1388:. Pearl Harbor was never mentioned as a potential target. The warnings were not specific to any area and noted only that war with Japan was expected in the near future and that all commands should act accordingly. If any of the warnings had produced an active alert status in Hawaii, the attack might have been resisted more effectively and perhaps resulted in less death and damage. On the other hand, recall of men on shore leave to the ships in harbor might have led to still more being casualties from bombs and torpedoes or trapped in capsized ships by shut watertight doors, as the attack alert status would have required, or killed in their obsolete aircraft by the more experienced Japanese aviators. When the attack actually arrived, Pearl Harbor was effectively unprepared since anti-aircraft weapons not manned, most ammunition locked down, anti-submarine measures not implemented (such as no
39:
1368:
At best, the information available to decision makers in
Washington was fragmentary, contradictory, or poorly distributed and was almost entirely raw without supporting analysis. It was thus incompletely understood. Nothing in it pointed directly to an attack at Pearl Harbor, and a lack of awareness of Imperial Navy capabilities led to a widespread underlying belief that Pearl Harbor was not a possible attack target. Only one message from the Hawaiian Japanese consulate, sent on 6 December in a low-level consular cipher, included mention of an attack at Pearl Harbor, and it was not decrypted until 8 December. The Japanese diplomatic code (
217:
883:, the Italian Navy. Admiral Yamamoto even dispatched a delegation to Italy, which concluded a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, which would give Japan the time needed to establish a "barrier" defense to protect Japanese control of the Dutch East Indies. The delegation returned to Japan with information about the shallow-running torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised.
613:
170:. He finally won assent from the Naval High Command by, among other things, threatening to resign. The attack was approved in the summer at an Imperial Conference and again at a second Conference in the autumn. Simultaneously over the year, pilots were trained, and ships prepared for its execution. Authority for the attack was granted at the second Imperial Conference if a diplomatic result satisfactory to Japan was not reached. After the
730:
1380:
newspapers, contained extensive reports of the growing tension in the
Pacific. Late in November, all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii, were separately and explicitly warned that war with Japan was expected in the very near future, and it was preferred for Japan make the first hostile act. It was felt that war would most probably start with attacks in the Far East in the Philippines, French Indochina,
985:. Genda chose it because its geography and infrastructure presented most of the same problems bombers would face at Pearl Harbor. In training, each crew flew over the 5,000 ft (1,500 m) mountain behind Kagoshima, dove into the city, dodged buildings and smokestacks, and dropped to 25 ft (7.6 m) at the piers. Bombardiers released torpedoes at a breakwater some 300 yd (270 m) away.
1083:
742:
diplomatic settlement were not achieved before then. Over the following weeks, TÅjÅ's military regime offered a final deal to the United States. It offered to leave only
Indochina in return for large American economic aid. On November 26, the so-called Hull Memorandum (or Hull Note) rejected the offer and stated that in addition to leaving Indochina, the Japanese must leave China and agree to an
1446:) absent and Kimmel's battleships at a severe disadvantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely result would have been the sinking of the American battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with tremendous casualties (as many as 20,000 dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the crews could easily be rescued, and six battleships ultimately were raised.
1236:
914:
415:, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and that area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.'
1266:
Combined Fleet are to be assembled and returned to their bases in accordance with separate orders. proceed to the
Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day.
750:
1379:
U.S. civil and military intelligence had good information suggesting additional
Japanese aggression throughout the summer and fall before the attack. At the time, however, no reports specifically indicated an attack against Pearl Harbor. Public press reports during summer and fall, including Hawaiian
1265:
Japan has decided to open hostilities against the United States, United
Kingdom, and the Netherlands early in December.... Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostilities, it is understood that all elements of the
1070:
With an invasion ruled out, it was agreed that a massive carrier-based three wave airstrike against Pearl Harbor to destroy the
Pacific Fleet would be sufficient. Japanese planners knew that Hawaii, with its strategic location in the Central Pacific, would serve as a critical base from which the U.S.
690:
asserted that time had run out and that additional negotiations would be pointless. They urged swift military actions against all
American and European colonies in Southeast Asia and Hawaii. TÅjÅ argued that yielding to the American demand to withdraw troops would wipe out all the gains of the Second
452:
rejected compromises in China. Responding to
Japanese occupation of key airfields in Indochina (July 24) after an agreement between Japan and Vichy France, the U.S. froze Japanese assets on July 26, 1941, and on August 1, it established an embargo on oil and gasoline exports to Japan. The oil embargo
1409:
in the
Philippines was successfully demanding for as many as could be made available to the Pacific, where they were intended as a deterrent. The British, who had contracted for them, even agreed to accept fewer of them to facilitate the buildup. At the time of the attack, Army and Navy were both on
1367:
traffic, but nothing actually carried significant information about Japanese military plans in 1940 or 1941. Decryption and distribution of this intelligence, including such decrypts as were available, was capricious and sporadic, some of which can be accounted for by lack of resources and manpower.
1028:
Genda, who saw Hawaii as vital for American operations against Japan after war began, believed that Japan must follow any attack on Pearl Harbor with an invasion of Hawaii or risk losing the war. He viewed Hawaii as a base to threaten the West Coast of North America and perhaps as a negotiating tool
988:
However, even that low-altitude approach would not overcome the problem of torpedoes from reaching the bottom in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. Japanese weapons engineers created and tested modifications to allow successful shallow water drops. The efforts resulted in a heavily modified version
589:
Nomura asked for an appointment to see Hull at 1:00 pm but later asked it be postponed to 1:45 as Nomura was not quite ready. Nomura and Kurusu arrived at 2:05 pm and were received by Hull at 2:20. Nomura apologized for the delay in presenting the message. After Hull had read several pages, he asked
1623:
In late April or early May of 1942, Yamamoto reportedly secured a tentative agreement that an invasion of Hawaii would be launched after military operations in the Western Pacific were completed and additional ground troops and warships were available. By mid-1942, Yamamoto had assembled sufficient
629:
456:
Japanese war planners had long looked south, especially to Brunei for oil and Malaya for rubber and tin. In the autumn of 1940, Japan requested 3.15 million barrels of oil from the Dutch East Indies but received a counteroffer of only 1.35 million. The complete U.S. oil embargo reduced the Japanese
447:
Japan and the U.S. engaged in negotiations in 1941 in an effort to improve relations. During the negotiations, Japan considered withdrawal from most of China and Indochina after it had drawn up peace terms with the Chinese. Japan would also adopt an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact
1413:
There was also confusion about the Army's readiness status as Short had changed local alert level designations without clearly informing Washington. Most of the Army's mobile anti-aircraft guns were secured, with ammunition locked down in armories. To avoid upsetting property owners and in keeping
1396:
Nevertheless, it was believed Pearl Harbor had natural defenses against torpedo attack (such as by the shallow water) and so the Navy did not deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which were judged to inconvenience ordinary operations. As a result of the limited numbers of long-range aircraft (including
786:
On February 3, 1940, Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the potential attack plan and asked him to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor. Ogawa already had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he arranged for help
652:
proposed a summit with Roosevelt to discuss differences. Roosevelt replied that Japan must leave China before a summit meeting could be held. On September 6, 1941, at the second Imperial Conference concerning attacks on the Western colonies in Asia and Hawaii, Japanese leaders met to consider the
581:
The United States had decrypted the 14th part well before the Japanese did so, and long before, embassy staff had composed a clean typed copy. The final part, with its instruction for the time of delivery, had been decoded Saturday night but was not acted upon until the next morning, according to
577:
and had instructions to deliver it to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1:00 pm Washington time on December 7, 1941. The last part arrived late Saturday night (Washington Time), but because of decryption and typing delays, as well as Tokyo's failure to stress the crucial necessity of the
847:
The intent of a preventive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American naval power in the Pacific and to remove it from influencing operations against American, British, and Dutch colonies. Successful attacks on colonies were judged to depend on successfully dealing with the Pacific Fleet.
843:
Expecting war and seeing an opportunity in the forward basing of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, the Japanese began planning in early 1941 for an attack on Pearl Harbor. For the next several months, planning and organizing a simultaneous attack on Pearl Harbor and invasion of British and Dutch
1311:
produced a 324-page report warning that future wars, including with Japan, would include a new role for aircraft against existing ships and facilities. He even discussed the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, but his warnings were ignored. Navy Secretary Knox had also appreciated the
194:, which left neither belligerent, particularly Japan, satisfied, left a lasting general impression that the United States was inappropriately foisting itself into Asian regional politics and intent on limiting Japan, and set the stage for later more contentious politics between the two nations.
741:
On November 3, 1941, Nagano presented a complete plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor to Hirohito. At the Imperial Conference on November 5, Hirohito approved the plan for a war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands that was scheduled to start in early December if an acceptable
38:
965:
Although attacking the U.S. Pacific Fleet anchorage would achieve surprise, it also carried two distinct disadvantages. The targeted ships would be sunk or damaged in very shallow water and so they could quite likely be salvaged and possibly returned to duty (as six of the eight battleships
818:
patrol went out every morning and evening, and there was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor. Information was returned to Japan in coded form in Consular communications and by direct delivery to intelligence officers aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff.
599:
Japanese records, which were admitted into evidence during congressional hearings on the attack after the war, established that Japan had not even written a declaration of war until it had news of the successful attack. The two-line declaration was finally delivered to U.S. Ambassador
594:
I must say that in all my conversations with you... during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and
808:
Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking auto trips around the main islands, touring Oahu in a small plane, and posing as a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor frequently and sketched the harbor and location of ships from the crest of a hill. Once, he gained access to
1414:
with Washington's admonition not to alarm civil populations (such as in the late November war warning messages from the Navy and War Departments), guns were not dispersed around Pearl Harbor (on private property). Additionally, aircraft were parked on airfields to lessen the risk of
422:
further raised tensions. Along with Japan's war with China, withdrawal from the League of Nations, alliance with Germany and Italy, and increasing militarization, the move induced the United States to intensify its measures to restrain Japan economically. The United States placed an
1273:
Finally, Order Number 9, issued on 1 December 1941 by Nagano, told Yamamoto to crush hostile naval and air forces in Asia; the Pacific and Hawaii; seize the main U.S., British, and Dutch bases in East Asia promptly; and "capture and secure the key areas of the southern regions."
1312:
possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor in a written analysis shortly after he had taken office. American commanders had been warned that tests had demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo attacks were possible, but no one in charge in Hawaii fully appreciated that. In a 1932
431:
to Japanese shipping. That hit Japan's economy particularly hard because 74.1% of Japan's scrap iron came from the United States in 1938, and 93% of Japan's copper in 1939 came from the United States. In early 1941 Japan moved into southern Indochina, thereby threatening
3110:
856:
had been in 1905. A surprise attack posed a twofold difficulty compared to longstanding expectations. First, the Pacific Fleet was a formidable force and would not be easy to defeat or to surprise. Second, Pearl Harbor's shallow waters made using conventional
1063:(IJA) insisted it needed to focus on operations in China and Southeast Asia and so refused to provide substantial support elsewhere. Because of a lack of co-operation between the services, the IJN never discussed the Hawaiian invasion proposal with the IJA.
1397:
Army Air Corps bombers), reconnaissance patrols were not being made as often or as far out as required for adequate coverage against possible surprise attack (they improved considerably, with far fewer remaining planes after the attack). The Navy had 33
1392:
being in the harbor), combat air patrol not flying, available scouting aircraft were not in the air at first light, Air Corps aircraft were parked wingtip to wingtip to reduce sabotage risks (they were not ready to fly at a moment's warning), and so on.
844:
colonies to the south occupied much of the Japanese Navy's time and attention. The plans for the Pearl Harbor attack arose out of the Japanese expectation the U.S. would be inevitably drawn into war after a Japanese attack against Malaya and Singapore.
955:, who was very worried about the area's air defenses. Yamamoto encouraged Kusaka by telling him, "Pearl Harbor is my idea and I need your support." Genda emphasized the attack should be carried out early in the morning and in total secrecy and use an
1071:
could extend its military power against Japan. However, the confidence of Japan's leaders that the conflict would be over quickly and that the U.S. would choose to negotiate a compromise, rather than fight a long bloody war, overrode that concern.
1344:. In Washington, he warned Stark about how unprepared the base was against a bomber attack. Stark replied, "I'm afraid that putting some of your recommendations into effect is going to make your visit out there very expensive for the U.S. Navy."
1033:. In September 1941, Commander Yasuji Watanabe of the Combined Fleet staff estimated two divisions (30,000 men) and 80 ships, in addition to the carrier strike force, could capture the islands. He identified two possible landing sites, near
1294:
773:
and Nagano, who reassured him that war would be successful. On December 1, Hirohito finally approved a "war against United States, Great Britain and Holland" during another Imperial Conference, to commence with a surprise attack on the
2914:
150:
concluded that an invasion of the Philippines would provoke an American military response. Rather than seize and fortify the islands and wait for the inevitable US counterattack, Japan's military leaders instead decided on the
848:
Planning had long anticipated a battle in Japanese home waters after the U.S. fleet traveled across the Pacific while it was under attack by submarines and other forces all the way. The U.S. fleet would be defeated in a
813:
in a taxi and memorized the number of visible planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers. He also discovered that Sunday was the day of the week on which the largest number of ships were likely to be in harbor, that
2269:
835:, which had opposed the attack from the outset, would have called it off since up-to-date information on the location of the Pacific Fleet, on which Yamamoto's plan depended, would no longer have been available.
230:
In the 1930s, Japan's increasingly expansionist policies brought it into renewed conflict with its neighbors, the Soviet Union and China. The latter was in 1922 disappointed by Germany's former Chinese colony of
303:
In 1938, the U.S. began to adopt a succession of increasingly-restrictive trade restrictions with Japan, including terminating its 1911 commercial treaty with Japan in 1939, which was further tightened by the
457:
options to two: seize Southeast Asia before its existing stocks of strategic materials were depleted or submission to American demands. Moreover, any southern operation would be vulnerable to attack from the
2475:
3115:
822:
In June 1941, German and Italian consulates were closed, and there were suggestions that those of Japan should be closed, as well. They were not because they continued to provide valuable information (
3167:
197:
Tensions between Japan and the prominent Western countries (the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands) increased significantly during the increasingly militaristic early
932:, the Navy Minister, from whom he also requested to be made commander-in-chief of the air fleet to attack Pearl Harbor. A few weeks later, in yet another letter, Yamamoto requested for Admiral
1592:
347:
89:. The Japanese government saw it necessary to become a colonial power in order to be modern and therefore Western. In addition, resentment was fanned in Japan by the rejection of the Japanese
411:
At least as early as October 8, 1940,... affairs had reached such a state that the United States would become involved in a war with Japan.... 'that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the
1336:
tactics against the Germans, an officer asked when and how the United States would enter the war. Mountbatten pointed to Pearl Harbor on a map of the Pacific and said "right here" by citing
590:
Nomura whether the document was presented under instructions of the Japanese government. Nomura replied that it was. After reading the full document, Hull turned to the ambassador and said:
186:
Both the Japanese public and the political perception of American antagonism began in the 1890s. The American acquisition of Pacific colonies near Japan and its brokering of the end of the
243:
with China in 1894â1895 and the Russo-Japanese War with Russia in 1904â1905. Japan's imperialist ambitions had a hand in precipitating both conflicts after which Japan gained a large
567:
In the days before the attack, a long 14-part message was sent to the embassy from the Foreign Office in Tokyo that was encrypted with the Type 97 cypher machine, in a cipher named
335:. The Tripartite Pact guaranteed assistance if a signatory was attacked by any country not already involved in conflict with the signatory, which implicitly meant the U.S. and the
951:. After studying the original proposal put forth by Yamamoto, Genda agreed that "the plan is difficult but not impossible." Yamamoto gave the bulk of the planning to Rear Admiral
604:
in Tokyo about ten hours after the completion of the attack. Grew was allowed to transmit it to the United States, where it was received late Monday afternoon (Washington time).
1137:(at the time, the most powerful carrier force with the greatest concentration of air power in the history of naval warfare), embarked 359 airplanes, which were organized as the
765:
warned his eldest brother, Hirohito, that the navy felt that Japan could not fight more than two years against the United States and wished to avoid war. After consulting with
116:
in an effort to embargo all imports into China, including war supplies that were purchased from the U.S. That move prompted the U.S. to embargo all oil exports, which led the
548:
Part of the Japanese plan for the attack included breaking off negotiations with the United States 30 minutes before the attack began. Diplomats from the Japanese embassy in
78:
1742:
1029:
for ending the war. He believed that after a successful air attack, 10,000-15,000 men could capture Hawaii, and he saw the operation as a precursor or an alternative to a
465:
159:, which they assumed would negate the American forces needed for the liberation and the reconquest of the islands. (Later that day , the Japanese indeed launched their
3339:
2682:
1455:
595:
distortions--infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them.
1228:-class midget submarines, which were to gather intelligence and sink U.S. vessels attempting to flee Pearl Harbor during or soon after the attack. It also had eight
2487:
1074:
Watanabe's superior, Captain Kameto Kuroshima, who believed the invasion plan unrealistic, would later call his rejection of it the "biggest mistake" of his life.
2909:
2881:
997:
by fitting fins and release shackles to 14- and 16-inch (356- and 406-mm) naval shells. They could penetrate the lightly armored decks of the old battleships.
42:
Captured Japanese photograph taken aboard a Japanese carrier before the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941 (U.S. National Archives, 80-G-30549, 520599)
947:, an expert on aerial torpedo warfare, and being told that the harbor's shallow waters rendered such an attack almost impossible, Onishi summoned Commander
292:
that December, further complicated relations with the rest of the world. The U.S., the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands all possessed colonies in
1138:
3100:
3080:
536:
if the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands ceased aiding China and lifted their sanctions against Japan. The American counterproposal of November 26, the
63:
3085:
1632:, the loss of four of Japan's six largest aircraft carriers made any future air and naval operations, let alone an invasion, against Hawaii impossible.
404:
that Pearl Harbor was the wrong place for his ships. Roosevelt believed relocating the fleet to Hawaii would exert a "restraining influence" on Japan.
3344:
3095:
2811:
2574:
1783:
937:
861:
ineffective. On the other hand, Hawaii's distance meant a successful surprise attack could not be blocked or quickly countered by forces from the
1100:
1096:
514:
202:
132:
1277:
On the home leg, the force was ordered to be alert for tracking and counterattacks by the Americans and to return to the friendly base in the
3334:
3131:
2847:
2748:
2372:
2343:
453:
was an especially strong response because oil was Japan's most crucial import, and more than 80% of Japan's oil came from the United States.
419:
2959:
1158:
160:
3212:
2630:
1030:
940:, to study the technical feasibility of an attack against the American base. Onishi gathered as many facts as possible about Pearl Harbor.
681:
2973:
1170:
2364:
398:
288:, including the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and the Netherlands. Japanese atrocities during the conflict, such as the notorious
3145:
2966:
2439:
2154:
1297:
1164:
662:
480:
105:
3260:
2980:
2874:
2514:
2086:
2026:
1913:
1871:
1176:
561:
532:
In its final proposal on November 20, Japan offered to withdraw its forces from southern Indochina and not to launch any attacks in
317:
3150:
1547:
473:
1324:
had been judged a success and to have caused considerable damage, a finding that was corroborated in a 1938 exercise by Admiral
3368:
2945:
1239:
1142:
1014:
684:
143:
2655:
3006:
2952:
1152:
1066:
Most of the senior officers of the Combined Fleet, particularly Admiral Nagano, believed an invasion of Hawaii was too risky.
67:
1109:, which the Japanese leaders saw as an unproductive and old proposal, was received, the carrier force, under the command of
499:
216:
2155:"Memorandum 95 Regarding a Conversation, Between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), and Mr. Kurusu
1857:
Joint Congressional Hearings on the Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 40, ^p.506, "Conclusions Restated With Supporting Evidence".
1006:
676:
Konoe argued for more negotiations and for possible concessions to avert war. However, military leaders such as Sugiyama,
654:
386:
300:. Japan's new military power and willingness to use it threatened the Western economic and territorial interests in Asia.
993:, which inflicted most of the ship damage during the eventual attack. Japanese weapons technicians also produced special
797:. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially requested additional Hawaiian intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner
2867:
1356:
977:, after the famous Z signal that was given by Admiral TÅgÅ at Tsushima. Over the summer, pilots trained in earnest near
2039:
1352:
1124:
1041:, and proposed for both to be used in an operation that would require up to four weeks with Japanese air superiority.
707:
370:
1428:
had discovered the Japanese approach, he would have sortied to meet them. With the three American aircraft carriers (
1401:
in the islands, but only three were on patrol at the time of the attack. Hawaii was low on the priority list for the
1957:
540:, required Japan to evacuate all of China unconditionally and to conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers.
3300:
1223:
762:
733:
340:
275:
267:
362:
and pledged sufficient continuing aid to ensure their survival. Thus, the United States slowly moved from being a
343:
intervention risked war on both shores: with Germany and Italy in the Atlantic and with Japan in the Pacific. The
3373:
3055:
2736:
1424:
said later, "It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941." Nimitz believed that if
1398:
390:
1222:
provided escort and screening. In addition, the Advanced Expeditionary Force included 20 fleet and five two-man
2599:
1482:
1049:
831:), and neither Roosevelt nor Hull wanted trouble in the Pacific. Had they been closed, however, it is possible
677:
281:
271:
109:
90:
665:, about the lack of success in China and the speculated low chances of victory against the United States, the
1013:
to provide Japan with a strategic base to shield its new empire, deny the United States any bases beyond the
793:
agent. None had been providing much militarily useful information. He planned to add the 29-year-old Ensign
715:
632:
616:
569:
240:
98:
17:
648:
would be exhausted within two years if a new source was not found. In August 1941, Japanese Prime Minister
3268:
3013:
2890:
1329:
1060:
670:
394:
270:
because the United States and the United Kingdom refused to grant the Japanese Navy parity with theirs. A
117:
47:
30:
2808:
2578:
1845:
1270:
Upon completion, the force was to return to Japan, re-equip, and redeploy for "Second Phase Operations."
970:
or would be rescued from the harbor afterward. Despite those concerns, Yamamoto and Genda pressed ahead.
832:
3252:
3204:
3174:
1886:, 2nd ed. (Taipei, Republic of China: Chung Wu Publishing, 1971), p.317, "Invasion of French Indochina".
1523:
1429:
1337:
895:
891:
810:
344:
2103:
1628:, which was expected to serve as a base for further attacks against Hawaii. However, in the subsequent
553:
469:
448:
and would not discriminate in trade if all other countries reciprocated. However, War Minister General
131:
Planning had been underway for some time on an attack on the "Southern Resource Area" to add it to the
1604:
For a more detailed analysis of whether a Japanese invasion of Hawaii could have been successful, see
201:. Japanese nationalists and military leaders increasingly influenced government policy and promoted a
3136:
3090:
3041:
3027:
2265:
1943:
1641:
The figure of 414 includes scout planes operated by escorts, which were not part of the strike force.
1435:
1348:
1282:
826:
770:
351:
236:
191:
94:
578:
timing, embassy personnel did not deliver the message to Hull until several hours after the attack.
3308:
3236:
3105:
2999:
1441:
994:
382:
358:
military dictatorship, it committed to help the British and the Chinese through loans of money and
244:
1474:
339:. By joining the pact, Japan gained geopolitical power and sent the unmistakable message that any
308:
of 1940. Those efforts failed to deter Japan from continuing its war in China or from signing the
3316:
3183:
2615:
2019:
No Choice But War: the United States Embargo Against Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific
1720:
1712:
1418:, not in anticipation of air attack, in keeping with Short's interpretation of the war warnings.
944:
805:. He had grown his hair longer than military length and assumed the cover name Tadashi Morimura.
775:
723:
305:
187:
2078:
1905:
251:
and saw an opportunity to expand its position in China.) In March 1933 Japan withdrew from the
3284:
3244:
3034:
2843:
2744:
2690:
2510:
2435:
2368:
2339:
2082:
2022:
1980:
1909:
1867:
1571:
1527:
1519:
1425:
1406:
1341:
868:
285:
263:
252:
147:
125:
2839:
2429:
1048:
Japan's ground forces, logistics, and resources were already fully committed not only to the
928:
In a letter dated January 7, 1941, Yamamoto finally delivered a rough outline of his plan to
3276:
3228:
3220:
3048:
2529:
1704:
1629:
1543:
1385:
1321:
1278:
1185:
1134:
1010:
956:
952:
898:
in 1904. Yamamoto's emphasis on destroying the American battleships was in keeping with the
872:
862:
743:
557:
549:
289:
232:
220:
210:
167:
113:
2626:
Pearl Harbor Operations: General Outline of Orders and Plans, 5 November to 2 December 1941
2162:
2924:
2815:
1992:
1965:
1659:
1219:
1182:
990:
966:
eventually were). Also, most of the crews would survive the attack since many would be on
933:
887:
794:
729:
722:'s advice. Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni became prime minister on 17 August 1945, after the
658:
503:
487:
412:
309:
51:
1799:
198:
612:
407:
Richardson asked Roosevelt if the United States was going to war and got this response:
2919:
2071:
1898:
1651:
1625:
1531:
1421:
1308:
1192:
1130:
1113:
1089:
978:
929:
858:
766:
753:
719:
699:
and jeopardize the control of Korea. Hence, doing nothing was the same as defeat and a
666:
649:
622:
533:
521:
510:
433:
297:
152:
2832:
66:
had been a threat to Japan since the 1890s, but real tensions did not begin until the
3362:
2827:
2503:
1724:
1313:
1229:
1211:
1207:
1005:
At several stages during 1941, Japan's military leaders discussed the possibility of
849:
769:, who advised him to take his time until he was convinced, and TÅjÅ, Hirohito called
710:, who was also the choice of the army and navy, as his successor. Hirohito appointed
583:
574:
363:
86:
55:
1258:
1082:
2659:
2237:
1389:
1376:), which had replaced JN-25B on 4 December 1941, could not be read until May 1942.
1300:
1242:
1189:
1110:
948:
921:
899:
878:
853:
815:
700:
687:
495:
476:
437:
428:
374:
336:
328:
313:
156:
82:
74:
2785:
2774:
2763:
2642:
2561:
Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Japanese Imperial Navy, 1887-1941
2547:
The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, February to June 1942
1044:
Although the idea gained some support, it was soon dismissed for several reasons:
982:
2335:
2331:
2327:
Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941
2325:
1261:
to the commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, to inform him:
1056:, which were planned to occur almost simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor attack.
3292:
2047:
1779:
1507:
1499:
1402:
1369:
1325:
1199:
1117:
1053:
1038:
1022:
967:
867:
Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by the British action at the
711:
638:
601:
458:
449:
389:, provoked a confrontation with Roosevelt by repeating his earlier arguments to
321:
206:
166:
Planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor had begun very early in 1941 by Admiral
139:
59:
3020:
1708:
1372:) could be read, but the current version (JN-25C) of the Japanese naval code (
1333:
1203:
959:
907:
645:
564:
regarding reactions to the Japanese move into French Indochina in the summer.
401:
121:
2741:
Days of Infamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill â the Shocking Truth Revealed
2694:
1866:
Richardson, "On the Treadmill", pp.425 and 434; Baker, "Human Smoke", p.239,
1123:
In 1941, Japan was one of the few countries capable of carrier aviation. The
1606:
1317:
1215:
1196:
1106:
1018:
918:
903:
696:
537:
525:
293:
260:
256:
248:
171:
2238:
OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
1363:, had intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese diplomatic and naval
461:, a U.S. colony, and so war against the U.S. seemed necessary in any case.
2536:. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), pp. 260, 323, and 329-330.
1293:
1235:
913:
124:
remaining and to support the existing plans to seize oil resources in the
2411:
2409:
2073:
Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941
1900:
Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941
1555:
1415:
1381:
1148:
802:
491:
420:
Japan's September 1940 move into Vichy France-controlled French Indochina
359:
332:
223:
175:
2625:
749:
657:. The summit occurred one day after the emperor had reprimanded General
97:, as well as by a series of racist laws, which enforced segregation and
1551:
1360:
1086:
1034:
424:
355:
2859:
1716:
1692:
902:
doctrine shared by all major navies during this period, including the
58:
was a possibility each nation's military forces had planned for after
2297:
Prange, Gordon W.; Dillon, Katherine V.; Goldstein, Donald M (1991).
2271:
The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945
1364:
789:
692:
644:
In July 1941, IJN headquarters informed Emperor Hirohito its reserve
441:
378:
2142:
The American Century, A History Of The United States Since the 1890s
1405:
finally becoming available for the Pacific, largely because General
2619:
1662:
that included a questionnaire about Pearl Harbor from the Japanese.
3062:
1373:
1292:
1234:
1081:
912:
748:
728:
627:
611:
215:
37:
1332:
visited Pearl Harbor. While lecturing American naval officers on
1882:
Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, translated by Wen Ha-hsiung.
1559:
1503:
628:
2863:
3168:
Crisis: The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor and Southeast Asia
2575:"US Department of the Navy description of Pearl Harbor Attack"
1743:"Biased history helps feed U.S. fascination with Pearl Harbor"
1655:
101:
from citizenship, land ownership, and immigration to the U.S.
2361:
War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897â1945
255:
in response to international condemnation of its conquest of
2809:
Naval Air Station, Kanoehe Bay, during the Pearl Harbor Raid
886:
Japanese strategists were undoubtedly influenced by Admiral
714:
instead and was worried, as he told Konoe, about having the
2656:"The Day that Will Live in Infamy... but it didn't have to"
718:
being held responsible for a war against Western powers on
266:
there. On January 15, 1936, the Japanese withdrew from the
1821:
Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations: 1932-1988
483:. No solution could be agreed upon for three key reasons:
354:
would be endangered if Europe and the Far East fell under
2104:"Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons"
1834:
Recent America, A History Of The United States Since 1900
1591:
It was for those reasons IJA also rejected proposals for
1303:, the commanding general of the Army post at Pearl Harbor
2549:. (United States Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1983)
2221:
2219:
1946:
Morton, Louis. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
284:
was condemned by the U.S. and by several members of the
1800:"Imperial Rescript to Withdraw from League of Nations"
1188:(Allied codename "Zeke," commonly called "Zero"), 171
2796:
2415:
2311:
2241:
Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941
2157:
Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941
973:
By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known as
509:
Japan wanted economic control and responsibility for
331:'s war in Europe to advance its own ambitions in the
73:
Japan's fear of being colonized and the government's
2830:; Goldstein, Donald M; Dillon, Katherine V. (1982).
178:, the order to attack was issued in early December.
3327:
3196:
3159:
3124:
3073:
2990:
2933:
2897:
2831:
2505:The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans
2502:
2070:
1897:
1253:On December 1, 1941, after the striking force was
787:from a German already living in Hawaii who was an
778:at its main forward base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
81:in Asia and the Pacific, as it sought to join the
2534:A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II
2469:
2467:
2465:
2463:
1120:, sortied for Hawaii under strict radio silence.
706:On October 16, 1941, Konoe resigned and proposed
427:on scrap-metal shipments to Japan and closed the
1456:Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory
1410:training status, rather than operational alert.
369:In mid-1940, President Roosevelt moved the U.S.
120:(IJN) to estimate it had less than two years of
64:expansion of American territories in the Pacific
1263:
757:(advisor to Emperor Hirohito from 1940 to 1945)
464:After the embargoes and the asset freezes, the
2563:. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute. p. 472.
2021:(Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 1995).
1836:(Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1946)Page. 635-645
560:, had been conducting extended talks with the
381:, to deter Japan. On October 8, 1940, Admiral
2875:
876:
552:, including the Japanese ambassador, Admiral
8:
2128:
1884:History of The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)
18:Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor
2159:(Department of State, Washington, DC 1943)"
2144:(John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), pp. 243-247.
1939:
1937:
1650:On August 1941, the Yugoslav-British agent
350:would not be dissuaded. Believing that the
2882:
2868:
2860:
2324:Evans, David C.; Peattie, Mark R. (2012).
2243:(Department of State, Washington, DC 1943)
1697:Comparative Studies in Society and History
268:Second London Naval Disarmament Conference
1202:(Allied codename "Val") aboard. Two fast
924:stressed that surprise would be critical.
104:In the 1930s, Japan expanded slowly into
2611:
2609:
2607:
2040:"The Way to Pearl Harbor: U.S. vs Japan"
1819:Lester H. Brune and Richard Dean Burns,
1582:Both U.S. and Japanese, as it turns out.
466:Japanese ambassador to the United States
99:barred Asian people (including Japanese)
2743:. New York: Pocket Books. p. 174.
2658:. The USS Flier Project. Archived from
2600:Order of Battle for Pearl Harbor Attack
2225:
2210:
1958:"United States freezes Japanese assets"
1785:Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan
1727:– via Cambridge University Press.
1693:"The Evolution of Japanese Colonialism"
1683:
1466:
1105:On November 26, 1941, the day that the
2454:
2284:
1988:
1978:
1846:Shift Of Our Fleet To Atlantic Studied
1766:
1338:Japan's surprise attack on Port Arthur
1257:, Chief of Staff Nagano gave a verbal
1101:Attack on Pearl Harbor order of battle
1097:1st Air Fleet (Imperial Japanese Navy)
1001:Concept of Japanese invasion of Hawaii
680:General Hideki TÅjÅ, and chief of the
515:Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
203:Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
133:Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
2724:Peaarl Harbor: The Verdict of History
2474:Caravaggio, Angelo N. (Winter 2014).
2401:The Influence of Sea Power on History
2140:La Feber, Walter. Polenberg, Richard
737:(younger brother of Emperor Hirohito)
7:
3213:The War at Sea from Hawaii to Malaya
2683:"Mountbatten Predicted Pearl Harbor"
2681:O'Toole, Thomas (December 7, 1982).
1736:
1734:
1031:Japanese invasion of the Philippines
259:and subsequent establishment of the
3340:Advance-knowledge conspiracy theory
2797:Prange, Dillon & Goldstein 1991
2786:War warning, dated 27 November 1941
2416:Prange, Dillon & Goldstein 1991
2365:United States Naval Institute Press
2312:Prange, Dillon & Goldstein 1991
2252:
2183:
2005:
1928:
1671:Technically called "Condition Zed."
524:unless it kept its puppet state of
146:, were also a Japanese target. The
2077:. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. p.
1741:Burress, Charles (July 19, 2001).
1530:, and the territory of the future
1195:(Allied codename "Kate"), and 108
479:held multiple meetings to resolve
272:second war between Japan and China
235:being transferred to Japan in the
174:and the final approval by Emperor
25:
2301:. New York: Penguin. p. 151.
2102:Record, Jeffrey (February 2009).
387:Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
135:Japan envisioned in the Pacific.
2330:. Seaforth Publishing. pp.
2274:. Random House. pp. 152â53.
691:Sino-Japanese War, depress Army
112:in 1937. In 1940, Japan invaded
2434:. Open Road Media. p. 14.
1944:Chapter V: The Decision for War
1904:. Ithaca: Cornell UP. pp.
1848:, New York Times, June 23, 1940
2038:Yuichi Arima (December 2003).
1691:Kublin, Hyman (October 1959).
1624:forces for an invasion of the
962:and several types of bombing.
327:Japan would take advantage of
320:, which officially formed the
68:Japanese invasion of Manchuria
46:A series of events led to the
1:
3335:Vulnerability of Pearl Harbor
2501:Goldstein, Donald M. (1993).
2069:Barnhart, Michael A. (1987).
1896:Barnhart, Michael A. (1987).
1133:'s main carrier force of six
655:Imperial General Headquarters
1473:The effort to establish the
1357:Office of Naval Intelligence
1054:offensives in Southeast Asia
943:After first consulting with
282:Japan's 1937 attack on China
205:as part of Japan's alleged "
2486:(1): 85â118. Archived from
2476:""Winning" the Pacific War"
2108:Strategic Studies Institute
1570:With Indonesia, the former
1489:, or "holy war", by Japan).
1353:Signal Intelligence Service
708:Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni
556:and Special Representative
481:Japanese-American relations
226:, reigned from 1926 to 1989
161:invasion of the Philippines
3390:
3261:The Revolt of Mamie Stover
2764:November 28, 1941, message
2359:Miller, Edward S. (2007).
1654:submitted a report to the
1094:
890:'s surprise attack on the
763:Nobuhito, Prince Takamatsu
734:Nobuhito, Prince Takamatsu
366:to one preparing for war.
276:Marco Polo Bridge Incident
29:For more information, see
28:
3116:Medal of Honor recipients
2643:Japanese Monograph No. 97
2509:. Washington: Brassey's.
2186:, pp. 411 & 745.
1709:10.1017/S0010417500000554
1607:"Invasion: Pearl Harbor!"
1116:and already assembled in
653:attack plans prepared by
573:. It was decoded by U.S.
544:Breaking off negotiations
391:Chief of Naval Operations
199:reign of Emperor Hirohito
2559:Evans, David C. (1997).
2480:Naval War College Review
2395:.; Peattie & Evans,
2129:Evans & Peattie 2012
1593:an invasion of Australia
1483:Second Sino-Japanese War
1050:Second Sino-Japanese War
936:, chief of staff of the
239:. (Japan had fought the
110:Second Sino-Japanese War
91:Racial Equality Proposal
77:policies led to its own
3101:U.K. declaration of war
3096:U.S. declaration of war
2838:. McGraw-Hill. p.
2213:, pp. 29 & 35.
2196:Wetzler, Peter (1998).
2110:. U.S. Army War College
2017:Worth, Roland H., Jr.,
1832:Parkes, Henry Bamford.
633:Prime Minister of Japan
617:Prime Minister of Japan
520:Japan refused to leave
513:, as envisioned in the
474:U.S. Secretary of State
241:First Sino-Japanese War
3369:Attack on Pearl Harbor
3269:Storm Over the Pacific
3111:Pearl Harbor Committee
1330:Lord Louis Mountbatten
1304:
1268:
1245:
1232:for underway fueling.
1092:
1061:Imperial Japanese Army
925:
877:
782:Intelligence gathering
758:
738:
641:
625:
620:(1937â1939, 1940â1941)
597:
417:
227:
209:" to unify Asia under
118:Imperial Japanese Navy
48:attack on Pearl Harbor
43:
31:Causes of World War II
3253:From Here to Eternity
3205:Secret Agent of Japan
3146:Survivors Association
2905:Prelude to the attack
2428:Lord, Walter (2012).
2046:(118). Archived from
1481:) had begun with the
1351:, through the Army's
1296:
1238:
1183:Mitsubishi A6M Type 0
1085:
1007:launching an invasion
916:
896:Battle of Port Arthur
892:Russian Pacific Fleet
871:in which 21 obsolete
761:On 30 November 1941,
752:
732:
631:
615:
592:
562:U.S. State Department
409:
399:Secretary of the Navy
345:Franklin D. Roosevelt
219:
144:American protectorate
41:
3091:Day of Infamy speech
3086:Sleeping giant quote
2629:. Washington, D.C.:
2530:Weinberg, Gerhard L.
1349:signals intelligence
1190:Nakajima B5N Type 97
1017:and further isolate
995:armor-piercing bombs
352:American way of life
237:Treaty of Versailles
192:Treaty of Portsmouth
95:Treaty of Versailles
85:, all of which were
3301:The Final Countdown
3151:Commemorative Medal
3106:Roberts Commissions
2891:Pearl Harbor attack
2631:US dept of the Army
2581:on October 12, 2007
2314:, pp. 151â152.
2255:, pp. 430â431.
2165:on October 22, 2015
2050:on October 13, 2007
1788:. pp. 326â327.
1328:. In October 1941,
1309:William L. Mitchell
1289:Lack of preparation
833:Naval General Staff
661:, chief of the IJA
383:James O. Richardson
245:sphere of influence
108:, which led to the
3345:In popular culture
3007:salvaged artifacts
2814:2012-01-07 at the
2620:Japanese monograph
1991:has generic name (
1305:
1298:Lieutenant General
1281:, rather than the
1246:
1169:, and the newest,
1093:
938:Eleventh Air Fleet
926:
875:disabled half the
776:U.S. Pacific Fleet
759:
739:
724:surrender of Japan
642:
626:
554:KichisaburÅ Nomura
470:KichisaburÅ Nomura
306:Export Control Act
228:
188:Russo-Japanese War
50:. War between the
44:
3353:
3352:
3285:Tora! Tora! Tora!
2849:978-0-07-050672-5
2834:Miracle at Midway
2828:Prange, Gordon W.
2750:978-0-671-76985-7
2490:on July 14, 2014.
2418:, pp. 25â27.
2374:978-1-59114-500-4
2363:. Annapolis, MD:
2345:978-1-84832-159-5
1611:Combinedfleet.com
1572:Dutch East Indies
1407:Douglas MacArthur
1342:attack on Taranto
1307:In 1924, General
1197:Aichi D3A Type 99
1135:aircraft carriers
869:Battle of Taranto
850:"decisive battle"
829:
771:ShigetarÅ Shimada
746:in the Far East.
682:IJN General Staff
572:
286:League of Nations
264:puppet government
253:League of Nations
153:preventive attack
148:Japanese military
126:Dutch East Indies
16:(Redirected from
3381:
3374:Preludes to wars
3229:This Is the Army
2915:Present US ships
2884:
2877:
2870:
2861:
2854:
2853:
2837:
2824:
2818:
2806:
2800:
2794:
2788:
2783:
2777:
2772:
2766:
2761:
2755:
2754:
2733:
2727:
2716:The Codebreakers
2712:
2706:
2705:
2703:
2701:
2678:
2672:
2671:
2669:
2667:
2662:on March 4, 2016
2651:
2645:
2640:
2634:
2613:
2602:
2597:
2591:
2590:
2588:
2586:
2577:. Archived from
2571:
2565:
2564:
2556:
2550:
2543:
2537:
2527:
2521:
2520:
2508:
2498:
2492:
2491:
2471:
2458:
2452:
2446:
2445:
2425:
2419:
2413:
2404:
2385:
2379:
2378:
2356:
2350:
2349:
2321:
2315:
2309:
2303:
2302:
2299:At Dawn We Slept
2294:
2288:
2282:
2276:
2275:
2262:
2256:
2250:
2244:
2235:
2229:
2223:
2214:
2208:
2202:
2201:
2198:Hirohito and War
2193:
2187:
2181:
2175:
2174:
2172:
2170:
2161:. Archived from
2151:
2145:
2138:
2132:
2126:
2120:
2119:
2117:
2115:
2099:
2093:
2092:
2076:
2066:
2060:
2059:
2057:
2055:
2044:ICE Case Studies
2035:
2029:
2015:
2009:
2003:
1997:
1996:
1990:
1986:
1984:
1976:
1974:
1972:
1953:
1947:
1941:
1932:
1926:
1920:
1919:
1903:
1893:
1887:
1880:
1874:
1864:
1858:
1855:
1849:
1843:
1837:
1830:
1824:
1817:
1811:
1810:
1808:
1806:
1796:
1790:
1789:
1776:
1770:
1764:
1758:
1757:
1755:
1753:
1738:
1729:
1728:
1688:
1672:
1669:
1663:
1648:
1642:
1639:
1633:
1630:Battle of Midway
1621:
1615:
1614:
1602:
1596:
1589:
1583:
1580:
1574:
1568:
1562:
1544:French Indochina
1540:
1534:
1516:
1510:
1496:
1490:
1471:
1386:Russian Far East
1340:and the British
1322:Harry E. Yarnell
1279:Marshall Islands
1220:fleet submarines
1011:Hawaiian Islands
957:aircraft carrier
953:Ryunosuke Kusaka
882:
873:Fairey Swordfish
863:Continental U.S.
859:aerial torpedoes
827:
744:Open Door Policy
568:
550:Washington, D.C.
290:Nanjing Massacre
211:Emperor Hirohito
168:Isoroku Yamamoto
114:French Indochina
21:
3389:
3388:
3384:
3383:
3382:
3380:
3379:
3378:
3359:
3358:
3354:
3349:
3323:
3192:
3155:
3132:Remembrance Day
3120:
3069:
2992:
2986:
2937:
2935:
2929:
2925:Niihau incident
2910:Order of battle
2893:
2888:
2858:
2857:
2850:
2826:
2825:
2821:
2816:Wayback Machine
2807:
2803:
2795:
2791:
2784:
2780:
2773:
2769:
2762:
2758:
2751:
2735:
2734:
2730:
2713:
2709:
2699:
2697:
2687:Washington Post
2680:
2679:
2675:
2665:
2663:
2653:
2652:
2648:
2641:
2637:
2614:
2605:
2598:
2594:
2584:
2582:
2573:
2572:
2568:
2558:
2557:
2553:
2545:Willmott, H.P.
2544:
2540:
2528:
2524:
2517:
2500:
2499:
2495:
2473:
2472:
2461:
2453:
2449:
2442:
2427:
2426:
2422:
2414:
2407:
2393:War Plan Orange
2386:
2382:
2375:
2358:
2357:
2353:
2346:
2323:
2322:
2318:
2310:
2306:
2296:
2295:
2291:
2283:
2279:
2264:
2263:
2259:
2251:
2247:
2236:
2232:
2224:
2217:
2209:
2205:
2195:
2194:
2190:
2182:
2178:
2168:
2166:
2153:
2152:
2148:
2139:
2135:
2127:
2123:
2113:
2111:
2101:
2100:
2096:
2089:
2068:
2067:
2063:
2053:
2051:
2037:
2036:
2032:
2016:
2012:
2004:
2000:
1987:
1977:
1970:
1968:
1966:History Channel
1955:
1954:
1950:
1942:
1935:
1927:
1923:
1916:
1895:
1894:
1890:
1881:
1877:
1865:
1861:
1856:
1852:
1844:
1840:
1831:
1827:
1823:, 2003, p. 504.
1818:
1814:
1804:
1802:
1798:
1797:
1793:
1778:
1777:
1773:
1765:
1761:
1751:
1749:
1747:The Japan Times
1740:
1739:
1732:
1690:
1689:
1685:
1680:
1675:
1670:
1666:
1660:J. Edgar Hoover
1649:
1645:
1640:
1636:
1622:
1618:
1605:
1603:
1599:
1590:
1586:
1581:
1577:
1569:
1565:
1548:in World War II
1541:
1537:
1517:
1513:
1498:Possessing the
1497:
1493:
1472:
1468:
1464:
1452:
1320:led by Admiral
1301:Walter C. Short
1291:
1251:
1193:torpedo bombers
1141:. The carriers
1139:First Air Fleet
1103:
1095:Main articles:
1080:
1003:
991:Type 91 torpedo
934:Takijiro Onishi
888:Heihachiro Togo
841:
795:Takeo Yoshikawa
784:
756:
736:
678:Minister of War
659:Hajime Sugiyama
637:
635:
621:
619:
610:
546:
504:Tripartite Pact
395:Harold R. Stark
310:Tripartite Pact
274:began with the
184:
87:Western nations
52:Empire of Japan
34:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
3387:
3385:
3377:
3376:
3371:
3361:
3360:
3351:
3350:
3348:
3347:
3342:
3337:
3331:
3329:
3325:
3324:
3322:
3321:
3313:
3305:
3297:
3289:
3281:
3273:
3265:
3257:
3249:
3241:
3233:
3225:
3217:
3209:
3200:
3198:
3194:
3193:
3191:
3190:
3181:
3176:Days of Infamy
3172:
3163:
3161:
3157:
3156:
3154:
3153:
3148:
3143:
3134:
3128:
3126:
3122:
3121:
3119:
3118:
3113:
3108:
3103:
3098:
3093:
3088:
3083:
3077:
3075:
3071:
3070:
3068:
3067:
3060:
3053:
3046:
3039:
3032:
3025:
3018:
3011:
3010:
3009:
2996:
2994:
2988:
2987:
2985:
2984:
2977:
2970:
2963:
2956:
2949:
2941:
2939:
2931:
2930:
2928:
2927:
2922:
2920:Battleship Row
2917:
2912:
2907:
2901:
2899:
2895:
2894:
2889:
2887:
2886:
2879:
2872:
2864:
2856:
2855:
2848:
2819:
2801:
2789:
2778:
2767:
2756:
2749:
2737:Costello, John
2728:
2707:
2673:
2646:
2635:
2603:
2592:
2566:
2551:
2538:
2522:
2515:
2493:
2459:
2457:, p. 160.
2447:
2441:978-1453238424
2440:
2420:
2405:
2380:
2373:
2351:
2344:
2316:
2304:
2289:
2287:, p. 167.
2277:
2257:
2245:
2230:
2215:
2203:
2188:
2176:
2146:
2133:
2131:, p. 489.
2121:
2094:
2087:
2061:
2030:
2010:
2008:, p. 401.
1998:
1948:
1933:
1931:, p. 395.
1921:
1914:
1888:
1875:
1859:
1850:
1838:
1825:
1812:
1791:
1771:
1759:
1730:
1682:
1681:
1679:
1676:
1674:
1673:
1664:
1643:
1634:
1616:
1597:
1584:
1575:
1563:
1535:
1511:
1491:
1465:
1463:
1460:
1459:
1458:
1451:
1448:
1422:Chester Nimitz
1347:By 1941, U.S.
1290:
1287:
1250:
1247:
1208:heavy cruisers
1131:Combined Fleet
1114:Chuichi Nagumo
1090:Chuichi Nagumo
1079:
1076:
1068:
1067:
1064:
1057:
1002:
999:
979:Kagoshima City
930:Koshiro Oikawa
852:, as Russia's
840:
837:
783:
780:
716:Imperial House
667:British Empire
650:Fumimaro Konoe
623:Konoe Fumimaro
609:
606:
545:
542:
534:Southeast Asia
530:
529:
522:Mainland China
518:
511:Southeast Asia
507:
434:British Malaya
348:administration
298:Southeast Asia
278:in July 1937.
183:
180:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3386:
3375:
3372:
3370:
3367:
3366:
3364:
3357:
3346:
3343:
3341:
3338:
3336:
3333:
3332:
3330:
3326:
3319:
3318:
3314:
3311:
3310:
3306:
3303:
3302:
3298:
3295:
3294:
3290:
3287:
3286:
3282:
3279:
3278:
3277:In Harm's Way
3274:
3271:
3270:
3266:
3263:
3262:
3258:
3255:
3254:
3250:
3247:
3246:
3242:
3239:
3238:
3234:
3231:
3230:
3226:
3223:
3222:
3218:
3215:
3214:
3210:
3207:
3206:
3202:
3201:
3199:
3195:
3188:
3186:
3182:
3179:
3177:
3173:
3170:
3169:
3165:
3164:
3162:
3158:
3152:
3149:
3147:
3144:
3142:
3140:
3135:
3133:
3130:
3129:
3127:
3123:
3117:
3114:
3112:
3109:
3107:
3104:
3102:
3099:
3097:
3094:
3092:
3089:
3087:
3084:
3082:
3079:
3078:
3076:
3072:
3066:
3065:
3061:
3059:
3058:
3057:West Virginia
3054:
3052:
3051:
3047:
3045:
3044:
3040:
3038:
3037:
3033:
3031:
3030:
3026:
3024:
3023:
3019:
3017:
3016:
3012:
3008:
3005:
3004:
3003:
3002:
2998:
2997:
2995:
2991:United States
2989:
2983:
2982:
2978:
2976:
2975:
2971:
2969:
2968:
2964:
2962:
2961:
2957:
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2923:
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2913:
2911:
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2903:
2902:
2900:
2896:
2892:
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2873:
2871:
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2862:
2851:
2845:
2841:
2836:
2835:
2829:
2823:
2820:
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2810:
2805:
2802:
2798:
2793:
2790:
2787:
2782:
2779:
2776:
2771:
2768:
2765:
2760:
2757:
2752:
2746:
2742:
2738:
2732:
2729:
2725:
2721:
2717:
2714:Kahn, David.
2711:
2708:
2696:
2692:
2688:
2684:
2677:
2674:
2661:
2657:
2650:
2647:
2644:
2639:
2636:
2632:
2628:
2627:
2621:
2617:
2612:
2610:
2608:
2604:
2601:
2596:
2593:
2580:
2576:
2570:
2567:
2562:
2555:
2552:
2548:
2542:
2539:
2535:
2531:
2526:
2523:
2518:
2516:9780028810010
2512:
2507:
2506:
2497:
2494:
2489:
2485:
2481:
2477:
2470:
2468:
2466:
2464:
2460:
2456:
2451:
2448:
2443:
2437:
2433:
2432:
2431:Day of Infamy
2424:
2421:
2417:
2412:
2410:
2406:
2402:
2398:
2394:
2390:
2384:
2381:
2376:
2370:
2366:
2362:
2355:
2352:
2347:
2341:
2337:
2333:
2329:
2328:
2320:
2317:
2313:
2308:
2305:
2300:
2293:
2290:
2286:
2281:
2278:
2273:
2272:
2267:
2261:
2258:
2254:
2249:
2246:
2242:
2239:
2234:
2231:
2228:, p. 39.
2227:
2222:
2220:
2216:
2212:
2207:
2204:
2200:. p. 44.
2199:
2192:
2189:
2185:
2180:
2177:
2164:
2160:
2158:
2150:
2147:
2143:
2137:
2134:
2130:
2125:
2122:
2109:
2105:
2098:
2095:
2090:
2088:9780801419157
2084:
2080:
2075:
2074:
2065:
2062:
2049:
2045:
2041:
2034:
2031:
2028:
2027:0-7864-0141-9
2024:
2020:
2014:
2011:
2007:
2002:
1999:
1994:
1982:
1967:
1963:
1959:
1952:
1949:
1945:
1940:
1938:
1934:
1930:
1925:
1922:
1917:
1915:9780801419157
1911:
1907:
1902:
1901:
1892:
1889:
1885:
1879:
1876:
1873:
1872:1-4165-6784-4
1869:
1863:
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1854:
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1567:
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1557:
1553:
1550:), including
1549:
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1501:
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1400:
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1377:
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1371:
1366:
1362:
1358:
1354:
1350:
1345:
1343:
1339:
1335:
1331:
1327:
1323:
1319:
1316:, a surprise
1315:
1314:fleet problem
1310:
1302:
1299:
1295:
1288:
1286:
1284:
1280:
1275:
1271:
1267:
1262:
1260:
1256:
1249:Execute order
1248:
1244:
1241:
1240:Fleet Admiral
1237:
1233:
1231:
1227:
1226:
1221:
1217:
1213:
1212:light cruiser
1209:
1205:
1201:
1198:
1194:
1191:
1187:
1184:
1180:
1179:
1174:
1173:
1168:
1167:
1162:
1161:
1156:
1155:
1150:
1146:
1145:
1140:
1136:
1132:
1128:
1127:
1121:
1119:
1118:Hitokappu Wan
1115:
1112:
1108:
1102:
1098:
1091:
1088:
1084:
1077:
1075:
1072:
1065:
1062:
1058:
1055:
1052:but also for
1051:
1047:
1046:
1045:
1042:
1040:
1036:
1032:
1026:
1024:
1020:
1016:
1012:
1009:to seize the
1008:
1000:
998:
996:
992:
986:
984:
980:
976:
971:
969:
963:
961:
958:
954:
950:
946:
941:
939:
935:
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923:
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905:
901:
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893:
889:
884:
881:
880:
874:
870:
865:
864:
860:
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851:
845:
838:
836:
834:
830:
825:
820:
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812:
806:
804:
800:
796:
792:
791:
781:
779:
777:
772:
768:
764:
755:
751:
747:
745:
735:
731:
727:
725:
721:
717:
713:
709:
704:
702:
698:
694:
689:
686:
685:Fleet Admiral
683:
679:
674:
672:
668:
664:
663:General Staff
660:
656:
651:
647:
640:
634:
630:
624:
618:
614:
607:
605:
603:
596:
591:
587:
585:
584:Henry Clausen
579:
576:
575:cryptanalysts
571:
565:
563:
559:
558:SaburÅ Kurusu
555:
551:
543:
541:
539:
535:
527:
523:
519:
516:
512:
508:
505:
501:
497:
493:
489:
486:
485:
484:
482:
478:
475:
471:
467:
462:
460:
454:
451:
445:
443:
439:
435:
430:
426:
421:
416:
414:
413:Kra Peninsula
408:
405:
403:
400:
396:
392:
388:
384:
380:
376:
372:
371:Pacific Fleet
367:
365:
364:neutral power
361:
357:
353:
349:
346:
342:
341:U.S. military
338:
334:
330:
325:
323:
319:
318:Fascist Italy
315:
312:in 1940 with
311:
307:
301:
299:
295:
291:
287:
283:
279:
277:
273:
269:
265:
262:
258:
254:
250:
246:
242:
238:
234:
225:
222:
218:
214:
212:
208:
204:
200:
195:
193:
189:
181:
179:
177:
173:
169:
164:
162:
158:
154:
149:
145:
141:
136:
134:
129:
127:
123:
119:
115:
111:
107:
102:
100:
96:
92:
88:
84:
80:
76:
71:
69:
65:
61:
57:
56:United States
53:
49:
40:
36:
32:
27:
19:
3355:
3315:
3309:Pearl Harbor
3307:
3299:
3291:
3283:
3275:
3267:
3259:
3251:
3243:
3237:December 7th
3235:
3227:
3219:
3211:
3203:
3184:
3175:
3166:
3138:
3081:Consequences
3063:
3056:
3049:
3042:
3035:
3028:
3021:
3014:
3000:
2979:
2972:
2965:
2958:
2951:
2944:
2904:
2833:
2822:
2804:
2792:
2781:
2770:
2759:
2740:
2731:
2723:
2719:
2715:
2710:
2698:. Retrieved
2686:
2676:
2664:. Retrieved
2660:the original
2649:
2638:
2623:
2595:
2583:. Retrieved
2579:the original
2569:
2560:
2554:
2546:
2541:
2533:
2525:
2504:
2496:
2488:the original
2483:
2479:
2450:
2430:
2423:
2400:
2396:
2392:
2388:
2383:
2360:
2354:
2326:
2319:
2307:
2298:
2292:
2280:
2270:
2266:Toland, John
2260:
2248:
2240:
2233:
2226:Wetzler 1998
2211:Wetzler 1998
2206:
2197:
2191:
2179:
2169:February 21,
2167:. Retrieved
2163:the original
2156:
2149:
2141:
2136:
2124:
2112:. Retrieved
2107:
2097:
2072:
2064:
2052:. Retrieved
2048:the original
2043:
2033:
2018:
2013:
2001:
1971:December 12,
1969:. Retrieved
1961:
1951:
1924:
1899:
1891:
1883:
1878:
1862:
1853:
1841:
1833:
1828:
1820:
1815:
1803:. Retrieved
1794:
1784:
1780:Bix, Herbert
1774:
1762:
1750:. Retrieved
1746:
1703:(1): 67â84.
1700:
1696:
1686:
1667:
1646:
1637:
1626:Midway Atoll
1619:
1610:
1600:
1587:
1578:
1566:
1538:
1514:
1494:
1486:
1478:
1475:Imperial Way
1469:
1442:
1436:
1430:
1420:
1412:
1395:
1390:torpedo nets
1378:
1346:
1306:
1283:Home Islands
1276:
1272:
1269:
1264:
1254:
1252:
1243:Osami Nagano
1224:
1218:, and three
1200:dive bombers
1177:
1171:
1165:
1159:
1153:
1143:
1125:
1122:
1111:Vice Admiral
1104:
1078:Strike force
1073:
1069:
1043:
1027:
1004:
987:
974:
972:
964:
949:Minoru Genda
942:
927:
922:Minoru Genda
885:
879:Regia Marina
866:
854:Baltic Fleet
846:
842:
823:
821:
811:Hickam Field
807:
798:
788:
785:
760:
740:
705:
701:loss of face
688:Osami Nagano
675:
671:their allies
643:
598:
593:
588:
580:
566:
547:
531:
490:honored its
477:Cordell Hull
463:
455:
446:
438:North Borneo
429:Panama Canal
418:
410:
406:
375:Pearl Harbor
368:
337:Soviet Union
329:Adolf Hitler
326:
314:Nazi Germany
302:
280:
229:
207:divine right
196:
185:
165:
157:Pearl Harbor
137:
130:
103:
93:in the 1919
83:great powers
75:expansionist
72:
45:
35:
26:
3185:Pacific War
3125:Remembrance
2775:ibiblio.org
2700:November 5,
2585:October 23,
2455:Toland 1970
2285:Toland 1970
1989:|last=
1805:October 24,
1767:Toland 1970
1752:January 31,
1652:Dušan Popov
1508:Wake Island
1500:Philippines
1370:Purple code
1326:Ernest King
1204:battleships
1039:Kaneohe Bay
1023:New Zealand
975:Operation Z
968:shore leave
945:Kosei Maeda
767:KÅichi Kido
754:KÅichi Kido
720:KÅichi Kido
712:Hideki Tojo
695:, endanger
639:Hideki Tojo
636:(1941â1944)
602:Joseph Grew
459:Philippines
450:Hideki Tojo
322:Axis Powers
140:Philippines
79:imperialism
60:World War I
3363:Categories
3245:Task Force
3015:California
2993:ships sunk
2391:; Miller,
2387:Willmott,
1678:References
1431:Enterprise
1334:Royal Navy
1225:Ko-hyoteki
1216:destroyers
1181:, had 135
1126:Kido Butai
1015:West Coast
908:Royal Navy
799:Nitta-maru
646:bunker oil
402:Frank Knox
182:Background
142:, then an
122:bunker oil
3221:Air Force
3189:(2007â08)
3180:(2004â05)
3074:Aftermath
2718:; Prange
2695:0190-8286
2666:August 7,
2654:Rebekah.
2616:U.S. Army
2399:; Mahan,
2054:April 10,
1956:Editors.
1725:146457602
1528:Singapore
1520:Hong Kong
1437:Lexington
1384:, or the
1318:airstrike
1259:directive
1107:Hull Note
1019:Australia
919:Commander
904:U.S. Navy
697:Manchukuo
538:Hull note
526:Manchukuo
261:Manchukuo
257:Manchuria
249:Manchuria
213:'s rule.
172:Hull note
70:in 1931.
3141:Memorial
3043:Sotoyomo
3029:Oklahoma
2938:involved
2936:carriers
2934:Japanese
2812:Archived
2739:(1994).
2268:(1970).
2253:Bix 2001
2184:Bix 2001
2114:July 26,
2006:Bix 2001
1981:cite web
1929:Bix 2001
1782:(2001).
1556:Cambodia
1532:Malaysia
1485:(called
1450:See also
1443:Saratoga
1416:sabotage
1382:Thailand
1355:and the
1255:en route
1186:fighters
917:Planner
906:and the
900:Mahanian
839:Planning
803:Yokohama
492:alliance
393:Admiral
360:materiel
333:Far East
233:Shandong
224:Hirohito
190:via the
176:Hirohito
54:and the
3139:Arizona
3001:Arizona
2981:Zuikaku
2974:ShÅkaku
2389:Barrier
1962:HISTORY
1906:144â145
1552:Vietnam
1361:OP-20-G
1214:, nine
1178:Zuikaku
1172:ShÅkaku
1087:Admiral
1035:Haleiwa
989:of the
894:at the
502:in the
496:Germany
425:embargo
356:fascist
221:Emperor
3320:(2019)
3317:Midway
3312:(2001)
3304:(1980)
3296:(1979)
3288:(1970)
3280:(1965)
3272:(1960)
3264:(1956)
3256:(1953)
3248:(1949)
3240:(1943)
3232:(1943)
3224:(1943)
3216:(1942)
3208:(1942)
3187:series
3178:series
3171:(1992)
3022:Oglala
2898:Attack
2846:
2747:
2693:
2513:
2438:
2397:Kaigun
2371:
2342:
2085:
2025:
1912:
1870:
1723:
1717:177547
1715:
1506:, and
1487:seisen
1440:, and
1426:Kimmel
1365:cipher
1230:oilers
1210:, one
1206:, two
1129:, the
983:Kyūshū
790:Abwehr
693:morale
669:, and
570:PURPLE
472:, and
442:Brunei
379:Hawaii
62:. The
3328:Other
3197:Films
3160:Books
3064:YFD-2
2967:Hiryū
2960:SÅryÅ«
2946:Akagi
2720:et al
1721:S2CID
1713:JSTOR
1542:With
1524:Burma
1518:With
1462:Notes
1403:B-17s
1374:JN-25
1166:Hiryū
1160:SÅryÅ«
1144:Akagi
981:. on
960:force
828:MAGIC
500:Italy
488:Japan
106:China
3293:1941
3137:USS
3050:Utah
3036:Shaw
2953:Kaga
2844:ISBN
2745:ISBN
2702:2020
2691:ISSN
2668:2012
2587:2007
2511:ISBN
2436:ISBN
2369:ISBN
2340:ISBN
2171:2017
2116:2016
2083:ISBN
2056:2006
2023:ISBN
1993:help
1973:2018
1910:ISBN
1868:ISBN
1807:2009
1754:2021
1560:Laos
1558:and
1504:Guam
1479:kÅdÅ
1399:PBYs
1175:and
1154:Kaga
1149:flag
1099:and
1059:The
1037:and
1021:and
498:and
440:and
397:and
316:and
296:and
294:East
138:The
2722:.,
2622:#97
2336:489
2332:462
2079:166
1705:doi
1658:'s
1656:FBI
1359:'s
1151:),
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816:PBY
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608:War
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373:to
247:in
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