132:
respectively. In both a high and low salary option, the employee will benefit more from choosing the low effort option. In a high salary path, the high effort choice yields a utility of 2 for the employee whereas in the low effort path the utility is 3. In the low salary high effort path, the employees utility will be 0 compared to the low effort choice which results in a utility of 1. Thus the employee will choose low effort regardless of the salary choice made by the employer. Moving a decision back, it is now the employers choice between high or low salary. Knowing the employee will choose low effort, the employer will also choose the option that maximises their utility. In the high salary low effort option, their utility eventuates to 0 whereas in the low salary low effort option, their utility is 1. Knowing the employee will choose the low effort option as it maximises their utility, the employer will choose low salary. This will lead to the equilibrium of low salary and low effort.
195:
transactions from beginning to end. In this way, the influence of expectations of both sides on the "long-term future" is excluded, and the choice of the level of effort of "employees" is completely self-conscious. According to the traditional economic view, employees will be willing to accept any wage greater than 0, and provide the minimum level of effort after receiving the salary. However, the experimental results show that employers always offer wages much higher than the minimum level, while employees almost always provide efforts much higher than the minimum level. This proves that even if there are no other supervision and punishment mechanisms, the wage level in the labor market is often higher than the market-clearing price for some "fair" and "goodwill" motives in exchange for the labor provider's initiative and loyalty. It's also an example of how social norms and reciprocity can affect human behavior even in the absence of regulation.
203:
were required to perform a specific task for six hours in total. Each participant would receive an hourly wage that had been previously advertised to them. The participants in each experiment were divided into two groups, one of which were informed that the actual wage they would be receiving was higher than the wage advertised to them. Each of the two experiments yielded similar results. For both experiments, the group receiving the increased wage only performed the task more efficiently in the initial stage of the task. Towards the end of the six hours, the groups yielded similar outputs and were performing at the same productivity level. While these results are inconsistent with previous laboratory finds, they endorse one feature of "reciprocal behaviour", that is, as time goes on, preferential treatment will be taken for granted, thus reducing the willingness of employees to supply labour.
219:
two followers, who had the option to award or not award each other with gifts. The originator received an initial amount of ÂŁ8.3, and each follower received ÂŁ11.1. The originator could offer a fixed amount of ÂŁ1.6 to a follower, while a follower could give ÂŁ1, ÂŁ2, or ÂŁ3, with a corresponding reduction in their payoff. The experiment aimed to explore the effects of gift-giving on the players' payoffs and the dynamics of reciprocity. The study found that the frequency of non-gift giving was lower than what an egoistic payoff maximization assumption would predict, with an average non-gift frequency of 69% in the studied one-shot games. However, it was still over 50% in almost all cases. The paragraph also notes that it is difficult to create models of human behavior without access to the hidden variables that determine the players' choices.
240:
to innocuous changes. Groups of consisting of an emploer and an employee were chosen whereby the employer chooses the wage for their employee. employees were paid for their work at a self-chosen effort level and the corresponding cost of effort for that level. one group was presented with a payoff table, detailing employee and employer wages and the other ignorant of potential payoff. Charness found that when a payoff table was included in the experiment that demarcated the relationship between wages, effort and payoff, gift exchange was sharply reduced. Charness suggests that this reduction in gift exchange could be due to the framing effect. The framing affect would reduce positive reciprocation by reducing the positive effect caused by an unexpected bonus and replacing it with a mutual understanding of the firms expectations.
236:
participants randomly selected into a employer or employee category. The managers would offer the workers a wage and an effort level that was required and the workers would choose to accept or decline the offer. The acceptance rate for the groups according to effort and wage were measured. The study suggested that there was little evidence for positive reciprocity and that laboratory gift exchange is highly sensitive to the parametrization of the model and the way the model is implemented. Engelmann also found that workers experienced negative reciprocity to negative wages. Engelmann suggested that gift-exchange is highly sensitive to changes in the parameters of the game (parametrization), the framing effect and anonymity. This has important consequence for empirical implementation.
75:, strike and the decline of unionization. The gift-exchange theory also incorporates a social component, where homogenous agents who are employed with an equivalent wage level will exert greater effort. This then continues to result in a higher market efficiency and higher rent than those agents receiving different wages. The first examination of this component is referred to as the fair uniform-wage hypothesis, where experiments establish the significant efficiency premium of uniform wages. However, this is not a consequential result of a stronger level or reciprocity by the agents, although the reinforcement of endorsing these options on the side of principals with uniform wages is why implementing boundaries to freedom can lead to efficiency-enhancing results.
207:
game as many times before were far more likely to follow the Nash equilibrium, unable to achieve the higher possible pay-offs. However, if the game is repeated more times or the players were 'partners' (worked together and knew each other better) they had far greater success at maintaining higher pay-offs in the game. This study published by the
Tinbergen Institute also concluded that âsimplerâ or smaller gifts were far more likely to be reciprocated and maintained appropriately than larger gifts that could be more appealing to exploit. Van Den Akker, Olmo R. van Assen et al. found that subjects in the gift-exchange game exhibit selfish behaviour in specific labour markets and other principal-agent environments.
223:
to free-riding at work can lead to employee strikes or the intervention of unions and other labor organizations to coordinate. As the employer pays a flat wage, such collective action may prompt the employer to resort to dismissal mechanisms, i.e. firing the free-riding. If unions and other labor organizations step in to coordinate, employees may face increased employment risks in the absence of success in reducing free-rider behavior. These effects may help to understand the reasons for the decline in unionization in developed economies. For example, in the US, companies adopt enterprise resource planning and applications to simplify the adjustment of wage differentiation.
299:
conducted in a laboratory setting, such as Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), which have presented strong evidence of the relationship between increased fixed wages and its influence in eliciting positive reciprocity from employees in the form of increased effort. However, these results have not been reflected in field studies, which have largely found no or little evidence of the relationship. Kube, Marechal, and Puppe (2012) found that in the field setting, there was no significant increase in effort after increased fixed wages. However, they did find that gifts of equivalent value that took alternative forms than fixed wages significantly increased effort.
303:
doesn't provide any attention to their employees) who is paying a higher wage to retain their employees. Eventually, the altruistic manager's marginal cost of attention exceeds a point where increasing the employees wage becomes a better alternative. This outcome is dependent on the employee exhibiting "neutral" or "warm" feelings towards their employer such that their expected utility increases with the attention they receive. Rather than contradict, this model supplements traditional game-exchange theory by demonstrating in a real world setting, managers have socioemotional tools at their disposal that may be preferred to a monetary gift.
215:
problem of information asymmetry between employees and employers. When employees have access to market information about average wages, they decide whether to work hard or not by comparing their current wage with the average wage and getting a relative reciprocal from their employer. But this increases the pressure on employers and competition between them, as wages are determined by the market offer. Especially, in organizations where control is separated from ownership, the relationship between wage increases and effort cannot be observed through the relative reciprocal.
336:
results into real world relationships found in the labour market. The paper explored multi-level hierarchies and focused on the complex structure where âownership and control are separatedâ. The classical gift-exchange game was manipulated to mimic a trilateral relationship where the firm is controlled by a manager but owned by a shareholder. This experiment found that employees rewarded higher wages with higher effort regardless of whether the manager shared in the firmsâ profits or not.
155:
sub-optimal outcomes for both parties, even when cooperation is in the best interest of both players. In the gift-exchange game, the choices of all players are interdependent, and the social norms of reciprocity incentivize participants to act in ways that benefit the group as a whole. In our follow-up experiments with the gift exchange game, we found that only a few people in the real world would choose the minimum wage and minimum effort to reach the
104:
decision. So employers have no incentive to pay high salaries if workers know what they are choosing. If the employer pays a higher salary, it is irrational for the employee to put extra effort, since effort will reduce his or her payoff. It is also irrational for the employee to put extra effort while receiving a lower salary. Therefore, the minimum salary and the minimum effort is the equilibrium of this game.
108:
307:
gift exchange in the fieldâ. The study identified a few factors that could be impacting gift exchange effectiveness such as âhabituation to the gift, fatigue, and small gift sizeâ. Accounting for these factors and subsequently implementing a field experiment to remove them, the studyâs results found no evidence to support gift exchange in the work place.
199:"fairness" or compensation, considering that they are after all the employer's money. (2) If, at almost the same income level, employees are told that the wage level is determined by the experimenter, they will think that they don't have to pay a lot of responsibility for the "loss" to the employer, so they will relatively reduce their efforts.
92:
310:
The multitude of factors for this discrepancy between laboratory and field settings is the topic of much subsequent research, but it is not entirely clear. While conflicting results do degrade the reliability of the application of the gift exchange game, it is important to note that it still provides
218:
Moreover, Tagiew and
Ignatov (2014) have conducted an experiment at the University of Nottingham using one-shot games, where participants did not participate more than once. The study included participates of both genders, with an average age of 20. Each game involved three players, an originator and
206:
Some other observations noted about whether players will follow the expected nash equilibrium or were more likely to deviate and provide the gift and extra effort included, how much the game was repeated and if the players were familiar to each other. Players who were strangers or had not entered the
198:
The experiment of charness (2000, JEBO) wanted to explore what would happen if the benefit of high wages was not given by the employer but a random result or a third party. The results of this experiment are as follows: (1) if wages are generated randomly, employees usually give extra efforts to show
103:
solution for rational players predicts that employeesâ effort will be minimum for one-shot and finitely repeated interactions. The difference constitutes by the sequentiality of gift-exchange game. In the gift exchange game, the employer pays a high or low salary first and then the employee makes the
83:
In the game theory, the equilibrium analysis can be implemented to determine and examine strategic decisions between the players in a game. Nash equilibrium is the situation of a game where no player has an incentive to change the strategy given the strategic decision based on the other player. It is
306:
Many laboratory experiments support the theory of using gift exchange as an incentive mechanism. However, field evidence has resulted in conflicting effectiveness. A study conducted by
Evesteves-Sorenson and Macera (2013) aimed to investigate removing any theoretical factors that could be âdampening
302:
One particular non-monetary gift believed to incentivise employees is the attention they receive from their employer. In a model developed by Prof. Robert Dur, altruistic managers who signal a level of attention towards their employees can achieve the same level of output as an egoistic manager (who
239:
Gary
Charness, Guillaume R. Frechette, and John H. kagelâs experiment, 'How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?', studied the effect of gift-exchange in the US. While they found positive reciprocity attributable to the gift-exchange effect, they also found that the gift-exchange effect is sensitive
222:
This game can help us to understand strikes, coordination, and dismissal in uniform wage settings. In a gift-exchange game in a multi-employee environment with collective action mechanisms, the employer offers a uniform wage. The breakdown of trust and reciprocity between employers and employees due
214:
Kean Siang, Ch'Ng's experiment explores the role of relative information and reciprocity in the gift-exchange game. They found that lack of enforcement was not the only reason to explain employees' reluctance to work hard, so the concept of 'relative reciprocal' was creatively introduced. There is a
131:
can also be used to determine the equilibrium of this game. As both players are rational, they will both work to maximise their utility. Looking at game tree shown on the right, the last decision is determined by the employee. The utilities for the employer and employee are outlined in red and blue
235:
Dirk
Engelmann and Andreas Ortmannâs study: âThe Robustness Of Laboratory Gift exchange: A Reconsiderationâ took a subject pool of students from economics and business courses at the University of Berlin and the Institute For Empirical Research In Economics at the University of Zurich and had
202:
Gneezy and List (2006, Econometrica) were two of the first economists to investigate whether similar results found in the previous laboratory experiments could be replicated in a field setting. They did so by conducting two separate experiments, each involving a number of volunteer participants who
175:
was conducted to observe the difference in findings that were predicted to occur when the gift-exchange game performed between one employer one employee was compared to a game performed between one employer and four employees. The results indicated the number of employees did not have a significant
335:
Most laboratory and field studies regarding the gift-exchange game focus on a bilateral relationship (one employee and one employer). An experiment conducted by
Maximiano, Sloof and Sonnemans (2013) focused on creating a more complex laboratory environment to allow for further extrapolation of the
269:
The results demonstrate the commonality for individuals to experience a feeling of duty or reciprocate actions with commensurate worth or significance. To put in other words, If the employer expects the employee to put in a higher effort when offered a higher salary it may be in the employees best
194:
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993, QJE) designed a market in which "employers" and "employees" do not meet. All wages and effort and "employees" are put in different rooms for many experiments, and are told that the counterparties of each transaction are different, and both sides keep "anonymous"
210:
Chaudhuri, Ananish Sbai, Erwann found in a study of sex differences in trust and reciprocity in repeated gift exchange games that there were no significant gender differences in trust, and women performed better in reciprocity. However, when the experimental context was placed in a specific labor
144:
when strategies are involved in the decision-making between the players. However, there are key differences between the two games. The difference constitutes by the sequentiality of gift-exchange game, with the gift exchange games being based on social norms of reciprocity, where participants are
70:
as it demonstrates that self-interest maximization is not the sole determinant of economic decision-making. Rather, reciprocity is a fundamental factor that shapes individuals' behaviour in economic contexts. By simulating labor relations between an employer and employee, the game explicates that
331:
The experiment of Franke et al is based on a modified gift-exchange game, where workers can participate in wage setting. The results of this experiment show that when workers have the right to make wage decisions, they show a positive incentive to work harder. However, if firms want employees to
298:
Akerlof's model has become the topic of several experiments aimed at understanding employee motivation and behaviour, as well as the effect of fairness from employers. The results of these experiments have been mixed and are highly dependent on the experimental setting. Several studies have been
46:
to model reciprocacy in labor relations. The gift-exchange game simulates a labor-management relationship execution problem in the principal-agent problem in labor economics. The simplest form of the game involves two players â an employee and an employer. The employer first decides whether they
248:
Reciprocity is a fundamental concept within game theory that offers the idea that agents are more likely to cooperate if they believe that the cooperation will be reciprocated back. Ie. You do something for me, Iâll do something for you; a mutual gain. Within the gift exchange game, it has been
319:
The gift-exchange game is not only used in the workplace but can also be practiced in other areas. For example, in the field of charitable giving, when a charity first makes a gift to a potential donor as part of a donation solicitation, more generous gifts are associated with higher frequency
277:
Reciprocity within the gift exchange game shows how social interaction play a large role in what are considered economic decisions and is the factor that balances and maintains the stability between give and take. In recognising the important of reciprocity, employees and employers can foster
253:
to investigate the gift exchange theory in a natural setting. Findings found that out of roughly 10,000 solicitation letter to potential donors, one third contained no gift to accompany the call for donations, one third a small gift and one third a large gift with random assignments. The data
154:
aims to show how rational decisions can lead to sub-optimal outcomes for both parties, even when cooperation is in the best interest of both parties. The goal of both games is to maximize the amount of money each player receives, but in the prisoner's dilemma, rational decisions can lead to
270:
interests to put in a greater effort. Additionally, if the employee puts in a higher effort it may result in an increase in wage down the track. Thus indicating that the gift exchange game may have multiple equilibria, dependant on expectations, beliefs and if
294:
wage. According to
Akerlof's model, this is because the workerâs effort not only depends on the effort itself, wage rate if employed, and the unemployed benefit if unemployed, but also the norm for effort. Thus, to affect these norms, firms may pay more.
332:
exert high effort, firms need to offer high enough offers or delegate substantial decisions to employees. In practical applications, different mechanisms of co-determination might lead to very different incentive structures and performance outcomes.
71:
when employer offer a higher salary, employees are more inclined to reciprocate with great effort, leading to mutually beneficial outcomes. Gift exchange games have been used to study economic and social phenomena such as labor contracts,
84:
implemented to evaluate these situations and the decisions by the players that are made affecting each players out come. The extra effort in gift-exchange games is modelled to be a negative payoff if not compensated by salary. The
63:. If the employer pays extra salary and the employee puts in extra effort, then both players are better off than otherwise. The relationship between an investor and an investee has been investigated as the same type of a game.
254:
confirmed that potential donors were much more likely to donate with the relative frequency being 75% more likely to receive a donation from a large gift recipient. These results are backed by a number of similar studies from
290:. George A. Akerlof described labor contracts as "partial gift exchange". Unlike what is depicted in the simple model above, in real life, employees may exceed the minimum work required and firms may pay more than the
226:
A recent study in 2023 showed that in the gift-exchange game of labor relations, employees' costless and non-binding voice leads firms to reduce the actual workload in agreed contracts rather than increase wages.
145:
incentivized to act in ways that other players deem fair. The goal of the game is to maximize the amount of money each player receives, and to follow the expectations of the group. Although, in contrast to the
167:
A positive relationship between salary and effort has been observed in a large number of gift-exchange experiments performed in a laboratory setting. This behaviour obviously deviates from the equilibrium.
149:
two participants are faced with either cooperation or betrayal, without knowing what the other players will decide and the payoff of each possible outcome is determined by the choices of both players. The
249:
identified within numerous large-scale studies that the higher the gift the higher the quality levels or effort put in. An example of reciprocity due to social norms was a field study conducted by the
47:
should award a higher salary to the employee. The employee then decides whether to reciprocate with a higher level of effort (work harder) due to the salary increase or not. Like
1817:
88:
of own extra work is not considered in the payoff structure of this game. Therefore, this model rather fits labor conditions, which are less meaningful for the employees.
627:
943:
1347:
Yamamori, Tetsuo; Iwata, Kazuyuki (3 February 2023). "Wage claim detracts reciprocity in labor relations: an experimental study of gift exchange games".
1533:
Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias (September 2014). "Corporate Social
Responsibility in the work place: Experimental evidence from a gift-exchange game".
609:
1989:
810:
2888:
1689:
Esteves-Sorenson, Constança (September 2018). "Gift
Exchange in the Workplace: Addressing the Conflicting Evidence with a Careful Test".
1910:
Franke, Jörg; Gurtoviy, Ruslan; Mertins, Vanessa (October 2016). "Workers' participation in wage setting: A gift-exchange experiment".
2705:
2240:
2038:
3056:
2524:
2343:
2145:
418:
Kean Siang, ChâNg (1 March 2011). "Role of
Relative Information and Reciprocity in a Gift Exchange Game: An Experimental Study".
2614:
52:
1291:
Chaudhuri, Ananish; Sbai, Erwann (April 2011). "Gender differences in trust and reciprocity in repeated gift exchange games".
1092:
Fehr, Ernst; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Riedl, Arno (1993). "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation".
3051:
2155:
2484:
838:
Fehr, E.; Kirchsteiger, G.; Riedl, A. (1 May 1993). "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation".
2665:
2083:
2058:
610:"Testing a forgotten aspect of Akerlof's gift exchange hypothesis: Relational contracts with individual and uniform wages"
3015:
2441:
2195:
2185:
2120:
1383:
20:
2235:
2215:
2700:
286:
The gift exchange model is used to explain workers' effort and wages provided by firms in the real world, especially
873:
Fehr, Ernst; GĂ€chter, Simon (May 1998). "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans".
2949:
2670:
2328:
2170:
2165:
176:
impact on the level of effort that was chosen, with both mean effort levels increasing with wage at similar rates.
2985:
2908:
2644:
2200:
2125:
1982:
578:
Gose, Karina; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim (August 2014). "Strike, coordination, and dismissal in uniform wage settings".
762:
Charness, Gary; Frechette, Guillaume R.; Kagel, John H. (June 2004). "How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?".
3000:
2733:
2619:
2416:
2210:
2028:
825:
S Kuhn. (1997). Prisonerâs dilemma (Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
287:
263:
188:
2803:
1272:"Sex differences in trust and trustworthiness: A meta-analysis of the trust game and the gift-exchange game".
641:
Ariely, Dan; Kamenica, Emir; Prelec, DraĆŸen (September 2008). "Man's search for meaning: The case of Legos".
3005:
2604:
2574:
2230:
2018:
255:
172:
2939:
3030:
3010:
2990:
2609:
2514:
2373:
2323:
2318:
2250:
2220:
2140:
2068:
1190:"Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments"
1156:"Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments"
2048:
1558:
1437:
621:
2489:
2474:
350:
151:
146:
141:
713:"No Strategy Can Win in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Linking Game Theory and Computer Simulations"
2823:
2808:
2695:
2690:
2594:
2579:
2544:
2509:
2108:
2053:
1975:
2980:
2599:
2549:
2386:
2313:
2293:
2150:
2033:
128:
124:
491:
Berg, Joyce; Dickhaut, John; McCabe, Kevin (July 1995). "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History".
278:
advantageous relationships with others to contribute to more harmonious and productive relations.
2959:
2818:
2649:
2629:
2358:
2263:
2190:
2135:
1892:
1851:
1798:
1706:
1671:
1636:
1601:
1550:
1515:
1417:
1364:
1327:
1308:
1254:
1212:
1109:
1071:
1048:
1026:
981:
973:
921:
855:
779:
668:
508:
397:
271:
259:
250:
180:
72:
1938:
2944:
2913:
2868:
2763:
2634:
2589:
2564:
2494:
2368:
2298:
2288:
2180:
2130:
2078:
1593:
1425:
806:
744:
557:
56:
1429:
805:. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. pp. 1913â1915.
3025:
3020:
2954:
2918:
2898:
2858:
2828:
2783:
2738:
2723:
2680:
2534:
2175:
2112:
2098:
2063:
1953:
1919:
1882:
1843:
1788:
1780:
1747:
1737:
1698:
1663:
1628:
1585:
1542:
1507:
1480:
1409:
1356:
1300:
1246:
1204:
1170:
1136:
1101:
1063:
1018:
963:
955:
913:
882:
847:
803:
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
771:
734:
724:
658:
650:
587:
547:
539:
500:
471:
461:
427:
389:
184:
156:
116:
140:
The payoff matrix of the gift-exchange game has the same structure as the payoff matrix of
2923:
2883:
2838:
2753:
2748:
2469:
2421:
2308:
2073:
2043:
2013:
1450:
360:
323:
Some user interaction systems use the gift-exchange game as the right gamification model.
291:
187:
with minimal salary and minimal effort. Data from another experiment on 123 students from
67:
2788:
1127:
Charness, Gary (July 2000). "Responsibility and effort in an experimental labor market".
775:
528:"Is reciprocity really outcome-based? A second look at gift-exchange with random shocks"
2863:
2853:
2843:
2778:
2768:
2758:
2743:
2539:
2519:
2504:
2499:
2459:
2426:
2411:
2406:
2396:
2205:
1768:
1326:
Tagiew, Rustam; Ignatov, Dmitry I. (2014-02-23). "Reciprocity in Gift-Exchange-Games".
1250:
1022:
826:
739:
712:
552:
527:
380:
Akerlof, A. G.; Yellen, J. (1990). "The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment".
355:
112:
39:
1484:
1140:
886:
431:
3045:
2903:
2893:
2848:
2833:
2813:
2639:
2584:
2559:
2431:
2401:
2391:
2378:
2283:
2225:
2160:
2093:
1896:
1887:
1870:
1847:
1554:
1511:
1368:
1312:
1208:
1174:
1067:
959:
591:
512:
1855:
1710:
1605:
1519:
1421:
1258:
1030:
985:
783:
672:
2878:
2873:
2728:
2303:
1619:
Homans, George C. (1954). "The Cash Posters: A Study of a Group of Working Girls".
925:
43:
1075:
107:
1562:
1304:
798:
2995:
2798:
2793:
2773:
2569:
2554:
2363:
2333:
2268:
2258:
2088:
2023:
1999:
1784:
100:
85:
35:
1923:
1871:"Gift-exchange Game Theory for Gamification on Digital Data Collection Systems"
1360:
654:
476:
2624:
2278:
1957:
1546:
543:
345:
48:
1597:
729:
266:
with the data showing a contrast to what is considered the nash equilibrium.
66:
The gift exchange game serves as a valuable lens through which to understand
2529:
2449:
2273:
901:
60:
1742:
1725:
1702:
1189:
1155:
748:
561:
504:
1405:
2964:
2464:
1576:
Trivers, Robert L. (March 1971). "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism".
1465:
690:
466:
449:
1967:
1802:
1413:
1002:
Heijden, ECM; Nelissen, JHM; Potters, JJM; Verbon, HAA (26 March 2007).
191:
showed a rate of 69% for high salary being paid by employer in advance.
91:
19:
This article is about the game-theoretic model. For the party game, see
2685:
2675:
2353:
1793:
1752:
1724:
Kube, Sebastian; Maréchal, Michel André; Puppe, Clemens (1 June 2012).
1675:
1654:
Akerlof, George A. (1982). "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange".
1640:
1231:
1216:
1113:
1003:
977:
968:
859:
401:
1404:
Charness, Gary; Fréchette, Guillaume R.; Kagel, John H. (2001-10-08).
1087:
1085:
663:
1818:
Revisiting Gift Exchange: Theoretical Considerations and a Field Test
1230:
Heijden, Ecm; Nelissen, Jhm; Potters, Jjm; Verbon, Haa (April 2001).
573:
571:
1937:
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep (January 2013).
1667:
1632:
1105:
851:
393:
1589:
1466:"Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets"
917:
2454:
1332:
1047:
GĂ€chter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin (December 2012).
614:
University of Innsbruck Working Papers in Economics and Statistics
106:
90:
608:
G. Kocher, J. Luhan, Sutter, Martin, Wolfgang, Matthias (2012).
1971:
1384:"The robustness of laboratory gift exchange: A reconsideration"
1464:
Fehr, Ernst; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Riedl, Arno (January 1998).
1726:"The Currency of Reciprocity: Gift Exchange in the Workplace"
902:"Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market"
700:. -1627 (Experimental Economics and Machine Learning): 82â93.
1834:
Falk, Armin (September 2007). "Gift Exchange in the Field".
1816:
EstevesâSorenson, Constança; Macera, Rosario (August 2013).
1498:
Falk, Armin (September 2007). "Gift Exchange in the Field".
942:
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep (2007).
797:
Damer, Steven; Gini, Maria; Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. (2019).
1939:"Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control"
526:
Davis, Brent J.; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Oexl, Regine (2017).
119:. Actions predicted by this equilibrium are colored black.
1869:
Supriyanto, Supriyanto; Fahana, Jefree (30 April 2020).
450:"Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity"
711:
GarcĂa, JuliĂĄn; van Veelen, Matthijs (29 August 2018).
320:
donations, resulting in more donations to the charity.
311:
valuable insight into employee and employer behavior.
127:
game where all players are aware of previous actions,
1769:"Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?"
1823:(Report). Institution for Social and Policy Studies.
1232:"Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory"
1004:"Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory"
827:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/
2973:
2932:
2714:
2658:
2440:
2342:
2249:
2107:
2006:
799:"The Gift Exchange Game: Managing Opponent Actions"
111:Idealistic representation of gift-exchange game in
1875:Lontar Komputer: Jurnal Ilmiah Teknologi Informasi
1049:"The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity*"
211:market, female reciprocity performance decreased.
1382:Engelmann, Dick; Ortmann, Andreas (2002-01-01).
1349:Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
1129:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
643:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
183:showed that only 33% of games ended up in the
1983:
8:
1773:Journal of the European Economic Association
1154:Gneezy, Uri; List, John A (September 2006).
626:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
171:A study on 84 undergraduate students at the
532:Journal of the Economic Science Association
1990:
1976:
1968:
684:
682:
1886:
1792:
1751:
1741:
1406:"How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?"
1331:
967:
738:
728:
662:
551:
475:
465:
689:Tagiew, Rustam; Ignatov, Dmitry (2016).
51:, gift-exchange games are used to study
691:"Gift Ratios in Laboratory Experiments"
372:
1446:
1435:
944:"Gift Exchange in a Multi-Worker Firm"
619:
443:
441:
179:Another experiment with students from
1056:The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
1042:
1040:
997:
995:
937:
935:
448:Fehr, E.; GĂ€chter, S. (Summer 2000).
413:
411:
327:Modification of game conditions usage
7:
603:
601:
454:The Journal of Economic Perspectives
1188:Gneezy, Uri; List, John A. (2006).
2039:First-player and second-player win
1656:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
1251:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00066.x
1094:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
1023:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00066.x
840:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
776:10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026979.14590.3c
14:
95:Normal form of gift exchange game
2146:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
1888:10.24843/LKJITI.2020.v11.i01.p06
1848:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00800.x
1512:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00800.x
1209:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00707.x
1175:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00707.x
1068:10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01730.x
960:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02065.x
592:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.04.001
163:Experimental Methods and Results
136:Contrast with Prisoner's dilemma
115:. This game has only one single
1578:The Quarterly Review of Biology
2156:Evolutionarily stable strategy
1912:Journal of Economic Psychology
1274:Journal of Economic Psychology
382:Quarterly Journal of Economics
244:Reciprocity & Social Norms
55:for human subject research in
1:
2084:Simultaneous action selection
1485:10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00051-7
1141:10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00096-2
887:10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00131-1
432:10.1016/S0313-5926(11)50007-4
123:As this game is considered a
3016:List of games in game theory
2196:Quantal response equilibrium
2186:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
2121:Bayes correlated equilibrium
1621:American Sociological Review
1305:10.1080/00779954.2011.556072
900:Charness, Gary (July 2004).
717:Frontiers in Robotics and AI
420:Economic Analysis and Policy
21:White elephant gift exchange
2485:Optional prisoner's dilemma
2216:Self-confirming equilibrium
1946:Games and Economic Behavior
1785:10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.550
1293:New Zealand Economic Papers
493:Games and Economic Behavior
30:also commonly known as the
3073:
2950:Principal variation search
2666:Aumann's agreement theorem
2329:Strategy-stealing argument
2241:Trembling hand equilibrium
2171:Markov perfect equilibrium
2166:Mertens-stable equilibrium
1924:10.1016/j.joep.2016.07.002
1361:10.1007/s11403-023-00378-9
906:Journal of Labor Economics
801:. In Elkind, Edith (ed.).
655:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.01.004
18:
2986:Combinatorial game theory
2645:Princess and monster game
2201:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
2126:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
1958:10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.004
1547:10.1007/s10683-013-9372-x
698:CEUR Workshop Proceedings
544:10.1007/s40881-017-0041-2
3057:Game theory game classes
3001:Evolutionary game theory
2734:Antoine Augustin Cournot
2620:Guess 2/3 of the average
2417:Strictly determined game
2211:Satisfaction equilibrium
2029:Escalation of commitment
1730:American Economic Review
1473:European Economic Review
875:European Economic Review
730:10.3389/frobt.2018.00102
580:European Economic Review
288:involuntary unemployment
264:University of Nottingham
189:University of Nottingham
3006:Glossary of game theory
2605:Stackelberg competition
2231:Strong Nash equilibrium
256:University of Amsterdam
173:University of Amsterdam
135:
34:, is a common economic
3031:Tragedy of the commons
3011:List of game theorists
2991:Confrontation analysis
2701:SpragueâGrundy theorem
2221:Sequential equilibrium
2141:Correlated equilibrium
1743:10.1257/aer.102.4.1644
1703:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2801
1535:Experimental Economics
1445:Cite journal requires
764:Experimental Economics
505:10.1006/game.1995.1027
120:
96:
3052:Non-cooperative games
2804:Jean-François Mertens
110:
99:Like in trust games,
94:
32:gift exchange dilemma
2933:Search optimizations
2809:Jennifer Tour Chayes
2696:Revelation principle
2691:Purification theorem
2630:Nash bargaining game
2595:Bertrand competition
2580:El Farol Bar problem
2545:Electronic mail game
2510:Lewis signaling game
2054:Hierarchy of beliefs
1767:Dur, Robert (2009).
948:The Economic Journal
467:10.1257/jep.14.3.159
79:Equilibrium analysis
2981:Bounded rationality
2600:Cournot competition
2550:Rock paper scissors
2525:Battle of the sexes
2515:Volunteer's dilemma
2387:Perfect information
2314:Dominant strategies
2151:Epsilon-equilibrium
2034:Extensive-form game
1414:10.2139/ssrn.292854
477:20.500.11850/146582
315:Other fields usages
129:backwards induction
125:perfect information
73:market transactions
28:gift-exchange game,
16:Type of game theory
2960:Paranoid algorithm
2940:Alphaâbeta pruning
2819:John Maynard Smith
2650:Rendezvous problem
2490:Traveler's dilemma
2480:Gift-exchange game
2475:Prisoner's dilemma
2392:Large Poisson game
2359:Bargaining problem
2264:Backward induction
2236:Subgame perfection
2191:Proper equilibrium
1691:Management Science
954:(522): 1025â1050.
351:Prisoner's dilemma
272:social preferences
260:Tilburg University
181:Tilburg University
152:prisoner's dilemma
147:prisoner's dilemma
142:Prisoner's dilemma
121:
97:
3039:
3038:
2945:Aspiration window
2914:Suzanne Scotchmer
2869:Oskar Morgenstern
2764:Donald B. Gillies
2706:Zermelo's theorem
2635:Induction puzzles
2590:Fair cake-cutting
2565:Public goods game
2495:Coordination game
2369:Intransitive game
2299:Forward induction
2181:Pareto efficiency
2161:Gibbs equilibrium
2131:Berge equilibrium
2079:Simultaneous game
1408:. Rochester, NY.
812:978-1-4503-6309-9
251:University of Bon
57:social psychology
3064:
3026:Topological game
3021:No-win situation
2919:Thomas Schelling
2899:Robert B. Wilson
2859:Merrill M. Flood
2829:John von Neumann
2739:Ariel Rubinstein
2724:Albert W. Tucker
2575:War of attrition
2535:Matching pennies
2176:Nash equilibrium
2099:Mechanism design
2064:Normal-form game
2019:Cooperative game
1992:
1985:
1978:
1969:
1962:
1961:
1943:
1934:
1928:
1927:
1907:
1901:
1900:
1890:
1866:
1860:
1859:
1842:(5): 1501â1511.
1831:
1825:
1824:
1822:
1813:
1807:
1806:
1796:
1779:(2/3): 550â560.
1764:
1758:
1757:
1755:
1745:
1736:(4): 1644â1662.
1721:
1715:
1714:
1697:(9): 3971â4470.
1686:
1680:
1679:
1651:
1645:
1644:
1616:
1610:
1609:
1573:
1567:
1566:
1530:
1524:
1523:
1506:(5): 1501â1511.
1495:
1489:
1488:
1470:
1461:
1455:
1454:
1448:
1443:
1441:
1433:
1401:
1395:
1394:
1388:
1379:
1373:
1372:
1344:
1338:
1337:
1335:
1323:
1317:
1316:
1288:
1282:
1281:
1269:
1263:
1262:
1239:Economic Inquiry
1236:
1227:
1221:
1220:
1203:(5): 1365â1384.
1194:
1185:
1179:
1178:
1169:(5): 1365â1384.
1160:
1151:
1145:
1144:
1124:
1118:
1117:
1089:
1080:
1079:
1062:(4): 1346â1367.
1053:
1044:
1035:
1034:
1011:Economic Inquiry
1008:
999:
990:
989:
971:
939:
930:
929:
897:
891:
890:
881:(3â5): 845â859.
870:
864:
863:
835:
829:
823:
817:
816:
794:
788:
787:
759:
753:
752:
742:
732:
708:
702:
701:
695:
686:
677:
676:
666:
649:(3â4): 671â677.
638:
632:
631:
625:
617:
605:
596:
595:
575:
566:
565:
555:
523:
517:
516:
488:
482:
481:
479:
469:
445:
436:
435:
415:
406:
405:
377:
282:Work Field usage
185:Nash equilibrium
157:Nash equilibrium
117:Nash equilibrium
3072:
3071:
3067:
3066:
3065:
3063:
3062:
3061:
3042:
3041:
3040:
3035:
2969:
2955:max^n algorithm
2928:
2924:William Vickrey
2884:Reinhard Selten
2839:Kenneth Binmore
2754:David K. Levine
2749:Daniel Kahneman
2716:
2710:
2686:Negamax theorem
2676:Minimax theorem
2654:
2615:Diner's dilemma
2470:All-pay auction
2436:
2422:Stochastic game
2374:Mean-field game
2345:
2338:
2309:Markov strategy
2245:
2111:
2103:
2074:Sequential game
2059:Information set
2044:Game complexity
2014:Congestion game
2002:
1996:
1966:
1965:
1941:
1936:
1935:
1931:
1909:
1908:
1904:
1868:
1867:
1863:
1833:
1832:
1828:
1820:
1815:
1814:
1810:
1766:
1765:
1761:
1723:
1722:
1718:
1688:
1687:
1683:
1668:10.2307/1885099
1653:
1652:
1648:
1633:10.2307/2087919
1618:
1617:
1613:
1575:
1574:
1570:
1532:
1531:
1527:
1497:
1496:
1492:
1468:
1463:
1462:
1458:
1444:
1434:
1403:
1402:
1398:
1386:
1381:
1380:
1376:
1346:
1345:
1341:
1325:
1324:
1320:
1290:
1289:
1285:
1271:
1270:
1266:
1234:
1229:
1228:
1224:
1192:
1187:
1186:
1182:
1158:
1153:
1152:
1148:
1126:
1125:
1121:
1106:10.2307/2118338
1091:
1090:
1083:
1051:
1046:
1045:
1038:
1006:
1001:
1000:
993:
941:
940:
933:
899:
898:
894:
872:
871:
867:
852:10.2307/2118338
837:
836:
832:
824:
820:
813:
796:
795:
791:
761:
760:
756:
710:
709:
705:
693:
688:
687:
680:
640:
639:
635:
618:
607:
606:
599:
577:
576:
569:
525:
524:
520:
490:
489:
485:
447:
446:
439:
417:
416:
409:
394:10.2307/2937787
379:
378:
374:
369:
361:Efficiency wage
342:
329:
317:
292:market-clearing
284:
274:are two-sided.
246:
233:
165:
138:
81:
68:economic theory
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
3070:
3068:
3060:
3059:
3054:
3044:
3043:
3037:
3036:
3034:
3033:
3028:
3023:
3018:
3013:
3008:
3003:
2998:
2993:
2988:
2983:
2977:
2975:
2971:
2970:
2968:
2967:
2962:
2957:
2952:
2947:
2942:
2936:
2934:
2930:
2929:
2927:
2926:
2921:
2916:
2911:
2906:
2901:
2896:
2891:
2889:Robert Axelrod
2886:
2881:
2876:
2871:
2866:
2864:Olga Bondareva
2861:
2856:
2854:Melvin Dresher
2851:
2846:
2844:Leonid Hurwicz
2841:
2836:
2831:
2826:
2821:
2816:
2811:
2806:
2801:
2796:
2791:
2786:
2781:
2779:Harold W. Kuhn
2776:
2771:
2769:Drew Fudenberg
2766:
2761:
2759:David M. Kreps
2756:
2751:
2746:
2744:Claude Shannon
2741:
2736:
2731:
2726:
2720:
2718:
2712:
2711:
2709:
2708:
2703:
2698:
2693:
2688:
2683:
2681:Nash's theorem
2678:
2673:
2668:
2662:
2660:
2656:
2655:
2653:
2652:
2647:
2642:
2637:
2632:
2627:
2622:
2617:
2612:
2607:
2602:
2597:
2592:
2587:
2582:
2577:
2572:
2567:
2562:
2557:
2552:
2547:
2542:
2540:Ultimatum game
2537:
2532:
2527:
2522:
2520:Dollar auction
2517:
2512:
2507:
2505:Centipede game
2502:
2497:
2492:
2487:
2482:
2477:
2472:
2467:
2462:
2460:Infinite chess
2457:
2452:
2446:
2444:
2438:
2437:
2435:
2434:
2429:
2427:Symmetric game
2424:
2419:
2414:
2412:Signaling game
2409:
2407:Screening game
2404:
2399:
2397:Potential game
2394:
2389:
2384:
2376:
2371:
2366:
2361:
2356:
2350:
2348:
2340:
2339:
2337:
2336:
2331:
2326:
2324:Mixed strategy
2321:
2316:
2311:
2306:
2301:
2296:
2291:
2286:
2281:
2276:
2271:
2266:
2261:
2255:
2253:
2247:
2246:
2244:
2243:
2238:
2233:
2228:
2223:
2218:
2213:
2208:
2206:Risk dominance
2203:
2198:
2193:
2188:
2183:
2178:
2173:
2168:
2163:
2158:
2153:
2148:
2143:
2138:
2133:
2128:
2123:
2117:
2115:
2105:
2104:
2102:
2101:
2096:
2091:
2086:
2081:
2076:
2071:
2066:
2061:
2056:
2051:
2049:Graphical game
2046:
2041:
2036:
2031:
2026:
2021:
2016:
2010:
2008:
2004:
2003:
1997:
1995:
1994:
1987:
1980:
1972:
1964:
1963:
1929:
1902:
1861:
1826:
1808:
1759:
1716:
1681:
1662:(4): 543â569.
1646:
1627:(6): 724â733.
1611:
1590:10.1086/406755
1568:
1541:(3): 347â370.
1525:
1490:
1456:
1447:|journal=
1396:
1374:
1355:(3): 573â597.
1339:
1318:
1299:(1â2): 81â95.
1283:
1264:
1245:(2): 280â297.
1222:
1180:
1146:
1135:(3): 375â384.
1119:
1100:(2): 437â459.
1081:
1036:
1017:(2): 280â297.
991:
931:
918:10.1086/383111
912:(3): 665â688.
892:
865:
846:(2): 437â459.
830:
818:
811:
789:
770:(2): 189â205.
754:
703:
678:
633:
597:
567:
538:(2): 149â160.
518:
499:(1): 122â142.
483:
460:(3): 159â181.
437:
407:
388:(2): 255â283.
371:
370:
368:
365:
364:
363:
358:
356:Ultimatum game
353:
348:
341:
338:
328:
325:
316:
313:
283:
280:
245:
242:
232:
229:
164:
161:
137:
134:
113:extensive form
101:game-theoretic
80:
77:
40:George Akerlof
38:introduced by
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3069:
3058:
3055:
3053:
3050:
3049:
3047:
3032:
3029:
3027:
3024:
3022:
3019:
3017:
3014:
3012:
3009:
3007:
3004:
3002:
2999:
2997:
2994:
2992:
2989:
2987:
2984:
2982:
2979:
2978:
2976:
2974:Miscellaneous
2972:
2966:
2963:
2961:
2958:
2956:
2953:
2951:
2948:
2946:
2943:
2941:
2938:
2937:
2935:
2931:
2925:
2922:
2920:
2917:
2915:
2912:
2910:
2909:Samuel Bowles
2907:
2905:
2904:Roger Myerson
2902:
2900:
2897:
2895:
2894:Robert Aumann
2892:
2890:
2887:
2885:
2882:
2880:
2877:
2875:
2872:
2870:
2867:
2865:
2862:
2860:
2857:
2855:
2852:
2850:
2849:Lloyd Shapley
2847:
2845:
2842:
2840:
2837:
2835:
2834:Kenneth Arrow
2832:
2830:
2827:
2825:
2822:
2820:
2817:
2815:
2814:John Harsanyi
2812:
2810:
2807:
2805:
2802:
2800:
2797:
2795:
2792:
2790:
2787:
2785:
2784:Herbert Simon
2782:
2780:
2777:
2775:
2772:
2770:
2767:
2765:
2762:
2760:
2757:
2755:
2752:
2750:
2747:
2745:
2742:
2740:
2737:
2735:
2732:
2730:
2727:
2725:
2722:
2721:
2719:
2713:
2707:
2704:
2702:
2699:
2697:
2694:
2692:
2689:
2687:
2684:
2682:
2679:
2677:
2674:
2672:
2669:
2667:
2664:
2663:
2661:
2657:
2651:
2648:
2646:
2643:
2641:
2638:
2636:
2633:
2631:
2628:
2626:
2623:
2621:
2618:
2616:
2613:
2611:
2608:
2606:
2603:
2601:
2598:
2596:
2593:
2591:
2588:
2586:
2585:Fair division
2583:
2581:
2578:
2576:
2573:
2571:
2568:
2566:
2563:
2561:
2560:Dictator game
2558:
2556:
2553:
2551:
2548:
2546:
2543:
2541:
2538:
2536:
2533:
2531:
2528:
2526:
2523:
2521:
2518:
2516:
2513:
2511:
2508:
2506:
2503:
2501:
2498:
2496:
2493:
2491:
2488:
2486:
2483:
2481:
2478:
2476:
2473:
2471:
2468:
2466:
2463:
2461:
2458:
2456:
2453:
2451:
2448:
2447:
2445:
2443:
2439:
2433:
2432:Zero-sum game
2430:
2428:
2425:
2423:
2420:
2418:
2415:
2413:
2410:
2408:
2405:
2403:
2402:Repeated game
2400:
2398:
2395:
2393:
2390:
2388:
2385:
2383:
2381:
2377:
2375:
2372:
2370:
2367:
2365:
2362:
2360:
2357:
2355:
2352:
2351:
2349:
2347:
2341:
2335:
2332:
2330:
2327:
2325:
2322:
2320:
2319:Pure strategy
2317:
2315:
2312:
2310:
2307:
2305:
2302:
2300:
2297:
2295:
2292:
2290:
2287:
2285:
2284:De-escalation
2282:
2280:
2277:
2275:
2272:
2270:
2267:
2265:
2262:
2260:
2257:
2256:
2254:
2252:
2248:
2242:
2239:
2237:
2234:
2232:
2229:
2227:
2226:Shapley value
2224:
2222:
2219:
2217:
2214:
2212:
2209:
2207:
2204:
2202:
2199:
2197:
2194:
2192:
2189:
2187:
2184:
2182:
2179:
2177:
2174:
2172:
2169:
2167:
2164:
2162:
2159:
2157:
2154:
2152:
2149:
2147:
2144:
2142:
2139:
2137:
2134:
2132:
2129:
2127:
2124:
2122:
2119:
2118:
2116:
2114:
2110:
2106:
2100:
2097:
2095:
2094:Succinct game
2092:
2090:
2087:
2085:
2082:
2080:
2077:
2075:
2072:
2070:
2067:
2065:
2062:
2060:
2057:
2055:
2052:
2050:
2047:
2045:
2042:
2040:
2037:
2035:
2032:
2030:
2027:
2025:
2022:
2020:
2017:
2015:
2012:
2011:
2009:
2005:
2001:
1993:
1988:
1986:
1981:
1979:
1974:
1973:
1970:
1959:
1955:
1951:
1947:
1940:
1933:
1930:
1925:
1921:
1917:
1913:
1906:
1903:
1898:
1894:
1889:
1884:
1880:
1876:
1872:
1865:
1862:
1857:
1853:
1849:
1845:
1841:
1837:
1830:
1827:
1819:
1812:
1809:
1804:
1800:
1795:
1790:
1786:
1782:
1778:
1774:
1770:
1763:
1760:
1754:
1749:
1744:
1739:
1735:
1731:
1727:
1720:
1717:
1712:
1708:
1704:
1700:
1696:
1692:
1685:
1682:
1677:
1673:
1669:
1665:
1661:
1657:
1650:
1647:
1642:
1638:
1634:
1630:
1626:
1622:
1615:
1612:
1607:
1603:
1599:
1595:
1591:
1587:
1583:
1579:
1572:
1569:
1564:
1560:
1556:
1552:
1548:
1544:
1540:
1536:
1529:
1526:
1521:
1517:
1513:
1509:
1505:
1501:
1494:
1491:
1486:
1482:
1478:
1474:
1467:
1460:
1457:
1452:
1439:
1431:
1427:
1423:
1419:
1415:
1411:
1407:
1400:
1397:
1392:
1385:
1378:
1375:
1370:
1366:
1362:
1358:
1354:
1350:
1343:
1340:
1334:
1329:
1322:
1319:
1314:
1310:
1306:
1302:
1298:
1294:
1287:
1284:
1279:
1275:
1268:
1265:
1260:
1256:
1252:
1248:
1244:
1240:
1233:
1226:
1223:
1218:
1214:
1210:
1206:
1202:
1198:
1191:
1184:
1181:
1176:
1172:
1168:
1164:
1157:
1150:
1147:
1142:
1138:
1134:
1130:
1123:
1120:
1115:
1111:
1107:
1103:
1099:
1095:
1088:
1086:
1082:
1077:
1073:
1069:
1065:
1061:
1057:
1050:
1043:
1041:
1037:
1032:
1028:
1024:
1020:
1016:
1012:
1005:
998:
996:
992:
987:
983:
979:
975:
970:
965:
961:
957:
953:
949:
945:
938:
936:
932:
927:
923:
919:
915:
911:
907:
903:
896:
893:
888:
884:
880:
876:
869:
866:
861:
857:
853:
849:
845:
841:
834:
831:
828:
822:
819:
814:
808:
804:
800:
793:
790:
785:
781:
777:
773:
769:
765:
758:
755:
750:
746:
741:
736:
731:
726:
722:
718:
714:
707:
704:
699:
692:
685:
683:
679:
674:
670:
665:
660:
656:
652:
648:
644:
637:
634:
629:
623:
615:
611:
604:
602:
598:
593:
589:
585:
581:
574:
572:
568:
563:
559:
554:
549:
545:
541:
537:
533:
529:
522:
519:
514:
510:
506:
502:
498:
494:
487:
484:
478:
473:
468:
463:
459:
455:
451:
444:
442:
438:
433:
429:
426:(1): 99â108.
425:
421:
414:
412:
408:
403:
399:
395:
391:
387:
383:
376:
373:
366:
362:
359:
357:
354:
352:
349:
347:
344:
343:
339:
337:
333:
326:
324:
321:
314:
312:
308:
304:
300:
296:
293:
289:
281:
279:
275:
273:
267:
265:
261:
257:
252:
243:
241:
237:
230:
228:
224:
220:
216:
212:
208:
204:
200:
196:
192:
190:
186:
182:
177:
174:
169:
162:
160:
158:
153:
148:
143:
133:
130:
126:
118:
114:
109:
105:
102:
93:
89:
87:
78:
76:
74:
69:
64:
62:
58:
54:
50:
45:
41:
37:
33:
29:
22:
2879:Peyton Young
2874:Paul Milgrom
2789:Hervé Moulin
2729:Amos Tversky
2671:Folk theorem
2479:
2382:-player game
2379:
2304:Grim trigger
1952:(1): 41â60.
1949:
1945:
1932:
1915:
1911:
1905:
1878:
1874:
1864:
1839:
1836:Econometrica
1835:
1829:
1811:
1776:
1772:
1762:
1733:
1729:
1719:
1694:
1690:
1684:
1659:
1655:
1649:
1624:
1620:
1614:
1584:(1): 35â57.
1581:
1577:
1571:
1538:
1534:
1528:
1503:
1500:Econometrica
1499:
1493:
1476:
1472:
1459:
1438:cite journal
1399:
1390:
1377:
1352:
1348:
1342:
1321:
1296:
1292:
1286:
1277:
1273:
1267:
1242:
1238:
1225:
1200:
1197:Econometrica
1196:
1183:
1166:
1163:Econometrica
1162:
1149:
1132:
1128:
1122:
1097:
1093:
1059:
1055:
1014:
1010:
951:
947:
909:
905:
895:
878:
874:
868:
843:
839:
833:
821:
802:
792:
767:
763:
757:
720:
716:
706:
697:
646:
642:
636:
622:cite journal
613:
583:
579:
535:
531:
521:
496:
492:
486:
457:
453:
423:
419:
385:
381:
375:
334:
330:
322:
318:
309:
305:
301:
297:
285:
276:
268:
247:
238:
234:
225:
221:
217:
213:
209:
205:
201:
197:
193:
178:
170:
166:
139:
122:
98:
82:
65:
44:Janet Yellen
31:
27:
25:
2996:Coopetition
2799:Jean Tirole
2794:John Conway
2774:Eric Maskin
2570:Blotto game
2555:Pirate game
2364:Global game
2334:Tit for tat
2269:Bid shading
2259:Appeasement
2109:Equilibrium
2089:Solved game
2024:Determinacy
2007:Definitions
2000:game theory
1918:: 151â162.
1794:10419/26541
1753:10419/45629
1479:(1): 1â34.
969:10419/86245
586:: 145â158.
86:IKEA effect
53:reciprocity
49:trust games
3046:Categories
2640:Trust game
2625:Kuhn poker
2294:Escalation
2289:Deterrence
2279:Cheap talk
2251:Strategies
2069:Preference
1998:Topics of
1563:1555370108
664:10161/6324
367:References
346:Trust game
2824:John Nash
2530:Stag hunt
2274:Collusion
1897:237509941
1881:(1): 57.
1598:0033-5770
1555:254467677
1369:256593027
1333:1402.5593
1313:144025994
513:144827131
61:economics
2965:Lazy SMP
2659:Theorems
2610:Deadlock
2465:Checkers
2346:of games
2113:concepts
1856:11340103
1803:40282772
1711:27617458
1606:19027999
1559:ProQuest
1520:11340103
1422:16908983
1391:Abstract
1259:13371057
1031:13371057
986:56388626
784:16908983
749:33500981
673:14043040
562:31998602
340:See also
231:Critique
2717:figures
2500:Chicken
2354:Auction
2344:Classes
1676:1885099
1641:2087919
1280:. 2020.
1217:3805928
1114:2118338
978:4625542
926:7530325
860:2118338
740:7805755
723:: 102.
553:6956943
402:2937787
1895:
1854:
1801:
1709:
1674:
1639:
1604:
1596:
1561:
1553:
1518:
1430:292854
1428:
1420:
1367:
1311:
1257:
1215:
1112:
1076:930534
1074:
1029:
984:
976:
924:
858:
809:
782:
747:
737:
671:
560:
550:
511:
400:
2455:Chess
2442:Games
1942:(PDF)
1893:S2CID
1852:S2CID
1821:(PDF)
1799:JSTOR
1707:S2CID
1672:JSTOR
1637:JSTOR
1602:S2CID
1551:S2CID
1516:S2CID
1469:(PDF)
1418:S2CID
1387:(PDF)
1365:S2CID
1328:arXiv
1309:S2CID
1255:S2CID
1235:(PDF)
1213:JSTOR
1193:(PDF)
1159:(PDF)
1110:JSTOR
1072:S2CID
1052:(PDF)
1027:S2CID
1007:(PDF)
982:S2CID
974:JSTOR
922:S2CID
856:JSTOR
780:S2CID
694:(PDF)
669:S2CID
509:S2CID
398:JSTOR
2136:Core
1594:ISSN
1451:help
1426:SSRN
807:ISBN
745:PMID
628:link
558:PMID
262:and
59:and
42:and
36:game
26:The
2715:Key
1954:doi
1920:doi
1883:doi
1844:doi
1789:hdl
1781:doi
1748:hdl
1738:doi
1734:102
1699:doi
1664:doi
1629:doi
1586:doi
1543:doi
1508:doi
1481:doi
1410:doi
1357:doi
1301:doi
1247:doi
1205:doi
1171:doi
1137:doi
1102:doi
1098:108
1064:doi
1060:114
1019:doi
964:hdl
956:doi
952:117
914:doi
883:doi
848:doi
844:108
772:doi
735:PMC
725:doi
659:hdl
651:doi
588:doi
548:PMC
540:doi
501:doi
472:hdl
462:doi
428:doi
390:doi
386:105
3048::
2450:Go
1950:77
1948:.
1944:.
1916:56
1914:.
1891:.
1879:11
1877:.
1873:.
1850:.
1840:75
1838:.
1797:.
1787:.
1775:.
1771:.
1746:.
1732:.
1728:.
1705:.
1695:64
1693:.
1670:.
1660:97
1658:.
1635:.
1625:19
1623:.
1600:.
1592:.
1582:46
1580:.
1557:.
1549:.
1539:17
1537:.
1514:.
1504:75
1502:.
1477:42
1475:.
1471:.
1442::
1440:}}
1436:{{
1424:.
1416:.
1389:.
1363:.
1353:18
1351:.
1307:.
1297:45
1295:.
1278:81
1276:.
1253:.
1243:39
1241:.
1237:.
1211:.
1201:74
1199:.
1195:.
1167:74
1165:.
1161:.
1133:42
1131:.
1108:.
1096:.
1084:^
1070:.
1058:.
1054:.
1039:^
1025:.
1015:39
1013:.
1009:.
994:^
980:.
972:.
962:.
950:.
946:.
934:^
920:.
910:22
908:.
904:.
879:42
877:.
854:.
842:.
778:.
766:.
743:.
733:.
719:.
715:.
696:.
681:^
667:.
657:.
647:67
645:.
624:}}
620:{{
612:.
600:^
584:70
582:.
570:^
556:.
546:.
534:.
530:.
507:.
497:10
495:.
470:.
458:14
456:.
452:.
440:^
424:41
422:.
410:^
396:.
384:.
258:,
159:.
2380:n
1991:e
1984:t
1977:v
1960:.
1956::
1926:.
1922::
1899:.
1885::
1858:.
1846::
1805:.
1791::
1783::
1777:7
1756:.
1750::
1740::
1713:.
1701::
1678:.
1666::
1643:.
1631::
1608:.
1588::
1565:.
1545::
1522:.
1510::
1487:.
1483::
1453:)
1449:(
1432:.
1412::
1393:.
1371:.
1359::
1336:.
1330::
1315:.
1303::
1261:.
1249::
1219:.
1207::
1177:.
1173::
1143:.
1139::
1116:.
1104::
1078:.
1066::
1033:.
1021::
988:.
966::
958::
928:.
916::
889:.
885::
862:.
850::
815:.
786:.
774::
768:7
751:.
727::
721:5
675:.
661::
653::
630:)
616:.
594:.
590::
564:.
542::
536:3
515:.
503::
480:.
474::
464::
434:.
430::
404:.
392::
23:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
