Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.

370:

of Kodak machinery cannot readily switch to other companies' machinery (thereby obviating the need for Kodak parts). Once one owns Kodak's expensive machinery, he is locked in to it. Kodak countered that it had no power in the primary market, because its market share relative to IBM, Xerox, 3M, and the others was small. If equipment buyers find Kodak charging too much for parts and services, they will buy from IBM, Xerox, 3M, etc. instead of from Kodak. But once a purchaser has bought a Kodak copier, he cannot turn to IBM or Xerox for parts to fix his broken Kodak copier. But this is all theory, not fact, the court continued, and "market imperfections can keep economic theories about how consumers will act from mirroring reality." The court pointed to evidence that Kodak charged up to twice as much as the ISOs for service that is of lower quality than the ISOs's service. A price differential is evidence of market power. This indicates that there is a material issue of fact over market power, and therefore summary judgment on the issue was improvident.

570:

any of those antitrust claims" if Kodak misused its parts monopoly to monopolize or attempt to monopolize. The Ninth Circuit said the case presented a question of first impression. "At the border of intellectual property monopolies and antitrust markets lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute or the Supreme Court." Some weight, but not decisive weight, must be given to the intellectual property rights of a monopolist. The court concluded it should use this test to resolve the question of whether one in Kodak's position should be held liable: "while exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a copyright," or to sell its patented or copyrighted work, a monopolist's "desire to exclude others from its work is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers." The court said that using such a "presumption should act to focus the factfinder on the primary interest of both intellectual property and antitrust laws: public interest."

743:

value of a customer's used equipment. When a customer switches it pays the net cost of the new brand of equipment minus the used value of its old brand of equipment. A manufacturer's increase in service or parts prices will correspondingly lower the market value of used equipment. Thus, "a $ 2000 increase in the present value of lifetime service costs will reduce used equipment prices by $ 2000 and thus will raise the cost of switching to another brand by $ 2000." The result is that the customer "is unable to avoid the costs of supracompetitive aftermarket pricing, and the possibility of switching to another equipment brand does not solve the problem, as defendants argue." Accordingly: "Even under the most favorable assumptions-perfect competition in the equipment market and perfect information on the part of consumers-firms have the ability and incentive to price aftermarket products above cost."

520:

nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% of the service market, with no readily available substitutes, was sufficient to survive summary judgment under the stringent monopoly standard of § 2. Kodak contended, however, that as a matter of law a single brand of a product or service can never be a relevant market under the Sherman Act. The Court disagreed: "Because service and parts for Kodak equipment are not interchangeable with other manufacturers' service and parts, the relevant market from the Kodak equipment owner's perspective is composed of only those companies that service Kodak machines." This is, the Court continued, a fact issue. Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate.

442:

It purchased parts from parts manufacturers. As part of Kodak's policy to limit sales of replacement parts for micrographic and copying machines only to buyers of Kodak equipment who use Kodak service or repair their own machines, Kodak sought to limit ISOs' access to other sources of Kodak parts besides Kodak itself, Kodak got manufacturers of its parts to agree with it that they would not sell parts that fit Kodak equipment to anyone other than Kodak. Kodak also pressured Kodak equipment owners and independent parts distributors not to sell Kodak parts to ISOs. In addition, Kodak took steps to restrict the availability to ISOs of used machines.

912:, in which the Court stated that arbitrary "exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive," McCullen argues that the Federal Circuit correctly concluded that subjective motivation for the refusal to license is irrelevant and should not be inquired into. "To hold otherwise," she insists, "would diminish the patent holder's statutory right to exclude others, defeating the primary objective of the patent law: to encourage innovation and to bring forth new knowledge for the benefit of society." 541:

rationality of equipment buyers would lead them to "simply turn to Kodak's competitors for photocopying and micrographic systems," if Kodak engaged in price gouging on parts. A "rational consumer considering the purchase of Kodak equipment will inevitably factor into his purchasing decision the expected cost of aftermarket support." Therefore, Kodak could not logically have market power in a supposed relevant market for unique Kodak parts. To be sure, there are some irrational consumers, such as the U.S. Government, "ut we have never before premised the application of antitrust doctrine on the lowest common denominator of consumer.

342:

Howell, 3M, and various Japanese manufacturers and has no significant market share as an OEM. The ISOs contended that Kodak "has a dominant share of a purported market for servicing Kodak copiers and micrographic equipment." But the conduct alleged does not "suggest that Kodak has attempted to leverage power in that market to gain competitive advantage in another market." To be sure, Kodak has "a natural monopoly over the market for parts it sells under its name but that imposes no duty on it to sell to plaintiffs." Therefore, "Kodak's unilateral refusal to sell its parts to plaintiffs does not violate Section 2."

961:

deal without an ulterior purpose, such as one to divide markets illegally or restrict competition in markets outside the scope of the patent. His focus is on selective refusals to deal used to require adherence to a restrictive practice. He asserts that the exhaustion doctrine should be expanded so that an equipment seller such as Kodak or Xerox "should neither indirectly limit the existing choices of a buyer nor constrain a buyer's right to use, repair, and resell the product, without reasonable business interests or justifications." He further asserts:

529: 317:

selling used Kodak copiers and equipment. The effect of these practices is to bar sales of parts required to repair and maintain Kodak copiers and imaging equipment to the ISOs. In addition, Kodak refuses to sell maintenance service contracts on used equipment unless it is first inspected and brought up to standard by Kodak. Therefore, purchasers of used equipment from ISOs who want to purchase a maintenance agreement for the equipment from Kodak must first submit the equipment to Kodak for inspection and any necessary repair and upgrading.

42: 761:

the parts and services markets because such an action would jeopardize sales volume in the primary photocopier equipment market. In other words, any gains realized by anti-competitive practices in the parts and service market would be offset by losses in the photocopier equipment market. Based on this economic reasoning, Kodak urged the adoption of a substantive legal rule that competition in primary markets precludes the finding of market power in derivative aftermarkets.

856:

School's demise are greatly exaggerated." He points out that the Supreme Court's grounds for reversing the summary judgment merely used one set of "theoretical arguments (information defects exacerbated by price discrimination and switching costs) to defeat another theoretical argument describing the effect competition in the foremarket has on aftermarkets." He sees the populist barbarians at the gate as having a long way to go before demolishing the Chicago Empire.

429: 491:

a consumer must acquire a substantial amount of raw data and undertake sophisticated analysis. The necessary information would include data on price, quality, and availability of products needed to operate, upgrade, or enhance the initial equipment, as well as service and repair costs, including estimates of breakdown frequency, nature of repairs, price of service and parts, length of "downtime," and losses incurred from downtime.

382:

competition in the primary equipment market "necessarily precludes power in the derivative market." With respect to the § 2 monopolization claim, the dissent concluded that, entirely apart from market power considerations, Kodak was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of its first business justification because it had "submitted extensive and undisputed evidence of a marketing strategy based on high-quality service."

886:

Kodak to monopolize the parts and the service markets is less than the long-term harm of not providing firms like Kodak with adequate incentive to enter a competitive market and develop new products. It is not entirely clear, however, that the patent and copyright systems should be used to subsidize Kodak's inability to compete in the service market against the ISOs, who might provide better service to consumers for less money.

578:

allowed to charge monopoly prices rather than merely "reasonable" prices. The Ninth Circuit said when compulsory sales relief was ordered in patent-antitrust cases, the courts ordered the sales to be a "reasonable" prices. In this case, however, it would be sufficient that the prices be nondiscriminatory and therefore the Ninth Circuit modified the district court's injunction order to eliminate the reasonableness requirement.

869:

rights to play any role in an antitrust defense" would "undermine the public interest in the patent and copyright statutes"; and (2) patents should "always be allowed to trump antitrust law"—would equally be mistakes. But the Note faults the Ninth Circuit's analysis because it "does not harmonize this 'field of dissonance' directly."That is, the court did not decide whether the scope of the patent rights

635:, in which the Supreme Court held it illegal for a dentists' organization to establish a policy requiring its members to withhold x-rays from dental insurers in connection with evaluating claims for benefits. In both cases the Court found that the organizations were tampering with price mechanisms by using the unavailability of information to prevent "the functioning of markets." Patterson sees 903:

based on a motivation to protect the patented item but rather was a pretext to hide anti-competitive activity." The writer criticizes the Ninth Circuit's rejection of Kodak's proffered legitimate business justification "by evaluating Kodak's subjective motivation in refusing to license or sell the patented invention and labeling Kodak's justification as a 'pretext.' "

966:

cases. Thus, the product composed of patented parts must be treated as primary. After a seller sells a product and the patented repair parts, a patentee should not be able to restrict the buyers' right to repair some components of the purchased product through repair service, or to refuse to sell to any other buyer on similar terms, without a business justification.

354:

sell replacement parts for its equipment to Kodak equipment owners unless they agree not to use ISOs. Second, Kodak will not knowingly sell replacement parts to ISOs." The court added, "Kodak admits that the purpose of these policies is to prevent ISOs from competing with Kodak's own service organization for the repair of Kodak equipment."

1026:

entrenched and threatens to continue entrenching its monopoly power in the relevant lines of commerce' by coercing other customers into licensing their innovations to Intel." This would assure Intel "access to any new technology and prevent threats to its alleged microprocessor monopoly from ever developing."

1025:

remand case. The FTC acted against Intel, however, because it saw unlawful monopolization in Intel's refusal to deal (provide technical information on purchased microprocessor chips or sell chips) unless customers were willing to make their patents available to Intel. The FTC alleged "that 'Intel has

898:, which "correctly held that a patent holder who unilaterally refuses to license or sell a patented item in any product market does not violate antitrust laws without evidence of illegal tying, fraud in the patent procurement process or sham litigation," and the Ninth Circuit's remand decision in the 824:

signals that populism is creeping into antitrust law, the decision may have adverse implications for competition. Antitrust policy based on populism, as opposed to economic theory, may result in the protection of individual competitors, but not overall competition. As a result, antitrust law may once

760:

Kodak alleged that if it raised the price of its parts and service above competitive levels, consumers would simply purchase an alternative photocopier equipment brand with more attractive parts and service costs. Kodak further argued that it lacked the market power to engage in monopoly practices in

737:

Only if expected profits from equipment are growing at a faster rate than the discount rate will a firm have the incentive to price the aftermarket product at (or below) the competitive level. While such rapid growth does occur at times, it is generally short-lived and is then followed by a period of

536:

Justice Scalia dissented and denied that this was just another case on the proper standard for summary judgment, as the majority had said. Justice Scalia insisted that "the case presents a very narrow—but extremely important—question of substantive antitrust law: whether, . . . for purposes

381:

The dissent accepted Kodak's argument that Kodak was justified in imposing its restrictions to guard against inadequate service, because it had "submitted extensive and undisputed evidence of a marketing strategy based on high-quality service." The dissent also agreed with Kodak that that evidence of

353:

The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, 2–1. Preliminarily, the Ninth Circuit characterized at least one of the issues somewhat differently from the district court—as involving concerted rather than unilateral action. The Ninth Circuit said there were two main issues: "First, Kodak will not

742:

The authors then address other information costs. They explain that, even if there were no switching costs to adopting a new brand, high aftermarket prices would still be rational. The reason is that a manufacturer's aftermarket pricing policies can raise the cost of switching by lowering the market

626:

decision is rational and economically sound, incorporating into antitrust law previously neglected but important economic learning about the cost and value of product information and its relevance to creating market power. He points to other cases in the past where market power was created by making

577:

The injunction requiring part sales originally applied to all parts. The Ninth Circuit limited the injunction to parts made by Kodak, since the ISOs could now buy such parts from their independent manufacturers. Kodak argued that on parts for which it had a copyright or patent monopoly, it should be

569:

That left the main issue whether the patent ownership justified what would otherwise be monopolization. Kodak argued that the district court had erroneously instructed the jury that "the fact that some of the replacement parts are patented or copyrighted does not provide Kodak with a defense against

561:

The ISOs contended that Kodak had used its monopoly in the parts market to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, the service market. Kodak now asserted that its intellectual property rights provided a defense against the claim. The court held that rights under patents and copyrights are a rebuttably

490:

consumers must inform themselves of the total cost of the "package"—equipment, service, and parts—at the time of purchase; that is, consumers must engage in accurate life-cycle pricing. Life-cycle pricing of complex, durable equipment is difficult and costly. In order to arrive at an accurate price,

449:

Kodak argued that it could not have the power to raise prices of service and parts above the level that would be charged in a competitive market, because any increase in profits from a higher price in the aftermarkets at least would necessarily be offset by a corresponding loss in profits from lower

441:

The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's denial of Kodak's summary judgment motion reversing the district court. Justice Blackmun began by emphasizing some additional facts from the record that neither court below had relied on. Kodak did not make all of the parts that went into its equipment.

377:

Turning to the monopolization claim, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there were material issues of fact concerning whether Kodak fell within one of the exceptions to the principle that a firm generally has no duty to deal with competitors. On the factual record before the court, it was not possible

369:

That raised the question whether, if there was a tie-in, did Kodak have the market power necessary to make the tie unlawful. The ISOs argued that Kodak does have power in the parts market for two interdependent reasons. First, many Kodak parts are unique and available only from Kodak. Second, owners

365:

to receive parts. Kodak will sell parts to owners who agree to self-service their machines. The Ninth Circuit said that an unlawful tie-in violation occurs not only when a seller conditions a sale of one thing on the purchase of another thing too. It is also a violation to get the purchaser to agree

320:

In addition, Kodak has allegedly entered into agreements with original equipment manufacturers to prevent them from providing parts for Kodak equipment to the ISOs, with owners of Kodak equipment to prevent them from selling parts to the ISOs, with organizations that repair Kodak equipment to refuse

974:

The definition of the first-sale doctrine must be broadened to limit a patent holder's rights, when those rights which restrict a consumer's choices or freedom of trade and result in a consumer becoming locked into a patent by the patent holder's indirect and socially undesirable business strategy.

902:

case, which instead "adopted a rebuttable presumption that a patent holder's refusal to license or sell a patented work constitutes a presumptively valid business justification to exclude others," but also held that the presumption is vulnerable to evidence that "the patent holder's refusal was not

855:

Fesca says that from this language some "commentators have deduced that we are witnessing the end of the Chicago School era" and been led "to claim that we will be returning to the economic populism that prevailed before the rise of the Chicago School." But he concludes that "reports of the Chicago

850:

did little to help the cause of Chicago proponents . . . with respect to economic analysis in general. In language that may signal a watershed in antitrust jurisprudence, the Court questioned implicitly the norms accepted by the Chicago School. "Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic

803:

suggested that the Court had reached the point of complete acceptance of "Chicago School" theory by indicating that parties could defend against antitrust allegations merely by asserting that the allegation is contrary to economic theory In Kodak, however, the Court retreats from its embracement of

770:

he majority found that the possibility of market imperfections created a material issue of fact as to. whether Kodak's theory was an accurate description of reality Thus, according to the majority the use of economic theory to grant summary judgment was inappropriate in this case. Instead, Kodak is

765:

As a result of the existence of market imperfections such as imperfect information and information costs, the Supreme Court believed that "many consumers would be incapable of making total package price computations, or alternatively would simply choose not to make such calculations." and therefore

727:

The authors describe a continuous "balancing between high aftermarket prices that reap profits from customers who have already purchased the equipment and low aftermarket prices that tend to increase future equipment sales." In this process, future profits from enhanced futures sales as a result of

573:

This presumption could be rebutted if the justifications for invoking intellectual property rights were merely pretextual and just an excuse for exclusionary conduct. After reviewing the evidence, the court said that "it is more probable than not that the jury would have found Kodak's presumptively

565:

Kodak easily met the market share requirements of a § 2 case because "Kodak controls nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to 90% of the service market, with no readily available substitutes." In addition, significant barriers to entry existed in the parts and service markets, and "Kodak has

505:

If the cost of switching is high, consumers who already have purchased the equipment, and are thus "locked in," will tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing equipment brands. Under this scenario, a seller profitably could maintain supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket if

477:

But there could easily be a middle, optimum price at which the increased revenues from the higher priced sales of service and parts would more than compensate for the lower revenues from lost equipment sales. The fact that the equipment market imposes a restraint on prices in the aftermarkets by no

467:

Even if Kodak could not raise the price of service and parts one cent without losing equipment sales, that fact would not disprove market power in the aftermarkets. The sales of even a monopolist are reduced when it sells goods at a monopoly price, but the higher price more than compensates for the

445:

Kodak intended to and was successful, through these policies, in making it more difficult for ISOs to sell service for Kodak machines. ISOs were unable to obtain parts from reliable sources, and many were forced out of business, while others lost substantial revenue. Customers were forced to switch

357:

The Ninth Circuit also emphasized some facts to which the district court had not referred. After 1982 ISOs began to compete significantly against Kodak in the repair of Kodak equipment. ISOs offered service for as little as half of Kodak's price. To better compete, Kodak in some cases cut its price

1008:

The Federal Circuit focused on incentives for the creation of IP by allowing the IP holder to reap profits wherever they were available. However, it only emphasized one side of IP policy—namely, that giving more benefits to a patentee creates more innovations. The other aspect is the limitation of

960:

contexts, based upon an idea for redefining the scope of a patent holder's rights by means of expanding the definitions of the doctrine and doctrine of repair to conform with patent policy goals." The author excludes from his discussion "pure" refusals to deal, by which he means those refusals to

951:

it to keep it in good order. The general theory is that once a manufacturer such as Kodak sells a copier to a customer, the customer acquires a property interest in the copier that includes a right to use it without restrictions and keep it in good repair, but refusals to sell repair parts to ISOs

732:

of the future equipment sales, but present profits from current aftermarket sales do not need to be discounted. In a declining market for original equipment, which many antitrust cases have involved, there is a great incentive to charge high aftermarket prices at the expense of incumbent equipment

544:

Scalia dismissed lock–in as a material factor for "it is of no concern to the antitrust laws." He explained, "Though that power can plainly work to the injury of certain consumers, it produces only a brief perturbation in competitive conditions—not the sort of thing the antitrust laws do or should

540:

He complained: "The Court today finds in the typical manufacturer's inherent power over its own brand of equipment—over the sale of distinctive repair parts for that equipment, for example— the sort of 'monopoly power' sufficient to bring the sledgehammer of § 2 into play." He argued that the

453:

The Court refused to do that. It insisted that this was a fact issue, not something to be decided by theory. Kodak was equally insistent that the existence of market power in the service and parts markets, absent power in the equipment market, "simply makes no economic sense," and the absence of a

341:

The court turned to the section 2 monopolization claim. The ISOs contended that Kodak monopolized by leveraging monopoly power in one market to gain competitive advantage in another. The court rejected this argument as lacking any factual support. Kodak competes as an OEM with Xerox, IBM, Bell and

178:

Even though an equipment manufacturer lacked significant market power in the primary market for its equipment, it could have sufficient market power (based on purchasers' being "locked in" to its product) in the secondary aftermarket (or submarket) for repair parts to be liable under the antitrust

885:

If there were no way for Kodak to recoup its investment in developing parts and machines other than to effectuate its patent and copyright monopoly in the service market, there would be strong reasons for allowing it to do so. It might be the case that the short-term harm to consumers of allowing

608:

Twenty years of litigation under Kodak had expended millions of dollars in legal fees and not produced a single defensible decision finding market power on the basis of lock–in. Academic commentary has been overwhelmingly negative as well. Kodak seems to be one of those ill conceived expansionist

298:

decision in which the Court held that even though an equipment manufacturer lacked significant market power in the primary market for its equipment—copier-duplicators and other imaging equipment—nonetheless, it could have sufficient market power in the secondary aftermarket for repair parts to be

868:

agreed with the Ninth Circuit's legal standard on remand that it would "allow the presumption that IP rights constitute a legitimate business justification for exclusionary conduct and allow the antitrust plaintiff to rebut it." The writer concluded that the polar options (1) "of not allowing IP

779:

as "clearly a setback for Chicago School adherents who seek to fully integrate their economic theory into antitrust law," and instead a coming era in which "parties will be forced to factually demonstrate the effect on competition caused by the challenged conduct" and where "reliance on economic

461:

Kodak's proposed rule rests on a factual assumption about the cross-elasticity of demand in the equipment and aftermarkets: "If Kodak raised its parts or service prices above competitive levels, potential customers would simply stop buying Kodak equipment. Perhaps Kodak would be able to increase

316:

had followed a policy of selling patented and unpatented repair parts only to direct purchasers of its equipment. The 18 plaintiff in this case are Independent Service Organizations ("ISOs") engaged in repairing and servicing Kodak's copiers and other equipment, and in buying, reconditioning and

965:

When a consumer purchases the product, maintaining the purchased product through repair service should be one of the consumer's freedoms, whether or not the components of the product are patented. Once it is sold, some parts of the product will eventually need to be repaired or replaced in most

519:

The Court then turned to the final issue: whether there were genuine issues for trial as to whether Kodak has monopolized, or attempted to monopolize, the Kodak equipment service and parts markets, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The Court said that the evidence that Kodak controls

514:

In sum, there is a question of fact whether information costs and switching costs foil the simple assumption that the equipment and service markets act as pure complements to one another. We conclude, then, that Kodak has failed to demonstrate that respondents' inference of market power in the

819:

may, however, signal more than just an increased antitrust docket for the District Courts. The Court's refusal to decide antitrust claims based solely on economic theory may implicate more than just a setback for "Chicago School" adherents, who would readily decide such claims by reference to

722:

In fact, firms will rationally engage in above-cost aftermarket pricing even if the equipment market is very competitive, all parties are well informed, and demand in the market is stable. Supracompetitive prices for proprietary aftermarket goods and services will occur so long as there is an

717:

Court that "market imperfections can keep economic theories about how consumers will react from mirroring reality." But they argue that the Court did not go far enough in rejecting the defense economic arguments. They insist that "strong primary market competition will discipline aftermarket

537:

of applying our exacting rules governing the behavior of would-be monopolists, a manufacturer's conceded lack of power in the interbrand market for its equipment is somehow consistent with its possession of market, or even monopoly, power in wholly derivative aftermarkets for that equipment."

651:

as "essentially a case about abusing competitors; it is not essentially a case about lack of consumer information," as many other analysts perceive it. "Abuse and bullying by one firm with power over another is the oldest antitrust violation extant and has not lost its place in the antitrust

557:

In August 1997 the Ninth Circuit considered the case another time on remand. The court affirmed a jury verdict that awarded the ISOs $ 72 million in treble damages on section 2 of the Sherman Act. It also allowed a 10-year injunction that requiring Kodak to sell the parts for its machines at

496:

Much of this information is difficult—some of it impossible—to acquire at the time of purchase. During the life of a product, companies may change the service and parts prices, and develop products with more advanced features, a decreased need for repair, or new warranties. In addition, the

373:

Kodak argued that it acted unilaterally in refusing to deal with the ISOs. But the Ninth Circuit responded that Kodak entered into agreements with its equipment owners, which expressly set out in its "Terms of Sale," that Kodak will sell parts only to users "who service only their own Kodak

1172:

903 F.2d at 615. Thus § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, makes it unlawful to sell goods "on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller, where the effect

450:

equipment sales as consumers began purchasing equipment with more attractive service costs from other sellers. It urged the Court to adopt an irrebuttable presumption or substantive legal rule that "equipment competition precludes any finding of monopoly power in derivative aftermarkets."

566:

220 patents and controls its designs and tools, brand name power and manufacturing ability . . . controls original equipment manufacturers through contracts," and operates on an economy of scale. In addition to possessing its market share, Kodak engaged in exclusionary conduct.

515:

service and parts markets is unreasonable, and that, consequently, Kodak is entitled to summary judgment. It is clearly reasonable to infer that Kodak has market power to raise prices and drive out competition in the aftermarkets, since respondents offer direct evidence that Kodak did so.

1599:

Present value is the value of an expected income stream determined as of the date of valuation. The present value is always less than or equal to the future value because money has interest-earning potential, a characteristic referred to as the time value of money. David R. Henderson,

462:

short term profits through such a strategy, but at a devastating cost to its long term interests."Kodak argues that the Court should accept, as a matter of law, this "basic economic realit" that competition in the equipment market necessarily prevents market power in the aftermarkets.

873:

have extended to the use of parts to provide service and maintenance. Reliance on pretext to condemn the restraints is too case–specific. It fails to "offer much insight or guidance as to how this court will, or any other court should, review firms' actions" in future cases. Gully,

548:

As for monopolization under § 2, it should be reserved as "a specialized mechanism for responding to extraordinary agglomerations (or threatened agglomerations) of economic power," not mere power over one's one brand of product where there exists a vibrant interbrand market.

804:

economic theory Now, defendants must introduce evidence to prove that its economic theory does in fact reflect commercial realities. Alternatively, plaintiffs can now challenge certain conduct merely by attacking the assumptions on which the defendant's economic theory is based.

1940: 303:

laws for its exclusionary conduct in the aftermarket. The reason was that it was possible that, once customers were committed to the particular brand by having purchased a unit, they were "locked in" and no longer had any realistic alternative to turn to for repair parts.

336:

The fact that Kodak refused to sell parts to plaintiffs and other ISOs does not violate Section 1. The right of a manufacturer unilaterally to select its customers and to refuse to sell to others is well-established, regardless of the possible adverse effect on would-be

842:

decision as a setback for the Chicago School, but finds it less distressing, and also he considers seeing the decision as an announcement of Chicago demise to be an exaggeration. He points first to the Court['s insistence on the supremacy of facts over theories:

478:

means disproves the existence of power in those markets. Thus, contrary to Kodak's assertion, there is no immutable physical law—no "basic economic reality"—insisting that competition in the equipment market cannot coexist with market power in the aftermarkets.

755:

perceives the decision of the Supreme Court as a setback for the Chicago Law School's form of antitrust analysis. The Comment explained Kodak's "Chicago School" that persuaded the district court but which the court of appeals and Supreme Court rejected:

788:, in which the Court had said that "if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense - must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary" in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. 927:

decisions to include the FTC's proceeding against Intel over use of monopoly power in the microprocessor market to force customers to grant Intel royalty-free licenses to their own microprocessor technology and the Federal Circuit's decision in the

631:, the Supreme Court held illegal an engineering society's rule that forbade members from providing price information to buyers until the buyers had tentatively agreed to purchase the members' services. Patterson gives as another example 700:

through the rejection, as a matter of law, of the position that consumer welfare can be harmed if manufacturers of complex durable equipment are allowed to recover monopoly profits in aftermarkets (like service or software) of their

955:

The author considers high-tech industries that evolve and change rapidly and are complicated. That may call for different rules than used in the past. The author states, "This paper proposes a plausible alternative approach for the

851:

distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the "particular facts disclosed by record ."

738:

slowly growing or declining equipment sales. If slower growth or declines in sales are forecast in the near future, then the incentive to raise aftermarket prices is likely to be present even if current growth is quite rapid.

3194: 987:

cases, which had similar facts (both equipment manufacturers refused to sell parts to ISOs or to equipment purchasers who used ISOs to repair their equipment) but opposite results, leads to an approval of

545:

worry about." The Court should not condemn out of hand "such potentially procompetitive arrangements simply because of the antitrust defendant's inherent power over the unique parts for its own brand."

1702: 705:

If Kodak had prevailed in making its economic theories the law, these authors maintain, the consequence would have been to exempt "a vast and growing sector of the economy from the antitrust laws."

1806: 975:

This approach based on consumer perspectives strikes a better balance between a patentee's legitimate profits and a consumer's benefits than the approach based on the patent holder's perspective.

1875: 361:

As to the Section 1 issue, Kodak and the district court misconceived the statute. Kodak argued that it does not force owners to buy service in order to receive parts; Kodak only requires owners

1877:

Comment, The Federal Circuit and Ninth Circuit Faceoff: Does a Patent Holder Violate the Sherman Act by Unilaterally Excluding Others From a Patented Invention in More Than One Relevant Market?

1525: 947:, which hold respectively that the owner of patented property such as a machine has a right to use and dispose of it without being subject to post-sale restrictions by the patentee and a 358:

for service. Some customers found ISO service superior to Kodak service. Kodak then developed its present policies of not selling replacement parts to ISOs or to customers who use ISOs.

1071: 2135: 1899: 1707: 1486: 1463: 1089: 161: 134: 83: 321:

to deal with the ISOs, and with entities providing financing for the purchase of Kodak equipment to cause them to require Kodak repair and service as a condition of financing.

497:

information is likely to be customer specific; lifecycle costs will vary from customer to customer with the type of equipment, degrees of equipment use, and costs of downtime.

1009:

patent rights to prevent overreaching. In this respect, the proposed standard strikes a better balance between the legitimate interests of patent holders and their customers.

1004:

was that the Ninth Circuit considered that pretext undermined the proffered business justification while the Federal Circuit considered motivation and pretext irrelevant:

1894: 908: 639:

as an extension of these decisions and "thus a step toward providing a more economically supportable and judicially consistent antitrust treatment of information."

1029:

The author concludes from his analysis that selective refusals to deal in intellectual property rights should be held violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act if:

688:

case describe the decision as turning back a growing trend of "Chicago School" revanchism against protection of consumers against wealth transfers to monopolists:

506:

the switching costs were high relative to the increase in service prices, and the number of locked-in customers were high relative to the number of new purchasers.

771:

required to withstand trial, and prove that its economic theory is indeed representative of reality in order to successfully defend its replacement parts policy.

2819: 733:

owners. Even if equipment demand is expected to remain constant, the writers argue, profits in the future are of less value due to discounting. Accordingly:

1729:

economic theory supporting its behavior, regardless of its accuracy in reflecting the actual market, it is entitled to summary judgment." 504 U.S. at 468.

1036:

the conduct "excludes or substantially impairs the competitive capacity of a competitor or brings about anti-competitive effects in a related market"; and

3189: 324:

The ISOs sued Kodak, alleging that it violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14.

3179: 1058:

and its rejection of the notion that "an antitrust violation may be found where a patent holder does precisely that which the patent laws authorize."

815:

signals that fewer cases will be dismissed on summary judgment, since parties will have to factually prove their economic theories. . . .

3199: 2221: 2105: 766:

not act in accordance with the Chicago School's model. In addition, the model does not consider switching costs and resulting lock-in. Therefore:

1547: 3184: 944: 3152: 46: 3069: 2484: 2322: 1604: 1422: 2448: 2146: 2509: 808:

The writer sees this as ominous and concludes that the decision may signal an unfortunate reversion to 19th century populism:

562:

presumed legitimate business justification for refusing to deal with competitors. However, the ISOs rebutted the presumption.

2479: 820:

economic theory alone. Threads of populism may underly the Court's refusal to accept Kodak's economic theory on its face. If

600:, he strongly disagreed that a single-brand aftermarket could ever constitute a separate relevant market. In his 2015 book 2733: 660:

and U.S. antitrust law from the wrong end of the telescope. Peeling away the economics-of-information technicalities of

881:

To answer the question of proper scope of patent rights, the Note says, the court should have explored further issues:

17: 3158: 3083: 2214: 295: 2087:

Note: Unilateral Refusals To Deal In Intellectual Property After Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.

528: 468:

loss in sales. Kodak's claim that charging more for service and parts would be "a short-run game" is based on the

378:

to determine that summary judgment was proper. Therefore, the issue would have to be tried in the district court.

2754: 1173:. , , may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 2939: 2799: 2264: 825:

again be subject to Justice Holmes's criticism of being "humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetence."

791:

The writer deplores the Court's unwillingness to allow defendants to rest on an assertion of economic theory:

952:(at least absent a sound business justification) unreasonably derogates from the customer's property rights. 2869: 1964: 1846: 1368: 157: 2182: 2111: 1581: 1144: 1054:

remand decision, the author comments that, perhaps, "the Ninth Circuit has certainly come a long way from

122: 3146: 3130: 3125: 2728: 2443: 2438: 2433: 2428: 2423: 2207: 222: 3017: 2612: 2393: 2139: 1903: 1711: 1490: 1467: 1093: 281: 165: 138: 75: 482:

The real underlying problem with Kodak's theories, echoed by the United States (Antitrust Division) as

2971: 2961: 2844: 2804: 2540: 2458: 2453: 2418: 2413: 2408: 2403: 2398: 2340: 2335: 332:

The district court granted Kodak's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. It said:

3042: 3032: 2824: 2602: 2566: 2375: 2370: 2155: 1942:

Selective Refusals to Sell Patented Goods: The Relationship between Patent Rights and Antitrust Law

940: 90: 101:) ¶ 69,839; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4823; 92 Daily Journal DAR 7688; 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 331 2976: 2935: 696:

case would have been much more significant had the dissenters prevailed. Their explicit goal was

2164: 418: 728:

creating a reputation for not gouging customers on aftermarket sales must be discounted to the

3001: 2607: 2365: 2244: 1657: 1527:

Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc. – Information Failure as Soul or Hook?

402: 394: 214: 194: 3047: 3037: 3026: 2814: 2794: 2789: 2582: 1980: 697: 1714: 457:

The Court refused to accept Kodak's economic theories and responded that they were flawed:

428: 2996: 2597: 2530: 2385: 2360: 2355: 2350: 2345: 2288: 948: 469: 422: 406: 246: 234: 1659:

Kodak v. Image Technical Services: A Setback for the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis

668:

teaches that price theory economics has not read competitors or dynamics out of the law.

472:

that there are only two prices that can be charged—a competitive price or a ruinous one.

3204: 2981: 2966: 2945: 2906: 2319: 2249: 1906: 1601: 1506: 1493: 1470: 1096: 414: 390: 345:

The district court dismissed the complaint and the ISOs appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

226: 210: 2173: 1721:

Court thought that the proffered Chicago analysis made sufficient economic sense. The

374:

equipment." That was sufficient to make the conduct concerted rather than unilateral.

3173: 3022: 2991: 2874: 2859: 2829: 2769: 2689: 2504: 2330: 2315: 2254: 729: 98: 1448:

Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, The Law of Competition and Its Practice

1111:, No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17218, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1988). 3120: 3115: 3105: 3100: 2986: 2912: 2884: 2738: 2718: 2679: 2545: 2525: 2474: 2301: 410: 238: 894:

by Sharon McCullen addresses a conflict between the Federal Circuit's decision in

78: 1021:

found IP rights dominant, and it simply rejected the Ninth Circuit's view in the

3110: 3052: 2930: 2764: 2759: 2550: 2296: 398: 202: 118:, No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17218 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1988); 903 1508:

Product Definition, Product Information, and Market Power: Kodak in Perspective

713:

A paper by three economists—Borenstein, MacKie-Mason, and Netz—agrees with the

2864: 2702: 2697: 2592: 2587: 1717: (1986). The writer does not address the possible interpretation that the 130: 94: 1725:

Court had said, "The Court did not hold that if the moving party enunciates

596:

Herbert Hovenkamp has been highly critical of the decision. In his 2006 book

2879: 2849: 2834: 2674: 2311: 1968: 1850: 486:, is that it unrealistically postulates an all-knowing equipment purchaser: 300: 723:

inability to contract for these goods and services at the time of purchase.

65:

Eastman Kodak Company, Petitioner v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et al.

2191: 2889: 2669: 2664: 2659: 2654: 2649: 2644: 2639: 2535: 2115: 1372: 1148: 1067: 126: 2839: 2809: 2259: 609:

antitrust doctrines that the Supreme Court would do well to overrule.

1436:

Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution

1043:

unless the patentee proffers a valid reason to justify its refusal.

2723: 2230: 427: 313: 602:

Federal Antitrust Policy, The Law of Competition and Its Practice

510:

The Court explained that it was unpersuaded by Kodak's theories:

501:

Furthermore, the Court explained, there is the issue of lock–in:

2199: 1580:

Severin Borenstein, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, and Janet S. Netz,

154: 119: 2203: 1549:

The Benefits and Burdens of Kodak from a Litigant's Perspective

1013:

The author then turned to the two cases involving Intel. As in

41: 2854: 1703:

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.

917:

University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy

786:

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.

574:

valid business justification rebutted on grounds of pretext."

263:

Blackmun, joined by Rehnquist, White, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter

799:

was developing into a body of law based on economic theory.

1842:

In re Independent Service Organization Antitrust Litigation

1460:

National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States

896:

In re Independent Service Organization Antitrust Litigation

629:

National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States

446:

to Kodak service even though they preferred ISO service.

432:

Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court

3195:

United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court

718:

behavior, even without market imperfections," and that:

558:

reasonable, non-monopoly and nondiscriminatory prices.

454:

legal presumption would deter procompetitive behavior.

35:

Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc.

18:

Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc.

1836: 1834: 1039:"constrains customer choices directly or indirectly"— 970:

The author argues that to maximize consumer welfare;

780:

theory alone will not suffice." The writer contrasts

179:

laws for its exclusionary conduct in the aftermarket.

3139: 3093: 3061: 3010: 2954: 2921: 2898: 2782: 2747: 2711: 2688: 2632: 2625: 2575: 2559: 2518: 2497: 2467: 2384: 2310: 2287: 2280: 2273: 2237: 2133:

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.

1751:at 1220. The quotation of Justice Holmes is from 1 1364:

Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.

1086:

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.

996:. The main difference between the Ninth Circuit in 275: 267: 259: 254: 183: 172: 151:

Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.

145: 111: 106: 70: 60: 53: 34: 1895:Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. 1140:Image Technical Service, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 909:Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. 684:, two of the lawyers representing the ISOs in the 1109:Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 627:information expensive to obtain. For example, in 291:Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. 116:Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 906:Relying on the Supreme Court's 1908 decision in 1033:the intellectual property confers market power; 2215: 1229: 1227: 1208: 1206: 1066:The citations in this article are written in 393:delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 8: 1769:, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 619, 670 (1993). 1159: 1157: 366:not to purchase things from another seller. 1767:The Decline and Fall of the Chicago Empire? 97:3405; 60 U.S.L.W. 4465; 1992-1 Trade Cas. ( 2629: 2284: 2277: 2222: 2208: 2200: 349:Ninth Circuit reversal of summary judgment 31: 532:Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion 919:, expands on the comparison between the 527: 2106:United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. 1985:, Dkt. No. 9288 (1998) (consent order). 1542: 1540: 1078: 1546:Ronald S. Katz and Douglas Rosenthal, 939:The author builds his analysis on the 328:District court summary judgment ruling 1483:FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists 915:● Seungwoo Son, in an article in the 656:The information-failure analysts see 633:FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists 417:filed a dissenting opinion, in which 29:1992 United States Supreme Court case 7: 3153:You Press the Button, We Do the Rest 945:repair and reconstruction doctrine 271:Scalia, joined by O'Connor, Thomas 47:Supreme Court of the United States 25: 3190:United States Supreme Court cases 3077:Kodak v. Image Technical Services 2142:451 (1992) is available from: 1605:Concise Encyclopedia of Economics 1423:United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd. 930:Independent Service Organizations 923:remand and the Federal Circuit's 294:, 504 U.S. 451 (1992), is a 1992 3180:United States antitrust case law 1583:Antitrust Policy in Aftermarkets 979:Applying these standards to the 751:A Comment by Jill Protos in the 40: 1960:Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp. 866:Berkeley Technology Law Journal 838:, Lawrence Fesca also sees the 753:Case Western Reserve Law Review 160:(9th Cir. 1997); cert. denied, 3200:1992 in United States case law 2093:1079, 1100 & n,142 (1998). 1129:1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *8-9. 1: 3185:United States patent case law 2734:Kodacolor (still photography) 1884:469, 470, 487, 504–05 (2001). 618:Mark Patterson argues in the 1947:Ill. J.L. Tech. & Policy 1120:1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *6. 1000:and the Federal Circuit in 2485:Z712 IS ZOOM digital camera 652:firmament." She continues: 3221: 2192:Oyez (oral argument audio) 2510:Cine Special 16mm Cameras 1919:Continental Paper Bag Co. 1874:Sharon Brawner McCullen, 1420:125 F.3d at 1225 (citing 1017:, the Federal Circuit in 620:North Carolina Law Review 280: 188: 177: 39: 2800:Carousel slide projector 2480:Z612 Zoom Digital Camera 2265:ESL Federal Credit Union 1766: 1534:L.J. 759, 766–57 (1994). 795:Antitrust law, prior to 598:The Antitrust Enterprise 54:Argued December 10, 1991 1571:, 504 U.S. at 479 n.29. 709:Borenstein et al. paper 395:Chief Justice Rehnquist 3147:Union of Kodak Workers 3131:Eastman Color Positive 3126:Eastman Color Negative 2729:Kodacolor (filmmaking) 1865:, 125 F.3d at 1218–19. 1753:Holmes-Pollock Letters 1524:Eleanor M. Documents, 1426:, 410 U.S. 52 (1973)). 1074:for more information. 1070:style. Please see the 1011: 977: 968: 888: 853: 827: 806: 773: 763: 740: 725: 703: 670: 664:, one might conclude: 647:Eleanor Fox perceives 611: 533: 517: 508: 499: 493: 480: 474: 464: 433: 363:not to buy ISO service 339: 3018:Eastman Business Park 1965:195 F.3d 1346 1847:203 F.3d 1322 1815:L.J. 339, 349 (1998). 1393:See 125 F.3d at 1214. 1369:125 F.3d 1195 1048:Washington Law Review 1006: 972: 963: 883: 860:On the remand opinion 845: 836:Notre Dame Law Review 810: 793: 768: 758: 735: 720: 690: 654: 606: 531: 512: 503: 494: 488: 475: 465: 459: 431: 334: 282:Sherman Antitrust Act 89:112 S. Ct. 2072; 119 2972:Leopold Godowsky Jr. 2845:Kodacolor Technology 2805:Cinema Digital Sound 2112:648 F.2d 642 2085:Brian F. Ladenburg, 1755:163 (Howe ed. 1941). 1738:Comment, at 1219–20. 1664:Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1656:Jill Dickey Protos, 1411:125 F.3d at 1219-20. 1384:125 F.3d at 1206-08. 1145:903 F.2d 612 983:remand case and the 834:In a Comment in the 386:Opinion of the Court 56:Decided June 8, 1992 3043:Kodak Picture Kiosk 3033:Kodak Park Railroad 2755:High-Speed Infrared 2183:Library of Congress 1930:210 U.S. at 504–05. 1805:Jennifer E. Gully, 1515:185, 188–89 (1994). 1450:544 (5th ed. 2015). 1335:504 U.S. at 497–98. 1326:504 U.S. at 495–96. 1299:504 U.S. at 480–82. 1272:504 U.S. at 473–74. 1263:504 U.S. at 470–71, 1245:504 U.S. at 465–66. 1200:903 F.2d at 620-21. 1191:903 F.2d at 618–19. 1182:903 F.2d at 616–18. 1046:● In a Note in the 992:and disapproval of 941:exhaustion doctrine 890:● A Comment in the 223:Sandra Day O'Connor 2977:Thomas J. Hargrave 2936:Four Thirds system 1921:, 210 U.S. at 429. 1666:1199, 1201 (1993). 1236:, 504 U.S. at 458. 534: 434: 199:Associate Justices 3167: 3166: 3002:William S. Vaughn 2940:Micro Four Thirds 2870:Proofing Software 2778: 2777: 2621: 2620: 2608:Vest Pocket Kodak 2493: 2492: 2245:Chinon Industries 1982:In re Intel Corp. 1863:Eastman Kodak Co. 1402:125 F.3d at 1218. 1234:Eastman Kodak Co. 892:Temple Law Review 775:The Comment sees 680:In an article in 592:Herbert Hovenkamp 419:Justices O'Connor 299:liable under the 287: 286: 195:William Rehnquist 16:(Redirected from 3212: 3048:Kodak, Tennessee 3038:Kodak Photo Spot 2795:Autographic film 2790:Approval proofer 2630: 2285: 2278: 2224: 2217: 2210: 2201: 2196: 2190: 2187: 2181: 2178: 2172: 2169: 2163: 2160: 2154: 2151: 2145: 2119: 2109: 2100: 2094: 2092: 2083: 2077: 2070: 2064: 2057: 2051: 2044: 2038: 2031: 2025: 2018: 2012: 2005: 1999: 1992: 1986: 1978: 1972: 1962: 1956: 1950: 1948: 1937: 1931: 1928: 1922: 1916: 1910: 1891: 1885: 1883: 1872: 1866: 1860: 1854: 1844: 1838: 1829: 1822: 1816: 1814: 1803: 1797: 1790: 1784: 1777: 1771: 1770: 1768: 1765:Lawrence Fesca, 1762: 1756: 1754: 1745: 1739: 1736: 1730: 1699: 1693: 1686: 1680: 1673: 1667: 1665: 1654: 1648: 1641: 1635: 1628: 1622: 1615: 1609: 1607: 1597: 1591: 1590:L.J. 355 (1995). 1589: 1578: 1572: 1563: 1557: 1555: 1544: 1535: 1533: 1522: 1516: 1514: 1505:Mark Patterson, 1503: 1497: 1480: 1474: 1457: 1451: 1449: 1445: 1439: 1437: 1433: 1427: 1418: 1412: 1409: 1403: 1400: 1394: 1391: 1385: 1382: 1376: 1366: 1360: 1354: 1353:504 U.S. at 503. 1351: 1345: 1344:504 U.S. at 502. 1342: 1336: 1333: 1327: 1324: 1318: 1317:504 U.S. at 489. 1315: 1309: 1308:504 U.S. at 486. 1306: 1300: 1297: 1291: 1290:504 U.S. at 477. 1288: 1282: 1281:504 U.S. at 466. 1279: 1273: 1270: 1264: 1261: 1255: 1254:504 U.S. at 467. 1252: 1246: 1243: 1237: 1231: 1222: 1221:903 F.2d at 622. 1219: 1213: 1212:903 F.2d at 623. 1210: 1201: 1198: 1192: 1189: 1183: 1180: 1174: 1170: 1164: 1163:903 F.2d at 614. 1161: 1152: 1142: 1136: 1130: 1127: 1121: 1118: 1112: 1106: 1100: 1083: 1050:critical of the 864:● A Note in the 698:judicial economy 437:Majority opinion 391:Justice Blackmun 184:Court membership 168:1094 (1998). 141:1216 (1991). 44: 43: 32: 21: 3220: 3219: 3215: 3214: 3213: 3211: 3210: 3209: 3170: 3169: 3168: 3163: 3135: 3089: 3084:Vroegh v. Kodak 3070:Kodak v. Worden 3057: 3006: 2997:Henry A. Strong 2950: 2923: 2917: 2894: 2774: 2743: 2707: 2684: 2617: 2613:Vigilant camera 2571: 2555: 2514: 2489: 2463: 2380: 2314: 2306: 2269: 2233: 2228: 2194: 2188: 2185: 2179: 2176: 2170: 2167: 2161: 2158: 2152: 2149: 2143: 2128: 2123: 2122: 2103: 2101: 2097: 2090: 2084: 2080: 2071: 2067: 2058: 2054: 2045: 2041: 2032: 2028: 2019: 2015: 2006: 2002: 1993: 1989: 1979: 1975: 1958: 1957: 1953: 1946: 1938: 1934: 1929: 1925: 1917: 1913: 1892: 1888: 1881: 1873: 1869: 1861: 1857: 1840: 1839: 1832: 1823: 1819: 1812: 1804: 1800: 1791: 1787: 1778: 1774: 1764: 1763: 1759: 1752: 1746: 1742: 1737: 1733: 1700: 1696: 1687: 1683: 1674: 1670: 1663: 1655: 1651: 1642: 1638: 1629: 1625: 1616: 1612: 1603: 1598: 1594: 1587: 1579: 1575: 1564: 1560: 1553: 1545: 1538: 1531: 1523: 1519: 1512: 1504: 1500: 1481: 1477: 1458: 1454: 1447: 1446: 1442: 1438:, ch. 5 (2006). 1435: 1434: 1430: 1419: 1415: 1410: 1406: 1401: 1397: 1392: 1388: 1383: 1379: 1362: 1361: 1357: 1352: 1348: 1343: 1339: 1334: 1330: 1325: 1321: 1316: 1312: 1307: 1303: 1298: 1294: 1289: 1285: 1280: 1276: 1271: 1267: 1262: 1258: 1253: 1249: 1244: 1240: 1232: 1225: 1220: 1216: 1211: 1204: 1199: 1195: 1190: 1186: 1181: 1177: 1171: 1167: 1162: 1155: 1138: 1137: 1133: 1128: 1124: 1119: 1115: 1107: 1103: 1084: 1080: 1064: 1052:Image Technical 949:right to repair 862: 832: 749: 711: 678: 645: 616: 594: 589: 587:On main opinion 584: 555: 553:Remand decision 526: 470:false dichotomy 439: 388: 351: 330: 310: 247:Clarence Thomas 237: 235:Anthony Kennedy 225: 215:John P. Stevens 213: 102: 55: 49: 30: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 3218: 3216: 3208: 3207: 3202: 3197: 3192: 3187: 3182: 3172: 3171: 3165: 3164: 3162: 3161: 3156: 3149: 3143: 3141: 3137: 3136: 3134: 3133: 3128: 3123: 3118: 3113: 3108: 3103: 3097: 3095: 3091: 3090: 3088: 3087: 3080: 3073: 3065: 3063: 3059: 3058: 3056: 3055: 3050: 3045: 3040: 3035: 3030: 3020: 3014: 3012: 3008: 3007: 3005: 3004: 2999: 2994: 2989: 2984: 2982:Leopold Mannes 2979: 2974: 2969: 2967:George Eastman 2964: 2962:Colby Chandler 2958: 2956: 2952: 2951: 2949: 2948: 2946:Wratten number 2943: 2933: 2927: 2925: 2919: 2918: 2916: 2915: 2910: 2907:Changing Focus 2902: 2900: 2896: 2895: 2893: 2892: 2887: 2882: 2877: 2872: 2867: 2862: 2857: 2852: 2847: 2842: 2837: 2832: 2827: 2822: 2817: 2812: 2807: 2802: 2797: 2792: 2786: 2784: 2783:Other products 2780: 2779: 2776: 2775: 2773: 2772: 2767: 2762: 2757: 2751: 2749: 2745: 2744: 2742: 2741: 2736: 2731: 2726: 2721: 2715: 2713: 2709: 2708: 2706: 2705: 2700: 2694: 2692: 2690:Color reversal 2686: 2685: 2683: 2682: 2677: 2672: 2667: 2662: 2657: 2652: 2647: 2642: 2636: 2634: 2627: 2623: 2622: 2619: 2618: 2616: 2615: 2610: 2605: 2600: 2595: 2590: 2585: 2579: 2577: 2573: 2572: 2570: 2569: 2563: 2561: 2557: 2556: 2554: 2553: 2548: 2543: 2538: 2533: 2528: 2522: 2520: 2516: 2515: 2513: 2512: 2507: 2501: 2499: 2495: 2494: 2491: 2490: 2488: 2487: 2482: 2477: 2471: 2469: 2465: 2464: 2462: 2461: 2456: 2451: 2446: 2441: 2436: 2431: 2426: 2421: 2416: 2411: 2406: 2401: 2396: 2390: 2388: 2382: 2381: 2379: 2378: 2373: 2368: 2363: 2358: 2353: 2348: 2343: 2338: 2333: 2327: 2325: 2308: 2307: 2305: 2304: 2299: 2293: 2291: 2282: 2275: 2271: 2270: 2268: 2267: 2262: 2257: 2252: 2247: 2241: 2239: 2235: 2234: 2229: 2227: 2226: 2219: 2212: 2204: 2198: 2197: 2156:Google Scholar 2127: 2126:External links 2124: 2121: 2120: 2095: 2078: 2065: 2052: 2039: 2026: 2013: 2000: 1987: 1973: 1951: 1939:Seungwoo Son, 1932: 1923: 1911: 1886: 1867: 1855: 1830: 1817: 1813:Berkeley Tech. 1798: 1785: 1772: 1757: 1740: 1731: 1694: 1681: 1668: 1649: 1636: 1623: 1610: 1608:(2d ed. 2008). 1592: 1573: 1558: 1536: 1517: 1498: 1475: 1452: 1440: 1428: 1413: 1404: 1395: 1386: 1377: 1355: 1346: 1337: 1328: 1319: 1310: 1301: 1292: 1283: 1274: 1265: 1256: 1247: 1238: 1223: 1214: 1202: 1193: 1184: 1175: 1165: 1153: 1131: 1122: 1113: 1101: 1077: 1076: 1063: 1060: 1041: 1040: 1037: 1034: 861: 858: 831: 830:Lawrence Fesca 828: 748: 745: 710: 707: 677: 671: 644: 641: 615: 614:Mark Patterson 612: 593: 590: 588: 585: 583: 580: 554: 551: 525: 522: 438: 435: 415:Justice Scalia 399:Justices White 387: 384: 350: 347: 329: 326: 309: 306: 285: 284: 278: 277: 273: 272: 269: 265: 264: 261: 257: 256: 252: 251: 250: 249: 227:Antonin Scalia 211:Harry Blackmun 200: 197: 192: 186: 185: 181: 180: 175: 174: 170: 169: 147: 143: 142: 113: 109: 108: 104: 103: 88: 72: 68: 67: 62: 61:Full case name 58: 57: 51: 50: 45: 37: 36: 28: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 3217: 3206: 3203: 3201: 3198: 3196: 3193: 3191: 3188: 3186: 3183: 3181: 3178: 3177: 3175: 3160: 3157: 3154: 3150: 3148: 3145: 3144: 3142: 3138: 3132: 3129: 3127: 3124: 3122: 3119: 3117: 3114: 3112: 3109: 3107: 3104: 3102: 3099: 3098: 3096: 3092: 3086: 3085: 3081: 3079: 3078: 3074: 3072: 3071: 3067: 3066: 3064: 3060: 3054: 3051: 3049: 3046: 3044: 3041: 3039: 3036: 3034: 3031: 3028: 3024: 3023:Kodak Heights 3021: 3019: 3016: 3015: 3013: 3009: 3003: 3000: 2998: 2995: 2993: 2992:Steven Sasson 2990: 2988: 2985: 2983: 2980: 2978: 2975: 2973: 2970: 2968: 2965: 2963: 2960: 2959: 2957: 2953: 2947: 2944: 2941: 2937: 2934: 2932: 2929: 2928: 2926: 2920: 2914: 2911: 2909: 2908: 2904: 2903: 2901: 2897: 2891: 2888: 2886: 2883: 2881: 2878: 2876: 2873: 2871: 2868: 2866: 2863: 2861: 2860:Motorola Zine 2858: 2856: 2853: 2851: 2848: 2846: 2843: 2841: 2838: 2836: 2833: 2831: 2828: 2826: 2825:Ektra (phone) 2823: 2821: 2818: 2816: 2813: 2811: 2808: 2806: 2803: 2801: 2798: 2796: 2793: 2791: 2788: 2787: 2785: 2781: 2771: 2770:Technical Pan 2768: 2766: 2763: 2761: 2758: 2756: 2753: 2752: 2750: 2746: 2740: 2737: 2735: 2732: 2730: 2727: 2725: 2722: 2720: 2717: 2716: 2714: 2710: 2704: 2701: 2699: 2696: 2695: 2693: 2691: 2687: 2681: 2678: 2676: 2673: 2671: 2668: 2666: 2663: 2661: 2658: 2656: 2653: 2651: 2648: 2646: 2643: 2641: 2638: 2637: 2635: 2631: 2628: 2624: 2614: 2611: 2609: 2606: 2604: 2603:Stereo Camera 2601: 2599: 2596: 2594: 2591: 2589: 2586: 2584: 2581: 2580: 2578: 2574: 2568: 2567:Retina Reflex 2565: 2564: 2562: 2558: 2552: 2549: 2547: 2544: 2542: 2539: 2537: 2534: 2532: 2529: 2527: 2524: 2523: 2521: 2517: 2511: 2508: 2506: 2503: 2502: 2500: 2496: 2486: 2483: 2481: 2478: 2476: 2473: 2472: 2470: 2466: 2460: 2457: 2455: 2452: 2450: 2447: 2445: 2442: 2440: 2437: 2435: 2432: 2430: 2427: 2425: 2422: 2420: 2417: 2415: 2412: 2410: 2407: 2405: 2402: 2400: 2397: 2395: 2392: 2391: 2389: 2387: 2383: 2377: 2374: 2372: 2369: 2367: 2364: 2362: 2359: 2357: 2354: 2352: 2349: 2347: 2344: 2342: 2339: 2337: 2334: 2332: 2329: 2328: 2326: 2324: 2321: 2317: 2313: 2309: 2303: 2300: 2298: 2295: 2294: 2292: 2290: 2286: 2283: 2279: 2276: 2272: 2266: 2263: 2261: 2258: 2256: 2255:Kodak Express 2253: 2251: 2248: 2246: 2243: 2242: 2240: 2236: 2232: 2231:Eastman Kodak 2225: 2220: 2218: 2213: 2211: 2206: 2205: 2202: 2193: 2184: 2175: 2166: 2157: 2148: 2147:CourtListener 2141: 2137: 2134: 2130: 2129: 2125: 2117: 2113: 2108: 2107: 2099: 2096: 2091:Wash. L. Rev. 2088: 2082: 2079: 2075: 2069: 2066: 2062: 2056: 2053: 2049: 2043: 2040: 2036: 2030: 2027: 2023: 2017: 2014: 2010: 2004: 2001: 1997: 1991: 1988: 1984: 1983: 1977: 1974: 1970: 1966: 1961: 1955: 1952: 1944: 1943: 1936: 1933: 1927: 1924: 1920: 1915: 1912: 1908: 1905: 1901: 1897: 1896: 1890: 1887: 1882:Temp. L. Rev. 1879: 1878: 1871: 1868: 1864: 1859: 1856: 1852: 1848: 1843: 1837: 1835: 1831: 1827: 1821: 1818: 1810: 1809: 1802: 1799: 1795: 1789: 1786: 1782: 1776: 1773: 1761: 1758: 1750: 1744: 1741: 1735: 1732: 1728: 1724: 1720: 1716: 1713: 1709: 1705: 1704: 1698: 1695: 1691: 1685: 1682: 1678: 1672: 1669: 1661: 1660: 1653: 1650: 1646: 1640: 1637: 1633: 1627: 1624: 1620: 1614: 1611: 1606: 1602: 1596: 1593: 1585: 1584: 1577: 1574: 1570: 1567: 1562: 1559: 1551: 1550: 1543: 1541: 1537: 1529: 1528: 1521: 1518: 1510: 1509: 1502: 1499: 1495: 1492: 1488: 1484: 1479: 1476: 1472: 1469: 1465: 1461: 1456: 1453: 1444: 1441: 1432: 1429: 1425: 1424: 1417: 1414: 1408: 1405: 1399: 1396: 1390: 1387: 1381: 1378: 1374: 1370: 1365: 1359: 1356: 1350: 1347: 1341: 1338: 1332: 1329: 1323: 1320: 1314: 1311: 1305: 1302: 1296: 1293: 1287: 1284: 1278: 1275: 1269: 1266: 1260: 1257: 1251: 1248: 1242: 1239: 1235: 1230: 1228: 1224: 1218: 1215: 1209: 1207: 1203: 1197: 1194: 1188: 1185: 1179: 1176: 1169: 1166: 1160: 1158: 1154: 1150: 1146: 1141: 1135: 1132: 1126: 1123: 1117: 1114: 1110: 1105: 1102: 1098: 1095: 1091: 1087: 1082: 1079: 1075: 1073: 1069: 1061: 1059: 1057: 1053: 1049: 1044: 1038: 1035: 1032: 1031: 1030: 1027: 1024: 1020: 1016: 1010: 1005: 1003: 999: 995: 991: 986: 982: 976: 971: 967: 962: 959: 953: 950: 946: 942: 937: 935: 931: 926: 922: 918: 913: 911: 910: 904: 901: 897: 893: 887: 882: 879: 877: 872: 867: 859: 857: 852: 849: 844: 841: 837: 829: 826: 823: 818: 814: 809: 805: 802: 798: 792: 789: 787: 783: 778: 772: 767: 762: 757: 754: 746: 744: 739: 734: 731: 730:present value 724: 719: 716: 708: 706: 702: 699: 695: 689: 687: 683: 675: 672: 669: 667: 663: 659: 653: 650: 642: 640: 638: 634: 630: 625: 621: 613: 610: 605: 603: 599: 591: 586: 581: 579: 575: 571: 567: 563: 559: 552: 550: 546: 542: 538: 530: 523: 521: 516: 511: 507: 502: 498: 492: 487: 485: 484:amicus curiae 479: 473: 471: 463: 458: 455: 451: 447: 443: 436: 430: 426: 424: 420: 416: 412: 408: 404: 400: 396: 392: 385: 383: 379: 375: 371: 367: 364: 359: 355: 348: 346: 343: 338: 333: 327: 325: 322: 318: 315: 307: 305: 302: 297: 296:Supreme Court 293: 292: 283: 279: 274: 270: 266: 262: 258: 255:Case opinions 253: 248: 244: 240: 236: 232: 228: 224: 220: 216: 212: 208: 204: 201: 198: 196: 193: 191:Chief Justice 190: 189: 187: 182: 176: 171: 167: 163: 159: 156: 152: 148: 144: 140: 136: 132: 128: 124: 121: 117: 114: 110: 105: 100: 96: 92: 86: 85: 80: 77: 73: 69: 66: 63: 59: 52: 48: 38: 33: 27: 19: 3159:Sponsorships 3082: 3076: 3075: 3068: 2987:Kenneth Mees 2913:The Brownies 2905: 2719:Eastmancolor 2238:Subsidiaries 2132: 2104: 2098: 2086: 2081: 2073: 2068: 2060: 2055: 2047: 2042: 2034: 2029: 2021: 2016: 2008: 2003: 1995: 1990: 1981: 1976: 1959: 1954: 1941: 1935: 1926: 1918: 1914: 1909: (1908). 1893: 1889: 1876: 1870: 1862: 1858: 1849:, 1326 ( 1841: 1825: 1820: 1807: 1801: 1793: 1788: 1780: 1775: 1760: 1748: 1743: 1734: 1726: 1722: 1718: 1701: 1697: 1689: 1684: 1676: 1671: 1658: 1652: 1644: 1639: 1631: 1626: 1618: 1613: 1595: 1582: 1576: 1568: 1565: 1561: 1548: 1526: 1520: 1511:, 73 N.C.L. 1507: 1501: 1496: (1986). 1482: 1478: 1473: (1978). 1459: 1455: 1443: 1431: 1421: 1416: 1407: 1398: 1389: 1380: 1363: 1358: 1349: 1340: 1331: 1322: 1313: 1304: 1295: 1286: 1277: 1268: 1259: 1250: 1241: 1233: 1217: 1196: 1187: 1178: 1168: 1139: 1134: 1125: 1116: 1108: 1104: 1085: 1081: 1065: 1056:Westinghouse 1055: 1051: 1047: 1045: 1042: 1028: 1022: 1018: 1014: 1012: 1007: 1001: 997: 993: 989: 984: 980: 978: 973: 969: 964: 957: 954: 938: 933: 929: 924: 920: 916: 914: 907: 905: 899: 895: 891: 889: 884: 880: 875: 870: 865: 863: 854: 847: 846: 839: 835: 833: 821: 816: 812: 811: 807: 800: 796: 794: 790: 785: 781: 776: 774: 769: 764: 759: 752: 750: 741: 736: 726: 721: 714: 712: 704: 693: 691: 685: 681: 679: 673: 665: 661: 657: 655: 648: 646: 636: 632: 628: 623: 619: 617: 607: 601: 597: 595: 576: 572: 568: 564: 560: 556: 547: 543: 539: 535: 518: 513: 509: 504: 500: 495: 489: 483: 481: 476: 466: 460: 456: 452: 448: 444: 440: 389: 380: 376: 372: 368: 362: 360: 356: 352: 344: 340: 335: 331: 323: 319: 312:Since 1975, 311: 290: 289: 288: 276:Laws applied 242: 239:David Souter 230: 218: 206: 150: 115: 107:Case history 82: 64: 26: 3062:Court cases 3053:Kodak Tower 2931:DX encoding 2712:Color print 2626:Camera film 2541:Kodak 35 RF 2519:Rangefinder 2118: 1981). 2114:, 647 ( 1971: 1999). 1949:109 (2002). 1853: 2000). 1679:at 1212–13. 1643:Henderson, 1630:Henderson, 1617:Henderson, 1375: 1997). 1151: 1990). 958:Kodak-Xerox 878:at 350–51. 747:Jill Protos 643:Eleanor Fox 604:, he said: 203:Byron White 149:On remand, 133:. granted, 3174:Categories 3027:Building 9 2922:Technical 2865:Picture CD 2703:Kodachrome 2698:Ektachrome 2588:Instamatic 2505:Ciné-Kodak 2341:400 series 2336:300 series 2050:at 168–69. 1945:, 2002 U. 1783:at 670–71. 1647:at 467–68. 1621:at 465–66. 1062:References 1019:Intergraph 925:Intergraph 801:Matsushita 582:Commentary 337:customers. 308:Background 146:Subsequent 95:U.S. LEXIS 93:265; 1992 3094:Processes 2924:standards 2880:Starmatic 2850:Kodascope 2835:KAF-10500 2820:Ektaprint 2598:Starflash 2531:Retinette 2386:EasyShare 2376:Pro SLR/n 2371:Pro SLR/c 2289:DC series 1969:Fed. Cir. 1851:Fed. Cir. 1588:Antitrust 1556:8 (1992). 1554:Antitrust 1532:Antitrust 1072:talk page 701:products. 682:Antitrust 674:Antitrust 622:that the 301:antitrust 91:L. Ed. 2d 71:Citations 2890:Versamat 2815:Colorama 2536:Kodak 35 2131:Text of 2116:9th Cir. 1747:Protos, 1715:574, 587 1692:at 1215. 1688:Protos, 1675:Protos, 1373:9th Cir. 1149:9th Cir. 1068:Bluebook 943:and the 936:) case. 425:joined. 413:joined. 260:Majority 127:9th Cir. 3140:Related 2875:S-mount 2840:Keykode 2830:Gallery 2748:B&W 2680:Super 8 2633:Formats 2583:Brownie 2366:Pro 14n 2281:Digital 2274:Cameras 2102:Citing 2076:at 191. 2063:at 171. 2037:at 168. 2024:at 151. 2011:at 150. 1998:at 147. 1828:at 352. 1824:Gully, 1796:at 672. 1792:Fesca, 1779:Fesca, 1634:at 466. 676:article 524:Dissent 407:Kennedy 403:Stevens 268:Dissent 173:Holding 129:1990); 3011:Places 2955:People 2885:Ultima 2810:Cineon 2739:Portra 2576:Others 2560:Reflex 2546:Signet 2526:Retina 2475:Pixpro 2468:Others 2449:DX7590 2444:DX6490 2439:DX6440 2434:DX4530 2429:CX4230 2424:CX4200 2302:DC3200 2260:Qualex 2195: 2189: 2186: 2180: 2177: 2174:Leagle 2171: 2168: 2165:Justia 2162: 2159: 2153: 2150: 2144: 2110:, 1967: ( 1963:, 1898:, 1845:, 1706:, 1485:, 1462:, 1371: ( 1367:, 1147: ( 1143:, 1088:, 871:should 423:Thomas 411:Souter 245: 243:· 241: 233: 231:· 229: 221: 219:· 217: 209: 207:· 205: 153:, 125 3205:Kodak 2899:Media 2765:Tri-X 2760:T-MAX 2724:Ektar 2551:Ektra 2498:Movie 2394:C1013 2361:DCS 3 2356:DCS 1 2351:D6000 2346:D2000 2297:DC215 2138: 2089:, 73 2074:supra 2072:Son, 2061:supra 2059:Son, 2048:supra 2046:Son, 2035:supra 2033:Son, 2022:supra 2020:Son, 2009:supra 2007:Son, 1996:supra 1994:Son, 1902: 1880:, 74 1826:supra 1811:, 13 1794:supra 1781:supra 1749:supra 1723:Kodak 1719:Kodak 1710: 1690:supra 1677:supra 1662:, 43 1645:supra 1632:supra 1619:supra 1586:, 63 1569:Kodak 1530:, 62 1489: 1466: 1092: 1023:Kodak 1015:Xerox 1002:Xerox 998:Kodak 994:Xerox 990:Kodak 985:Xerox 981:Kodak 934:Xerox 921:Kodak 900:Kodak 876:supra 848:Kodak 840:Kodak 822:Kodak 817:Kodak 813:Kodak 797:Kodak 784:with 782:Kodak 777:Kodak 715:Kodak 694:Kodak 686:Kodak 666:Kodak 662:Kodak 658:Kodak 649:Kodak 637:Kodak 624:Kodak 314:Kodak 164: 137: 112:Prior 3121:K-14 3116:RA-4 3106:C-41 3101:C-22 2675:Disc 2593:Pony 2459:V570 2454:P880 2419:C813 2414:C613 2409:C340 2404:C330 2399:C300 2323:DSLR 2250:Creo 2140:U.S. 1904:U.S. 1808:Note 1712:U.S. 1552:, 7 1513:Rev. 1491:U.S. 1468:U.S. 1094:U.S. 932:(or 692:The 421:and 409:and 397:and 166:U.S. 158:1195 155:F.3d 139:U.S. 131:cert 120:F.2d 84:more 76:U.S. 74:504 3111:E-6 2855:KPR 2670:828 2665:616 2660:135 2655:127 2650:126 2645:120 2640:110 2331:100 2312:DCS 2136:504 1907:405 1900:210 1727:any 1708:475 1566:See 1494:447 1487:476 1471:679 1464:435 1097:451 1090:504 162:523 135:501 123:612 99:CCH 79:451 3176:: 2320:EF 2316:NF 1833:^ 1539:^ 1226:^ 1205:^ 1156:^ 405:, 401:, 3155:" 3151:" 3029:) 3025:( 2942:) 2938:( 2318:/ 2223:e 2216:t 2209:v 1099:. 125:( 87:) 81:( 20:)

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.

Knowledge (XXG)

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.

Index