Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army

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battalion; only five battalions were sent to East Pakistan because the GHQ probably could not spare anything else. The first two units (the 38th FF and 50th Punjab) were given to the 9th Division. The next three battalions were split up and sent as reinforcements to various areas, as needed. The last three battalions were to replace the 53rd Brigade as command reserves in Dhaka, but never arrived from West Pakistan. At the meeting, the Eastern Command was told to continue its "political mission" (i.e. prevent territory from falling into Mukti Bahini hands), although by this time 5,000 square miles (13,000 km) of territory had fallen into their hands. Gen Niazi claims this order was never withdrawn, and Gen. Hassan suggested that Gen. Hamid never altered the plan Gen. Niazi had submitted in October (including the deployment of troops near the border). The GHQ never commented on the deployment plan, while others claim the Eastern Command failed to readjust its deployments despite advice from GHQ.

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settlement). One of the bases of the replacement was Admiral Ahsan's resignation; he opposed any military actions in the East Pakistan, and was determined to find political solutions rather than military. The GHQ generals in the army and air force (and the navy admirals) were determined to curb the political movement with violence and military might. Admiral Ahsan went to East Pakistan, later returning to West Pakistan. General Yaqub Khan temporarily assumed control of the province in place of Admiral Ahsan; he was replaced by Lt. General Tikka Khan on his refusal to support military action against civilians. Once Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal launched, Admiral Ahsan resigned from his position as Martial Law Administrator and Governor of East Pakistan, retiring from the Navy in protest. In his place, Rear Admiral

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Command moved 9th Division HQ (GOC Maj. Gen. Shawkat Riza) to Jessore, putting the 107th (Commander Brig. Makhdum Hayat, HQ Jessore) and the 57th (Commander Brig. Jahanzab Arbab, HQ Jhenida) under this division. The 16th Division (GOC Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah) HQ moved to Bogra, which now included the 23rd (Commander Brig. Abdullah Malik, HQ Rangpur), the 205th (HQ Bogra) and the 34th (HQ Nator) Brigades. The 14th Division (GOC Maj. Gen. Rahim) HQ remained at Dhaka, with its brigades at Mymensingh (27th), Sylhet (313th) and Comilla (117th). The 97th Independent Brigade was formed in Chittagong, while the 53rd Brigade was moved to Dhaka as a command reserve.

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Pakistan, they had a rough parity with the Indian army in infantry and a slight edge in armour. However, they could only hope to attack with 3:1 superiority in selected areas where surprise was vital. Pakistan had raised the 33rd Infantry Division, and had started to raise the 35th and the 37th Divisions to replace those sent to Bangladesh; these formations were active but not fully operational by November 1971. The Pakistan Army deployed ten infantry and two armoured divisions to face an Indian force of three corps (thirteen infantry, two mountain, one armoured division and several battle groups under the Indian Army Western and Southern Commands) as follows:

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troops close to the border but Lt. General Gul Hassan, CGS, had little faith in the plan Lt. Gen. Niazi had outlined to him in June. Gen. Hassan supposedly tried to get the plan revised several times and insisted on abandoning the concept of defending every inch of the province, wanted the Eastern Command to redeploy regular units away from the border, fight for the BoPs and strong points on a limited scale and ensure Dhaka Bowl had enough reserves instead of the gradual withdrawal of forces to Dhaka outlined in the existing plan. However, GHQ Rawalpindi approved in October 1971 only with the following adjustments:

732:, commander of the Pakistan Navy in the region, ran violent naval operations that contributed to the insurgency. The Pakistan armed forces had no reserves to meet any unforeseen events, and success depended heavily on reinforcements from West Pakistan. There was no contingency plan for any Indian military action – the main reason Generals Yakub, Khadim and Farman had opposed launching the operation. Pakistani forces occupied Bangladesh, and Gen. Gul Hassan, then Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan army, and no admirer of Gen. Niazi from 11 April 1971 – expressed satisfaction with the situation in mid-April. 2080:

and Mukti Bahini activity. The Pakistani Eastern Command was fighting a holding action cut off from reinforcements and without any reserves to counter unforeseen developments, and its ultimate success lay in Pakistan defeating India in the west. If any of the factors deviated from the assumed norm of the plan, the Eastern Command was without the resources to win on its own. The Pakistani army had been fighting the insurgency nonstop for eight months and was severely fatigued and short of supplies; in addition, the deployment near the border had robbed them of the manoeuvrability needed for a flexible defence.

1579:"Mobile Warfare" (positional defence): While the planners agreed that this was best possible course of action (given the terrain of the province), they also noted the chance of being chased and cornered by both the Mukti Bahini and the Indian army was also greater. Indian air dominance would also pose a threat to mobility, and might unhinge the strategy. Also, a large uncommitted reserve force was needed to execute this strategy properly; the Eastern Command had no such reserves, and could not create one unless reinfiorced by West Pakistan or by abandoning the "defending every inch of the province" concept. 278:) on major communication hubs as "fortress towns" and placed the bulk of his troops near the Indian border. The final plan called for the armed forces to delay Indian attacks at the border and then gradually fall back to the fortress towns. From the fortresses, part of the surviving force was to take up positions near Dhaka and hold out until India was defeated in the west; Pakistani forces in the fortress towns would delay the bulk of the Indian forces and prevent them from concentrating on Dhaka. 1916:(north of Comilla), which was turned into a fortress. The 53rd Field Regiment and the 117th Independent Mortar Battery were attached to this brigade, along with three EPCAF wings and a troop of tanks. This brigade was responsible for the border between Kasba (to the north of Comilla) to Belonia in Noakhali. It was to concentrate near Comilla in the event of an Indian advance, then fall back to Daudkandi and Chandpur (which were part of the Dhaka outer-defense line and designated fortresses). 4274: 944: 469: 1909:. The Eighth Independent Armored Squadron (four tanks), 10 field guns from the 31st Field Regiment, a mortar battery along with an EPCAF wing, a Mujahid battalion, units from the 21st Azak Kashmir and 48th Punjab were also part of this brigade. Brig. Saadullah anticipated a three-pronged assault on his area around Akhaura, and planned to ultimately fall back to Bhairab (which was the nearest fortress, and part of the Dhaka outer-defense line). 1482:

from some battalions was split into platoons and deployed at the BoPs or other places. Paramilitary personnel were attached to the platoons to bring these units up to company strength. The army members were to stiffen these mixed units, but often the paramilitary members proved to be the weakest link. Thus, some of the regular army units lost cohesion and effectiveness when their regular companies were detached from them.

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independent armoured brigades) and the 17th (GOC Maj. Gen. R.D. Shamim: five infantry brigades) infantry divisions under I Corps (Commander Lt General Irshad Ahmed Khan). The 8th was to attack near Sakkargarh, in an attempt to draw off Indian reserves. These formations would then attempt to cut off Kashmir from the rest of India. The 6th Armored and the 17th Divisions were designated "Reserve North".

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of their supporting units)—in all, fifteen infantry and one commando battalion and two heavy mortar batteries by May 1971. Until the end of 1971, General Yahya Khan's government was unable to find an active military administrator comparable to Admiral Ahsan as the civil war in East Pakistan intensified. Senior general officers and admirals were unwilling to assume the command of East Pakistan until

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the west and the east, and the ongoing insurgency. Since the defence of East Pakistan rested on overwhelming Pakistani success in the west (resulting in India withdrawing its forces in the east), any formal war would also start when Pakistani forces in West Pakistan were ready to strike. In the summer of 1970, the western operational plan was revised. The following conclusions were drawn:

1700: 741: 1028:) and had another seven squadrons deployed elsewhere. Pakistani planners had assumed the PAF will be neutralized within 24 hours of IAF launching combat operations over East Pakistan, and the Pakistani planners were aware that the Indian Air force would then be free to concentrate more aircraft in the west after deploying units to negate any Chinese moves. The PAF devised 1379:(40,000 members, against a target of 100,0000) were raised after June 1971. The armed police (11,000 members) was also reorganised and bolstered with 5,000 West Pakistani personnel. Therefore, the undermanned army was only fit for "Police action". According to General Niazi, he had requested the following from GHQ in June 1971: 1562:

bowl would be lost without much effort from the invaders; India could set up the Bangladesh government easily inside the province. Also, it gave the Indians the opportunity to divert some of their forces to the west (thus threatening the balance of forces there) where a near-parity in forces was needed for a decisive result.

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divisions fit for conventional warfare. Seven West Pakistan Ranger wings, five Mujahid battalions and a wing of Khyber Rifles, Tochi and Thal Scouts were sent to East Pakistan by November 1971. Five infantry battalions were sent from West Pakistan in November. Al Badr and Al Shams units contributed another 5,000 men each.

701:(AOC, PAF Base Dacca) stressed the importance of a political solution rather than military action. Air Commodore Masud backed Admiral Ahsan, as he believed that an autonomous East Pakistan was preferable to the certainty of military defeat if India decided to intervene. General Yahya Khan rejected Masud's arguments. 2298:^ Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat Richard H. Shultz, Andrea Dew: "The Martial Races Theory had firm adherents in Pakistan and this factor played a major role in the under-estimation of the Indian Army by Pakistani soldiers as well as civilian decision makers in 1965."^ 1992:

These suggestions were incorporated in the plan without change. From September onwards Pakistani forces had begun to fortify positions with concrete bunkers, anti-tank ditches, land mines and barbed wires. Spiked bamboo was also used, and some areas were flooded to hinder enemy movements. Engineering

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The 53rd Brigade (Commander Brig. Aslam Niazi, the 15th and 39th Baloch Battalions) was posted in Dhaka as command reserves and was responsible for the Dhaka inner defence line. Dhaka also had Razakar, EPCAF and other units that could be deployed for defence of the city. In November, Pakistani forces

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The 16th Infantry Division (GOC Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah, HQ Bogra, then Nator) defended this area. It had the 29th Cavalry, two artillery regiments and a heavy mortar battery (the 117th Independent Mortar Battery), in addition to three infantry brigades: the 23rd (Commander Brig. S.A. Ansari, HQ

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BoPs: East Pakistan had 370 border outposts along the Indian border, of which 90 had been occupied by Pakistani forces in an attempt to stop Mukti Bahini infiltration. Some of them had been fortified to withstand conventional assaults and airstrikes. EPCAF or regular soldiers were to man the outposts

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General Niazi hoped that by creating five divisional HQs and simulating the signal traffic of numerous brigades, he would deceive the Indian Eastern Command into committing at least 15 infantry divisions and other assorted supporting forces in the east; this would mean India would have less to deploy

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towards Ramgarh. Once India had committed her reserves, II Corps would assemble south of the Sutlej (near Bahawalpur) and move east into India, swinging northeast towards Bhatinda and Ludhiana. Then IV Corps would push towards the Indian Punjab. Given that India had a slight edge in forces, Pakistani

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Infrastructure is poor; navigable rivers cut across roads, and many places can only be reached by dirt roads. There are 300 large canals (navigable during summer), which can be an obstacle or helpful for the battle plan. Control over air and rivers are necessary for unhindered movement along interior

376:

The Pakistan Armed Forces grew significantly in size between the wars of 1949 and 1965. The number of infantry divisions jumped from 6 to 13; it also boasted two armored divisions and several independent infantry and armored brigades by 1965. All these formations had the required artillery, commando,

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was to hold that part of the country until the Pakistani forces defeated India in the west (in case of war). The Pakistan Army created the Eastern Command, with one commander in the rank of Lieutenant General responsible for the command. The armed forces (particularly the Pakistan Army), had drawn up

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Strong points: These positions were to be chosen by the area division commanders according to the area terrain. Each strong point was to delay the enemy advance after troops have retreated from the BoPs and regular army units had concentrated around these positions. Flanking areas and communications

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The Pakistani high command began contemplating full-scale war with India to settle all issues as the insurgency in Bangladesh began to escalate after August; with Mukti Bahini activities more aggressive and effective, Pakistani forces were in disarray. In doing so they had to contemplate fighting in

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impasse. Lieutenant General Tikka Khan's staff at the Eastern Command headquarters was the first to present their assessment of the civil and military situation to General Yahya Khan and the army and air force's senior officers accompanying him, and Vice-Admiral Ahsan persuaded General Yahya Khan at

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The final plan was created to meet both political and strategic objectives, and its success depended on two crucial factors: predicting the possible Indian axis of advance correctly, and the ability of the Pakistani troops to fall back to their designated areas in the face of Indian air superiority

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Fortresses: These were major cities located on communications-network hubs. After delaying the enemy at the strong points, Pakistani units were to fall back on the fortresses and fight till the last. The fortresses were to contain rations to last 45 days, munitions for 60 days and be fortified like

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planes (which had played a crucial role during Operation Searchlight) were withdrawn from the province, diminishing the airlift capacity of the Pakistani forces further. The Mukti Bahini had sabotaged 231 bridges and 122 rail lines by November 1971 (thus diminishing transport capacity to 10 percent

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All paramilitary units (EPCAF/Razakar/Mujahid) were not up to army standards in terms of equipment and effectiveness, and the Eastern Command began to mix them with regular units to bolster their efficiency. Pakistani battalions were given two-thirds-companies of paramilitary units, while a company

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Aside from these formations, Pakistan also had two independent artillery and two infantry brigade groups deployed on the border. The initial Pakistani plan was to launch diversionary attacks along the whole Indian border to keep Indian reserve forces away from the main target areas, then attack the

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in East Pakistan) also advocated aggressive action against select Indian targets. General Hamid ruled out any provocations that might provoke Indian retaliation, while outlining the main objective of the Eastern Command: to keep the insurgency under control and prevent the formation of a Bangladesh

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The size and disposition of Pakistan combat forces in East Pakistan changed during Operation Searchlight. The 14th Division was reinforced by the 9th (made up of the 27th, 313th and 117th Brigades) and the 16th (comprising the 34th and 205th Brigades) Divisions (minus their heavy equipment and most

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As events unfolded in Bangladesh and the Pakistani Army began to face ever-increasing difficulties, some officers at GHQ began to have second thoughts about the existing operational plan to defend East Pakistan. General Abdul Hamid, COS of the Pakistani Army, approved of the existing deployment of

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The 313th Brigade (Commander Brig. Rana, 30th FF and 22nd Baloch Battalions plus elements of the 91st Mujahid Battalion) moved to Maulavi Bazar (which was developed as a strong point), and the unit was responsible for the border between Latu and Kamalganj. After resisting the expected thrust along

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districts and was defended by the 9th Division (GOC Maj. Gen. Ansari) made up of two infantry brigades: the 107th (Commander Brig. Makhdum Hayat, HQ Jessore), covering the border from Jibannagar to the Sunderbans to the south, and the 57th (Commander Brig. Manzoor Ahmed, HQ Jhenida), which covered

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The "fortress" concept: Principal towns (especially those situated at communication hubs or an expected enemy thrust axis) would be converted into fortresses and defended to the last. This concept had two advantages: it did not call for the voluntary surrender of territory, concentrated forces and

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Deploying all available forces to defend the Dhaka Bowl along the Meghna, Jamuna and Padma Rivers. The Pakistan Army could use interior lines to switch forces as needed, and build up a strategic reserve while fighting on a narrower front. The disadvantage was that large tracts of areas outside the

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The underdeveloped state of the Bangladeshi communication infrastructures and the river system cutting through the plains was a formidable challenge to the movement of troops and supplies. General Niazi had ordered the Pakistan army to live off the land because of logistical difficulties, and Maj.

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The overall objective of the Pakistani ground assault was to capture enough Indian territory in the west to ensure a favourable bargaining position with India (should the Pakistani Eastern Command fail to repel the Indian attack on Bangladesh), and by forcing India to commit forces in the west and

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West Pakistan would retaliate immediately after the Indians launched an attack in East Pakistan. Pakistani formations would take over border areas without stretching their defensive capabilities; the idea was to create an impression that West Pakistan had launched a full-scale attack all along the

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The main plan remained unchanged until September 1971: Pakistani units were to fight a series of defensive battles before deploying to defend the Dhaka Bowl, but every inch of the province would not be defended. The Pakistan army occupied all the towns and fortified 90 of the 370 BoPs (half of the

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If reinforced with another two divisions (while reinforcing existing forces with required artillery and armour), it might be possible to carry the war onto Indian soil. With India deploying at least 15 divisions in the east to defeat the Pakistani force, its forces in the west could be defeated by

413:

in 1966, he initiated a series of reforms to revamp the combat capability of the Pakistan army. In East Pakistan a corps headquarters was to be established (initially designated as the III corps which later known as the Eastern Command), but except the 14th Infantry Division, Dacca no new division

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and the 27th Brigades, while elements of three other artillery regiments (the 25th, 32nd and 56th) were proportionately distributed among the other brigades as required. The 29th Cavalry was split into three independent squadrons among the 16th Division troops, while two other tank squadrons (one

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Division to cover the Dhaka Bowl, when its HQ moved to Brahmanbaria. The 14th Division initially had four brigades: the 27th (Commander Brig. Saadullah Khan, HQ Mymensingh), the 313th (Brig Iftikar Rana, HQ Sylhet), the 117th (Brig. Mansoor H. Atif, HQ Comilla) and the 53rd (Brig. Aslam Niazi, HQ

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The Eastern Command staff kept the plan unchanged after the review; Pakistani troop deployments were not altered after the July appraisal. Pakistani units were kept at the border with the intention to withdraw them towards Dhaka after a series of defensive battles. The Eastern Command completed a

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Reinforced by another squadron of warplanes and an additional infantry brigade, and bringing the existing infantry divisions in East Pakistan up to strength with required artillery and armour along with proper antiaircraft defence, it might be possible to occupy parts of Assam and West Bengal and

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Following the change in command, the 14th Division initially had its brigades posted at Comilla (53rd), Dhaka (57th), Rangpur (23rd) and Jessore (107th) before March 1971. During Operation Searchlight the 57th and the 107th moved to Jessore, while the 53rd had relocated to Chittagong. The Eastern

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under Admiral Ahsan were changed and deployed at the borders to observe Indian intelligence efforts. The magnitude of force was also increased, and logistics efforts were improved under Admiral Ahsan's command. His two-year rule saw stability and improvement in government control of the province;

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The fortress concept was adopted; the planners decided on a single defensive deployment of troops on the border, which went against the troop deployments advocated by earlier plans. This was done to stick to the GHQ order of not surrendering any territory to the Mukti Bahini. When devising troop

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Before the start of military operations a final high-level meeting was held (chaired by General Yahya Khan) at the General Headquarters (GHQ), where the participants were unanimously in favour of the military operation (despite the calls from Admiral Ahsan and Air Commodore Masud for a political

649:

Against a conventional Indian attack with 3:1 superiority in numbers and enemy dominance of the air and sea, an East Pakistan armed force contingent consisting of a single infantry division (supported by a regiment of tanks, 17 EPR wings and other paramilitary forces, a squadron of jets and four

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staff planners proposed the following doctrine to justify this deployment: "The defense of the East lies in the West". Broadly speaking, this translated into Pakistan defeating India in the west, regardless of what transpired in the east (including Indian occupation of East Pakistan) because the

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Brigade (Commander Brig. Salimullah, HQ Sylhet) was created by detaching the 31st Punjab from the 313th Brigade and incorporating elements of the 91st Mujahid and 12th Azad Kashmir Battalions. A wing each of Tochi and Thal Scouts and Khyber Rifles were also attached to the brigade, along with a

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The 1st Armored Division (two armoured brigades and one infantry battalion) and the 7th (GOC Maj. Gen. I.A. Akram: three infantry brigades) and the 33rd (GOC Maj. Gen. Ch. Nessar Ahmed: three infantry brigades) Infantry Divisions were posted south of the Ravi River; they were later joined by an

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The Pakistani army had fifteen divisions (including two armored divisions and in addition to several independent brigade groups) in West Pakistan in 1971. After transferring the 9th and 16th Divisions (known as "China Divisions" because these formations were given new Chinese equipment) to East

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The Pakistani planners were aware of the possible negative political implications among the Bengali population of abandoning forward areas and concentrating the army around the Dhaka Bowl to maximise the defensive potential and achieve better co-ordination; however, it failed to come up with an

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The 34th Brigade (the 32nd Punjab and 32nd Baloch) would look after the area between Rajshahi and Naogaon, and if needed would fall back to the Outer Dhaka defence line and defend from Pabna and Bera (both proposed fortresses). Three EPCAF wings supported this brigade. A squadron of tanks was

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of East Pakistan. Syed Mohammad Ahsan, when Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Navy, had established the naval forces in East Pakistan; the naval presence was tripled in East Pakistan with more officers from West Pakistan deployed in the region. Earlier, The Chief of the General Staff at GHQ,

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directive (which emphasized the need to prevent the Mukti Bahini from occupying any area of the province and to fight for every inch of territory). HQ expected the Indians to occupy a large area of the province, transfer the Mukti Bahini and Bengali refugees there and recognize the Bangladesh

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In November, Gen. Niazi sent Maj. Gen Jamshed and Brig. Bakir Siddiqi to Rawalpindi to request two more divisions as reinforcements (as well as all the heavy equipment left behind by the 9th and 16th Divisions for East Pakistan). The GHQ promised to send 8 infantry battalions and an engineer

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required limited mobility. Also, the planners felt India would have to neutralise the fortresses by capturing them through direct assaults or keeping sufficient forces back before pushing inland; they might not have sufficient forces to threaten the Dhaka Bowl if they bypassed the fortresses.

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The Pakistan GHQ had to weigh every request to resupply, reequip and reinforce the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan against the need of the West Pakistani forces, and did not have enough reserves of manpower and equipment for a long conflict. The Eastern Command only deemed one of the three

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Pakistani planners assumed that the main Indian assault would take place on the western border of East Pakistan, and the army in East Pakistan would not defend every inch of the province. Pakistani staff planners identified the following features as significant for setting up a defence plan:

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sector the 6th Armored Division (GOC Maj. Gen. M. Iskanderul Karim: two armoured brigades and two infantry battalions) was deployed along with the 8th (GOC Maj. Gen. Abdul Ali Malik: three brigades and two armoured regiments), the 15th (GOC Maj. Gen. Abid Ali Zahid: four brigades and eight

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River to the north of Dhaka. The 27th Brigade initially was posted at Mymensingh, and the 53rd was in Dhaka. However, when the 27th Brigade was sent to Brahmanbaria, the 93rd Brigade (Commander Brig. Abdul Qadir Khan, HQ Mymensingh) was created from units of the 27th Brigade, and the 36th

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brigade – the 314th (CO Col. Fazle Hamid, one Mujahib battalion and five companies each from EPCAF and Razakars) was created to defend the city of Khulna. The 57th and 107th Brigades were to defend the border, then fall back to Jhenida and Jessore and prevent the Indians from crossing the

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were turned into strong points. The 48th Field regiment and one tank squadron (deployed near Thakurgaon) was also attached to this brigade. Three EPCAF wings, the 34th Punjab and a Mujahid battalion (the 86th) were also deployed in the brigade operational area. The area north of the

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The East Pakistan garrison was reinforced with two infantry divisions in April 1971 to restore order and fight the insurgency. All divisional heavy equipment needed to fight a conventional war was left in the west. A comparison of the deployed units between March and November shows:

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Dhaka). After the review of September, it was decided to make the 14th responsible for the eastern sector encompassing the Sylhet, Comilla and Noakhali districts only. Chittagong was designated as an independent defence zone under control of the 97th Independent Brigade. Also, two

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Pakistani planners assumed (based on intelligence estimates) that an Indian force of 8 to 12 infantry divisions, an armoured brigade and the Mukti Bahini would launch the invasion of East Pakistan during the winter. The Pakistani army had divided the country into four sectors:

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It was decided to keep part of the reserves to the north of the Ravi River and part to the south. The plan called for the formations near the border to seize favourable lodgement areas, to screen the main attack of the army. In September 1971 the plan was updated to include:

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Brig. Gulam Jilani (later DG ISI), chief of staff for Gen. Niazi, reviewed the existing East Pakistan defence plan in June 1971 in light of the prevailing circumstances and left the plan basically unchanged. The following assumptions were made while re-evaluating the plan:

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districts. Pakistani planners were undecided on whether the Indian attack would come from the Siliguri Corridor south towards Bogra or on the Hili–Chilimari axis (from southwest to northeast) to cut the area in two. The division was deployed to counter both possibilities.

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No war games were conducted to factor in the new directives, or specific plans drawn up to attain these objectives. The revised plan was sent to Rawalpindi and approved in August 1971. During June and July, Mukti Bahini regrouped across the border with Indian aid through

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According to one estimate, the Eastern Command needed at least 250,000 personnel; it barely had 150,000 (50,000 regular soldiers) by November 1971. To fill the manpower gap, the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF) (17 planes and approximately 23,000 personnel) and

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in the west after retaining forces to use against any possible Chinese attacks from the north (or at least deter the Indians from aggressive action). While India did not deploy 15 divisions in the east, the measures deceived the Indian Eastern Command to some extent.

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The 117th Brigade was to cover the area from Kasba to the north of Comilla to Chauddagram in the south. After fighting at the border, the force was to redeploy around the Mainamati fortress and then fall back to defend Daudkandi (which was on the Dhaka outer-defense

1925:

The 97th independent Infantry Brigade (Commander Brig. Ata Md. Khan Malik, HQ Chittagong) was to cover the Chittagong fortress and hill tracks. The 24th FF Battalion (along with two EPCAF wings and a Marine battalion) guarded Chittagong itself. The Second SSG was at

501:

Instead of defending every inch of the land, survival of the armed forces was given top priority and the defence of Dhaka was the ultimate objective. Instead of deploying along the 2,600-mile (4,200 km)-long Indian border, three lines of deployment were chosen:

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The 12th (GOC Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan: six infantry brigades and six wings from the Frontier Corps) and the 23rd (GOC Maj. Gen. Iftikhar Khan Janjua: five infantry brigades, an independent armoured brigade and an armoured regiment) infantry divisions were deployed in

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The troops deployed on the border were the forward line. This was in front of the forward line envisioned in the X-Sundarbans exercise of 1967, which had deemed the whole border impossible to defend against a conventional attack. The BoPs were all located on this

988:. This force was designated "Reserve South". The 7th Infantry Division (initially based at Peshawar) was to move east to areas where it could support the 12th and 23rd Divisions as a diversion, then move and form up with the rest of II Corps south of the Sutlej. 1816:

and Meherpur areas. The 49th Field Artillery regiment was attached to this brigade, and the 50th Punjab reinforced the unit in November. To defend the Hardinge Bridge, a tank squadron was placed under the Eastern Command control near Kushtia. In September an

1836:: Pakistani planners anticipated a brigade size attack on the Kamalpur – Sherpur – Jamalpur axis, and another along the Haluaghat – Mymensingh axis. They deemed this area impassable because of the hilly terrain on the Indian side and the Modhupur Jungle and 610:

Troops in Dhaka (if needed) would move north to defend the Jamalpur-Mymensingh-Bhairab area. The area north of Dhaka was deemed hazardous for military activity, and the Pakistan planners thought the hill country north of the border would impede Indian army

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The 23rd Brigade (8th, 25th, 48th Punjab and 26th Frontier Force Battalions) was to defend the area north of the Hili–Chilmari axis. The troops were to retreat to Dinajpur, Saidpur and Rangpur from the border areas, while Dinajpur, Saidpur, T-Junction and

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volunteered for this assignment. Lieutenant General Niazi was made the commander of the Pakistan Eastern Command (replacing Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, who remained as Chief Martial Law Administrator and Governor until September 1971). Rear Admiral

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The Eastern Command could not attach an artillery regiment to each of the infantry brigades, so only the 23rd, 205th, 57th, 107th, and 117th brigades were given an artillery regiment each. An artillery regiment (the 31st) was split between the 202nd

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the border from Jibannagar to the Padma in the north. Two artillery regiments, a heavy mortar battery (the 211th) and a squadron of tanks were also part of the division. Pakistani planners assumed three likely axes of advance from the Indian army:

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India would launch a conventional attack in East Pakistan aiming to liberate a large area, transfer the Mukti Bahini and the refugees in the liberated area and seek recognition for the Bangladesh government in exile – thus involving the UN in the

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Fortresses: All the fortresses were located on this line except Chittagong and Sylhet, which were to be independent defensive areas. This was the forward line of the 1967 X-Sundarbans plan; it was also deemed indefensible in its entirety in that

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The main Indian thrust would come from the east, not the west as assumed in the earlier plan. The Indian army would attack to take control over the area between Sylhet and Chandpur, while a secondary attack would be aimed at Rangpur – Bogra and

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battery from the 31st Field Regiment and the 88th Independent Mortar Battery. Sylhet was made a fortress, while this brigade was responsible for the border stretching from Sunamganj to the northwest of Sylhet, to Latu, to the east of that city.

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The 93rd Brigade (the 33rd Punjab and 31st Baloch, plus the 70th and 71st West Pakistan Ranger wings), supported by the two EPCAF wings and the 83rd Independent Mortar Battery was responsible for the border area between the Jamuna river and

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The 27th Brigade (33rd Baloch and 12th FF Battalions) was responsible for covering the border between Kamalganj and Kasba (just north of Comilla), and would block the expected main Indian axis of advance with strong points at Akhaura and

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Three medium- and one light-tank regiments were allocated for East Pakistan, out of which only the regiment already in the province was provided. Also, two heavy- and one medium-artillery regiments were supposed to be sent but never

846:

infiltrations along the 2,700-kilometre (1,700 mi) border with India, so that they could be intercepted. Gen. Niazi claimed to have suggested the following measures to Gen. Hamid (COS Pakistan Army) during his visit in June:

1804:

The 107th Brigade (the 12th Punjab, the 15th and 22nd FF Battalions) was tasked with guarding the Benapol axis. This brigade was reinforced with the 38th FF in November, while the Third Independent Tank Squadron was destroyed at

353:(an issue the Pakistani government was not above using armed force to resolve): Pakistan did not have the economic base to support adequate forces in both wings, and West Pakistan had more strategic relevance than East Pakistan. 1695:

The divisional commanders were authorised to make plans for limited counterattacks in Indian territory to aid in their defensive objectives (one of which was to maintain control of the main roads leading into the territory).

1547:

The Indian strategic objective was to occupy as much of the province as quickly as possible to set up the Bangladesh government and the Mukti Bahini in the liberated area. Full occupation of the province was not the Indian

2382:§The Man of Honor and Integrity: Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, Unified Commander of Pakistan Armed Forces in East Pakistan." (in English), Witness to Surrender., Inter Services Public Relations, Siddique Salik,, pp. 60–90, 366:

theory; it was widely believed that one Pakistani soldier was equal to four to ten Hindus/Indian soldiers, and that the numerical superiority of the Indian armed forces could be negated by a smaller number of Pakistani

485:

rains turn the mostly flat country into a morass which hinders movement; the best time for conventional warfare is between November and March, when the ground firms up to allow easy mechanized movement and armoured

1901:

the Maulavi Bazar – Shamshernagar front, the brigade was to move south and link up with the 27th Brigade near Brahmanbaria. Gen Niazi also envisioned this brigade launching an assault inside Tripura, if possible.

1394:

Bringing the 9th and 16th Divisions up to strength by sending the artillery and engineering units left behind in West Pakistan and allocating corps artillery and armour for the Eastern Command (none of which was

356:

Most government officials were from West Pakistan or non-Bengali. Most economic development was taking place in West Pakistan, and the bulk of the armed forces was placed there to keep its power base secure.

1662:

would be turned into fortresses, while Kamarkhali, Goalanda, Nagarbari and Narshindi would be strong points. Faridpur and Narshindi were turned into strong points in December; the other sites were not built

1024:, AOC-in-C, Western Air Command, Air Marshal M.M Engineer), while India deployed 12 squadrons (AOC-in-C, Eastern Air Command, Air Marshal H.C. Dewan) in the east (against one PAF squadron – CO Air Commodore 588:

Pakistani troops in Rangpur will move south, defend the area around Hili – Bogra and fall back to the Dhaka Bowl while troops from Rajshahi (after defending the Hardinge Bridge) retreated to the Dhaka Bowl.

1520:) reviewed the existing plan and updated it to factor in the manpower shortage, logistical difficulties, and the directive of the GHQ to defend every inch of East Pakistan. The initial assumptions were: 799:

The insurgency situation would have improved, and the Eastern Command would be ready for both internal and external threats. If not, internal security measures have to be taken to contain the insurgency.

2480:

Matinuddin, Kamal (1994), "§The Turning Point: Admiral's Resignation, the decision fills with regrets." (in English), Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis 1968 – 1971, Lahore Wajidalis, pp. 170–200,

642:

India would launch the main assault on East Pakistan from the west, aiming to capture the area up to the river Jamuna; secondary efforts, directed towards Sylhet and Chittagong, would take place in the

1809:

on 22 November. In addition, the 55th Field Artillery Regiment and the heavy mortar battery was attached to the brigade and the 12th and 21st Punjab Battalions were deployed near its operational area.

497:

into Indian territory, and could be used to launch attacks only if the forces posted there were stronger than the Indian forces opposing them. There were some Indian salients into the province also.

576:

Inner Line: The Dhaka Bowl (the area between the Jamuna, Padma, Meghna and Old Brahmaputra Rivers). This (especially the city of Dhaka) must be defended until Pakistan defeated India in the west.

2010:

In November 1971, Rawalpindi GHQ warned the Eastern Command that the Indian army would launch the main attack from the east. Gen. Niazi and Gen. Rahim identified the axis of the main attack as:

1121:

Besides the above, the planners also had to factor in the status of the Pakistani forces in the province, logistical challenges presented by their deployment and the state of communications.

1013:

To negate Indian superiority in infantry (in addition to the 13 divisions deployed along the Pakistan border, it could call up the main reserve force if needed), the Pakistan Air Force (OC

898:

government inside the province. Gen. Niazi remained convinced that his scheme would have forced India to concede terms, but at least one Pakistani source labels his proposal "sheer folly".

976:

The 10th (GOC Maj. Gen. S.A.Z Naqvi: four infantry brigades) and the 11th (six infantry brigades) Infantry Divisions, along with the 3rd Independent Armored Brigade, was stationed in the

934:

The reserve force of one armoured and two infantry divisions from south of the Ravi would launch a full-scale attack and, if successful, the northern reserve force would join the assault.

1114:

The Army GHQ had ordered that the Mukti Bahini would be denied any area in East Pakistan to declare as "Bangladesh". Every inch of the province was to be defended from Bangladesh forces.

1674:, then to Naryanganj and from Naryanganj back to Manikganj. This area was to have a fortress (Naryanganj) and strong points at Kalaikair and Tongi. None were developed by December 1971. 630:

would look after their own affairs. The planners did not devise a plan whereby East Pakistan forces would fight a self-sustained, independent action and defend the province on its own.

453:, decided to run a series of exercises in East Pakistan to formulate an integrated battle plan for the province in 1967. Dubbed "Operation X-Sunderbans-1", it was run by (then) Colonel 1412:

formations to mimic regular army formations and mixing regular troops with paramilitary units. When Pakistani planners assumed India would launch its main attack in the east along the

1524:

The Indian Army Eastern Command would use 12 infantry/mountain divisions and an armoured brigade for the invasion under three corps commands, supported by Mukti Bahini and BSF units.

1071:) consisting of one cruiser, eight frigates, one destroyer, two submarines and several patrol and missile boats in 1971. The Pakistan Navy had no aggressive plans except sending the 4328: 1993:

battalions were sent to construct fortified positions, although some of the strong points and fortresses (especially those inside the Dhaka outer-defense line) remained incomplete.

1095:) had only one destroyer was active along with seven gunboats; therefore, it was impossible to conduct operations in the deep Bay of Bengal and he had planned to sit the war out. 397:(BSF) and EPR had skirmished along the border; although India had one infantry division and one armoured brigade posted near East Pakistan, the armies never clashed in the east. 1391:

planes in East Pakistan in 1971, but these were withdrawn because the PAF infrastructure in the province lacked the operational capacity to support housing two active squadrons.

694:

the meeting. During this meeting, Admiral Ahsan brief ran counter to the cut-and-dried solutions of West Pakistan representatives and civil servants. The Pakistan Air Force's

2051:

The 53rd Brigade (the 15th and 39th Baloch, plus elements of the 21st Azad Kashmir Battalion) was transferred from the command reserve to guard the border from Chaddagram to

2070:

area. It was to fall back to Chittagong after defending the area. The 48th Baloch was sent to the 97th Brigade in Chittagong after the 24th FF was given to the 91st Brigade.

1040:

The Pakistan Navy was in no position to counter the Indian threat, despite appeals to enhance naval capabilities over the years. The Pakistan Navy under commander-in-chief

1432:

Brigade. The 14th Division (which covered both the Dhaka Bowl and the Eastern Sector except Chittagong) was given responsibility for the Eastern Sector only, and the 36th

1111:

Mukti Bahini activity (which was supposed to be neutralised when the conventional attack took place, according to the old plan) had peaked, instead of being under control.

782:

Pakistani deployment and defence plan in August 1971 after Eastern Command assessment following Operation Searchlight (generic representation—some unit locations not shown

389:

by 1963. In 1964, the 23rd Brigade was created in Dhaka. This under-strength division comprised three infantry brigades, with no armour and supported by 10 EPR wings, 12

1017:

A. Rahim Khan) needed to achieve air superiority on the western front. In 1971 it had 17 front-line squadrons facing 26 Indian front-line squadrons (Chief of Air Staff,

1959:

Pakistani deployment and final plan of defence after 19 November 1971, incorporating Pakistan Army GHQ suggestions (generic representation—some unit locations not shown

1424:

was moved to Akhaura, while two battalions from the brigade were detached to form the 93rd Brigade in Mymensingh. Similarly, the 313th Brigade was moved from Sylhet to

377:

engineer and transport units attached to them. The growth in military infrastructure was slower in East Pakistan; the single division (14th Infantry division) HQed at

1682:

Troops deployed on the border would hold on until ordered to retreat by the GOC. Later, Gen. Niazi forbade any retreat unless units had a casualty rate of 75 percent.

744:

Pakistani deployment in May 1971, after reorganisation of Eastern Command forces following Operation Searchlight (generic representation—some unit locations not shown

2099: 573:

along the Meghna River. Khulna, Jessore, Jhenida and Dinajpur-Rangpur were not to be defended in force; Sylhet and Chittagong were to be independent defence areas.

1877:

The Agartala – Akhaura – Bhairab Bazar axis would be the main thrust, with another attack coming towards Maulavi Bazar – Shamshernagar and a third near Comilla.

1703:

Pakistani Eastern Command assumed Indian army probable axis of advance in occupied Bangladesh, October 1971 (generic representation—not all unit locations shown

1593:

and offer initial resistance to enemy activity. Forward positions were to have supplies to last 7–15 days, and stockpiles for another 15–30 days in rear areas.

1117:

Control over communications networks vital for the movement of troops and logistics had collapsed due to the destruction of bridges, ferries and railway lines.

902:

BoPs were destroyed by Indian shell fire by July 1971 to facilitate Mukti Bahini infiltration) and deployed close to the border to halt Mukti Bahini activity.

1626:

and Mymensingh (defending the northern perimeter of the Dhaka bowl), and Sylhet and Chittagong (independent defence areas). There were four lines of defence:

980:

sector under IV Corps (Commander Lt. Gen. Bahadur Shah). These formations were to launch diversionary attacks across the border and defend the central Punjab.

2094: 1969: 1516:

General Niazi (along with General Jamshed (GOC EPCAF), General Rahim (2IC Eastern Command), Brig. Bakir (COS 3 Corps), Rear Admiral Sharif and Air Commodore

1757:, then fall back to Bogra (a fortress) and hold out. Palashbari, Phulchari and Joyporhut were turned into strong points. A squadron of tanks (deployed near 1646:

to the north and then to Mymensingh. From Mymensingh the line went south to Bhairab Bazar; from Bhairab it ran southwest along the Meghna to Daudkandi and

1527:

The Mukti Bahini would step up its activities and try to occupy border areas, (if possible) occupying a large area of the province adjacent to the border.

1091:) consisted of one aircraft carrier, one destroyer, four frigates, 2 submarines and at least four gunboats, Pakistan Navy eastern fleey (CO: Rear Admiral 393:

Saber planes, and three gunboats rode out the 1965 war in the east. The Air Forces had bombed each other's bases with the PAF emerging on top, while the

638:

A series of exercises, codenamed "Titu Mir", was conducted by the Eastern Command in 1970; the last was staged in January. The conclusions drawn were:

2104: 893:

The Indian military at this time was vulnerable, with its main formations posted away from the East Pakistan border. Col. Z.A. Khan (commander of the

1688:

The fortress would be defended to the last (which was understood as the amount of time needed for Pakistan to deliver the knockout blow in the west).

322:). Between them, the two battalions boasted five rifle companies (a battalion normally had five companies). This weak brigade – under the command of 4293: 1005:

triggering the withdrawal of Indian forces from the east. From October 1971 onwards, Pakistani units began to take up positions along the border.

991:

The 18th Infantry Division (GOC Maj. Gen. B.M. Mustafa: three infantry brigades) and two armoured regiments were deployed in Sindh, near Hydrabad.

410: 4338: 1452:

districts from the 14th Division units deployed in those areas; the 14th was tasked to defend the Sylhet and Brahmanbaria areas only. The 91st

4333: 4313: 4215: 4075: 4053: 4034: 4015: 3993: 3971: 3949: 3910: 3888: 3843: 1082: 1064: 238: 54: 581:

alternative solution. The planners recommended taking advantage of the poor state of infrastructure and natural obstacles to the fullest.

345:

had little presence in East Pakistan at that time. The reasons for placing more than 90 percent of the armed might in West Pakistan were:

1880:

The 14th Division (GOC: Maj. Gen. Rahim Khan, then Maj. Gen Abdul Majid Kazi) was initially HQed at Dhaka until the creation of the 36th

4298: 2066:

Brigade (the 24th FF battalion, one Ranger and one Mujahid battalion and elements of the 21st Azad Kashmir) was to guard the Belonia –

1889:

brigades were created: the 202nd and the 93rd, out of the units of the 14th Division. The division order of battle after September was:

473:

Pakistani Eastern Command plan for the defence of East Pakistan from 1967 to 1971 (generic representation—some unit locations not shown

2055:. This brigade was to fall back to Chandpur, a fortress located on the Dhaka outer-defense line after its initial defence of Feni and 1750:

was a separate defence area where the 25th Punjab, 86th Mujahid, one-wing EPCAF and the independent heavy mortar battery were located.

996:

Poonch and Chhamb sectors and drive back the Indian forces while an infantry brigade (supported by an armoured regiment) pushed into

4196: 4177: 4158: 4139: 4120: 4094: 3869: 2486: 2387: 2109: 1800:

Another thrust would be made, either using the Krishnanagar – Darshana – Chuadanga axis or the Murshidabad – Rajapur – Kushtia axis.

494: 242:

government in exile – turning the insurgency into an international diplomatic issue. Lieutenant General Niazi designated 10 cities (

237:

and insurgency throughout Bangladesh), Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi revised the existing plan according to the Pakistan Army's

197:

in 1971). Most of the assets of the Pakistan armed forces were stationed in West Pakistan; the role of the Pakistan armed forces in

1845:

Division (GOC Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jamshed Khan, HQ Dhaka) was created to replace the 14th Division. The order of battle of the 36th

1614:

Once the fortress defence was chosen, General Niazi and his staff designated the following cities as fortresses: Jessore, Jhenida,

31: 1753:

The 205th Brigade (the 4th and 13th Frontier Forces and the 3rd Baloch) would defend the area between Hili (a strong point) and

1588:

deployments, the planners mixed political considerations with strategic ones and envisioned a forward-leaning defence in depth:

947:

Deployment of forces on the western front, December 1971 (generic presentation, not to scale; not all geographic features shown)

362:

presumed West Pakistani success would force India to negotiate a favorable settlement. The Pakistani staff also believed in the

434: 1491:

General A.O. Mittha (Quartermaster General, Pakistan Army) had recommended setting up river-transport battalions, cargo and

672:

During 1971, Pakistan experienced riots and civil disobedience against the military dictatorship in both east and west. The

1565:

Deploying in depth along the border, gradually moving towards the Dhaka Bowl. There were three problems with this concept:

721:(Governor, Chief Martial Law Administrator and Commander of Eastern Command, ordered the formulation and implementation of 654:

The conclusions were submitted to GHQ in Rawalpindi, but no major alteration of the original plan took place at this time.

1822:

Jessore–Jhenida road (which runs almost parallel to the border). The brigades also had the option to fall back across the

1724: 527: 123: 1103:

Pakistan Eastern Command HQ began to revise the operational plan from September onwards under the following assumptions:

685:

however, the deployment ratio of military forces increased. In March 1971, General Yahya Khan visited Dhaka to break the

2089: 190: 869:

Force the BSF units away from the border areas, sabotage the Farrakka barrage, launch offensive demonstrations against

4308: 1873:: This sector included the Chittagong, Noakhali, Comilla and Sylhet districts. The anticipated lines of advance were: 717:. Masud resigned from the air force due to his apparent opposition to Operations Searchlight and Barisal. Lt. General 181:-sized military formation headed by a lieutenant-general, who was designated the Commander Eastern Command. After the 4273: 1912:

The 117th Brigade (the 23rd and 30th Punjab, 25th FF Battalions and 12th Azad Kashmir, minus elements) was HQed at

1866:

carried out a cleansing operation inside the Dhaka Bowl, but it had little effect in curbing Mukti Bahini activity.

1678:

Having chosen the defence concept and defensive lines, the Pakistan Eastern Command outlined its course of action:

709:

assumed the Naval Commander of East Pakistan (Flag Officer Commanding of the Eastern Naval Command). Air Commodore

461:(GOC 14th Division); the conclusions of this exercise formed the basis for the Pakistani operational plan in 1971. 334: 4323: 1761:, then Hili) along with the 80th Field Artillery Regiment and a mortar battery was also attached to this brigade. 1508:

final revision of the plan in October 1971, after both generals (Gul Hassan and Hamid) had visited the province.

1387:

A squadron of fighter planes to back up the PAF unit in East Pakistan. The PAF had plans to deploy a squadron of

1068: 673: 326: 207: 414:

was raised (although the 57th Infantry Brigade was formed in Dhaka, while the 23rd Infantry Brigade was sent to

4264: 1826:

River (which formed part of the Dhaka outer defence line) and defend the area between Faridpur, Kamarkhali and

1001:

armoured units and the Pakistan Air Force needed to gain the upper hand quickly to ensure this plan succeeded.

126: 802:

All communication links would be fully functional and under government control, to facilitate troop movements.

1862:

were turned into fortresses. The course of the Brahmaputra River was designated the "line of no penetration".

4348: 1685:

Troops would "trade space for time" and fight a delaying action, while falling back to the nearest fortress.

1436:

Division (containing only the 93rd Brigade) was created to defend the Dhaka Bowl. Similarly, the 314th (for

151: 2035:

Division (GOC Maj. Gen. Rahim, HQ Chandpur), which also included the 53rd (Commander Brig. Aslam Niazi, HQ

4318: 4303: 1733: 1623: 1029: 894: 570: 523: 650:

gunboats) with no support from West Pakistan would probably be able to last for a maximum of three weeks.

1823: 1658:. The fortresses of Bhairab and Mymensingh were part of this line. Pabna, Bera, Chandpur, Daudkandi and 1651: 1376: 722: 686: 681: 663: 596: 558: 394: 222: 193:

was divided into two territories separated by 1,000 miles (1,600 km) (prior to the independence of

1597:

would be guarded by paramilitary troops. Strong points stored munitions and supplies for up to 15 days.

1504:

of normal), and complicated the delivery of the daily minimum 600 tons of supplies to the army units.

4250: 1659: 796:. At least five Indian infantry divisions (supported by an armoured brigade) would launch the attack. 698: 626:(which, surrounded by Indian territory from three sides, would be extremely difficult to defend) and 604: 450: 430: 330: 311: 307: 147: 1948:

with the 107th Brigade and the other with the 117th Brigade) and two tank troops (one with the 36th

1742: 1719:: This area is to the north of the Padma and west of the Jamuna River, encompassing the Rajhshahi, 690: 677: 531: 441: 415: 319: 315: 291: 255: 155: 1638:

Dhaka Outer Defense Line: Troops from the fortresses were to retreat to this line, which ran from

4261: 4254: 4247: 1806: 1021: 750: 600: 358: 338: 329:(served as an acting Major General – appointment: GOC, 14th Infantry Division) – and a number of 182: 921:

A reserve force is needed to reinforce formations whenever needed, or to strike a decisive blow.

2043:

Brigade (Commander Brig. Mian Taskeen Uddin, HQ Chittagong). The deployment of the troops was:

4343: 4211: 4192: 4173: 4154: 4135: 4116: 4090: 4071: 4049: 4030: 4011: 3989: 3967: 3945: 3925: 3906: 3884: 3865: 3839: 3822: 2482: 2383: 2031:

Gen Niazi split the 14th Division and transferred the 117th Brigade to the newly created 39th

2015: 1781: 1736:, HQ Bogra) and the 34th (Brig. Mir Abdul Nayeem, HQ Nator). The general plan of defence was: 1647: 1517: 1032:

to launch preemptive strikes on the IAF and neutralize its advantage at the onset of the war.

1025: 1018: 831: 753: 714: 667: 535: 259: 226: 30:"Eastern Command (Pakistan)" redirects here. For Eastern Commands of the other countries, see 17: 2793:

Cloughley, Brian, A History of the Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press 1999, pp155 – pp184

1408:

The lack of regular units also forced the Eastern Command to improvise in two ways: creating

4063: 3959: 3858: 3853: 2021: 1979:

Pakistani units to launch offensive action against English Bazar in West Bengal, if possible

1092: 758: 729: 706: 426: 290:

inherited six infantry divisions and an armored brigade after independence in 1947 from the

92: 3937: 2067: 1457: 1413: 1044: 962: 834:

and sent 2,000–5,000 guerrillas across the border (the unsuccessful "Monsoon Offensive").

206:

by concentrating all their forces along the Dhaka Bowl (the area surrounded by the rivers

1557:

The review committee analysed four strategic concepts when formulating the revised plan:

2856:

Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Hakeem A., The 1971 Indo –Pak War A Soldier's Narrative, pp137- pp139

3898: 3814: 2052: 1931: 1927: 1776:: This area (south of the Padma and east of the Meghna) contained the Khulna, Jessore, 1534: 592: 511: 454: 386: 243: 186: 102: 965:

sector, while the 23rd would attack the Chhamb sector initially and then push forward.

943: 4287: 2535: 2036: 1858:. It developed strong points at Kamalpur, Haluaghat and Durgapur, while Jamalpur and 1827: 1619: 1530:

The PAF in East Pakistan would last only 24 hours against the IAF Eastern Contingent.

1492: 870: 695: 458: 342: 299: 295: 287: 198: 169: 96: 4224: 984:

independent infantry brigade under II Corps (Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan), headquartered in

48: 4151:

History, standing of important persons involved in the Bangladesh war of liberation

4003: 3981: 1906: 1747: 1691:

Troop formations would fall back to the Dhaka outer line to defend Dhaka as needed.

1428:

and a battalion from the 313th was kept at Sylhet to form the nucleus of the 202nd

1417: 1388: 1085: 1048: 1041: 958: 843: 438: 363: 234: 230: 851:

Attack the Mukti Bahini training camps across the border inside India in July 1971

2820:

Hassan Khan, Lt. Gen. Gul, Memories of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, pp283 – pp286

1837: 1425: 1088: 1014: 859: 855: 710: 646:

Only with the fall of Dhaka would the capitulation of the province be completed.

445: 211: 4238: 3033:

Arefin, A.S.M. Shamsul, Muktijudder Prekkhapotey Bektir Aubsthan, pp342 – pp344

2811:

Hassan Khan, Lt. Gen. Gul, Memories of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, pp291 – pp293

4257: 2025: 1859: 1789: 1496: 1421: 793: 718: 627: 551: 539: 419: 406: 275: 263: 194: 106: 3929: 1812:

The 57th Brigade (the 18th Punjab and 29th Baloch) was deployed to cover the

1544:

The naval detachment would move into the harbours once hostilities commenced.

1420:

axis, it had no brigades available to cover this area. The 27th brigade from

3826: 1913: 1855: 1667: 1643: 1072: 1060: 997: 874: 819: 618:

would move west and defend the area between Chandpur, Bhairab and Daudkandi.

515: 323: 303: 247: 1444:

Brigades were created and deployed in September. In mid-November, the 39th

825:

Take over as much Indian territory as possible when the opportunity arises

1813: 1568:

The state of the transport network and the transport capacity of the army

1449: 878: 815: 565:

River, ran west along the Padma to Rajshahi, then north to Hili, then to

519: 422:, but East Pakistan was not given any corps artillery or armoured units. 82: 1769:

brigade was formed in Rajshahi to block the Padma from river operations.

1063:, four submarines and several gunboats, faced the Indian Western Fleet ( 381:

now contained two infantry brigades, with the 53rd Brigade stationed at

3597:

Arefin, A.S.M. Shamsul, Muktijudder Prekkhapotey Bektir Aubsthan, pp343

2056: 1785: 1777: 1758: 1754: 1538: 1056: 1052: 969: 918:

Launch preemptive strikes on Indian soil after GHQ approval is granted.

811: 615: 547: 490:

lines, and road conditions dictate the speed and direction of movement.

482: 382: 350: 271: 1602: 1437: 985: 977: 623: 569:, Jamalpur, Mymensingh to Bhairab, then south to Comilla and back to 543: 507: 267: 215: 2784:

Khan, Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, pp128

1985:

Defense of Chittagong should be formed around one infantry battalion

1955: 1797:

The main attack would come in the Calcutta – Banapol – Jessore axis.

1765:

deployed near Pakshi to guard the Hardinge bridge. In September, an

1699: 778: 740: 302:

had one infantry brigade in 1948, which was made up of two infantry

1954: 1720: 1698: 1671: 1655: 1639: 1615: 1500: 1460:

north of Chittagong as part of the 39th Division in November. The

942: 915:

Pakistan can counterattack in retaliation for an Indian attack, or

863: 777: 739: 566: 562: 468: 378: 251: 233:-led political movement in March 1971 (leading to the creation of 203: 178: 1464:

formations lacked the staff and equipment of regular formations.

554:. The Pakistan army did not have the numbers to defend this line. 27:

Pakistani military unit during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War

1930:

while the 60th and 61st Ranger Wings were posted at Ramgarh and

842:

The Pakistan Army had built up an intelligence network to track

390: 333:(EPR) wings were tasked with defending East Pakistan during the 4228: 1982:

Commando action to destroy Farakka barrage should be considered

1533:

The main Indian assault would come from the west (opposite the

2802:

Hamdoor Rahman Commission Report, Part IV, Chapters II and III

1537:

sector), with a subsidiary attack from the east (opposite the

1952:

Division and the other with the 27th Brigade) were deployed.

1574:

Mukti Bahini activity; all could combine to hinder movements.

1081:. On the Eastern Front, Indian Navy Eastern Fleet (Fleet CO: 713:

was also replaced by the inexperienced officer Air Commodore

425:

The Pakistan Eastern Command headquarters was inaugurated in

866:

insurgents, thus luring the Indian army away from Bangladesh

506:

The Forward Line: Roughly forming a semicircle running from

2895:

Rahman, Md. Khalilur, Muktijuddhey Nou-Abhijan, pp23 – pp24

418:). In 1970, the 29th Cavalry was deployed in Rangpur from 1077:

to the Bay of Bengal to sink the Indian aircraft carrier

433:

was appointed as the commander; on 1 September 1969, the

680:

was East Pakistan's governor also. The positions of the

1499:

in the province (none of which happened). Instead, the

4208:

A stranger in my own country, East Pakistan, 1969-1971

3836:

A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections

3540:

Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp243 – pp244

3012:

Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp196 – pp197

3174:

Hamdoor Rahman Commission Report, Part IV, Chapters V

2847:

Major Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp231

2829:

Major Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp188

3964:

Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis 1968 – 1971

2241:

Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp47, pp51

761:was made second-in-command of the Eastern Command. 140: 132: 119: 114: 88: 70: 62: 41: 4089:. Vol. 1. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. 3881:A Tale of Millions: Bangladesh Liberation War-1971 3857: 2766:Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, pp100, pp104 810:The Pakistani Army would launch attacks towards 2838:Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, pp310 2100:Military plans of the Bangladesh Liberation War 1448:Division was created to defend the Comilla and 725:after receiving approval from GHQ, Rawalpindi. 2874:Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp188 2865:Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp231 4329:Pakistan military presence in other countries 3303:Hassan, Moyeedul, Muldhara' 71, pp118 – pp119 2775:Hassan, Moyeedul, Muldhara' 71, pp118 – pp119 2471:Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp73 2349:Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp55 2328:Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp55 2232:Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp49 2223:Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp47 8: 2095:Pakistan Army order of battle, December 1971 1970:Pakistan Army order of battle, December 1971 1650:, then ran northwest along the Padma to the 1622:(these were located on communication hubs), 806:Gen. Niazi added the following to the plan: 4027:The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldiers Narrative 2652:Hassan, Moyeedul, Muldhara' 71, pp64 – pp65 4225: 3480: 3396: 2733: 2370: 2358: 2337: 2014:South of Comilla, towards Mudafarganj and 294:, deploying most of their armed assets in 3838:(1st ed.). Oxford University Press. 2105:Timeline of the Bangladesh Liberation War 557:The Secondary Line: This began along the 437:of the country, General Yahya Khan, sent 2538:(December 1977). "1971 Curtain-Raiser". 1666:Dhaka Inner Defense Line: This ran from 1132: 854:Create chaos within India by aiding the 3420: 3021: 2928: 2673: 2616: 2459: 2120: 1495:flotillas and increasing the number of 429:, Dacca on 23 August 1969 and Lt. Gen. 411:Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army 38: 3903:Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation 3774: 3762: 3726: 3714: 3678: 3666: 3654: 3606: 3573: 3561: 3549: 3528: 3516: 3504: 3468: 3444: 3432: 3372: 3360: 3348: 3336: 3324: 3312: 3291: 3267: 3255: 3243: 3231: 3219: 3207: 3195: 3183: 3162: 3150: 3138: 3126: 3114: 3090: 3078: 3066: 3054: 3042: 3000: 2988: 2976: 2952: 2940: 2916: 2904: 2883: 2745: 2721: 2709: 2697: 2685: 2604: 2592: 2580: 2568: 2556: 2498: 2316: 2286: 2262: 2211: 2199: 2187: 2175: 2151: 2127: 1732:Rangpur), the 205th (Commander Brig. 7: 3798: 3786: 3738: 3702: 3642: 3630: 3585: 3492: 3408: 3384: 2964: 2757:Hassan, Moyeedul, Muldhara' 71, pp45 2661: 2522: 2163: 1938:Distribution of artillery and armour 1921:Chittagong: Independent defence zone 3942:Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan 3905:. Dhaka: University Press Limited. 3750: 3690: 3618: 3456: 3279: 3102: 2640: 2628: 2510: 2447: 2435: 2423: 2411: 2399: 2274: 2250: 2139: 1997:Final reinforcements and directives 457:under the command of Major General 1964:Last-minute changes: November 1971 1456:Brigade was created to defend the 1099:Problems in East Pakistan military 658:Operations Searchlight and Barisal 599:river and defend the area between 385:and the 107th Brigade deployed in 25: 4230:Commanders of the Eastern Command 2110:Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts 1988:Dhaka to be defended at all costs 310:and the 1/14th (1st battalion of 4272: 4237: 1670:in the west to Kaliakair, on to 75: 47: 4087:India's Wars Since Independence 4025:Qureshi, Hakeem Arshad (2002). 3922:Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership 3864:. Brookings Institution Press. 676:of East Pakistan, Vice-Admiral 435:Chief Martial Law Administrator 66:23 August 1969–16 December 1971 4294:Military history of Bangladesh 4149:Shamsul Arefin, A.S.M (1998). 2307:^ Library of Congress studies. 1654:, along the Madhumati back to 622:Pakistani forces stationed in 18:East Pakistan Military Command 1: 4339:Political history of Pakistan 4206:Hussain Raja, Khadim (1999). 4111:Rahman, Md. Khalilur (2006). 3986:The Betrayal of East Pakistan 3210:, pp. 126, 139, 149, 167 1708:Planned Pakistani deployments 1571:Expected Indian air supremacy 961:. The 12th was to attack the 4334:Military history of Pakistan 4314:Pakistani military exercises 4070:. Dhaka: 978-984-08-0109-1. 4048:. Dehra Dun, India: Natraj. 3924:. National Book Foundation. 2090:Mitro Bahini order of battle 191:Islamic Republic of Pakistan 89:Eastern Command Headquarters 4210:. Oxford University Press. 4130:Jones, Owen Bennet (2003). 4029:. Oxford University Press. 4010:. Oxford University Press. 3988:. Oxford University Press. 3944:. Oxford University Press. 3920:Khan, Fazal Mukeem (1973). 3821:. Lahore: Jung Publishers. 3741:, pp. 295–299, 300–309 3645:, pp. 296–299, 309–313 2736:, pp. 342–343, 347–350 4365: 4299:Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 4170:Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata 1967: 838:Eastern offensive proposal 765:May 1971 army redeployment 661: 449:Rawalpindi, Major General 239:General Headquarters (GHQ) 29: 4270: 4244: 4235: 4134:. Yale University Press. 4132:Pakistan Eye of the Storm 4046:The Pakistan Army 1966–71 3834:Cloughley, Brian (1999). 1642:in the west, to Bera and 885:create chaos in Calcutta. 674:Martial law administrator 446:Martial Law Administrator 173:(initially designated as 46: 4153:. University Press Ltd. 4113:Muktijuddhay Nou-Abhijan 4085:Singh, Sukhwant (1980). 3879:Islam, Rafiqul (2006) . 3819:How Pakistan Got Divided 1553:Defensive considerations 1512:Final plan: October 1971 1317:W Pakistan Ranger Wings 1009:Importance of airstrikes 906:Western Command strategy 584:In brief, the plan was: 561:River, ran north to the 465:Operation X-Sundarbans-1 221:After Pakistan launched 4187:Islam, Rafiqul (1995). 1618:, Rangpur, Comilla and 1477:Subtraction by addition 1069:E. C. "Chandy" Kuruvila 168:Eastern Command of the 4044:Riza, Shaukat (1977). 2020:East of Belonia, from 1960: 1734:Tajammul Hussain Malik 1704: 1030:Operation Chengiz Khan 948: 895:Special Services Group 783: 745: 736:1971 High Command plan 595:will fall back to the 474: 349:West Pakistan borders 318:(3rd battalion of the 4191:. Kakoli Prokashoni. 4115:. Shahittha Prakash. 3966:. Lahore: Wajidalis. 2724:, pp. 98–99, 282 1958: 1723:, Bogra, Rangpur and 1702: 1247:Heavy Mortar battery 1051:MAK Lodhi), with one 946: 781: 743: 723:Operation Searchlight 682:Pakistan armed forces 664:Operation Searchlight 472: 401:Reforms of Yahya Khan 395:Border Security Force 223:Operation Searchlight 4172:. Agami Prokashoni. 4168:Nasir Uddin (2005). 4008:Witness to Surrender 3860:The Idea of Pakistan 2006:39th ad-hoc Division 493:East Pakistan was a 451:Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 431:Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 331:East Pakistan Rifles 312:14th Punjab Regiment 308:East Bengal Regiment 148:Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 136:Brig. Baqir Siddiqui 4189:Muktijuddher Itihas 2166:, pp. 301, 307 1440:) and the Rajshahi 1275:Engineer Battalion 1261:Commando Battalion 1219:Artillery Regiment 1205:Infantry battalion 1163:Ad hoc Division HQ 939:Western battle plan 889:the Pakistani army. 822:corridor if needed. 774:Changes to Titu Mir 442:Syed Mohammad Ahsan 335:Kashmir War of 1947 320:8th Punjab Regiment 316:8th Punjab Regiment 292:British Indian Army 156:Syed Mohammad Ahsan 4309:Pakistan Air Force 3801:, pp. 128–129 3705:, pp. 307–309 3633:, pp. 296–299 3588:, pp. 127–129 3495:, pp. 134–159 3483:, pp. 348–350 3471:, pp. 184–190 3459:, pp. 117–121 3411:, pp. 107–112 3399:, pp. 342–350 3387:, pp. 121–122 3375:, pp. 123–126 3327:, pp. 123–126 3186:, pp. 184–190 3057:, pp. 105–106 3003:, pp. 184–190 2991:, pp. 105–109 2979:, pp. 90, 105 2943:, pp. 124–125 2462:, pp. 119–120 2438:, pp. 115–116 2426:, pp. 117–118 2402:, pp. 114–119 2289:, pp. 309–310 2214:, pp. 124–125 2190:, pp. 124–125 2154:, pp. 131–132 2142:, pp. 118–119 1961: 1705: 1331:Mujahid Battalion 1191:Ad hoc Brigade HQ 1022:Pratap Chandra Lal 949: 784: 751:Lieutenant-General 746: 634:Operation Titu Mir 475: 359:Pakistani military 339:Pakistan Air Force 183:partition of India 4281: 4280: 4217:978-0-19-547441-1 4077:978-984-08-0109-1 4068:Bangladesh at War 4064:Shafiullah, K. M. 4055:978-81-85019-61-1 4036:978-0-19-579778-7 4017:978-0-19-577761-1 3995:978-0-19-577727-7 3973:978-969-8031-19-0 3960:Matinuddin, Kamal 3951:978-0-19-577447-4 3912:978-984-05-1395-6 3890:978-984-432-419-0 3883:. Dhaka: Ananna. 3854:Cohen, Stephen P. 3845:978-0-19-579015-3 1518:Inamul Haque Khan 1372: 1371: 1359:Al Badr/Al Shams 1289:Ack Ack Regiment 1233:Armored Regiment 1125:Manpower shortage 1026:Inamul Haque Khan 1019:Air Chief Marshal 832:Operation Jackpot 715:Inamul Haque Khan 668:Operation Barisal 227:Operation Barisal 202:a plan to defend 161: 160: 16:(Redirected from 4356: 4324:Pakistan Marines 4276: 4241: 4226: 4221: 4202: 4183: 4164: 4145: 4126: 4100: 4081: 4059: 4040: 4021: 3999: 3977: 3955: 3938:Khan, Gul Hassan 3933: 3916: 3894: 3875: 3863: 3849: 3830: 3802: 3796: 3790: 3784: 3778: 3772: 3766: 3760: 3754: 3748: 3742: 3736: 3730: 3724: 3718: 3712: 3706: 3700: 3694: 3688: 3682: 3676: 3670: 3664: 3658: 3652: 3646: 3640: 3634: 3628: 3622: 3616: 3610: 3604: 3598: 3595: 3589: 3583: 3577: 3571: 3565: 3559: 3553: 3547: 3541: 3538: 3532: 3526: 3520: 3514: 3508: 3502: 3496: 3490: 3484: 3478: 3472: 3466: 3460: 3454: 3448: 3442: 3436: 3430: 3424: 3418: 3412: 3406: 3400: 3394: 3388: 3382: 3376: 3370: 3364: 3358: 3352: 3346: 3340: 3334: 3328: 3322: 3316: 3310: 3304: 3301: 3295: 3289: 3283: 3277: 3271: 3265: 3259: 3253: 3247: 3241: 3235: 3229: 3223: 3217: 3211: 3205: 3199: 3193: 3187: 3181: 3175: 3172: 3166: 3160: 3154: 3148: 3142: 3136: 3130: 3124: 3118: 3112: 3106: 3100: 3094: 3088: 3082: 3076: 3070: 3064: 3058: 3052: 3046: 3040: 3034: 3031: 3025: 3019: 3013: 3010: 3004: 2998: 2992: 2986: 2980: 2974: 2968: 2962: 2956: 2950: 2944: 2938: 2932: 2926: 2920: 2914: 2908: 2902: 2896: 2893: 2887: 2881: 2875: 2872: 2866: 2863: 2857: 2854: 2848: 2845: 2839: 2836: 2830: 2827: 2821: 2818: 2812: 2809: 2803: 2800: 2794: 2791: 2785: 2782: 2776: 2773: 2767: 2764: 2758: 2755: 2749: 2743: 2737: 2731: 2725: 2719: 2713: 2707: 2701: 2695: 2689: 2688:, pp. 96–98 2683: 2677: 2671: 2665: 2659: 2653: 2650: 2644: 2638: 2632: 2626: 2620: 2614: 2608: 2602: 2596: 2590: 2584: 2578: 2572: 2566: 2560: 2554: 2548: 2547: 2532: 2526: 2520: 2514: 2508: 2502: 2496: 2490: 2478: 2472: 2469: 2463: 2457: 2451: 2445: 2439: 2433: 2427: 2421: 2415: 2409: 2403: 2397: 2391: 2380: 2374: 2368: 2362: 2356: 2350: 2347: 2341: 2335: 2329: 2326: 2320: 2314: 2308: 2305: 2299: 2296: 2290: 2284: 2278: 2272: 2266: 2260: 2254: 2248: 2242: 2239: 2233: 2230: 2224: 2221: 2215: 2209: 2203: 2197: 2191: 2185: 2179: 2173: 2167: 2161: 2155: 2149: 2143: 2137: 2131: 2125: 1934:, respectively. 1605:in World War II. 1303:EPR/EPCAF Wings 1133: 1093:Mohammad Shariff 759:Mohammad Shariff 730:Mohammad Shariff 707:Mohammad Shariff 427:Dacca Cantonment 110: 93:Dacca Cantonment 81: 79: 78: 51: 39: 21: 4364: 4363: 4359: 4358: 4357: 4355: 4354: 4353: 4284: 4283: 4282: 4277: 4268: 4267: 4242: 4231: 4218: 4205: 4199: 4186: 4180: 4167: 4161: 4148: 4142: 4129: 4123: 4110: 4107: 4105:Further reading 4097: 4084: 4078: 4062: 4056: 4043: 4037: 4024: 4018: 4002: 3996: 3980: 3974: 3958: 3952: 3936: 3919: 3913: 3897: 3891: 3878: 3872: 3852: 3846: 3833: 3815:Ali, Rao Farman 3813: 3810: 3805: 3797: 3793: 3785: 3781: 3773: 3769: 3761: 3757: 3749: 3745: 3737: 3733: 3725: 3721: 3713: 3709: 3701: 3697: 3689: 3685: 3677: 3673: 3665: 3661: 3653: 3649: 3641: 3637: 3629: 3625: 3617: 3613: 3605: 3601: 3596: 3592: 3584: 3580: 3572: 3568: 3560: 3556: 3548: 3544: 3539: 3535: 3527: 3523: 3515: 3511: 3503: 3499: 3491: 3487: 3481:Matinuddin 1994 3479: 3475: 3467: 3463: 3455: 3451: 3443: 3439: 3431: 3427: 3419: 3415: 3407: 3403: 3397:Matinuddin 1994 3395: 3391: 3383: 3379: 3371: 3367: 3359: 3355: 3347: 3343: 3335: 3331: 3323: 3319: 3311: 3307: 3302: 3298: 3290: 3286: 3278: 3274: 3266: 3262: 3254: 3250: 3242: 3238: 3230: 3226: 3218: 3214: 3206: 3202: 3194: 3190: 3182: 3178: 3173: 3169: 3161: 3157: 3149: 3145: 3137: 3133: 3125: 3121: 3113: 3109: 3101: 3097: 3089: 3085: 3077: 3073: 3065: 3061: 3053: 3049: 3041: 3037: 3032: 3028: 3020: 3016: 3011: 3007: 2999: 2995: 2987: 2983: 2975: 2971: 2963: 2959: 2951: 2947: 2939: 2935: 2927: 2923: 2915: 2911: 2903: 2899: 2894: 2890: 2882: 2878: 2873: 2869: 2864: 2860: 2855: 2851: 2846: 2842: 2837: 2833: 2828: 2824: 2819: 2815: 2810: 2806: 2801: 2797: 2792: 2788: 2783: 2779: 2774: 2770: 2765: 2761: 2756: 2752: 2744: 2740: 2734:Matinuddin 1994 2732: 2728: 2720: 2716: 2708: 2704: 2696: 2692: 2684: 2680: 2672: 2668: 2660: 2656: 2651: 2647: 2639: 2635: 2627: 2623: 2615: 2611: 2603: 2599: 2591: 2587: 2579: 2575: 2567: 2563: 2555: 2551: 2540:Defence Journal 2536:Siddiqui, A. R. 2534: 2533: 2529: 2521: 2517: 2509: 2505: 2497: 2493: 2479: 2475: 2470: 2466: 2458: 2454: 2446: 2442: 2434: 2430: 2422: 2418: 2410: 2406: 2398: 2394: 2381: 2377: 2371:Shafiullah 1989 2369: 2365: 2359:Matinuddin 1994 2357: 2353: 2348: 2344: 2338:Shafiullah 1989 2336: 2332: 2327: 2323: 2315: 2311: 2306: 2302: 2297: 2293: 2285: 2281: 2273: 2269: 2261: 2257: 2249: 2245: 2240: 2236: 2231: 2227: 2222: 2218: 2210: 2206: 2198: 2194: 2186: 2182: 2174: 2170: 2162: 2158: 2150: 2146: 2138: 2134: 2126: 2122: 2118: 2086: 2077: 2039:) and the 91st 2008: 1999: 1972: 1966: 1940: 1923: 1717:Northern Sector 1710: 1612: 1610:Defensive lines 1555: 1514: 1488: 1486:Logistical woes 1479: 1470: 1406: 1127: 1101: 1067:: Rear Admiral 1038: 1011: 941: 908: 840: 776: 767: 738: 670: 660: 636: 467: 403: 374: 284: 164: 150: 142: 120:Corps Commander 100: 76: 74: 58: 42:Eastern Command 35: 32:Eastern Command 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 4362: 4360: 4352: 4351: 4349:Military plans 4346: 4341: 4336: 4331: 4326: 4321: 4316: 4311: 4306: 4301: 4296: 4286: 4285: 4279: 4278: 4271: 4269: 4246: 4245: 4243: 4236: 4233: 4232: 4229: 4223: 4222: 4216: 4203: 4197: 4184: 4178: 4165: 4159: 4146: 4140: 4127: 4121: 4106: 4103: 4102: 4101: 4095: 4082: 4076: 4060: 4054: 4041: 4035: 4022: 4016: 4000: 3994: 3978: 3972: 3956: 3950: 3934: 3917: 3911: 3895: 3889: 3876: 3870: 3850: 3844: 3831: 3809: 3806: 3804: 3803: 3791: 3779: 3767: 3755: 3743: 3731: 3719: 3707: 3695: 3683: 3671: 3659: 3647: 3635: 3623: 3611: 3599: 3590: 3578: 3566: 3554: 3542: 3533: 3521: 3509: 3497: 3485: 3473: 3461: 3449: 3437: 3425: 3413: 3401: 3389: 3377: 3365: 3353: 3341: 3329: 3317: 3305: 3296: 3284: 3272: 3260: 3248: 3236: 3224: 3212: 3200: 3188: 3176: 3167: 3155: 3143: 3131: 3119: 3107: 3095: 3083: 3071: 3059: 3047: 3035: 3026: 3014: 3005: 2993: 2981: 2969: 2957: 2945: 2933: 2921: 2909: 2897: 2888: 2876: 2867: 2858: 2849: 2840: 2831: 2822: 2813: 2804: 2795: 2786: 2777: 2768: 2759: 2750: 2738: 2726: 2714: 2702: 2690: 2678: 2666: 2654: 2645: 2633: 2621: 2609: 2597: 2585: 2573: 2561: 2549: 2527: 2515: 2503: 2491: 2473: 2464: 2452: 2440: 2428: 2416: 2404: 2392: 2375: 2363: 2351: 2342: 2330: 2321: 2309: 2300: 2291: 2279: 2267: 2255: 2243: 2234: 2225: 2216: 2204: 2192: 2180: 2168: 2156: 2144: 2132: 2119: 2117: 2114: 2113: 2112: 2107: 2102: 2097: 2092: 2085: 2082: 2076: 2073: 2072: 2071: 2060: 2049: 2029: 2028: 2024:south towards 2018: 2007: 2004: 1998: 1995: 1990: 1989: 1986: 1983: 1980: 1965: 1962: 1939: 1936: 1922: 1919: 1918: 1917: 1910: 1902: 1898: 1890: 1878: 1871:Eastern Sector 1868: 1867: 1863: 1849:Division was: 1802: 1801: 1798: 1774:Western Sector 1771: 1770: 1762: 1751: 1709: 1706: 1693: 1692: 1689: 1686: 1683: 1676: 1675: 1664: 1636: 1632: 1611: 1608: 1607: 1606: 1598: 1594: 1585: 1584: 1580: 1577: 1576: 1575: 1572: 1569: 1563: 1554: 1551: 1550: 1549: 1545: 1542: 1531: 1528: 1525: 1513: 1510: 1487: 1484: 1478: 1475: 1469: 1466: 1405: 1402: 1397: 1396: 1392: 1385: 1370: 1369: 1366: 1363: 1360: 1356: 1355: 1352: 1349: 1346: 1342: 1341: 1338: 1335: 1332: 1328: 1327: 1324: 1321: 1318: 1314: 1313: 1310: 1307: 1304: 1300: 1299: 1296: 1293: 1290: 1286: 1285: 1282: 1279: 1276: 1272: 1271: 1268: 1265: 1262: 1258: 1257: 1254: 1251: 1248: 1244: 1243: 1240: 1237: 1234: 1230: 1229: 1226: 1223: 1220: 1216: 1215: 1212: 1209: 1206: 1202: 1201: 1198: 1195: 1192: 1188: 1187: 1184: 1181: 1178: 1174: 1173: 1170: 1167: 1164: 1160: 1159: 1156: 1153: 1150: 1146: 1145: 1142: 1139: 1136: 1126: 1123: 1119: 1118: 1115: 1112: 1109: 1100: 1097: 1045:Muzaffar Hasan 1037: 1034: 1010: 1007: 993: 992: 989: 981: 974: 966: 940: 937: 936: 935: 932: 923: 922: 919: 916: 907: 904: 891: 890: 886: 882: 867: 852: 839: 836: 827: 826: 823: 804: 803: 800: 797: 775: 772: 766: 763: 737: 734: 659: 656: 652: 651: 647: 644: 635: 632: 620: 619: 612: 608: 589: 578: 577: 574: 555: 499: 498: 491: 487: 466: 463: 455:Rao Farman Ali 402: 399: 373: 370: 369: 368: 354: 283: 280: 187:United Kingdom 162: 159: 158: 144: 138: 137: 134: 133:Chief of Staff 130: 129: 127:A. A. K. Niazi 121: 117: 116: 112: 111: 90: 86: 85: 72: 68: 67: 64: 60: 59: 52: 44: 43: 26: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 4361: 4350: 4347: 4345: 4342: 4340: 4337: 4335: 4332: 4330: 4327: 4325: 4322: 4320: 4319:Pakistan Navy 4317: 4315: 4312: 4310: 4307: 4305: 4304:Pakistan Army 4302: 4300: 4297: 4295: 4292: 4291: 4289: 4275: 4266: 4263: 4259: 4256: 4252: 4249: 4240: 4234: 4227: 4219: 4213: 4209: 4204: 4200: 4198:984-437-086-8 4194: 4190: 4185: 4181: 4179:984-401-455-7 4175: 4171: 4166: 4162: 4160:984-05-0146-1 4156: 4152: 4147: 4143: 4141:0-300-10147-3 4137: 4133: 4128: 4124: 4122:984-465-449-1 4118: 4114: 4109: 4108: 4104: 4098: 4096:0-7069-1057-5 4092: 4088: 4083: 4079: 4073: 4069: 4065: 4061: 4057: 4051: 4047: 4042: 4038: 4032: 4028: 4023: 4019: 4013: 4009: 4005: 4004:Salik, Siddiq 4001: 3997: 3991: 3987: 3983: 3982:Niazi, A.A.K. 3979: 3975: 3969: 3965: 3961: 3957: 3953: 3947: 3943: 3939: 3935: 3931: 3927: 3923: 3918: 3914: 3908: 3904: 3900: 3896: 3892: 3886: 3882: 3877: 3873: 3871:0-8157-1502-1 3867: 3862: 3861: 3855: 3851: 3847: 3841: 3837: 3832: 3828: 3824: 3820: 3816: 3812: 3811: 3807: 3800: 3795: 3792: 3789:, p. 133 3788: 3783: 3780: 3777:, p. 171 3776: 3771: 3768: 3765:, p. 128 3764: 3759: 3756: 3753:, p. 119 3752: 3747: 3744: 3740: 3735: 3732: 3729:, p. 132 3728: 3723: 3720: 3717:, p. 127 3716: 3711: 3708: 3704: 3699: 3696: 3693:, p. 100 3692: 3687: 3684: 3681:, p. 132 3680: 3675: 3672: 3669:, p. 113 3668: 3663: 3660: 3657:, p. 125 3656: 3651: 3648: 3644: 3639: 3636: 3632: 3627: 3624: 3621:, p. 119 3620: 3615: 3612: 3609:, p. 114 3608: 3603: 3600: 3594: 3591: 3587: 3582: 3579: 3576:, p. 181 3575: 3570: 3567: 3564:, p. 139 3563: 3558: 3555: 3552:, p. 113 3551: 3546: 3543: 3537: 3534: 3531:, p. 140 3530: 3525: 3522: 3519:, p. 149 3518: 3513: 3510: 3507:, p. 149 3506: 3501: 3498: 3494: 3489: 3486: 3482: 3477: 3474: 3470: 3465: 3462: 3458: 3453: 3450: 3447:, p. 124 3446: 3441: 3438: 3435:, p. 161 3434: 3429: 3426: 3423:, p. 124 3422: 3417: 3414: 3410: 3405: 3402: 3398: 3393: 3390: 3386: 3381: 3378: 3374: 3369: 3366: 3363:, p. 124 3362: 3357: 3354: 3351:, p. 134 3350: 3345: 3342: 3339:, p. 132 3338: 3333: 3330: 3326: 3321: 3318: 3315:, p. 110 3314: 3309: 3306: 3300: 3297: 3294:, p. 104 3293: 3288: 3285: 3281: 3276: 3273: 3270:, p. 126 3269: 3264: 3261: 3258:, p. 115 3257: 3252: 3249: 3245: 3240: 3237: 3234:, p. 127 3233: 3228: 3225: 3221: 3216: 3213: 3209: 3204: 3201: 3198:, p. 126 3197: 3192: 3189: 3185: 3180: 3177: 3171: 3168: 3165:, p. 109 3164: 3159: 3156: 3153:, p. 123 3152: 3147: 3144: 3140: 3135: 3132: 3129:, p. 136 3128: 3123: 3120: 3116: 3111: 3108: 3104: 3099: 3096: 3092: 3087: 3084: 3081:, p. 106 3080: 3075: 3072: 3069:, p. 105 3068: 3063: 3060: 3056: 3051: 3048: 3045:, p. 101 3044: 3039: 3036: 3030: 3027: 3023: 3018: 3015: 3009: 3006: 3002: 2997: 2994: 2990: 2985: 2982: 2978: 2973: 2970: 2967:, p. 308 2966: 2961: 2958: 2954: 2949: 2946: 2942: 2937: 2934: 2931:, p. 121 2930: 2925: 2922: 2919:, p. 127 2918: 2913: 2910: 2907:, p. 135 2906: 2901: 2898: 2892: 2889: 2886:, p. 132 2885: 2880: 2877: 2871: 2868: 2862: 2859: 2853: 2850: 2844: 2841: 2835: 2832: 2826: 2823: 2817: 2814: 2808: 2805: 2799: 2796: 2790: 2787: 2781: 2778: 2772: 2769: 2763: 2760: 2754: 2751: 2748:, p. 101 2747: 2742: 2739: 2735: 2730: 2727: 2723: 2718: 2715: 2711: 2706: 2703: 2699: 2694: 2691: 2687: 2682: 2679: 2676:, p. 109 2675: 2670: 2667: 2664:, p. 125 2663: 2658: 2655: 2649: 2646: 2643:, p. 100 2642: 2637: 2634: 2630: 2625: 2622: 2619:, p. 121 2618: 2613: 2610: 2606: 2601: 2598: 2595:, p. 126 2594: 2589: 2586: 2583:, p. 241 2582: 2577: 2574: 2571:, p. 126 2570: 2565: 2562: 2558: 2553: 2550: 2545: 2541: 2537: 2531: 2528: 2525:, p. 237 2524: 2519: 2516: 2512: 2507: 2504: 2500: 2495: 2492: 2488: 2487:969-8031-19-7 2484: 2477: 2474: 2468: 2465: 2461: 2456: 2453: 2450:, p. 114 2449: 2444: 2441: 2437: 2432: 2429: 2425: 2420: 2417: 2413: 2408: 2405: 2401: 2396: 2393: 2389: 2388:984-05-1374-5 2385: 2379: 2376: 2372: 2367: 2364: 2361:, p. 337 2360: 2355: 2352: 2346: 2343: 2339: 2334: 2331: 2325: 2322: 2319:, p. 103 2318: 2313: 2310: 2304: 2301: 2295: 2292: 2288: 2283: 2280: 2277:, p. 114 2276: 2271: 2268: 2265:, p. 1q2 2264: 2259: 2256: 2253:, p. 114 2252: 2247: 2244: 2238: 2235: 2229: 2226: 2220: 2217: 2213: 2208: 2205: 2201: 2196: 2193: 2189: 2184: 2181: 2178:, p. 123 2177: 2172: 2169: 2165: 2160: 2157: 2153: 2148: 2145: 2141: 2136: 2133: 2130:, p. 128 2129: 2124: 2121: 2115: 2111: 2108: 2106: 2103: 2101: 2098: 2096: 2093: 2091: 2088: 2087: 2083: 2081: 2074: 2069: 2065: 2061: 2058: 2054: 2050: 2046: 2045: 2044: 2042: 2038: 2034: 2027: 2023: 2019: 2017: 2013: 2012: 2011: 2005: 2003: 1996: 1994: 1987: 1984: 1981: 1978: 1977: 1976: 1971: 1963: 1957: 1953: 1951: 1946: 1937: 1935: 1933: 1929: 1920: 1915: 1911: 1908: 1903: 1899: 1895: 1891: 1888: 1883: 1879: 1876: 1875: 1874: 1872: 1864: 1861: 1857: 1852: 1851: 1850: 1848: 1844: 1839: 1835: 1831: 1829: 1825: 1820: 1815: 1810: 1808: 1799: 1796: 1795: 1794: 1791: 1787: 1783: 1779: 1775: 1768: 1763: 1760: 1756: 1752: 1749: 1744: 1739: 1738: 1737: 1735: 1729: 1726: 1722: 1718: 1714: 1707: 1701: 1697: 1690: 1687: 1684: 1681: 1680: 1679: 1673: 1669: 1665: 1661: 1657: 1653: 1649: 1645: 1641: 1637: 1633: 1629: 1628: 1627: 1625: 1621: 1620:Bhairab Bazar 1617: 1609: 1604: 1599: 1595: 1591: 1590: 1589: 1581: 1578: 1573: 1570: 1567: 1566: 1564: 1560: 1559: 1558: 1552: 1546: 1543: 1540: 1536: 1532: 1529: 1526: 1523: 1522: 1521: 1519: 1511: 1509: 1505: 1502: 1498: 1494: 1485: 1483: 1476: 1474: 1467: 1465: 1463: 1459: 1455: 1451: 1447: 1443: 1439: 1435: 1431: 1427: 1426:Maulavi Bazar 1423: 1419: 1415: 1411: 1403: 1401: 1393: 1390: 1386: 1382: 1381: 1380: 1378: 1367: 1364: 1361: 1358: 1357: 1353: 1350: 1347: 1344: 1343: 1339: 1336: 1333: 1330: 1329: 1325: 1322: 1319: 1316: 1315: 1311: 1308: 1305: 1302: 1301: 1297: 1294: 1291: 1288: 1287: 1283: 1280: 1277: 1274: 1273: 1269: 1266: 1263: 1260: 1259: 1255: 1252: 1249: 1246: 1245: 1241: 1238: 1235: 1232: 1231: 1227: 1224: 1221: 1218: 1217: 1213: 1210: 1207: 1204: 1203: 1199: 1196: 1193: 1190: 1189: 1185: 1182: 1179: 1176: 1175: 1171: 1168: 1165: 1162: 1161: 1157: 1154: 1151: 1148: 1147: 1143: 1140: 1137: 1135: 1134: 1131: 1124: 1122: 1116: 1113: 1110: 1106: 1105: 1104: 1098: 1096: 1094: 1090: 1087: 1084: 1080: 1076: 1075: 1070: 1066: 1062: 1058: 1054: 1050: 1046: 1043: 1035: 1033: 1031: 1027: 1023: 1020: 1016: 1008: 1006: 1002: 999: 990: 987: 982: 979: 975: 971: 967: 964: 960: 955: 954: 953: 945: 938: 933: 929: 928: 927: 920: 917: 914: 913: 912: 905: 903: 899: 896: 887: 883: 880: 876: 872: 871:English Bazar 868: 865: 861: 857: 853: 850: 849: 848: 845: 837: 835: 833: 824: 821: 817: 813: 809: 808: 807: 801: 798: 795: 790: 789: 788: 780: 773: 771: 764: 762: 760: 755: 752: 742: 735: 733: 731: 728:Rear-Admiral 726: 724: 720: 716: 712: 708: 702: 700: 697: 696:Air Commodore 692: 688: 683: 679: 675: 669: 665: 657: 655: 648: 645: 641: 640: 639: 633: 631: 629: 625: 617: 613: 609: 606: 602: 598: 594: 590: 587: 586: 585: 582: 575: 572: 568: 564: 560: 556: 553: 549: 545: 541: 537: 533: 529: 525: 521: 517: 513: 509: 505: 504: 503: 496: 492: 488: 484: 481: 480: 479: 471: 464: 462: 460: 459:Muzaffaruddin 456: 452: 447: 443: 440: 436: 432: 428: 423: 421: 417: 412: 408: 400: 398: 396: 392: 388: 384: 380: 371: 365: 360: 355: 352: 348: 347: 346: 344: 343:Pakistan Navy 340: 336: 332: 328: 325: 321: 317: 313: 309: 305: 301: 300:East Pakistan 297: 296:West Pakistan 293: 289: 288:Pakistan Army 281: 279: 277: 273: 269: 265: 261: 257: 253: 249: 245: 240: 236: 232: 228: 224: 219: 217: 213: 209: 205: 200: 199:East Pakistan 196: 192: 188: 184: 180: 176: 172: 171: 170:Pakistan Army 163:Military unit 157: 153: 149: 145: 139: 135: 131: 128: 125: 122: 118: 113: 108: 104: 98: 97:East Pakistan 94: 91: 87: 84: 73: 69: 65: 61: 56: 50: 45: 40: 37: 33: 19: 4207: 4188: 4169: 4150: 4131: 4112: 4086: 4067: 4045: 4026: 4007: 3985: 3963: 3941: 3921: 3902: 3880: 3859: 3835: 3818: 3794: 3782: 3770: 3758: 3746: 3734: 3722: 3710: 3698: 3686: 3674: 3662: 3650: 3638: 3626: 3614: 3602: 3593: 3581: 3569: 3557: 3545: 3536: 3524: 3512: 3500: 3488: 3476: 3464: 3452: 3440: 3428: 3421:Qureshi 2002 3416: 3404: 3392: 3380: 3368: 3356: 3344: 3332: 3320: 3308: 3299: 3287: 3282:, p. 93 3275: 3263: 3251: 3246:, p. 84 3239: 3227: 3222:, p. 98 3215: 3203: 3191: 3179: 3170: 3158: 3146: 3141:, p. 98 3134: 3122: 3117:, p. 87 3110: 3105:, p. 88 3098: 3093:, p. 96 3086: 3074: 3062: 3050: 3038: 3029: 3024:, p. 20 3022:Qureshi 2002 3017: 3008: 2996: 2984: 2972: 2960: 2955:, p. 90 2948: 2936: 2929:Qureshi 2002 2924: 2912: 2900: 2891: 2879: 2870: 2861: 2852: 2843: 2834: 2825: 2816: 2807: 2798: 2789: 2780: 2771: 2762: 2753: 2741: 2729: 2717: 2712:, p. 99 2705: 2700:, p. 65 2693: 2681: 2674:Qureshi 2002 2669: 2657: 2648: 2636: 2631:, p. 89 2624: 2617:Qureshi 2002 2612: 2607:, p. 85 2600: 2588: 2576: 2564: 2559:, p. 90 2552: 2543: 2539: 2530: 2518: 2513:, p. 89 2506: 2501:, p. 63 2494: 2476: 2467: 2460:Qureshi 2002 2455: 2443: 2431: 2419: 2414:, p. 14 2407: 2395: 2378: 2373:, p. 32 2366: 2354: 2345: 2340:, p. 31 2333: 2324: 2312: 2303: 2294: 2282: 2270: 2258: 2246: 2237: 2228: 2219: 2207: 2202:, p. 73 2195: 2183: 2171: 2159: 2147: 2135: 2123: 2078: 2063: 2040: 2032: 2030: 2009: 2000: 1991: 1973: 1949: 1944: 1941: 1924: 1907:Brahmanbaria 1893: 1886: 1881: 1870: 1869: 1846: 1842: 1833: 1832: 1818: 1811: 1803: 1773: 1772: 1766: 1748:Teesta River 1730: 1716: 1715: 1711: 1694: 1677: 1613: 1586: 1556: 1515: 1506: 1489: 1480: 1471: 1461: 1458:Ramgarh area 1453: 1445: 1441: 1433: 1429: 1418:Brahmanbaria 1409: 1407: 1404:Ad hoc units 1398: 1389:Shenyang F-6 1373: 1149:Division HQ 1128: 1120: 1102: 1086:Rear Admiral 1078: 1073: 1049:Rear Admiral 1042:Vice Admiral 1039: 1012: 1003: 994: 959:Azad Kashmir 950: 924: 909: 900: 892: 844:Mukti Bahini 841: 828: 805: 785: 768: 747: 727: 703: 671: 653: 637: 621: 614:Troops from 583: 579: 500: 476: 439:Vice-Admiral 424: 404: 375: 364:martial race 285: 235:Mukti Bahini 231:Awami League 229:to curb the 220: 174: 167: 165: 53:Insignia of 36: 1932:Cox's Bazar 1838:Brahmaputra 1497:helicopters 1177:Brigade HQ 1138:March 1971 1089:S. H. Sarma 1079:INS Vikrant 1047:(Fleet CO: 1015:Air Marshal 877:, and bomb 711:Mitty Masud 699:Mitty Masud 99:, Pakistan 4288:Categories 4258:Tikka Khan 4251:Yaqub Khan 3899:Jacob, JFR 3775:Salik 1997 3763:Salik 1997 3727:Niazi 1998 3715:Salik 1997 3679:Niazi 1998 3667:Niazi 1998 3655:Salik 1997 3607:Niazi 1998 3574:Salik 1997 3562:Salik 1997 3550:Niazi 1998 3529:Salik 1997 3517:Salik 1997 3505:Salik 1997 3469:Jacob 1997 3445:Salik 1997 3433:Salik 1997 3373:Salik 1997 3361:Salik 1997 3349:Salik 1997 3337:Salik 1997 3325:Salik 1997 3313:Niazi 1998 3292:Salik 1997 3268:Salik 1997 3256:Salik 1997 3244:Jacob 1997 3232:Salik 1997 3220:Niazi 1998 3208:Salik 1997 3196:Salik 1997 3184:Jacob 1997 3163:Niazi 1998 3151:Salik 1997 3139:Niazi 1998 3127:Niazi 1998 3115:Niazi 1998 3091:Salik 1997 3079:Niazi 1998 3067:Salik 1997 3055:Niazi 1998 3043:Salik 1997 3001:Jacob 1997 2989:Niazi 1998 2977:Salik 1997 2953:Salik 1997 2941:Salik 1997 2917:Salik 1997 2905:Salik 1997 2884:Salik 1997 2746:Salik 1997 2722:Niazi 1998 2710:Niazi 1998 2698:Singh 1980 2686:Niazi 1998 2605:Niazi 1998 2593:Salik 1997 2581:Islam 2006 2569:Salik 1997 2557:Salik 1997 2499:Salik 1997 2317:Cohen 2004 2287:Islam 2006 2263:Niazi 1998 2212:Salik 1997 2200:Jacob 1997 2188:Salik 1997 2176:Salik 1997 2152:Niazi 1998 2128:Niazi 1998 2116:References 2026:Chittagong 1968:See also: 1892:The 202nd 1860:Mymensingh 1834:Dhaka Bowl 1790:Patuakhali 1743:Thakurgaon 1422:Mymensingh 1141:June 1971 1061:destroyers 1036:Naval role 794:Mymensingh 754:Amir Niazi 719:Tikka Khan 678:S.M. Ahsan 662:See also: 628:Chittagong 591:Troops in 552:Chittagong 540:Mymensingh 420:Rawalpindi 407:Yahya Khan 341:(PAF) and 306:, the 1st 304:battalions 282:Background 276:Chittagong 264:Mymensingh 195:Bangladesh 143:commanders 115:Commanders 107:Bangladesh 4265:AAK Niazi 3930:976643179 3799:Khan 1973 3787:Riza 1977 3739:Khan 1993 3703:Khan 1993 3643:Khan 1993 3631:Khan 1993 3586:Khan 1973 3493:Riza 1977 3409:Khan 1973 3385:Riza 1977 2965:Khan 1993 2662:Khan 1973 2523:Khan 1993 2164:Khan 1993 2062:The 91st 1914:Mainamati 1856:Sunamganj 1824:Madhumati 1668:Manikganj 1652:Madhumati 1644:Sirajganj 1635:exercise. 1468:Deception 1345:Razakars 1144:Dec 1971 1108:conflict. 998:Rajasthan 875:Balurghat 820:Shiliguri 611:activity. 597:Madhumati 559:Madhumati 516:Jhenaidah 372:1949–1965 367:soldiers. 327:Ayub Khan 324:Brigadier 248:Jhenaidah 175:III Corps 146:Lt. Gen. 4344:Cold War 4066:(1989). 4006:(1997). 3984:(1998). 3962:(1994). 3940:(1993). 3901:(1997). 3856:(2004). 3827:28547552 3817:(1992). 3751:Ali 1992 3691:Ali 1992 3619:Ali 1992 3457:Ali 1992 3280:Ali 1992 3103:Ali 1992 2641:Ali 1992 2629:Ali 1992 2546:(12): 3. 2511:Ali 1992 2448:Ali 1992 2436:Ali 1992 2424:Ali 1992 2412:Ali 1992 2400:Ali 1992 2275:Ali 1992 2251:Ali 1992 2140:Ali 1992 2084:See also 2016:Chandpur 1828:Goalanda 1814:Darshana 1807:Garibpur 1782:Faridpur 1725:Dinajpur 1660:Faridpur 1648:Chandpur 1624:Jamalpur 1541:sector). 1450:Noakhali 1384:arrived. 1377:Razakars 1057:frigates 1055:, three 879:Calcutta 816:Calcutta 605:Faridpur 571:Faridpur 536:Jamalpur 528:Dinajpur 520:Rajshahi 486:warfare. 260:Jamalpur 177:) was a 124:Lt. Gen. 83:Pakistan 57:Pakistan 3808:Sources 2075:Summary 2068:Ramgarh 2057:Laksham 2053:Belonia 2022:Ramgarh 1786:Barisal 1778:Kushtia 1759:Naogaon 1755:Naogaon 1539:Comilla 1535:Jessore 1414:Akhaura 1368:10,000 1354:50,000 1351:22,000 1214:35 + 4 1059:, five 1053:cruiser 970:Sialkot 968:In the 931:border. 818:or the 812:Tripura 616:Comilla 593:Jessore 548:Comilla 532:Rangpur 512:Jessore 495:salient 483:Monsoon 416:Rangpur 409:became 387:Jessore 383:Comilla 351:Kashmir 314:) or 3/ 272:Comilla 256:Rangpur 244:Jessore 141:Notable 71:Country 4262:Lt Gen 4255:Lt Gen 4248:Lt Gen 4214: 4195: 4176: 4157: 4138: 4119: 4093: 4074: 4052: 4033: 4014: 3992: 3970: 3948: 3928: 3909: 3887: 3868: 3842: 3825: 2485: 2386: 2064:ad hoc 2048:line). 2041:ad hoc 2033:ad hoc 1950:ad hoc 1945:ad hoc 1928:Kaptai 1894:ad hoc 1887:ad hoc 1882:ad hoc 1847:ad hoc 1843:ad hoc 1819:ad hoc 1767:ad hoc 1603:Tobruk 1493:tanker 1462:ad hoc 1454:ad hoc 1446:ad hoc 1442:ad hoc 1438:Khulna 1434:ad hoc 1430:ad hoc 1410:ad hoc 1395:sent). 1228:6 + 3 986:Multan 978:Lahore 963:Poonch 691:Bhutto 624:Sylhet 601:Magura 544:Sylhet 508:Khulna 337:. The 268:Sylhet 216:Meghna 208:Jamuna 189:, the 80: 63:Active 1721:Pabna 1672:Tongi 1656:Pabna 1640:Pabna 1631:line. 1616:Bogra 1548:goal. 1501:C-130 1083:FOCEF 1074:Ghazi 1065:FOCWF 864:Naxal 687:Mujib 643:east. 567:Bogra 563:Padma 405:When 379:Dhaka 252:Bogra 212:Padma 204:Dhaka 179:corps 103:Dhaka 101:(now 4212:ISBN 4193:ISBN 4174:ISBN 4155:ISBN 4136:ISBN 4117:ISBN 4091:ISBN 4072:ISBN 4050:ISBN 4031:ISBN 4012:ISBN 3990:ISBN 3968:ISBN 3946:ISBN 3926:OCLC 3907:ISBN 3885:ISBN 3866:ISBN 3840:ISBN 3823:OCLC 2483:ISBN 2384:ISBN 2037:Feni 1788:and 873:and 862:and 860:Naga 856:Mizo 666:and 603:and 524:Hili 391:F-86 286:The 274:and 225:and 214:and 166:The 152:VADM 2544:III 1663:up. 1312:17 1309:17 1306:17 1211:30 1208:16 1186:11 1183:11 444:as 218:). 185:by 55:GHQ 4290:: 4260:• 4253:• 2542:. 1830:. 1784:, 1780:, 1416:– 1365:0 1362:0 1348:0 1340:5 1337:0 1334:0 1326:7 1323:7 1320:0 1298:1 1295:1 1292:1 1284:3 1281:3 1278:1 1270:2 1267:2 1264:1 1256:5 1253:5 1250:2 1242:1 1239:1 1236:1 1225:6 1222:5 1200:4 1197:0 1194:0 1180:4 1172:2 1169:0 1166:0 1158:3 1155:3 1152:1 858:, 814:, 550:– 546:- 542:– 538:. 534:– 530:– 526:– 522:– 518:– 514:– 510:– 298:. 270:, 266:, 262:, 258:, 254:, 250:, 246:, 210:, 154:. 105:, 95:, 4220:. 4201:. 4182:. 4163:. 4144:. 4125:. 4099:. 4080:. 4058:. 4039:. 4020:. 3998:. 3976:. 3954:. 3932:. 3915:. 3893:. 3874:. 3848:. 3829:. 2489:. 2390:. 2059:. 881:. 689:- 607:. 109:) 34:. 20:)

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Knowledge

Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army

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