule typically protects corporate officers from judicial scrutiny of their actions, the rule could be limited if judges found a 548: 553: 220:
conflict of interest in a corporate change of control setting. This case is the predecessor to future seminal corporate law cases including:
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The unsavory character of Arnold Maremont is a key factor in the court's decision. During proceedings leading up to the court's decision in
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first had to determine whether Holland's directors were protected from judicial scrutiny of their actions under the
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Arnold Maremont, who died in 1978, involved himself in pursuits other than business. According to his obituary in
558: 100: 525: 429: 370: 248: 135: 38: 32: 395: 369:, Maremont was both a patron of the arts and a visionary for social justice. A governing life member of the 471: 89: 450: 292: 288: 213: 188: 155: 49: 151: 377:, Maremont was the first Illinois industrialist to back a law ending employment discrimination against 296: 228: 183: 516: 365: 341:
Holland Furnace faced charges of unfair trade practices that were known prior to the decision in
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in the early 1960s, he campaigned for publicly supported birth control for welfare families.
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had already been pending for a year at the time of the events underlying the decision in
349:, the FTC issued a "cease and desist order" against the company, an order upheld by the 403: 537: 264: 316:
and that Maremont's apparent intentions negatively affected Holland's work force.
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Robert H. Trenkamp v. Anne J. Mathes and Harry Lewis and Holland Furnace Company
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aim of eliminating Maremont's threat to Holland's existence, the Holland
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for the years covering the events of this case, did not appear in 1966.
345:. As a result of their investigations into the sales practices of 205: 132: 17: 446:
Holland Furnace Company v. Federal Trade Commission
174: 166: 161: 147: 142: 127: 119: 106: 96: 82: 503:, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) is available from: 8: 79: 68:Learn how and when to remove this message 31:This article includes a list of general 416: 334:Holland Furnace, listed in editions of 7: 223:Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 37:it lacks sufficient corresponding 14: 549:United States corporate case law 487: 88: 22: 554:1964 in United States case law 383:Illinois Public Aid Commission 375:Lyric Opera and Ballet Theater 351:United States Court of Appeals 1: 467:In re Holland Furnace Company 216:first addressed the issue of 373:and a former trustee of the 575: 303:Threat to Corporate Policy 474: (7th Cir. 1965). 453: (7th Cir. 1961). 336:Moody's Industrial Manual 179: 101:Supreme Court of Delaware 87: 399:457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) 371:Art Institute of Chicago 249:Federal Trade Commission 544:Delaware state case law 396:Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 208:548 (Del. 1964), was a 52:more precise citations. 293:business judgment rule 289:Delaware Supreme Court 283:Business Judgment Rule 214:Delaware Supreme Court 189:business judgment rule 432: (Del. 1964). 381:. As chairman of the 154:, Josiah O. Wolcott, 152:Charles L. Terry, Jr. 472:341 F.2d 548 451:295 F.2d 302 430:199 A.2d 548 297:conflict of interest 229:Revlon v. MacAndrews 366:The New York Times 273:board of directors 492:Works related to 379:African Americans 235:Paramount v. Time 197: 196: 184:Directors' duties 78: 77: 70: 566: 559:1964 in Delaware 530: 524: 521: 515: 512: 506: 491: 475: 469: 460: 454: 448: 439: 433: 427: 421: 143:Court membership 92: 80: 73: 66: 62: 59: 53: 48:this article by 39:inline citations 26: 25: 18: 574: 573: 569: 568: 567: 565: 564: 563: 534: 533: 528: 522: 519: 513: 510: 504: 501:Cheff v. Mathes 494:Cheff v. Mathes 484: 479: 478: 465: 461: 457: 444: 440: 436: 425:Cheff v. Mathes 423: 422: 418: 413: 391: 347:Holland Furnace 343:Cheff v. Mathes 326: 313: 244: 201:Cheff v. Mathes 193: 113: 83:Cheff v. Mathes 74: 63: 57: 54: 44:Please help to 43: 27: 23: 12: 11: 5: 572: 570: 562: 561: 556: 551: 546: 536: 535: 532: 531: 517:Google Scholar 497: 483: 482:External links 480: 477: 476: 455: 434: 415: 414: 412: 409: 408: 407: 404:Unocal v. Mesa 400: 390: 387: 325: 322: 312: 309: 305: 304: 285: 284: 243: 240: 195: 194: 192: 191: 186: 180: 177: 176: 172: 171: 168: 164: 163: 159: 158: 156:James B. Carey 149: 148:Judges sitting 145: 144: 140: 139: 129: 125: 124: 123:March 17, 1964 121: 117: 116: 108: 107:Full case name 104: 103: 98: 94: 93: 85: 84: 76: 75: 30: 28: 21: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 571: 560: 557: 555: 552: 550: 547: 545: 542: 541: 539: 527: 518: 509: 508:CourtListener 502: 498: 496:at Wikisource 495: 490: 486: 485: 481: 473: 468: 464: 459: 456: 452: 447: 443: 438: 435: 431: 426: 420: 417: 410: 406: 405: 401: 398: 397: 393: 392: 388: 386: 384: 380: 376: 372: 368: 367: 361: 359: 354: 352: 348: 344: 339: 337: 332: 323: 321: 317: 310: 308: 302: 301: 300: 298: 294: 290: 282: 281: 280: 279:to Maremont. 278: 274: 268: 266: 260: 258: 254: 250: 241: 239: 237: 236: 231: 230: 225: 224: 219: 215: 212:in which the 211: 207: 203: 202: 190: 187: 185: 182: 181: 178: 173: 169: 165: 162:Case opinions 160: 157: 153: 150: 146: 141: 137: 134: 130: 126: 122: 118: 115: 109: 105: 102: 99: 95: 91: 86: 81: 72: 69: 61: 58:February 2012 51: 47: 41: 40: 34: 29: 20: 19: 16: 500: 466: 462: 458: 445: 441: 437: 424: 419: 402: 394: 364: 362: 357: 355: 346: 342: 340: 330: 327: 318: 314: 306: 286: 269: 265:World War II 261: 256: 252: 245: 233: 227: 221: 200: 199: 198: 110: 64: 55: 36: 15: 257:replacement 167:Decision by 138:(Del. 1964) 50:introducing 538:Categories 411:References 33:references 324:Aftermath 277:greenmail 259:boilers. 499:Text of 389:See also 311:Judgment 218:director 175:Keywords 128:Citation 120:Decided 46:improve 529:  526:Justia 523:  520:  514:  511:  505:  470:, 449:, 428:, 232:, and 204:, 199 35:, but 358:Cheff 253:Cheff 242:Facts 170:Carey 97:Court 287:The 210:case 206:A.2d 133:A.2d 131:199 463:See 442:See 331:not 136:548 540:: 238:. 226:, 71:) 65:( 60:) 56:( 42:.

Index

references
inline citations
improve
introducing
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Supreme Court of Delaware
A.2d
548
Charles L. Terry, Jr.
James B. Carey
Directors' duties
business judgment rule
A.2d
case
Delaware Supreme Court
director
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
Revlon v. MacAndrews
Paramount v. Time
Federal Trade Commission
World War II
board of directors
greenmail
Delaware Supreme Court
business judgment rule
conflict of interest
Moody's Industrial Manual
United States Court of Appeals
The New York Times

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