Knowledge (XXG)

Iraq Intelligence Commission

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The Commission's report also described systemic analytical, collection, and dissemination flaws that led the intelligence community to erroneous assessments about Iraq's alleged WMD programs. Chief among these flaws were "an analytical process that was driven by assumptions and inferences rather than
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The Intelligence Community's performance in assessing Iraq's pre-war weapons of mass destruction programs was a major intelligence failure. The failure was not merely that the Intelligence Community's assessments were wrong. There were also serious shortcomings in the way these assessments were made
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and other relevant agencies or organizations concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of Iraq relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related
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served as the Executive Director for the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction sometimes called the Iraq Intelligence Commission. He also served as the first Director of the
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One of the main and crucial intelligence sources for the case in Iraq was an informant named Curveball. Curveball had never been interviewed by American intelligence until after the war and was instead handled exclusively by
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The report also looked forward, recommending a large number of organizational and structural reforms. Of the 74 recommendations to the President, he fully accepted 69 in a public statement released on June 29, 2005.
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the report notes in several places that the commission's mandate did not allow it "to investigate how policymakers used the intelligence they received from the Intelligence Community on Iraq's weapons programs,"
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data", failures by certain agencies to gather all relevant information and analyze fully information on purported centrifuge tubes, insufficient vetting of key sources, particularly the source "
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The first seven members of the panel were appointed on February 6, 2004, the date of the executive order which created it. The final two members, Vest and Rowen, were appointed on February 13.
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President Bush holds a press briefing at the White House on Friday, February 6, 2004, announcing the formation of the commission. He is flanked by commission co-chairs Senator
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The 601-page document detailed many U.S. intelligence failures and identified intelligence breakdowns in dozens of cases. Some of the conclusions reached by the report were:
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Following intense study of the American Intelligence Community, the Commission delivered its report to the President on March 31, 2005, the so-called Robb-Silberman Report.
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Footnote 274 elaborates, explaining that 'when pressed for access to Curveball, said that Curveball disliked Americans and that he would refuse to speak to them.'
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Unclassified Version of the Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
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The Commission's mission is, in part, "to ensure the most effective counter-proliferation capabilities of the United States and response to the
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The impetus for the Commission lay with a public controversy occasioned by statements, including those of Chief of the
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Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
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and "related threats." However, the commission was not directed to examine the extent to which the
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was "based almost exclusively on information obtained" from Curveball, according to the report.
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in a nuclear weapons program were found by the commission to be used for conventional
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to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom and compare it with the findings of the
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While there were many reports that Curveball was actually the cousin of one of
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Days before the American commission was announced, the government of the
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intelligence, but also to look into intelligence on WMD programs in
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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
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Commission on the Prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism
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and the ongoing threat of terrorist activity." With regard to
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was due to American intelligence believing "transparently
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was wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about
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The commission was independent and separate from the
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and founded and served as the first Commander of the
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Bush administration controversies 749:Not everyone got it wrong on Iraq's weapons 121:Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction 646: 644: 642: 640: 638: 689:"Big Lies, Blind Spies, and Vanity Fair" 564:Federal Government of the United States 524:Federal Government of the United States 501: 104:may have manipulated the intelligence. 491:Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission 327:" shortly after the Commission formed. 426:, the U.S.'s primary ally during the 221:September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 80:(WMD) before the March 2003 start of 7: 773:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction 627:Chait, Jonathan (February 9, 2015). 461:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction 117:United States Intelligence Community 803:United States national commissions 123:and that this constituted a major 25: 691:. sundaytelegraph. Archived from 515:United States Department of State 333:, Democrat, retired judge of the 132:and communicated to policymakers. 406:National Counterterrorism Center 302:, Republican, U.S. Senator from 1: 546:Office of the Press Secretary 386:National Intelligence Council 323:. Cutler changed status to " 29:United States government body 755:p521 of War and Decision by 78:weapons of mass destruction 824: 359:Deputy Director of the CIA 163:German intelligence agents 808:2004 in the United States 738:October 31, 2013, at the 276:Ambassador to Yugoslavia 244:Commission members are: 185:Niger Yellowcake scandal 725:Text of Executive Order 476:Office of Special Plans 264:Deputy Attorney General 82:Operation Iraqi Freedom 434:or the Butler Review. 371:, former President of 143: 54:is a panel created by 47: 548:(February 11, 2004). 278:, et al., co-Chairman 257:U.S. Court of Appeals 56:Executive Order 13328 37: 788:Classified documents 743:". February 6, 2004. 631:. New York Magazine. 570:on November 22, 2016 481:Operation Rockingham 343:, then-President of 294:Governor of Virginia 236:means of delivery." 125:intelligence failure 65:in February 2004. 695:on November 6, 2007 388:, and President of 363:Director of the NSA 335:DC Court of Appeals 313:White House counsel 311:, Democrat, former 102:Bush administration 733:Intelligence Probe 730:Online NewsHour, " 601:The New York Times 526:. February 6, 2004 414:United States Navy 384:, Chairman of the 249:Laurence Silberman 240:Commission members 229:intelligence prior 167:biological weapons 48: 44:Laurence Silberman 687:(April 7, 2005). 665:on August 3, 2007 658:Los Angeles Times 471:Iraq Survey Group 266:under Presidents 233:Iraq Survey Group 197:forged signatures 98:WMD proliferation 70:Iraq Survey Group 42:(left) and Judge 16:(Redirected from 815: 727:(whitehouse.gov) 708: 707: 702: 700: 681: 675: 674: 672: 670: 661:. Archived from 648: 633: 632: 624: 618: 617: 615: 613: 608:. 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Bush 60:U.S. President 28: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 820: 809: 806: 804: 801: 799: 796: 794: 791: 789: 786: 784: 781: 779: 778:2004 in Niger 776: 774: 771: 770: 768: 758: 757:Douglas Feith 754: 751: 750: 745: 742: 741: 737: 734: 729: 726: 723: 721: 718: 717: 713: 706: 694: 690: 686: 680: 677: 664: 660: 659: 654: 647: 645: 643: 641: 639: 635: 630: 623: 620: 607: 606:New York City 603: 602: 594: 588: 585: 582: 569: 565: 561: 557: 556: 551: 547: 541: 538: 525: 521: 517: 516: 511: 505: 502: 496: 492: 489: 487: 484: 482: 479: 477: 474: 472: 469: 467: 464: 462: 459: 457: 454: 452: 449: 448: 444: 442: 440: 435: 433: 429: 425: 420: 418: 415: 411: 407: 402: 399: 391: 387: 383: 379: 376: 374: 370: 367: 364: 360: 356: 355:Bill Studeman 353: 349: 346: 342: 339: 336: 332: 331:Patricia Wald 329: 326: 322: 318: 314: 310: 307: 305: 301: 298: 296:, co-Chairman 295: 291: 287: 283: 280: 277: 273: 269: 268:Richard Nixon 265: 261: 258: 254: 250: 247: 246: 245: 239: 237: 234: 230: 226: 222: 217: 210: 205: 204:Ahmed Chalabi 201: 198: 194: 190: 186: 182: 179: 175: 171: 168: 164: 159: 156: 155: 154: 151: 149: 139: 133: 128: 126: 122: 118: 110: 108: 105: 103: 99: 95: 91: 87: 83: 79: 75: 71: 66: 64: 61: 57: 53: 45: 41: 36: 32: 27: 19: 783:Plame affair 748: 731: 704: 697:. 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Retrieved 513: 504: 436: 421: 398:Vice Admiral 395: 321:Bill Clinton 317:Jimmy Carter 309:Lloyd Cutler 290:U.S. Senator 282:Charles Robb 243: 218: 214: 152: 144: 130: 114: 106: 67: 58:, signed by 51: 49: 40:Charles Robb 31: 26: 685:Vest, Jason 417:Fifth Fleet 300:John McCain 272:Gerald Ford 174:centrifuges 90:Afghanistan 767:Categories 497:References 341:Rick Levin 325:Of Counsel 255:, retired 253:Republican 193:letterhead 380:, former 357:, former 292:from and 288:, former 148:Curveball 74:David Kay 793:Iraq War 736:Archived 699:July 24, 669:July 24, 612:April 9, 574:April 9, 530:April 9, 445:See also 428:Iraq War 350:Retired 286:Democrat 135:—  111:Findings 46:(right). 581:Alt URL 352:Admiral 304:Arizona 178:rockets 140:, p. 46 596:(PDF) 260:judge 94:Libya 701:2007 671:2007 614:2017 576:2017 532:2017 390:RAND 361:and 319:and 270:and 225:Iraq 183:The 92:and 86:Iraq 50:The 373:MIT 769:: 703:. 655:. 637:^ 604:. 598:. 562:: 558:. 552:. 522:: 518:. 512:. 441:. 284:, 274:, 262:, 251:, 195:, 127:. 72:, 759:. 673:. 616:. 578:. 534:. 392:. 365:. 347:. 337:. 180:. 20:)

Index

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

Charles Robb
Laurence Silberman
Executive Order 13328
U.S. President
George W. Bush
Iraq Survey Group
David Kay
weapons of mass destruction
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Iraq
Afghanistan
Libya
WMD proliferation
Bush administration
United States Intelligence Community
Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction
intelligence failure
Unclassified version of the commission's report
Curveball
German intelligence agents
biological weapons
centrifuges
rockets
Niger Yellowcake scandal
forged documents
letterhead
forged signatures
Ahmed Chalabi

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