631:. In Tibet, there were constructions of ammunition dumps and stockpiling of ammunition, weapons and gasoline, though there were no indications of a manpower buildup. China's preparedness for war strongly contrasted with India's, which had largely neglected its military throughout the 1950s. Nehru believed that the Himalayas were a large enough defense against China, however, the Korean war had provided China with practice in mountain combat. This neglect on behalf of India would decide numerous pivotal battles where logistical inadequacy and lack of leadership led to defeat after strong starts.
585:. The Air Force was considered a feasible way to repel the unbalanced ratio of Chinese troops to Indian troops and the Chinese air force was assessed as only capable of limited strategic raids which could be countered by the Indian air force. Indian Air Force soon started reconnaissance flights over the NEFA border. On 7 May 1962 Chinese troops shot down an Indian Dakota plane in which young officer B. P. Tiwari was lost. Following this incident, the Indian Air Force was told not to plan for close air support.
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response to Indian outposts encircling
Chinese positions, Chinese forces would build more outposts to counter-encircle these Indian positions. This pattern of encirclement and counter-encirclement resulted in an interlocking, chessboard-like deployment of Chinese and Indian forces. Despite the leapfrogging encirclements by both sides, no hostile fire occurred from either side as troops from both sides were under orders to fire only in defense. On the situation, Chairman
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managed to hold off the first
Chinese assault, inflicting heavy casualties. In the second assault, the Indians began their retreat, realising the situation was hopeless. The Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties, with the Chinese suffering 33. The Chinese troops held their fire as the Indians retreated, and then buried the Indian dead with military honors, as witnessed by the retreating soldiers. This was the first occurrence of heavy fighting in the war.
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to demonstrate that those lands were not unoccupied. India, of course, did not believe she was intruding on
Chinese territory. British author Neville Maxwell traces this confidence to Mullik, who was in regular contact with the CIA station chief in New Delhi. Mullik may therefore have been aware of Mao's sensitivity concerning U-2 flights.
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treaty with Japan and transfer of Taiwan to the PRC, Indochina, and decolonization and the Afro-Asian movement) had given Nehru a confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India. Much misunderstanding between the two nations led to diplomatic spats over Tibet, with Nehru's move to accommodate the
422:. Zhou tried many times to get Nehru to accept conceding Aksai Chin, he visited India four times in 1960. However, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over both of those territories and was not ready to give away any one of them. However, they had different opinions as to the legality of the
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Brigadier John Dalvi, tasked with taking Yumtso La, argued that he lacked necessary supplies and resources to take the pass. On 9 October, Kaul and
Brigadier Dalvi agreed to send a patrol of 50 soldiers to Tseng Jong, the approach to Yumtso La, to occupy the position and provide cover before the rest
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region on 16 September, north of the McMahon Line, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namkha Chu valley. The day after, India's Chief of the Army Staff Gen P N Thapar ordered his men to re-take the Thagla Ridge. According to the official Indian history, on 20 September, Indian eastern command
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China's policy on Tibet did much to heighten the conflict and tensions between the two nations. The perceptions of India as a capitalist expansionist body intent on the independence of Tibet to create a buffer zone between India proper and China were fundamentally erroneous. The negative rhetoric led
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22 July 1962 saw a change in the
Forward Policy, according to the official Indian history of the war. While the Forward Policy was initially intended to prevent the Chinese from advancing into empty areas (by occupying them first), "it was now decided to push back the Chinese from posts they already
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Kaul was confident through previous diplomacy that the
Chinese would not react with force. According to the Indian Official History, Indian posts and Chinese posts were separated by a narrow stretch of land. China had been steadily spreading into those lands and India reacted with the Forward Policy
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According to John W. Garver, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalyzed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions (befriending China on such issues as war in Korea, the PRC's U.N. admission, the peace
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On 1 July 1954 Nehru wrote a memo directing that the maps of India be revised to show definite boundaries on all frontiers, where they were previously indicated as undemarcated. The new maps also revised the boundary in the east to show the
Himalayan hill crest as the boundary. In some places, this
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has practically helped them bring their border down to the Indian border... Aggression might well be committed by people who are always in the habit of committing aggression." Ambedkar further urged for alliance with western world and said, "is better for us to align ourselves with what we call the
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because China, which India viewed as an important factor in this treaty, was not invited because of its status as an international pariah. In the coming years India strove to become China's representative in world matters, as China had been isolated from many issues. India vigorously pressed, since
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on the treaty map. Brigadier John Dalvi would later write of this claim: "The
Chinese had raised a dispute about the exact alignment of the McMahon Line in the Thagla Ridge area. Therefore the Thagla-Dhola area was not strictly territory that 'we should have been convinced was ours' as directed by
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that
Chinese maps showed some 120,000 square kilometres of Indian territory as Chinese. Zhou responded that there were errors in the maps and that they were of little meaning. He stated that the maps needed revising from previous years where such ideas were considered to be true. In November 1956,
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After the talks, India produced its official reports on the talks and translated the
Chinese report into English. India believed it would improve a feeling of understanding between the nations. China saw it as an unreasonable attempt by India to secure its claim lines. Nehru's adamance that China
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On 10 October, these 50 Indian troops were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers. The Chinese troops opened fire on the Indians believing that the Indians had intruded upon Chinese land. The Indians were surrounded by a Chinese positions which used mortar fire. However, they
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On 4 October, a new corp was created 4 corp, under Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul, tasked with evicting the Chinese from Dhola-Thagla 10 October was the planned date for Operation Leghorn. Because of the difficulties involved in directly assaulting and taking Thagla, Kaul made the decision instead to occupy
472:. The Chinese, however, did not believe they were intruding upon Indian territory. In response the Indians launched a policy of creating outposts behind the Chinese troops so as to cut off their supplies and force their return to China. According to the Home Minister in Delhi on 4 February 1962:
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Chinese studies of the 1990s still maintain that India was planning aggression in Tibet. Most Chinese scholars believe that the root cause of the war was India's plan to seize Tibet and turn it into a protectorate or colony of India. The official Chinese history of the war states that Nehru was
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Tensions steadily increased between the two nations when Mao implied that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was caused by Indians. On 6 May 1959, Mao published "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy" where he accused Nehru of openly encouraging Tibetan rebels. This publication was evident of
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According to the official Indian history, a decision was made on 9 September to evict the Chinese from the southern part of the Thagla Ridge, by force, if necessary. Two days later, it was decided that "all forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered
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The initial reaction of the Chinese forces was to withdraw when Indian outposts advanced towards them. However, this appeared to encourage the Indian forces to accelerate their Forward Policy even further. In response, the Central Military Commission adopted a policy of "armed coexistence". In
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QMG but he was influential in all army decisions. Kaul reorganized the general staff and removed the officers who had resisted the idea of patrolling in disputed areas, although Nehru still refused to increase military spending or otherwise prepare for war. In the summer of 1961, China began
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overshadowing his other actions and opinions on Tibet, including the opinion that an armed resistance movement in Tibet would be suicidal and counterproductive. While China treated India's concerns with Tibet as expansionist, some in India claim that its concerns were in fact sentimental and
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Nehru and people from the Indian upper class oppose reform in Tibet, even to the extent of saying that reform is impossible... Tibet to remain for a long time in a backward state, becoming a 'buffer state' between China and India. This is their guiding mentality, and also the center of the
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Nehru wants to move forward and we won't let him. Originally, we tried to guard against this, but now it seems we cannot prevent it. If he wants to advance, we might as well adopt armed coexistence. You wave a gun, and I'll wave a gun. We'll stand face to face and can each practice our
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Transcripts from the decision for war was not made by China's leaders until early 6 October 1962, and only then were war plans drawn by China's Central Military Commission. Roderik McFarquhar states, "In May–June 1962, the main concern in Beijing was over the threat of an
600:. According to China Quarterly, the Government of India released press reports to the public indicating that Indian had gained 2,000 mi of territory from the Chinese. However, in their diplomatic reply to the Chinese, India denied that any incident had taken place.
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under which India acknowledged Chinese sovereignty in Tibet. Indian negotiators presented a frontier map to the Chinese that included the McMahon Line and the Chinese side did not object. At this time, the Indian government under Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan
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and China would withdraw its claims from NEFA. According to John W. Garver, Zhou's propositions were unofficial and subtle. Zhou consistently refused to accept the legitimacy of India's territorial claims; he proposed that any negotiations had to take into account the
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defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. The Soviet Union's siding with Nehru, as well as the United States' influence in the region, gave China the belief that it was surrounded by enemy forces. On 16 October, General Lei Yingfu reported on Indian expansionism on the
435:" He remained firm that there would be no boundary negotiations until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin and areas south of the British McMahon Line. This was unacceptable to China which never recognized the legal validity of the McMahon Line. Nehru stated "
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border than the newly formed Indian republic was. India decided to take moves to ensure a stable Indo-Chinese border. In August 1950, China expressed its gratitude to India's attempts to "stabilize the Indo-Chinese border". To clear any doubts or ambiguities,
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ordered all Indian posts and patrols to engage any Chinese patrols within range of their weapons. On 20 September, at one of the bridges on the river a firefight developed, killing nine Chinese and Indian soldiers. Skirmishes continued throughout September.
687:, officers at the Indian Defense Ministry had expressed the concern that even Indian maps showed the entire Namkha Chu valley and Dhola Post-Thagla area as Chinese territory; they were told to ignore the maps. However, Nehru's directives to Defense Minister
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withdraw from Aksai Chin and thus abandon the highway was seen as another Indian attempt to undermine China's presence in Tibet. According to John W. Garver, China reached the incorrect conclusion that Nehru was continuing his "grand plans in Tibet".
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According to Neville Maxwell, Nehru was not ready to simply concede the territory and leave negotiations at that. He was open to continued negotiations, but did not accept the idea of Indian troops withdrawing from their claimed regions. Nehru stated
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which eventually led to the inability to reach a decision. Nehru's adamance was seen within China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet, as China needed the highway through Aksai Chin to maintain an effective control over the Tibetan plateau.
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staunchly defended Mao. A brief period of liberalization followed while Mao and Lin plotted a comeback. Jung Chang writes that China was prepared for war with India after the border clashes in May and June, but were concerned about the
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to what Zhou himself called the Sino-Indian conflict. Because of these false fears, China treated the Indian Forward Policy of the 1960s, which India admits as a fundamental mistake, as the beginning of Indian expansionism into Tibet.
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were unclear, and the response, code named Operation LEGHORN, got underway only slowly. As the Chinese numbers were exaggerated to 600 instead of about 50 or 60, the 9 Punjab battalion, numbering 400 riflemen, was sent to Dhola.
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was that of maintaining cordial relations with China. The Indian government wished to revive its ancient friendly ties with China. When the PRC was declared, India was among the first countries to give it diplomatic recognition.
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After coming to power, the PRC announced that its army would be occupying Tibet. India sent a letter of protest to China proposing negotiations on the Tibet issue. The newly formed PRC was more active in posting troops to the
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and did not establish itself in Aksai Chin. On various occasions in 1951 and 1952, however, the government of China expressed the idea that there were no frontier issues between India and Chinese Tibet to be worried about.
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forces stationed there. The Chinese troops attempted to convince the Gurkhas that they should not be fighting for India, to cause an abandonment of the post. After a fiery argument the 350 Chinese withdrew from the area.
389:". He defined this line as "the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west". Nehru responded with a proposal to turn the disputed area into a no man's land.
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in Tibet. Based on the treaty map of the 1914 Simla Convention, the McMahon Line lay at 27°45'40"N. However, Dhola post lay about 3.5 mile (6 km) north of the McMahon Line The Indian government maintained that the
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was considering to attack simultaneously in the west. Chinese airfields in Tibet and Yunnan were addressed as a threat to Indian cities, as the PLAAF could conduct heavy bombings through their use of Soviet aeroplanes.
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This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue, but by 18 October it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack on India, with massive troop buildups on the border.
439:" In light of these comments, the international community rallied behind Nehru in claiming that China was at fault in failing to conduct proper negotiations. Maxwell argues that Nehru's words were ambiguous.
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of the McMahon Line was to set the border along the highest ridges, and that the international border fell on the highest ridges of Thagla, about 3 to 4 miles (4.8 to 6.4 km) north of the line drawn by
249:, India. The Indian public was outraged when it learned in 1958 that China had built a road between Xinjiang and Tibet through Indian territory in Aksai Chin (historically a part of Indian state of Ladakh).
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in Aksai Chin in which 9 Indian frontier policemen were killed. Recognizing that it was not ready for war, the Indian Army assumed responsibility for the border and pulled back patrols from disputed areas.
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Be sharp, don't fear to irritate him , don't fear to cause him trouble. Nehru miscalculated the situation believing that China could not suppress the rebellion in Tibet and would have to beg India's help.
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On 8 September 1962, a 60-strong PLA unit descended from the heights and occupied positions which dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola. Neither side opened fire for 12 days. Nehru had gone to
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In August, China issued diplomatic protests which accused India of violating even the McMahon Line, and Chinese soldiers began occupying positions at the top of Thagla, north of Indian positions.
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China's perception of India as a threat to its rule of Tibet, which became an underlying reason for triggering the Sino-Indian War. India had become the imperialist enemy, with Nehru and his "big
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Nehru did not agree to barter away the Aksai Chin area, under illegal occupation of China, in return for China giving up its unreasonable claim to Indian territory south of the McMahon Line.
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In June, 1962, the Indian Intelligence Bureau said it received information about a Chinese military buildup along the border which could result in a war. Information was also received that
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nationalist forces that influenced Nehru to pursue the goal of controlling Tibet. Zhao Weiwen, of the Chinese Ministry of State and Security, places emphasis on Nehru's "dark mentality".
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India continued negotiations about Tibet. According to the Indian official history, India wished to express goodwill to China and stop the claims of it having a hostile design in Tibet.
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occupied." Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defense, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened.
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is our boundary and that is our boundary...we stand by that boundary and we will not let anyone else come across that boundary". China expressed no concerns at these statements.
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Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and fall of 1962. According to Chinese sources, in June 1962, a minor
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proposed non-violent means to solving India's problems, and Indian military leaders, who proposed that India should prepare for a full-scale attack, were ignored or dismissed.
543:... Chinese leaders would have been reluctant to provoke hostilities in the Himalayas, which might have meant diverting military resources from the main danger point along the
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patrolling along the McMahon Line. They entered parts of Indian-administered regions and much angered the Indians in doing so. After May 1961 Chinese troops occupied
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killed and wounded. Units of the Indian and Chinese militaries maintained close contact throughout September 1962; however, hostile fire occurred only infrequently.
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on 19 April to produce commentary on unknown Indian expansionists operating in Tibet. Mao decided on 25 April to openly criticize Nehru for his Tibet policy:
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370:. On 18 October, the Chinese government approved the PLA's plan of a "self-defensive counterattack" against India because of its actions in Tibet.
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By 1951, China had extended numerous posts in Aksai Chin. The Indian government, on the other hand, concentrated its military efforts on stopping
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We will never compromise on our boundaries, but we are prepared to consider minor adjustments to them and to talk to the other side about them.
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We will negotiate and negotiate and negotiate to the bitter end. I absolutely reject the approach of stopping negotiations at any state.
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On 2 May 1962 the Directorate of Military Operations in India had suggested that the air force should be readied for use in NEFA and
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obtained in India when he fled there in March 1959. The Tibet disagreements heightened in the Chinese media, with Mao himself asking
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This has been referred to as the "Forward Policy". There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the McMahon Line.
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at this time, overcoming some armed resistance and expelling its Tibetan administrators. In 1954, China and India concluded the
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However, Mao decided against further escalation because he feared that India would retaliate by permitting the U.S. to station
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On 8 July, the Chinese initiated another diplomatic communication, to protest against an alleged Indian incursion into the
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Later, in September 1951, India declined to attend a conference in San Francisco for the conclusion of a peace treaty with
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as responsible for widespread famine. The overwhelming majority of delegates expressed agreement, but Defense Minister
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Beginning in 1956, the CIA used Indian territory to recruit Tibetan guerrillas to fight Chinese troops, with a base in
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Noorani, A.G., Fresh Insights into the 1962 War. Frontline. 5–18 December 1998, quoting from Roderick, MacFarquhar,
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In August, 1962, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line, particularly in the
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and, when told of the act, said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory".
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surveillance aircraft on its territory. This would allow the CIA to photograph China's nuclear test site at
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314:" striving to "prevent China from exercising full sovereignty over its territory of Tibet" to form of a
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the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, and someone is guilty of exceeding the limits prescribed by him."
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nearby Yumtso La to the west, to position his troops behind and dominate the Chinese positions.
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413:(the Aksai Chin) as Chinese. In 1960, Zhou Enlai proposed that India drop its claim to
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in 1962. According to John W. Garver, Chinese perceptions about the Indian designs for
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The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. Vol. 3, The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961-1966
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If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by her, India will have to repeat
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planning to create a "great Indian empire". It was also insisted that there were
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Gregory Clark, "Remembering a War - The 1962 India-China Conflict", Rediff,
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Zhou again repeated his assurances that he had no claims based on the maps.
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Numerous changes occurred in the late 1940s, with the independence of the
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The Indian military was not ready for full-scale combat. India had just
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By the time the Indian battalion reached the Thagla Ridge area in the
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of the battalion would move forward for the occupation of Yumtso La.
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Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, "The CIA's Secret War in Tibet",
1370:"Unforgiveable Mistakes, The Kongka-La Incident, 21st October 1959"
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In August 1959, the Chinese army took an Indian patrol prisoner at
1840:"Line of Defense", by Manoj Joshi, Times of India, 21 October 2000
957:"Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues"
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the start of the 1950s, for the PRC to be included within the UN.
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On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post at
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1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on Air Power
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In June 1962, Indian forces had established an outpost called
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broke out between the two sides, and dozens of members of the
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2036:, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India
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in Xinjiang. A few days after Kongka Pass, Chinese Premier
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had been under influence of Indian culture for many years.
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First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
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conference in Beijing in January 1962, Chinese President
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proposed that each side withdraw 20 kilometres from a "
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SOAS (1962). "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation".
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129:(PRC) in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the
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New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy
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New directions in the study of China's foreign policy
1971:, in Alastair Iain Johnston; Robert S. Ross (eds.),
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In 1956, Nehru expressed concern to Chinese Premier
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line is a few kilometres north of the McMahon Line.
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459:At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General
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2027:Sinha, P.B.; Athale, A.A.; Prasad, S. N. (1992),
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751:. Stanford University Press. pp. 86–130.
1966:"China's Decision for War with India in 1962"
745:Alastair I. Johnston; Robert S. Ross (2006).
552:annexed the Portuguese State of India or, Goa
42:The examples and perspective in this article
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1535:"Henderson Brooks Report: An Introduction"
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304:addressing a Politburo Standing Committee
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75:Learn how and when to remove this message
2030:History of the Conflict with China, 1962
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1349:. Marine Corps Command and Staff College
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238:free nations if we believe in freedom".
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279:Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
207:Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
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322:lashed out at Nehru's "class nature".
125:in 1947, and the establishment of the
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955:Maxwell, Neville (9 September 2006).
154:in 1950 that "Our maps show that the
18:Events leading to the Sino-Indian War
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1345:Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984).
1049:Noorani, A. G. (16–29 August 2003),
1019:Noorani, A. G. (30 September 2003),
284:was humiliated by the reception the
193:recognized Chinese sovereignty over
1993:, University of California Press,
46:include all significant viewpoints
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1949:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
1938:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
1927:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
1916:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
1905:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
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1883:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
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1819:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
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863:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
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841:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
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801:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
790:Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992)
214:(India and China are brothers).
105:'s decision to fight a war with
98:
33:
1533:Maxwell, Neville (April 2001).
1051:"Perseverance in peace process"
1537:. stratmag.com. Archived from
1422:Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday,
881:resolving the boundary dispute
468:and established a post on the
1:
2010:War and Peace in Modern India
1436:"The Shade of the Big Banyan"
964:Economic and Political Weekly
647:, overlooking the village of
635:Confrontation at Thagla Ridge
1987:Hoffmann, Steven A. (1990),
1347:"The China-India Border War"
829:"The Great India-China Game"
123:Islamic Republic of Pakistan
2084:
2007:Raghavan, Srinath (2010),
1990:India and the China Crisis
1761:Cambridge University Press
1719:. Oxford University Press.
1591:India's Quest for Security
1073:University Press of Kansas
970:(36): 3876. Archived from
621:North East Frontier Agency
127:People's Republic of China
1272:10.1017/S0305741000044805
1587:Kavic, Lorne J. (1967).
827:Mohan Guruswamy, Mohan,
576:People's Liberation Army
560:Indian National Congress
183:People's Liberation Army
1964:Garver, John W (2006),
1806:9 February 2001 at the
831:, Rediff, 23 June 2003.
512:Chinese Communist Party
2013:, Palgrave Macmillan,
1563:India's Ad Hoc Arsenal
1424:Mao: The Unknown Story
503:
482:
448:
387:Line of Actual Control
337:
307:
271:culturally-linked, as
1560:Smith, Chris (1994).
1426:(2006), pp. 568, 579.
996:Untouchable's Warning
327:Sino-Indian conflict.
212:Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai
1641:on 27 September 2007
1382:on 30 September 2011
1004:, September 06, 1954
683:According to author
541:invasion from Taiwan
201:asserted control of
165:from being taken by
101:) were important in
1757:The China Quarterly
1260:The China Quarterly
680:Indian territory".
478:what she did in Goa
420:facts on the ground
405:Border negotiations
318:. On the same day,
261:Tibet disagreements
53:improve the article
1031:on 13 October 2007
1021:"Facts of History"
689:V.K. Krishna Menon
520:Great Leap Forward
506:Other developments
290:Xinhua News Agency
223:Indian Upper House
113:Friendly relations
2020:978-1-137-00737-7
2000:978-0-520-06537-6
1801:Battle of Chushul
1763:on behalf of the
1635:"Hindustan Times"
1075:, 2002, pp. 96-97
977:on 1 October 2006
758:978-0-8047-5363-0
363:Nikita Khrushchev
131:Indian government
119:Republic of India
85:
84:
77:
57:discuss the issue
16:(Redirected from
2075:
2037:
2035:
2023:
2003:
1983:
1982:on 26 March 2009
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566:Early incidents
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1989:
1977:the original
1972:
1958:Bibliography
1944:
1933:
1922:
1911:
1900:
1889:
1878:
1867:
1856:
1845:
1836:
1825:
1814:
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1750:
1742:
1740:CIA Journals
1716:
1711:
1700:
1688:
1677:
1666:
1655:
1643:. Retrieved
1639:the original
1629:
1616:
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1555:
1543:. Retrieved
1539:the original
1512:
1501:
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1468:
1457:
1446:
1438:
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1423:
1396:
1384:. Retrieved
1377:the original
1363:
1351:. Retrieved
1263:
1259:
1234:
1223:
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1179:
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1059:the original
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981:29 September
979:. Retrieved
972:the original
967:
963:
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897:
886:
858:
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796:
785:
774:
762:. Retrieved
747:
740:
714:
710:
706:
702:
694:
682:
678:
672:to attend a
667:
664:
653:
645:Thagla Ridge
638:
618:
614:
602:
595:
587:
580:
569:
549:
537:
529:Nationalists
509:
499:
490:
486:
483:
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449:
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441:
436:
432:
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408:
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391:
372:
368:Thagla Ridge
357:
341:
338:
325:
308:
295:
277:
264:
251:
244:
240:
216:
211:
189:in 1950 and
180:
172:
160:
156:McMahon Line
136:
116:
88:
86:
71:
62:
43:
26:
1767:: 252–258.
1386:17 November
1266:: 136–141,
764:16 November
496:commented,
455:Early 1960s
352:Kongka Pass
316:buffer zone
312:bourgeoisie
199:Indian army
2057:Categories
1353:15 October
732:References
641:Dhola Post
516:Liu Shaoqi
494:Mao Zedong
415:Aksai Chin
395:right wing
383:Zhou Enlai
333:Zhou Enlai
320:Zhou Enlai
302:Mao Zedong
286:Dalai Lama
282:Mao Zedong
268:Dalai Lama
254:Zhou Enlai
152:Parliament
150:stated in
140:Aksai Chin
1773:0305-7410
1545:18 August
1288:153324884
1055:Frontline
1025:Frontline
654:intention
461:B.M. Kaul
247:Kalimpong
217:In 1954,
1804:Archived
1645:24 April
879:VK Singh
720:See also
629:Xinjiang
590:Pakistan
572:skirmish
547:coast."
524:Lin Biao
501:courage.
330:—
299:—
121:and the
44:may not
697:Chedong
605:Chushul
556:Kashmir
379:Lop Nor
221:in the
51:Please
2017:
1997:
1781:651833
1779:
1771:
1570:
1286:
1280:652088
1278:
755:
670:London
609:Gurkha
583:Ladakh
558:. The
545:Fujian
533:Taiwan
344:Longju
233:, the
203:Tawang
187:Chamdo
163:Ladakh
2034:(PDF)
1980:(PDF)
1969:(PDF)
1777:JSTOR
1380:(PDF)
1373:(PDF)
1284:S2CID
1276:JSTOR
975:(PDF)
960:(PDF)
625:Tibet
510:At a
231:Lhasa
195:Tibet
191:Lhasa
175:Japan
148:Nehru
107:India
103:China
95:Tibet
2015:ISBN
1995:ISBN
1769:ISSN
1647:2007
1568:ISBN
1547:2006
1439:Time
1388:2010
1355:2011
983:2006
766:2010
753:ISBN
627:and
181:The
1597:169
1268:doi
375:U-2
229:of
55:or
2059::
1789:^
1775:.
1724:^
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1407:^
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1282:,
1274:,
1264:43
1262:,
1245:^
1053:,
1037:^
1023:,
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649:Le
623:,
109:.
1783:.
1649:.
1599:.
1576:.
1549:.
1390:.
1357:.
1270::
985:.
768:.
431:"
78:)
72:(
67:)
63:(
59:.
49:.
20:)
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