2742:, believes that the proponents of primacy suffer from the "light-switch model," in which only two positions exist: on and off. "Many, seemingly most, proponents of U.S. preeminence do not recognize the existence of options between current policy of promiscuous global interventionism and isolationism." Adherence to the light switch model, Carpenter argues, reflects intellectual rigidity or an effort to stifle discussion about a range of alternatives to the status quo. Selective engagement is a strategy that sits in between primacy and isolationism and, given growing multipolarity and American fiscal precariousness, should be taken seriously. "Selectivity is not merely an option when it comes to embarking on military interventions. It is imperative for a major power that wishes to preserve its strategic insolvency. Otherwise, overextension and national exhaustion become increasing dangers." Carpenter thinks that off-loading U.S. security responsibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the United States must refrain from using military might in campaigns that do not directly deal with U.S. interests. "If a sense of moral indignation, instead of a calculating assessment of the national interest, governs U.S. foreign policy, the United States will become involved in even more murky conflicts in which few if any tangible American interests are at stake."
2760:
strives to retain overwhelming military power, under a theory that potential competitors will not even try to compete on the global stage. It also retains an extensive network of permanent alliance commitments around the world, using the alliance system both to advance and retain hegemonic power and to solidify emerging liberal political systems. According to Posen, this strategy sees "threats emanating from three major sources: failed states, rogue states, and illiberal peer competitors." Failed states, in this view, are sources of instability; rogue states can sponsor terrorism, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and behave unpredictably; illiberal peer competitors would compete directly with the United States and "would complicate the spread of liberal institutions and the construction of liberal states." Support for liberal hegemonic strategies among major thinkers in both political parties helps explain the broad elite support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 intervention in Libya, even though U.S. military involvement in those conflicts had been initiated by presidents of different parties. The chief difference on foreign policy between
Republican and Democratic proponents of liberal hegemony, according to Posen, is on support for international institutions as a means to achieving hegemony.
2769:
great powers, and defended by a powerful nuclear deterrent. Other great powers are at present weaker than the United States, close to one another, and face the same pressures to defend themselves as does the United States." Proponents of strategic restraint argue, consistent with the realist tradition, that states are self-interested and accordingly will look out for their own interests and balance against aggressors; however, when possible, states prefer to "free ride" or "cheap ride," passing the buck to other states to bear the cost of balancing. Restraint proponents also emphasize the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, which tremendously raise the stakes of confrontations between great powers, breeding caution, rather than rewarding aggression. Restraint advocates see nationalism as a powerful force, one that makes states even more resistant to outside conquest and thus makes the international system more stable. Restraint proponents also argue, drawing on thinkers like the
Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, that military force is a blunt, expensive, and unpredictable instrument, and that it accordingly should only be used rarely, for clear goals.
2546:
the
American homeland, the United States does not need to intervene abroad. Stressing a particular understanding of nuclear weapons, the authors describe how proponents believe the destructive power of nuclear weapons and retaliatory potential of the United States assure the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United States, while the proliferation of such weapons to countries like Britain, France, China and Russia prevents the emergence of any competing hegemon on the Eurasian landmass. The United States' security and the absence of threats means that "national defense will seldom justify intervention abroad." Even further, its proponents argue that "the United States is not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of, maintaining world order." They also believe that "the pursuit of economic well-being is best left to the private sector," and that the United States should not attempt to spread its values because doing so increases resentment towards the U.S. and in turn, decreases its security. In short, neo-isolationism advises the United States to preserve its freedom of action and strategic independence.
2697:, believes the activist U.S. foreign policy that continues to define U.S. strategy in the twenty-first century is an "undisciplined, expensive, and bloody strategy" that has done more harm than good to U.S. national security. "It makes enemies almost as fast as it slays them, discourages allies from paying for their own defense, and convinces powerful states to band together and oppose Washington's plans, further raising the costs of carrying out its foreign policy." The United States was able to afford such adventurism during the 1990s, Posen argues, because American power projection was completely unchallenged. Over the last decade, however, American power has been relatively declining while the Pentagon continues to "depend on continuous infusions of cash simply to retain its current force structure—levels of spending that the Great Recession and the United States' ballooning debt have rendered unsustainable."
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to a major debate about the acquisition of an empire in the 1890s (culminating in the conquest of the
Philippines and Cuba during the Spanish–American War), followed by rapid shifts between offshore balancing, liberal internationalism, and isolationism around the world wars. The Cold War saw increasing use of deep, onshore engagement strategies (including the creation of a number of permanent alliances, significant involvement in other states' internal politics, and a major counterinsurgency war in Vietnam.) With the end of the Cold War, an early strategic debate eventually coalesced into a strategy of primacy, culminating in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The aftershocks of this war, along with an economic downturn, rising national debt, and deepening political gridlock, have led to a renewed strategic debate, centered on two major schools of thought: primacy and restraint. A return to
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2785:, the United States would refrain from significant involvement in security affairs overseas except to prevent a state from establishing hegemony in what offshore balancers identify as the world's three key strategic regions: Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. This strategy advocates a significantly reduced overseas presence compared to liberal hegemony, but argues that intervention is necessary in more circumstances than restraint. Offshore balancing is associated with offensive realist theories of state behavior: it believes that conquest can often enable states to gain power, and thus that a hegemon in regions with large economies, high populations, or critical resources could quickly become a global menace to U.S. national interests.
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it must. Large troop contingents in unprecedentedly peaceful regions such as Europe would be significantly downsized, incentivizing NATO members to provide more for their own security. Under such a scenario, the United States would have more leeway in using resources to combat the most pressing threats to its security. A strategy of restraint, therefore, would help preserve the country's prosperity and security more so than a hegemonic strategy. To be sure, Posen makes clear that he is not advocating isolationism. Rather, the United States should focus on three pressing security challenges: preventing a powerful rival from upending the global balance of power, fighting terrorists, and limiting nuclear proliferation.
2337:). Due to the perceived impenetrability of these perimeter defenses, the Emperors kept no central reserve army. The Roman system of roads allowed for soldiers to move from one frontier to another (for the purpose of reinforcements during a siege) with relative ease. These roads also allowed for a logistical advantage for Rome over her enemies, as supplies could be moved just as easily across the Roman road system as soldiers. This way, if the legions could not win a battle through military combat skill or superior numbers, they could simply outlast the invaders, who, as historian E.A. Thompson wrote, "Did not think in terms of millions of bushels of wheat."
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foreign policy should focus on maintaining U.S. power and preventing any other power from becoming a serious challenger to the United States. With this in mind, some supporters of this strategy argue that the U.S. should work to contain China and other competitors rather than engage them. In regards to humanitarian crises and regional conflicts, primacy holds that the U.S. should only intervene when they directly impact national security, more along the lines of selective engagement than collective security. It does, however, advocate for the active prevention of nuclear proliferation at a level similar to collective security.
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with some qualifiers. "Although the precise causal mechanism remain disputed, hegemonic eras are nevertheless strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of globalization." However, Drezner highlights a caveat: The cost of maintaining global public goods catches up to the superpower providing them. "Other countries free-ride off of the hegemon, allowing them to grow faster. Technologies diffuse from the hegemonic power to the rest of the world, facilitating catch-up. Chinese analysts have posited that these phenomena, occurring right now, are allowing China to outgrow the United States."
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military potential and the prevention of war amongst those states. Most proponents of this strategy believe Europe, Asia and the Middle East matter most to the United States. Europe and Asia contain the great powers, which have the greatest military and economic impact on international politics, and the Middle East is a primary source of oil for much of the developed world. In addition to these more particular concerns, selective engagement also focuses on preventing nuclear proliferation and any conflict that could lead to a great power war, but provides no clear guidelines for humanitarian interventions.
2723:, push back on Posen's selective engagement thesis, arguing that American engagement is not as bad as Posen makes it out to be. Advocates of selective engagement, they argue, overstate the costs of current U.S. grand strategy and understate the benefits. "The benefits of deep engagement...are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of
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far less threatening to great powers that are situated oceans away, the authors claim. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching U.S. military might. "Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors."
2677:. "One argument, which I label 'geoeconomic favoritism,' hypothesizes that the military hegemon will attract private capital because it provides the greatest security and safety to investors. A second argument posits that the benefits from military primacy flow from geopolitical favoritism: that sovereign states, in return for living under the security umbrella of the military superpower, voluntarily transfer resources to help subsidize the cost of the economy. The third argument postulates that states are most likely to enjoy global
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concludes, it avoids both overly restrictive and overly expansive definitions of U.S. interests, finding instead a compromise between doing too much and too little militarily. Additionally, selective engagement is the best strategy for achieving both realist goals—preventing WMD terrorism, maintaining great power peace, and securing the supply of oil; and liberal goals—preserving free trade, spreading democracy, observing human rights, and minimizing the
2087:, challenge the prevailing notion that only great powers are capable of having grand strategies. They found that smaller states like Rwanda can, and do, deploy national resources in response to external challenges and opportunities, which is a hallmark of grand strategy. This approach is influenced by the country's historical memory and involves a complex interplay of military, economic, and diplomatic tools tailored to the specific context of Rwanda.
2068:, grand strategy emphasizes the military implications of policy; considers costs benefits of policies, as well as limits on capabilities; establishes priorities; and sets out a practical plan rather than a set of ambitions and wishes. A country's political leadership typically directs grand strategy with input from the most senior military officials. Development of a nation's grand strategy may extend across many years or even multiple generations.
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dynamism as a key source of national power and accordingly tends to argue for a relatively open trade system. Some restrainers call for supporting this trade system via significant naval patrols; others suggest that the international economy is resilient against disruptions and, with rare exceptions, does not require a powerful state to guarantee the security of global trade.
2597:. The realist goals represent vital interests and the liberal goals represent desirable interests. Desirable interests are not unimportant, Art maintains, but they are of lesser importance when a trade-off between them and vital interests must be made. Selective engagement, however, mitigates the effect of the trade-off precisely because it is a moderate, strategic policy.
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whether such a policy could garner sustained support from a liberal democracy experienced with a moralistic approach to international relations, whether the United States could successfully differentiate necessary versus unnecessary engagement and whether a strategy that focuses on Europe, Asia and the Middle East actually represents a shift from current engagement.
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application of military means to achieve policy objectives. For these thinkers, grand strategy was not only different from the operational strategy of winning a particular battle, but it also encompassed both peacetime and wartime policies. For them, grand strategy should operate for decades (or longer) and should not cease at war's end or begin at war's start.
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should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will. ...
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to be susceptible to outside armies coming in. Also, people who lived near the Roman frontiers would begin to look to the barbarians for protection after the Roman armies departed. This argument is considered to have originated in the writings of
Eunapius As stated by the 5th century AD historian Zosimus:
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Finally, when the United States wields its security leverage, the authors argue, it shapes the overall structure of the global economy. "Washington wins when U.S. allies favor status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances."
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Ikenberry, Brooks, and
Wohlforth are not convinced that the current U.S. grand strategy generates subsequent counterbalancing. Unlike the prior hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated and faces no contiguous great power rivals interested in balancing it. This means the United States is
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under a unipolar distribution of military power, accelerating global economic growth and reducing security tensions. These public goods benefit the hegemon as much, if not more, than they do other actors." Drezner maintains the empirical evidence supporting the third argument is the strongest, though
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Proponents of liberal hegemony favor a world order in which the United States is a hegemon and uses this power advantage to create a liberal international system and at times use force to enforce or spread liberal values (such as individual rights, free trade, and the rule of law). The United States
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As a result, it advocates that the United States pursue ultimate hegemony and dominate the international system economically, politically and militarily, rejecting any return to bipolarity or multipolarity and preventing the emergence of any peer competitor. Therefore, its proponents argue that U.S.
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The conversation around grand strategy in the United States has evolved significantly since the country's founding, with the nation shifting from a strategy of continental expansion, isolation from
European conflicts, and opposition to European empires in the Western hemisphere in its first century,
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According to
Helmuth von Moltke, the initial task of strategy was to serve politics and the subsequent task was to prepare the means to wage war. Moltke however warned that plans may not survive an encounter with the enemy. Other thinkers challenged Clausewitz's idea that politics could set the aims
2095:
There is no universally accepted definition of grand strategy. One common definition is that grand strategy is a state's strategy of how means (military and nonmilitary) can be used to advance and achieve national interests in the long-term. Grand strategy expands on the traditional idea of strategy
2700:
Posen proposes the United States abandon its hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of restraint. This translates into jettisoning the quest of shaping a world that is satisfactory to U.S. values and instead advances vital national security interests: The U.S. military would go to war only when
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Implementation of such a strategy would entail military forces at similar levels to those during the Cold War, with emphasis on military modernization and research and development. They note, however, that "the quest for primacy is likely to prove futile for five reasons": the diffusion of economic
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and deter interstate conflict. Posen and Ross propose that collective action is the most effective means of preventing potential state and non-state aggressors from threatening other states. Cooperative security considers nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and humanitarian crises to be major
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With similar roots in the realist tradition of international relations, selective engagement advocates that the United States should intervene in regions of the world only if they directly affect its security and prosperity. The focus, therefore, lies on those powers with significant industrial and
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Stemming from a defensive realist understanding of international politics, what the authors call "neo-isolationism" advocates the United States remove itself from active participation in international politics in order to maintain its national security. It holds that because there are no threats to
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This charge by
Zosimus is considered to be a gross exaggeration and inaccurate assessment of the situations in the fourth century under Constantine by many modern historians. B.H. Warmington, for instance, argues that the statement by Zosimus is " oversimplification," reminding us that "the charge
2349:
Constantine abolished this frontier security by removing the greater part of the soldiery from the frontiers to cities that needed no auxiliary forces. He thus deprived of help the people who were harassed by the barbarians and burdened tranquil cities with the pest of the military, so that several
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moved the legions from the frontiers to one consolidated roving army as a way to save money and to protect wealthier citizens within the cities. However, this grand strategy, according to some ancient sources, had costly effects on the Roman empire by weakening its frontier defenses and allowing it
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Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources – for to foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too,
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Proponents of a grand strategy of restraint call for the United States to significantly reduce its overseas security commitments and largely avoid involvement in conflicts abroad. America would take advantage of what Posen calls a "remarkably good" strategic position: " is rich, distant from other
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Posen has argued that the four schools of U.S. grand strategy that he identified in the 1990s have been replaced by just two: liberal hegemony, which came from a fusion of primacy and cooperative security, and restraint, which came from a fusion of neo-isolationism and selective engagement. Other
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argues that selective engagement is the best strategy for the twenty-first century because it is, by definition, selective. "It steers the middle course between an isolationist, unilateralist course, on the one hand, and world policeman, highly interventionist role, on the other." Therefore, Art,
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In more practical terms, the authors discuss how the implementation of a so-called "neo-isolationist" grand strategy would involve less focus on the issue of nuclear proliferation, withdrawal from NATO, and major cuts to the United States military presence abroad. The authors see a military force
2071:
Much scholarship on grand strategy focuses on the United States, which has since the end of World War II had a grand strategy oriented around primacy, "deep engagement", and/or liberal hegemony, which entail that the United States maintains military predominance; maintains an extensive network of
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The authors imagine that such a grand strategy would involve stronger support for international institutions, agreements, and the frequent use of force for humanitarian purposes. Were international institutions to ultimately entail the deployment of a multinational force, the authors suppose the
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Restraint is distinct from isolationism: isolationists favor restricting trade and immigration and tend to believe that events in the outside world have little impact within the United States. As already noted, it is sometimes confused with non-interventionism. Restraint, however, sees economic
2189:
Narrow definitions, similar to those of
Clausewitz, were commonplace during the 19th century. Towards the end of the 19th century and into the early 20th century (in particular with B. H. Liddell Hart's writings), some writers expanded the definition of strategy to refer to the distribution and
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argued that because of the intrinsically political nature of war that different types of wars (e.g. offensive wars, defensive wars, wars of expediency, wars with/without allies, wars of intervention, wars of conquest, wars of opinion, national wars, civil wars) had to be waged differently, thus
2577:
The authors envision that a strategy of selective engagement would involve a strong nuclear deterrent with a force structure capable of fighting two regional wars, each through some combination of ground, air and sea forces complemented with forces from a regional ally. They question, however,
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In the 20th century, some thinkers argued that all manners of actions (political, economic, military, cultural) counted as grand strategy in an era of total warfare. However, most definitions saw a division of labor between the actions of political leaders and those of the executing military.
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Furthermore, while the horizons of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity.
2061:, grand strategy encompasses more than military means (such as diplomatic and economic means); does not equate success with purely military victory but also the pursuit of peacetime goals and prosperity; and considers goals and interests in the long-term rather than short-term.
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In antiquity, the Greek word "strategy" referred to the skills of a general. By the sixth century, Byzantines distinguished between "strategy" (the means by which a general defends the homeland and defeats the enemy) and "tactics" (the science of organizing armies). Byzantine
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allies (exemplified by NATO, bilateral alliances and foreign US military bases); and integrates other states into US-designed international institutions (such as the IMF, WTO/GATT and World Bank). Critics of this grand strategy, which includes proponents for
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and technological capabilities, interstate balancing against the United States, the danger that hegemonic leadership will fatally undermine valuable multilateral institutions, the feasibility of preventive war and the dangers of imperial overstretch.
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classified himself as a "selective engagement" advocate, with the caveat that the United States should not only act to reduce the likelihood of great power war, but also oppose the rise of a Eurasian hegemon capable of threatening the United States.
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United States' contribution would emphasize command, control, communications and intelligence, defense suppression, and precision-guided munitions-what they considered at the time to be the United States' comparative advantage in aerospace power.
2633:, the problems of the effective formation of international institutions, the vacillating feelings of democratic populations, and the limitations of arms control are all offered by the authors as noted criticisms of collective security.
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The authors write "the most important distinguishing feature of cooperative security is the proposition that peace is effectively indivisible." Unlike the other three alternatives, cooperative security draws upon liberalism as well as
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he role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.
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The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the focal point of U.S. strategy: containing the Soviet Union. A major debate emerged about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. In a 1997 article,
2350:
straightway were deserted. Moreover, he softened the soldiers who treated themselves to shows and luxuries. Indeed, to speak plainly, he personally planted the first seeds of our present devastated state of affairs –
2400:. Conversely, while Japan's conquests garnered considerable public attention, they were mostly in colonial areas deemed less essential by planners and policy-makers. The specifics of Allied military strategy in the
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of war, as the aims of war would change during the war given the success or failure of military operations.These thinkers argued that strategy was a process that required adaptation to changing circumstances.
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of exposure of the frontier regions is at best anachronistic and probably reflects Zosimus' prejudices against Constantine; the corruption of the soldiers who lived in the cities was a literary commonplace."
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examining internal in addition to external forces – taking into account both the various instruments of power and the internal policies necessary for their implementation (conscription, for example)
2325:, Roman emperors employed a military strategy of "preclusive security—the establishment of a linear barrier of perimeter defence around the Empire. The Legions were stationed in great fortresses".
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creating the need for a grand strategy. Some contemporaries of Clausewitz and Jomini disputed the links between politics and war, arguing that politics ceases to be important once war has begun.
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structure that prioritizes a secure nuclear second-strike capability, intelligence, naval and special operations forces while limiting the forward-deployment of forces to Europe and Asia.
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in its approach to international relations. Stressing the importance of world peace and international cooperation, the view supposes the growth in democratic governance and the use of
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played an influential role in popularizing the concept of grand strategy in the mid-20th century. Subsequent definitions tend to build on his. He defines grand strategy as follows:
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strategy of how means (military and nonmilitary) can be used to advance and achieve national interests in the long-term. Issues of grand strategy typically include the choice of
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Thinkers differ as to whether grand strategy should serve to promote peace (as emphasized by B. H. Liddell Hart) or advance the security of a state (as emphasized by
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proposed in an influential work that politics and war were intrinsically linked. Clausewitz defined strategy as "the use of engagements for the object of the war".
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2392:(1941) had drawn the US into the war, was a sensible one in that Germany was the most powerful member of the Axis, and directly threatened the existence of the
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Gholz, Eugene; Press, Daryl G.; Sapolsky, Harvey M. (1997). "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation".
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Gholz, Eugene; Press, Daryl G. (June 2001). "The effects of wars on neutral countries: Why it doesn't pay to preserve the peace".
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was shortly thereafter translated into French and German, leading most thinkers to distinguish between tactics and strategy.
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Gholz, Eugene; Press, Daryl G. (31 August 2010). "Protecting 'The Prize': Oil and the U.S. National Interest".
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expanding strategy beyond military means to include diplomatic, financial, economic, informational, etc. means
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Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War
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defined strategy as "guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently... a theory for action".
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3813:"Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment"
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rather than grand strategy. The term grand strategy first emerged in France in the 19th century.
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United States Army in World War 2: War in the Pacific, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
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After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars
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1946:
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1771:
1709:
1602:
1530:
1523:
1380:
1313:
1263:
1253:
1128:
1048:
1008:
993:
960:
945:
816:
801:
754:
662:
620:
563:
558:
516:
339:
316:
223:
152:
81:
64:
4264:
Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance Today
3529:
Warmington, B. H. (1953). "Review of L'Armée de Dioclétien et la Réforme Constantinienne".
4336:
2860:
2145:
2043:
1791:
1776:
1694:
1650:
1592:
1248:
1243:
1133:
1123:
1038:
1013:
955:
796:
726:
716:
655:
568:
553:
476:
448:
248:
228:
76:
4386:
3869:
Drezner, Daniel W. (2013). "Military Primacy Doesn't Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)".
2404:
were therefore shaped by the lesser resources made available to the theatre commanders.
4362:
4325:
2825:
2739:
2724:
2704:
2666:
2393:
2065:
2035:
1976:
1966:
1714:
1138:
1098:
1063:
1053:
1023:
940:
893:
696:
687:
578:
531:
511:
501:
471:
438:
326:
283:
238:
110:
43:
3715:
Posen, Barry R.; Ross, Andrew L. (1996). "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy".
2217:, "all states... do grand strategy, but many of them do not do it particularly well."
4407:
4158:
4123:
4069:
3558:
3120:
3055:
The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars
2982:
2970:
2957:
2589:
2513:
and Andrew L. Ross identified four major grand strategic alternatives in the debate:
2244:
1813:
1801:
1657:
1577:
1493:
1476:
1333:
1188:
1168:
851:
846:
826:
806:
721:
692:
667:
543:
521:
506:
481:
321:
243:
206:
201:
98:
3890:
3848:
3757:
Art, Robert J. (1998). "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement".
3229:
3073:
3053:
2201:
Scholarship on grand strategy experienced a resurgence in the late 1960s and 1970s.
4377:
Borgwardt, Elizabeth; Nichols, Christopher Mcknight; Preston, Andrew, eds. (2021).
3894:
2554:
2540:
2493:
2397:
2385:
2381:
2077:
2000:
1926:
1906:
1901:
1796:
1741:
1375:
1370:
1193:
1108:
856:
590:
491:
288:
192:
3943:
Brooks, Stephen G.; Ikenberry, G. John; Wohlforth, William C. (30 November 2012).
3104:
2938:
2921:
4115:
3162:
4240:
4084:
2690:
2674:
2582:
2562:
2510:
2413:
2401:
2111:
1911:
1662:
1627:
1466:
1153:
1118:
831:
774:
677:
461:
182:
177:
4150:
3669:"Analysis | The long history of the U.S. interfering with elections elsewhere"
3287:
2840:
2795:
2226:
2214:
1868:
1838:
1560:
929:
4203:
3634:
3295:
3213:
3205:
3147:
3112:
2975:
War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History
2855:
2845:
2051:
1858:
1682:
1632:
1582:
1572:
1567:
1432:
1223:
1218:
1183:
625:
311:
278:
167:
3794:"Cooperative Security: From Individual Security to International Stability"
3317:
4051:
3882:
3829:
3812:
3320:(Report). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. pp. 2–7.
2805:
2553:
Posen and Ross identify such prominent scholars and political figures as
2417:
1873:
1848:
1481:
1113:
1088:
706:
261:
135:
3221:
3189:
4028:
3839:
3778:
3736:
2948:
2322:
1883:
1843:
1607:
1441:
1437:
784:
769:
645:
306:
301:
271:
210:
172:
3898:
3550:
2106:
including consideration of periods of peacetime in addition to wartime
4347:
2330:
2248:
2240:
1390:
791:
608:
344:
4020:
3770:
3728:
3542:
3164:
America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century
3029:
America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century
866:
402:
397:
162:
157:
16:
Long-term strategy employed by a nation to further its interests
3390:
3388:
3386:
3272:"Can Smaller Powers Have Grand Strategies? The Case of Rwanda"
2427:
2258:
35:
2922:"Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of 'Grand Strategy'"
2751:
scholars have proposed a third policy, offshore balancing.
2376:
An example of modern grand strategy is the decision of the
3800:. George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies.
3627:
Isolation and Alliances: An American Speaks to the British
3710:
3708:
3706:
3704:
3702:
3417:
3415:
2651:
Integration of other states into US-designed institutions
2492:
has also been proposed by prominent political scientists
2225:
One of the earlier writings on grand strategy comes from
4262:
Platias, Athanassios; Koliopoulos, Constantinos (2017).
4085:"What the 'Primacy' Debate in Foreign Policy Gets Wrong"
3700:
3698:
3696:
3694:
3692:
3690:
3688:
3686:
3684:
3682:
3373:
3371:
3369:
4172:
Mearsheimer, John J.; Walt, Stephen M. (13 June 2016).
2452:
3484:
The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation
3027:
Brooks, Stephen G.; Wohlforth, William Curti (2016).
4245:
Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy
3363:
London: Faber & Faber, 1967. 2nd rev. ed. p.322
3469:
3161:Brooks, Stephen G.; Wohlforth, William C. (2016).
2693:, director of the Security Studies Program at the
4330:American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment
2887:Balzacq, Thierry; Krebs, Ronald R., eds. (2021).
2388:. The decision, a joint agreement made after the
2148:distinguished between the two terms in his work
2054:, and methods to extract or mobilize resources.
3004:The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War
3938:
3936:
3934:
3864:
3862:
3860:
3858:
3270:Assamah, Daniel; Yuan, Shaoyu (January 2023).
3914:
3912:
3910:
3908:
3006:. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–23.
2641:Primacy is a grand strategy with four parts:
2441:The examples and perspective in this section
2008:
8:
4042:Sechser, Todd S.; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2016).
3962:
3960:
3958:
3058:. Cornell University Press. pp. 13–25.
3167:. Oxford University Press. pp. 73–77.
2998:Murray, Williamson; Grimsley, Mark (1996).
2416:as part of their grand strategy during the
2165:Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert
3318:The Promise and Pitfalls of Grand Strategy
2459:, or create a new section, as appropriate.
2015:
2001:
25:
3838:
3828:
3752:
3750:
3748:
3746:
3337:. Cambridge University Press. p. 5.
3334:War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness
2947:
2937:
2891:. Oxford University Press. pp. 2–4.
2669:, professor of international politics at
2475:Learn how and when to remove this message
2308:Learn how and when to remove this message
979:List of military strategies and concepts
3578:. GPO. pp. 376–386. Archived from
3421:
2897:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840299.001.0001
2872:
2654:Limits to the spread of nuclear weapons
2076:, selective engagement, restraint, and
33:
4372:Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire
4366:The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire
4044:Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy
3457:
3445:
3433:
3406:
3394:
3377:
2648:Reassurances and containment of allies
3994:
3311:
3309:
3307:
3305:
2889:The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy
2695:Massachusetts Institute of Technology
19:For grand strategy in wargaming, see
7:
3134:Freedman, Lawrence D. (2018-08-13).
2993:
2991:
2882:
2880:
2878:
2876:
2738:Ted Carpenter, senior fellow at the
2235:, an account of the war between the
4359:. London:Faber, 1967 (2nd rev. ed.)
3967:Carpenter, Ted Galen (March 2013).
3667:Tharoor, Ishaan (1 December 2021).
3648:Lears, Jackson (23 February 2017).
3142:. No. September/October 2018.
3089:"The Grandiosity of Grand Strategy"
2412:The US and the UK used a policy of
4387:10.1093/oso/9780190695668.001.0001
4379:Rethinking American Grand Strategy
14:
4223:Grand Strategies in War and Peace
4174:"The Case for Offshore Balancing"
2050:, as well as economic relations,
4292:. United States: Penguin Press.
2686:Primacy vs. selective engagement
2625:interests of the United States.
2432:
2368:List of World War II conferences
2263:
2232:History of the Peloponnesian War
53:
4083:Weisbrode, Ken (5 April 2020).
3969:"Delusions of Indispensability"
3002:. In Murray, Williamson (ed.).
3470:Platias & Koliopoulos 2017
3249:. Princeton University Press.
1:
3792:Cohen, Richard (April 2001).
3650:"How the US Began Its Empire"
3105:10.1080/0163660X.2019.1663061
2939:10.1080/09636412.2017.1360073
2167:, wrote an influential work,
4311:. Cornell University Press.
4309:A Grand Strategy for America
4247:. Cornell University Press.
4116:10.1080/09636412.2010.505865
3811:Porter, Patrick (May 2018).
3531:The Journal of Roman Studies
2620:will hopefully overcome the
4288:Gaddis, John Lewis (2018).
4266:. Oxford University Press.
3604:. Oxford University Press.
3600:Gaddis, John Lewis (2005).
3331:Murray, Williamson (2011).
3243:Ikenberry, G. John (2001).
3031:. Oxford University Press.
3000:"Introduction: On strategy"
2455:, discuss the issue on the
2283:. The specific problem is:
2117:British military historian
1472:Military–industrial complex
951:Operational manoeuvre group
4430:
3188:Desch, Michael C. (2007).
3087:Betts, Richard K. (2019).
2631:Collective action problems
2618:international institutions
2604:
2534:
2365:
2279:to meet Knowledge (XXG)'s
2080:, argue for pulling back.
18:
4225:. Yale University Press.
4221:Kennedy, Paul M. (1991).
4196:The Evolution of Strategy
4194:Heuser, Beatrice (2010).
4151:10.1080/09636410108429444
3625:Lippmann, Walter (1952).
3288:10.1177/09750878221135074
2985:: Routledge 2007, p. 283.
2159:, most thinkers wrote on
1536:Loss-of-strength gradient
393:Combat information center
4204:10.1017/cbo9780511762895
3919:Posen, Barry R. (2013).
3482:Ferrill, Arther (1988).
3206:10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.7
3093:The Washington Quarterly
3052:Posen, Barry R. (1984).
2595:impact of climate change
2372:Combined Chiefs of Staff
2169:General Essay on Tactics
1854:Military science fiction
1339:Technology and equipment
760:List of military tactics
2386:defeat of Germany first
2213:According to historian
1922:Wartime sexual violence
1678:Full-spectrum dominance
1489:Supply-chain management
4307:Art, Robert J (2004).
4009:International Security
3871:International Security
3817:International Security
3798:Marshall Center Papers
3759:International Security
3717:International Security
3572:Morton, Louis (1962).
3397:, pp. 6–8, 13–14.
3194:International Security
2801:Grand strategy wargame
2645:Military preponderance
2390:attack on Pearl Harbor
2384:to concentrate on the
2355:
2327:
2136:
1834:Awards and decorations
1807:Peace through strength
1782:Low-intensity conflict
1416:Conscientious objector
1289:Area of responsibility
21:Grand strategy wargame
4370:Papasotiriou, Harry.
4052:10.1017/9781316227305
3973:The National Interest
3486:. Thames and Hudson.
2920:Silove, Nina (2018).
2347:
2319:
2123:
426:Torpedo data computer
416:Ship gun fire-control
4343:Clausewitz, Carl von
4089:History News Network
3883:10.1162/isec_a_00124
3830:10.1162/isec_a_00311
3508:Zosimus: New History
3316:Brands, Hal (2012).
3074:10.7591/j.ctt1287fp3
2851:U.S. Army Strategist
2831:Operational mobility
2709:Princeton University
2601:Cooperative security
2569:Selective engagement
2523:cooperative security
2520:selective engagement
2453:improve this section
2443:may not represent a
2424:In the United States
2290:improve this section
2237:Peloponnesian League
2183:Antoine-Henri Jomini
1952:Military occupations
1787:Military engineering
1689:Unrestricted Warfare
1546:Force multiplication
444:Military manoeuvrers
4354:Liddell Hart, B. H.
3654:The New York Review
3358:Liddell Hart, B. H.
3136:"On Grand Strategy"
2607:Collective security
2537:Non-interventionism
2209:Historical examples
2179:Carl von Clausewitz
2083:Daniel Assamah and
2052:diplomatic behavior
1638:Penal military unit
1623:Rules of engagement
1299:Command and control
924:Operations research
388:Director (military)
378:Fire-control system
148:Command and control
29:Part of a series on
4335:2018-04-26 at the
2783:offshore balancing
2777:Offshore balancing
2490:offshore balancing
2119:B. H. Liddell Hart
2074:offshore balancing
1747:Counter-insurgency
1668:Command of the sea
1613:Jewish laws on war
1588:Geneva Conventions
1124:Divide and conquer
919:Military operation
884:Tactical objective
383:Fire-control radar
360:Electronic-warfare
4414:Military strategy
4396:978-0-19-069566-8
4318:978-0-8014-8957-0
4290:On Grand Strategy
4273:978-0-19-754805-9
4254:978-0-8014-7086-8
4232:978-0-300-05666-2
4213:978-0-521-19968-1
4061:978-1-107-10694-9
3895:Project MUSE
3629:. Little, Brown.
3611:978-0-19-803890-0
3510:. pg. 159, n.80.
3493:978-0-500-27495-8
3448:, pp. 16–17.
3409:, pp. 14–15.
3344:978-1-107-00242-5
3276:Insight on Africa
3256:978-0-691-05091-1
3174:978-0-19-046425-7
3065:978-0-8014-1633-0
3038:978-0-19-046425-7
3013:978-0-521-56627-8
2906:978-0-19-884029-9
2836:Principles of war
2816:Military strategy
2811:Military doctrine
2721:Dartmouth College
2717:William Wohlforth
2485:
2484:
2477:
2318:
2317:
2310:
2281:quality standards
2272:This section may
2221:Peloponnesian War
2157:French Revolution
2040:military doctrine
2025:
2024:
1917:Horses in warfare
1864:Anti-war movement
1767:Gunboat diplomacy
1757:Disaster response
1705:Philosophy of war
1700:Principles of war
1673:Deterrence theory
1618:Right of conquest
1541:Lanchester's laws
1309:Principles of war
999:Counter-offensive
984:Military campaign
889:Target saturation
812:Counterinsurgency
421:Gun data computer
355:Close air support
317:Aircraft carriers
4421:
4400:
4322:
4303:
4277:
4258:
4236:
4217:
4182:
4181:
4169:
4163:
4162:
4139:Security Studies
4134:
4128:
4127:
4104:Security Studies
4099:
4093:
4092:
4080:
4074:
4073:
4039:
4033:
4032:
4004:
3998:
3992:
3977:
3976:
3964:
3953:
3952:
3940:
3929:
3928:
3916:
3903:
3902:
3866:
3853:
3852:
3842:
3832:
3808:
3802:
3801:
3789:
3783:
3782:
3754:
3741:
3740:
3712:
3677:
3676:
3664:
3658:
3657:
3645:
3639:
3638:
3622:
3616:
3615:
3597:
3591:
3590:
3588:
3587:
3569:
3563:
3562:
3526:
3520:
3517:
3511:
3504:
3498:
3497:
3479:
3473:
3467:
3461:
3455:
3449:
3443:
3437:
3431:
3425:
3419:
3410:
3404:
3398:
3392:
3381:
3375:
3364:
3355:
3349:
3348:
3328:
3322:
3321:
3313:
3300:
3299:
3267:
3261:
3260:
3240:
3234:
3233:
3185:
3179:
3178:
3158:
3152:
3151:
3131:
3125:
3124:
3084:
3078:
3077:
3049:
3043:
3042:
3024:
3018:
3017:
2995:
2986:
2968:
2962:
2961:
2951:
2941:
2926:Security Studies
2917:
2911:
2910:
2884:
2821:Military tactics
2755:Liberal hegemony
2671:Tufts University
2622:security dilemma
2559:Patrick Buchanan
2531:Neo-isolationism
2517:neo-isolationism
2498:John Mearsheimer
2480:
2473:
2469:
2466:
2460:
2436:
2435:
2428:
2321:From the era of
2313:
2306:
2302:
2299:
2293:
2267:
2266:
2259:
2161:military science
2017:
2010:
2003:
1772:Humanitarian aid
1710:Security dilemma
1531:Power projection
1314:Economy of force
1294:Chain of command
1009:Defence in depth
994:Commerce raiding
817:Defeat in detail
153:Defense ministry
57:
48:
47:
38:
26:
4429:
4428:
4424:
4423:
4422:
4420:
4419:
4418:
4404:
4403:
4397:
4376:
4337:Wayback Machine
4326:Biddle, Stephen
4319:
4306:
4300:
4287:
4284:
4282:Further reading
4274:
4261:
4255:
4241:Posen, Barry R.
4239:
4233:
4220:
4214:
4193:
4190:
4185:
4178:Foreign Affairs
4171:
4170:
4166:
4136:
4135:
4131:
4101:
4100:
4096:
4082:
4081:
4077:
4062:
4041:
4040:
4036:
4021:10.2307/2539282
4006:
4005:
4001:
3993:
3980:
3966:
3965:
3956:
3949:Foreign Affairs
3942:
3941:
3932:
3925:Foreign Affairs
3918:
3917:
3906:
3868:
3867:
3856:
3810:
3809:
3805:
3791:
3790:
3786:
3771:10.2307/2539339
3756:
3755:
3744:
3729:10.2307/2539272
3714:
3713:
3680:
3673:Washington Post
3666:
3665:
3661:
3647:
3646:
3642:
3624:
3623:
3619:
3612:
3599:
3598:
3594:
3585:
3583:
3571:
3570:
3566:
3528:
3527:
3523:
3518:
3514:
3505:
3501:
3494:
3481:
3480:
3476:
3468:
3464:
3456:
3452:
3444:
3440:
3432:
3428:
3424:, pp. 3–4.
3420:
3413:
3405:
3401:
3393:
3384:
3380:, pp. 3–5.
3376:
3367:
3356:
3352:
3345:
3330:
3329:
3325:
3315:
3314:
3303:
3269:
3268:
3264:
3257:
3242:
3241:
3237:
3187:
3186:
3182:
3175:
3160:
3159:
3155:
3140:Foreign Affairs
3133:
3132:
3128:
3086:
3085:
3081:
3066:
3051:
3050:
3046:
3039:
3026:
3025:
3021:
3014:
2997:
2996:
2989:
2969:
2965:
2919:
2918:
2914:
2907:
2886:
2885:
2874:
2870:
2865:
2861:War termination
2791:
2779:
2766:
2757:
2748:
2688:
2639:
2609:
2603:
2571:
2543:
2533:
2506:
2481:
2470:
2464:
2461:
2450:
2437:
2433:
2426:
2410:
2374:
2364:
2314:
2303:
2297:
2294:
2287:
2268:
2264:
2257:
2223:
2211:
2141:
2096:in three ways:
2093:
2064:In contrast to
2057:In contrast to
2044:force structure
2021:
1992:
1991:
1942:
1932:
1931:
1897:
1889:
1888:
1829:
1819:
1818:
1792:Multilateralism
1777:Law enforcement
1737:
1727:
1726:
1695:Just war theory
1653:
1643:
1642:
1593:Geneva Protocol
1563:
1553:
1552:
1526:
1516:
1515:
1457:
1447:
1446:
1354:
1344:
1343:
1284:
1274:
1273:
1239:
1229:
1228:
1159:Network-centric
1079:
1069:
1068:
976:
966:
965:
914:
904:
903:
852:Rapid dominance
757:
747:
746:
702:Electromagnetic
611:
601:
600:
587:
540:
488:
464:
454:
453:
449:Combat training
430:
407:
373:Combat systems:
369:
331:
327:Auxiliary ships
293:
253:
249:Military police
215:
138:
128:
127:
67:
41:
40:
39:
34:
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
4427:
4425:
4417:
4416:
4406:
4405:
4402:
4401:
4395:
4374:
4368:
4360:
4351:
4340:
4323:
4317:
4304:
4299:978-1594203510
4298:
4283:
4280:
4279:
4278:
4272:
4259:
4253:
4237:
4231:
4218:
4212:
4189:
4186:
4184:
4183:
4164:
4129:
4110:(3): 453–485.
4094:
4075:
4060:
4034:
3999:
3978:
3954:
3945:"Lean Forward"
3930:
3904:
3854:
3803:
3784:
3742:
3678:
3659:
3640:
3617:
3610:
3592:
3564:
3543:10.2307/297803
3521:
3512:
3506:Ridley. 1982.
3499:
3492:
3474:
3462:
3450:
3438:
3426:
3411:
3399:
3382:
3365:
3350:
3343:
3323:
3301:
3282:(1): 108–127.
3262:
3255:
3235:
3180:
3173:
3153:
3126:
3079:
3064:
3044:
3037:
3019:
3012:
2987:
2963:
2912:
2905:
2871:
2869:
2866:
2864:
2863:
2858:
2853:
2848:
2843:
2838:
2833:
2828:
2826:Naval strategy
2823:
2818:
2813:
2808:
2803:
2798:
2792:
2790:
2787:
2778:
2775:
2765:
2762:
2756:
2753:
2747:
2744:
2740:Cato Institute
2725:global threats
2713:Stephen Brooks
2705:John Ikenberry
2687:
2684:
2667:Daniel Drezner
2656:
2655:
2652:
2649:
2646:
2638:
2635:
2602:
2599:
2581:In the piece,
2570:
2567:
2532:
2529:
2528:
2527:
2524:
2521:
2518:
2511:Barry R. Posen
2505:
2502:
2483:
2482:
2447:of the subject
2445:worldwide view
2440:
2438:
2431:
2425:
2422:
2409:
2406:
2394:United Kingdom
2363:
2360:
2335:Hadrian's Wall
2316:
2315:
2271:
2269:
2262:
2256:
2253:
2222:
2219:
2210:
2207:
2203:Bernard Brodie
2146:Emperor Leo VI
2140:
2137:
2108:
2107:
2104:
2101:
2092:
2089:
2066:foreign policy
2028:Grand strategy
2023:
2022:
2020:
2019:
2012:
2005:
1997:
1994:
1993:
1990:
1989:
1984:
1979:
1974:
1969:
1964:
1959:
1957:Military terms
1954:
1949:
1943:
1938:
1937:
1934:
1933:
1930:
1929:
1924:
1919:
1914:
1909:
1904:
1898:
1895:
1894:
1891:
1890:
1887:
1886:
1881:
1876:
1871:
1866:
1861:
1856:
1851:
1846:
1841:
1836:
1830:
1825:
1824:
1821:
1820:
1817:
1816:
1811:
1810:
1809:
1804:
1794:
1789:
1784:
1779:
1774:
1769:
1764:
1759:
1754:
1749:
1744:
1738:
1733:
1732:
1729:
1728:
1725:
1724:
1719:
1718:
1717:
1715:Tripwire force
1707:
1702:
1697:
1692:
1685:
1680:
1675:
1670:
1665:
1660:
1654:
1649:
1648:
1645:
1644:
1641:
1640:
1635:
1630:
1625:
1620:
1615:
1610:
1605:
1600:
1595:
1590:
1585:
1580:
1575:
1570:
1564:
1559:
1558:
1555:
1554:
1551:
1550:
1549:
1548:
1538:
1533:
1527:
1522:
1521:
1518:
1517:
1514:
1513:
1512:
1511:
1506:
1501:
1491:
1486:
1485:
1484:
1479:
1469:
1464:
1458:
1453:
1452:
1449:
1448:
1445:
1444:
1435:
1430:
1429:
1428:
1418:
1413:
1408:
1403:
1398:
1393:
1388:
1383:
1378:
1373:
1368:
1367:
1366:
1355:
1350:
1349:
1346:
1345:
1342:
1341:
1336:
1331:
1326:
1321:
1316:
1311:
1306:
1301:
1296:
1291:
1285:
1280:
1279:
1276:
1275:
1272:
1271:
1266:
1261:
1256:
1251:
1246:
1240:
1237:Administrative
1235:
1234:
1231:
1230:
1227:
1226:
1221:
1216:
1211:
1206:
1201:
1196:
1191:
1186:
1181:
1176:
1171:
1166:
1164:New generation
1161:
1156:
1151:
1146:
1141:
1139:Fleet in being
1136:
1131:
1126:
1121:
1116:
1111:
1106:
1101:
1096:
1091:
1086:
1080:
1077:Grand strategy
1075:
1074:
1071:
1070:
1067:
1066:
1064:Scorched earth
1061:
1056:
1051:
1046:
1041:
1036:
1031:
1026:
1021:
1016:
1011:
1006:
1001:
996:
991:
986:
977:
972:
971:
968:
967:
964:
963:
958:
953:
948:
943:
941:Deep operation
938:
933:
926:
921:
915:
910:
909:
906:
905:
902:
901:
896:
891:
886:
881:
876:
871:
870:
869:
859:
854:
849:
844:
839:
834:
829:
824:
819:
814:
809:
804:
799:
794:
789:
788:
787:
782:
777:
767:
758:
753:
752:
749:
748:
745:
744:
742:Unconventional
739:
734:
729:
724:
719:
714:
709:
704:
699:
690:
688:Disinformation
685:
680:
675:
670:
665:
660:
659:
658:
653:
643:
638:
633:
628:
623:
618:
612:
607:
606:
603:
602:
599:
598:
593:
586:
585:
584:
583:
582:
581:
571:
566:
561:
556:
551:
539:
538:
537:
536:
535:
534:
524:
519:
514:
509:
504:
499:
487:
486:
485:
484:
479:
474:
465:
460:
459:
456:
455:
452:
451:
446:
441:
439:Basic training
436:
429:
428:
423:
418:
413:
406:
405:
400:
395:
390:
385:
380:
375:
368:
367:
365:Reconnaissance
362:
357:
352:
347:
342:
337:
330:
329:
324:
319:
314:
309:
304:
299:
292:
291:
286:
284:Special forces
281:
276:
275:
274:
264:
259:
252:
251:
246:
241:
239:Reconnaissance
236:
231:
226:
221:
214:
213:
204:
199:
190:
185:
180:
175:
170:
165:
160:
155:
150:
145:
139:
134:
133:
130:
129:
126:
125:
124:
123:
118:
108:
107:
106:
101:
91:
90:
89:
82:Post-classical
79:
74:
68:
63:
62:
59:
58:
50:
49:
31:
30:
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4426:
4415:
4412:
4411:
4409:
4398:
4392:
4388:
4384:
4380:
4375:
4373:
4369:
4367:
4364:
4361:
4358:
4355:
4352:
4350:
4349:
4344:
4341:
4338:
4334:
4331:
4327:
4324:
4320:
4314:
4310:
4305:
4301:
4295:
4291:
4286:
4285:
4281:
4275:
4269:
4265:
4260:
4256:
4250:
4246:
4242:
4238:
4234:
4228:
4224:
4219:
4215:
4209:
4205:
4201:
4197:
4192:
4191:
4187:
4179:
4175:
4168:
4165:
4160:
4156:
4152:
4148:
4144:
4140:
4133:
4130:
4125:
4121:
4117:
4113:
4109:
4105:
4098:
4095:
4090:
4086:
4079:
4076:
4071:
4067:
4063:
4057:
4053:
4049:
4045:
4038:
4035:
4030:
4026:
4022:
4018:
4014:
4010:
4003:
4000:
3996:
3991:
3989:
3987:
3985:
3983:
3979:
3974:
3970:
3963:
3961:
3959:
3955:
3950:
3946:
3939:
3937:
3935:
3931:
3926:
3922:
3915:
3913:
3911:
3909:
3905:
3900:
3896:
3892:
3888:
3884:
3880:
3876:
3872:
3865:
3863:
3861:
3859:
3855:
3850:
3846:
3841:
3836:
3831:
3826:
3822:
3818:
3814:
3807:
3804:
3799:
3795:
3788:
3785:
3780:
3776:
3772:
3768:
3765:(3): 79–113.
3764:
3760:
3753:
3751:
3749:
3747:
3743:
3738:
3734:
3730:
3726:
3722:
3718:
3711:
3709:
3707:
3705:
3703:
3701:
3699:
3697:
3695:
3693:
3691:
3689:
3687:
3685:
3683:
3679:
3674:
3670:
3663:
3660:
3655:
3651:
3644:
3641:
3636:
3632:
3628:
3621:
3618:
3613:
3607:
3603:
3596:
3593:
3582:on 2017-08-30
3581:
3577:
3576:
3568:
3565:
3560:
3556:
3552:
3548:
3544:
3540:
3536:
3532:
3525:
3522:
3516:
3513:
3509:
3503:
3500:
3495:
3489:
3485:
3478:
3475:
3471:
3466:
3463:
3459:
3454:
3451:
3447:
3442:
3439:
3436:, p. 15.
3435:
3430:
3427:
3423:
3418:
3416:
3412:
3408:
3403:
3400:
3396:
3391:
3389:
3387:
3383:
3379:
3374:
3372:
3370:
3366:
3362:
3359:
3354:
3351:
3346:
3340:
3336:
3335:
3327:
3324:
3319:
3312:
3310:
3308:
3306:
3302:
3297:
3293:
3289:
3285:
3281:
3277:
3273:
3266:
3263:
3258:
3252:
3248:
3247:
3239:
3236:
3231:
3227:
3223:
3219:
3215:
3211:
3207:
3203:
3199:
3195:
3191:
3184:
3181:
3176:
3170:
3166:
3165:
3157:
3154:
3149:
3145:
3141:
3137:
3130:
3127:
3122:
3118:
3114:
3110:
3106:
3102:
3098:
3094:
3090:
3083:
3080:
3075:
3071:
3067:
3061:
3057:
3056:
3048:
3045:
3040:
3034:
3030:
3023:
3020:
3015:
3009:
3005:
3001:
2994:
2992:
2988:
2984:
2983:New York City
2980:
2976:
2972:
2967:
2964:
2959:
2955:
2950:
2945:
2940:
2935:
2931:
2927:
2923:
2916:
2913:
2908:
2902:
2898:
2894:
2890:
2883:
2881:
2879:
2877:
2873:
2867:
2862:
2859:
2857:
2854:
2852:
2849:
2847:
2844:
2842:
2839:
2837:
2834:
2832:
2829:
2827:
2824:
2822:
2819:
2817:
2814:
2812:
2809:
2807:
2804:
2802:
2799:
2797:
2794:
2793:
2788:
2786:
2784:
2776:
2774:
2770:
2763:
2761:
2754:
2752:
2745:
2743:
2741:
2736:
2732:
2728:
2726:
2722:
2718:
2714:
2710:
2706:
2702:
2698:
2696:
2692:
2685:
2683:
2680:
2676:
2675:externalities
2672:
2668:
2664:
2660:
2653:
2650:
2647:
2644:
2643:
2642:
2636:
2634:
2632:
2626:
2623:
2619:
2615:
2608:
2600:
2598:
2596:
2591:
2590:Robert J. Art
2587:
2584:
2579:
2575:
2568:
2566:
2564:
2560:
2556:
2551:
2547:
2542:
2538:
2530:
2525:
2522:
2519:
2516:
2515:
2514:
2512:
2503:
2501:
2499:
2495:
2491:
2479:
2476:
2468:
2465:February 2011
2458:
2454:
2448:
2446:
2439:
2430:
2429:
2423:
2421:
2419:
2415:
2407:
2405:
2403:
2399:
2395:
2391:
2387:
2383:
2379:
2373:
2369:
2361:
2359:
2354:
2353:
2346:
2343:
2338:
2336:
2332:
2326:
2324:
2312:
2309:
2301:
2298:February 2017
2291:
2286:
2282:
2278:
2277:
2270:
2261:
2260:
2254:
2252:
2250:
2246:
2245:Delian League
2242:
2238:
2234:
2233:
2228:
2220:
2218:
2216:
2208:
2206:
2204:
2199:
2195:
2191:
2187:
2184:
2180:
2176:
2174:
2170:
2166:
2162:
2158:
2155:Prior to the
2153:
2151:
2147:
2138:
2135:
2131:
2127:
2122:
2120:
2115:
2113:
2105:
2102:
2099:
2098:
2097:
2090:
2088:
2086:
2081:
2079:
2075:
2069:
2067:
2062:
2060:
2055:
2053:
2049:
2045:
2041:
2037:
2033:
2032:high strategy
2029:
2018:
2013:
2011:
2006:
2004:
1999:
1998:
1996:
1995:
1988:
1985:
1983:
1980:
1978:
1975:
1973:
1970:
1968:
1965:
1963:
1960:
1958:
1955:
1953:
1950:
1948:
1945:
1944:
1941:
1936:
1935:
1928:
1925:
1923:
1920:
1918:
1915:
1913:
1910:
1908:
1905:
1903:
1900:
1899:
1893:
1892:
1885:
1882:
1880:
1877:
1875:
1872:
1870:
1867:
1865:
1862:
1860:
1857:
1855:
1852:
1850:
1847:
1845:
1844:Warrior caste
1842:
1840:
1837:
1835:
1832:
1831:
1828:
1823:
1822:
1815:
1814:Show of force
1812:
1808:
1805:
1803:
1802:Peacebuilding
1800:
1799:
1798:
1795:
1793:
1790:
1788:
1785:
1783:
1780:
1778:
1775:
1773:
1770:
1768:
1765:
1763:
1760:
1758:
1755:
1753:
1750:
1748:
1745:
1743:
1740:
1739:
1736:
1731:
1730:
1723:
1720:
1716:
1713:
1712:
1711:
1708:
1706:
1703:
1701:
1698:
1696:
1693:
1691:
1690:
1686:
1684:
1681:
1679:
1676:
1674:
1671:
1669:
1666:
1664:
1661:
1659:
1658:Air supremacy
1656:
1655:
1652:
1647:
1646:
1639:
1636:
1634:
1631:
1629:
1626:
1624:
1621:
1619:
1616:
1614:
1611:
1609:
1606:
1604:
1601:
1599:
1598:Islamic rules
1596:
1594:
1591:
1589:
1586:
1584:
1581:
1579:
1578:Court-martial
1576:
1574:
1571:
1569:
1566:
1565:
1562:
1557:
1556:
1547:
1544:
1543:
1542:
1539:
1537:
1534:
1532:
1529:
1528:
1525:
1520:
1519:
1510:
1507:
1505:
1502:
1500:
1497:
1496:
1495:
1492:
1490:
1487:
1483:
1480:
1478:
1477:Arms industry
1475:
1474:
1473:
1470:
1468:
1465:
1463:
1460:
1459:
1456:
1451:
1450:
1443:
1439:
1436:
1434:
1431:
1427:
1424:
1423:
1422:
1419:
1417:
1414:
1412:
1409:
1407:
1404:
1402:
1399:
1397:
1394:
1392:
1389:
1387:
1384:
1382:
1379:
1377:
1374:
1372:
1369:
1365:
1362:
1361:
1360:
1357:
1356:
1353:
1348:
1347:
1340:
1337:
1335:
1332:
1330:
1327:
1325:
1322:
1320:
1317:
1315:
1312:
1310:
1307:
1305:
1302:
1300:
1297:
1295:
1292:
1290:
1287:
1286:
1283:
1278:
1277:
1270:
1267:
1265:
1262:
1260:
1257:
1255:
1252:
1250:
1247:
1245:
1242:
1241:
1238:
1233:
1232:
1225:
1222:
1220:
1217:
1215:
1212:
1210:
1207:
1205:
1202:
1200:
1197:
1195:
1192:
1190:
1187:
1185:
1182:
1180:
1177:
1175:
1172:
1170:
1167:
1165:
1162:
1160:
1157:
1155:
1152:
1150:
1147:
1145:
1142:
1140:
1137:
1135:
1132:
1130:
1127:
1125:
1122:
1120:
1117:
1115:
1112:
1110:
1107:
1105:
1102:
1100:
1097:
1095:
1094:Broken-backed
1092:
1090:
1087:
1085:
1082:
1081:
1078:
1073:
1072:
1065:
1062:
1060:
1057:
1055:
1052:
1050:
1047:
1045:
1042:
1040:
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4339:. April 2005
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3877:(1): 52–79.
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3584:. Retrieved
3580:the original
3574:
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3465:
3460:, p. 9.
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3422:Kennedy 1991
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2932:(1): 27–57.
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2555:Earl Ravenal
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2541:Isolationism
2507:
2504:In the 1990s
2494:Stephen Walt
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2471:
2462:
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2398:Soviet Union
2382:World War II
2375:
2362:World War II
2356:
2348:
2340:The emperor
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2295:
2288:Please help
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2255:Roman Empire
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2078:isolationism
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1927:Fifth column
1907:War resister
1902:Women in war
1797:Peacekeeping
1742:Arms control
1687:
1376:Mobilization
1371:Conscription
1329:Intelligence
1282:Organization
1076:
928:
857:Encirclement
737:Radiological
673:Conventional
527:Subterranean
434:Development:
433:
410:
372:
334:
297:Naval units:
296:
289:Signal corps
256:
234:Intelligence
219:Specialties:
218:
143:Organization
94:Early modern
4363:Luttwak, E.
4145:(4): 1–57.
4015:(4): 5–48.
3997:, p. .
3921:"Pull Back"
3840:10871/30563
3823:(4): 9–46.
3723:(3): 5–53.
3537:: 173–175.
3472:, p. .
3458:Heuser 2010
3446:Heuser 2010
3434:Heuser 2010
3407:Heuser 2010
3395:Heuser 2010
3378:Heuser 2010
3200:(3): 7–43.
3099:(4): 7–22.
2971:Gray, Colin
2949:1885/251092
2691:Barry Posen
2583:Barry Posen
2563:Doug Bandow
2414:containment
2402:Pacific War
2342:Constantine
2292:if you can.
2112:Barry Posen
2085:Shaoyu Yuan
1912:War studies
1735:Non-warfare
1663:Appeasement
1628:Martial law
1467:War economy
1406:Transgender
1359:Recruitment
1119:Containment
1004:Culminating
912:Operational
832:Envelopment
775:Air assault
656:Air cavalry
616:Air defence
596:Information
497:Cold-region
462:Battlespace
411:Historical:
257:Land units:
183:Space force
178:Coast guard
111:Late modern
72:Prehistoric
3995:Posen 2014
3586:2012-07-18
3519:Zos. II.34
2868:References
2841:Simulation
2796:Art of War
2719:, both of
2605:See also:
2535:See also:
2366:See also:
2331:fortresses
2243:) and the
2227:Thucydides
2215:Hal Brands
2091:Definition
1972:War crimes
1962:Operations
1869:Foot drill
1839:Battle cry
1752:deterrence
1411:Harassment
1386:Specialism
1209:Technology
1204:Succession
1149:Liberation
1084:Asymmetric
1019:Empty fort
930:Blitzkrieg
899:Withdrawal
862:Investment
641:Camouflage
636:Biological
574:Underwater
549:Amphibious
468:Aerospace
335:Air units:
312:Submarines
121:fourth-gen
116:industrial
104:napoleonic
4159:154095484
4124:153498435
4070:157599829
3635:558207707
3559:162860536
3296:0975-0878
3214:0162-2889
3148:0015-7120
3121:214452544
3113:0163-660X
2958:148878803
2856:Wargaming
2846:Total war
2764:Restraint
2457:talk page
2048:alliances
1859:War novel
1762:Grey-zone
1722:War games
1683:Overmatch
1633:War crime
1583:Desertion
1573:Ceasefire
1568:Armistice
1455:Logistics
1433:Mercenary
1421:Volunteer
1352:Personnel
1324:Engineers
1269:Sociology
1224:World war
1219:Total war
1199:Strategic
1189:Religious
1174:Political
1169:Perpetual
1144:Irregular
1059:Offensive
1034:Defensive
1029:Deception
989:Attrition
842:Guerrilla
837:Formation
780:Airbridge
712:Loitering
626:Artillery
279:Artillery
229:Engineers
197:Irregular
168:Air force
4408:Category
4357:Strategy
4333:Archived
4243:(2014).
3891:57558535
3849:57564228
3361:Strategy
3230:57572097
3222:30130517
2979:Abingdon
2806:Strategy
2789:See also
2451:You may
2418:Cold War
2408:Cold War
2396:and the
2274:require
2247:(led by
2239:(led by
2059:strategy
1874:War song
1849:War film
1482:Materiel
1401:Children
1381:Training
1319:Medicine
1304:Doctrine
1259:Training
1194:Resource
1179:Princely
1129:Economic
1114:Conquest
1109:Colonial
1104:Cold war
1089:Blockade
974:Strategy
946:Maneuver
707:Infantry
663:Chemical
517:Mountain
477:Airborne
340:Fighters
307:Warships
262:Infantry
188:Reserves
136:Military
4188:Sources
4029:2539282
3779:2539339
3737:2539272
2637:Primacy
2614:realism
2526:primacy
2352:Zosimus
2329:These "
2323:Hadrian
2276:cleanup
2173:Taktika
2150:Taktika
2139:History
2036:state's
1987:Writers
1982:Weapons
1947:Battles
1896:Related
1884:Wargame
1879:Uniform
1827:Culture
1608:Perfidy
1603:Justice
1524:Science
1509:Outpost
1462:History
1442:Warrior
1438:Soldier
1426:foreign
1364:counter
1264:Service
1214:Theater
1154:Limited
1134:Endemic
1049:Nuclear
822:Foxhole
797:Cavalry
785:Airdrop
770:Airlift
755:Tactics
727:Nuclear
717:Missile
646:Cavalry
631:Barrage
609:Weapons
569:Surface
350:Command
345:Bombers
302:Frogman
272:Cavalry
244:Medical
211:Militia
193:Regular
173:Marines
87:castles
77:Ancient
65:History
44:outline
4393:
4348:On War
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2378:Allies
2249:Athens
2241:Sparta
1967:Sieges
1651:Theory
1391:Morale
1249:Policy
1244:Branch
1024:Mosaic
1014:Fabian
961:Covert
894:Trench
879:Screen
802:Charge
792:Battle
765:Aerial
683:Denial
651:Horses
579:Seabed
532:Tunnel
512:Jungle
502:Desert
472:Aerial
4155:S2CID
4120:S2CID
4066:S2CID
4025:JSTOR
3887:S2CID
3845:S2CID
3775:JSTOR
3733:JSTOR
3555:S2CID
3547:JSTOR
3226:S2CID
3218:JSTOR
3117:S2CID
3070:JSTOR
2954:S2CID
2746:Today
2034:is a
1940:Lists
1396:Women
1334:Ranks
1254:Staff
1184:Proxy
1099:Class
1054:Naval
1039:Depth
874:Swarm
867:Siege
847:Naval
827:Drone
722:Music
697:Robot
693:Drone
678:Cyber
621:Armor
591:Cyber
564:Green
559:Brown
522:Urban
482:Space
403:Radar
398:Sonar
267:Armor
224:Staff
202:Ranks
4391:ISBN
4313:ISBN
4294:ISBN
4268:ISBN
4249:ISBN
4227:ISBN
4208:ISBN
4056:ISBN
3631:OCLC
3606:ISBN
3488:ISBN
3339:ISBN
3292:ISSN
3251:ISBN
3210:ISSN
3169:ISBN
3144:ISSN
3109:ISSN
3060:ISBN
3033:ISBN
3008:ISBN
2981:and
2901:ISBN
2715:and
2711:and
2561:and
2539:and
2496:and
2370:and
2046:and
1977:Wars
1494:Base
1044:Goal
956:Raid
554:Blue
492:Land
163:Navy
158:Army
4383:doi
4200:doi
4147:doi
4112:doi
4048:doi
4017:doi
3879:doi
3835:hdl
3825:doi
3767:doi
3725:doi
3539:doi
3284:doi
3202:doi
3101:doi
2944:hdl
2934:doi
2893:doi
2781:In
2727:."
2707:of
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2030:or
1561:Law
1504:FOB
1499:MOB
544:Sea
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42:(
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