Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2

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language on site. In an email, Lawrence of Rydon admitted that the site was “poorly performing” and they were using “cheap incompetent sub-contractors”. Reed of KCTMO found Rydon complacent. Rydon had given the job of packing the window gaps with fire-resistant Rockwool to a former employee's company, and was not aware they had substituted cheaper flammable material. KCTMO was aware that the Residents Association was dissatisfied with the work, and that one of their number had predicted the effects of the fire 14 months previously. He was labelled as aggressive. The contractors didn't clean up after the job and accused the residents of having made the mess. Lawrence in a contemporary email said there were missing finishes and gaps and he thought it was “a disaster”. He was not aware that there were window lining regulations he should adhere to.

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vulnerable were killed. But on the night of the fire the TMO document given to the fire brigade only listed 10 who were disabled, as in residence. It was confirmed on 6 May by Teresa Brown, the director of housing at the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation at the time, that the council had relied on its stay put-policy and that individualised evacuation plans had not been thought necessary and were not available and had not been produced. If a tenant had asked, one could have done for them. The tenants hadn't been told this was possible. The council had knowingly put disabled tenants on the top floor without doing such a plan- even though it was known that evacuation was needed from the Adair Tower fire, and the Shepherds Court fire, in nearby

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been obtained. He said the only assessment of its performance that he saw was of its thermal insulation, not its fire performance – he was not aware that it was his job to check that. He obtained a 43% discount as Celotex wished to use the tower as a case study. Celotex only guaranteed the safety of the insulation in the configuation they had tested and not for use with flammable plastic-filled aluminium panels. That caveat was missed by Bailey. Bailey said that had no training in understanding building regulations or in keeping up-to-date with industry codes of practice for the design and installation of cladding and windows. He said it was never his role to be considering the fire performance of the materials."

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is the ability to forget to fill in the paperwork.” The paperwork said there were 12 that needed individual rescue plans, when actually there were 35. There were no individual rescue plans in existence. Black made a decision not to act to fulfil the landlord obligation to should draw up these specific emergency evacuation plans for vulnerable and disabled people anywhere, claiming it was impractical. He had been warned by his own safety consultants and the London Fire Brigade that his fire management planning was inadequate. His director responsible for fire safety was also responsible for financial services and IT and she had no background or experience in fire safety.

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for aluminium in 2014 but told police he only knew about it after the June 2017 fire. He has since resigned. He was told in an appendix to an email, where the main focus had been on deciding the colour of the cladding panels. He said he didn't register the change, and “didn’t know the difference between aluminium and zinc”. He had no training or expertise in housing or fire safety. He said he relied on the expertise of others. He believed the regeneration of council estates but saw his role to question budget overruns. When the refurbishment was first discussed, he questioned it as a 2009 strategic report had recommended Grenfell be demolished.

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in my role. Simon informed me that it was not part of my role and had been dealt with.” Rydon did not normally employ specialist fire consultants and felt “comfortable with the risk”, as it had done before on social housing blocks: they believed they were using competent specialist sub-contractor. Rydon had assured RBKC and the architect that they were employing a fire expert in meetings in April, June, July, September and October 2014. Thus the cladding material had been chosen without consulting a professional. Lawrence confirmed this.

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safety engineer. Todd had been quoted as saying “little if any special competence is required in relation to the principles of fire safety to enable a competent fire risk assessor”. Subsequent to the fire, Todd's son Keith, has taken the position as director of fire safety for the tower’s owner (RBKC). Colin Todd owns a fire consultancy, and Keith worked for him for six years. The survivors group described this relationship as distressing. Nabil Choucair, who lost six relatives in the fire, said it was an unacceptable

617:(MHCLG) is awarding a £600,000 research grant to a consortium whose members include a fire testing specialist Eric Guillaume, whose research was funded by Kingspan, and José Torero, a fire engineer who has publicly opposed outright bans on combustible materials. A rival consortium for the grant, with stronger credentials in the field of smoke installation and toxicity was not appointed. There was no open competitive tender as the contract was let through the Crown Commercial Service system. 505:. The window reveal is the surround of a glazing unit perpendicular to the glass. The glazing unit creates an interior reveal, and an exterior reveal, the top is known as the head, the bottom is the sill and the sides are called the jambs. In the job, the window was moved outward and reduced in size. Dixon understood that his role was to create new interior reveals- in effect a purely cosmetic job. He agreed with Rydon to use rigid insulation board (flammable UPVC). He had not consulted 528:. He had not read the document about the fire performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multi-storey buildings known as BR135. It detailed a 1999 cladding fire in Garnock Court in Irvine, Scotland, and explained with pictures the rapid fire spread through cladding, and he was not aware of the guidance differentiating between non-combustible panels made from materials such as cement and combustible panels, including aluminium panels which may melt and create molten debris. 2333:

insulation – referred to as "new technology" versus "old technology" in proceedings – failed a subsequent fire test in December 2007 held by the Building Research Establishment (BRE). Internal Kingspan analysis at the time noted: "The new technology phenolic is very different in a fire situation to the previous technology which has passed several similar tests. The phenolic burnt very ferociously and gave the top cavity barrier a serious hammering."

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Reynobond panel. The test in 2004 showed that the cassette version gave off seven times more heat. That was written off as a rogue result, and no further tests were made to discover more. Claude Wehrle, Arconic’s technical manager, had said in his written statement the failed test for cassette panels was “not seen as a key issue or priority”. Under cross-examination, Schmidt confirmed that Arconic should have informed the BBA about the test.

815:(RBKC) in April 2017 that cladding panels were a potential problem, as often they did not comply with building regulations, leading to a fire spreading from flat to flat. On receiving such a warning, the RBKC should have verified that their inspector had done the necessary facade checks and written that into future fire risk assessments. Laura Johnson, RBKC director of housing, took no action other than to forward the letter to the 39: 925:

organisation.”. In written evidence Black had said he had had no contact with residents. On being reminded of petitions with large numbers of signatures in 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2017 all on the subject of safety and specifically fire safety he changed his evidence. He had also been approached by Blakeman, the local councillor who raised fire safety issues in 2012, 2013, 2015 and March 2017, three months before the fire.

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comment on things outside the building. He knew about inflammable panels, but saw that as outside the scope of the report. Stokes carried out six fire safety checks on the tower from 2009 to 2016, before, during and after the disastrous refurbishment. Parts of his reports were cut and pastes from other buildings. Stokes had neither qualifications or experience to write these statutory fire assessments.

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personally to a risk of prosecution”. Community activists protested loudly that “It's one rule for them and one rule for the firefighters,” and “It means the firefighters were hung out to dry. It's a whitewash. It means the inquiry is a whitewash.” Later, Andrzej Kuszell of Studio E, the architects admitted that refurbishing tower blocks was “something that was not within our normal experience”.

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global building and construction systems business, which said the polyethylene-filled aluminium panels were “flammable”. They were limited by smoke production and flaming droplets” and could only be used on buildings up to 12 metres. Furthermore, Wehrle had emailed colleagues that “PE is DANGEROUS on facades, and everything should be transferred to FR as a matter of urgency.”

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the national media and at the top of government. The materials are on thousands of homes, schools and hospitals across the country. While homes that cannot be sold are wrapped in flammable materials, Celotex, Kingspan, Arconic and BRE still operate as if nothing happened. No arrests have been made and some key Arconic executives are even refusing to attend the inquiry.

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issued by the London Fire and Emergency Authority on Grenfell Tower in November 2016 after issues such as with non-functioning self-closing doors. The £10.3 million Grenfell Tower revamp was the biggest capital refurbishment project for a single property the TMO had managed by early 2013, and the first over-cladding project for a high-rise block.

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projects of this size and he was not specifically asked to look at the documents. He said that he had also not thoroughly read the building guidelines "BR 135 guidance on fire spread in external walls". He said he had never visited the site but despite this that he had written the Fire Strategy document referred to by the design team at Studio E.

565:, and if discovered by the other tenderers could void the contract. Rydon was then given the contract. Maddison revealed that he still had his diaries and notebooks for the period, these were presented to the court, and transcribed. He had been told to hold on to them earlier, but had never previously been asked to hand them over. 625:

helped his employer sell its K-15 Kooltherm phenolic foam insulation, writing letters to clients saying it was suitable for use on high-rise buildings. After Celotex, which they also knew was selling a flammable product, came onto the market competing against their own K12, he managed the testing and certification.

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fire more than two years before the blaze, in conditions where the fire flamed through windows. The lawyers for Celotex introduced an email thread where Daniel Anketell-Jones of Rydon, discusses the need for a fire stop in the cavity and this was copied and discussed by the other organisations involved.

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Rita Dexter, the deputy commissioner of the London fire brigade, told Paget-Brown in 2015 of “a serious risk to the safety of residents” caused by the refurbishment. She urged the council to assess the risk and take appropriate remedial action. Paget-Brown did not pass that message to the TMO, or his

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Nicholas Paget-Brown (leader) had not verified whether the TMO executives, whom he thought of as housing professionals with appropriate CVs, knew enough about cladding a high rise to be able to hold their contractors to account. He was “surprised” that no one told him that a notice of deficiency was

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Lee Chapman, a leaseholder who lived on the 22nd floor, who complained to the TMO about the wind coming through gaps in the new windows which looked as if they had been improperly fitted. He was at work when the fire struck: his wife, Naomi, who survived, was home and was speaking to him on the phone

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Three of the Kingspan directors had been awarded shares as part of a 2018 bonus package. Predicting a share fall when the truth was revealed, they traded in these shares in September and October 2020. Gene Murtagh, who manufactured the panels, made a £3.1M profit, followed by the executive directors,

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In an opinion piece written for The Guardian, Karim Mussilhy of the Grenfell Survivors Group, commented. " the fire at Grenfell Tower was no accident – it was the result of years of neglect, deregulation and corporate greed." He complained about the scale of the dishonesty and the silence in much of

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Chris Holt, Rydon's site manager attested: “I was aware that as the refurbishment was to a residential block of flats, one of the main risk factors would be fire safety. When I started on the project I spoke to Simon Lawrence (Rydon) and asked whether I was required to consider aspects of fire safety

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was explored. RBKC had a reputation for sticking to the letter of the regulations. Obtaining building regulations approval is seen as being a process of negotiation. One proposal is put forward and a compromise reached. RBKC were adamant that the new wall structure must include fire stopping barriers

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Sounes, the architect said he had “no knowledge” of rapid fire spread and had not read regulatory guidance about how to design the cavity barriers that were intended to stop fire spread and which failed at Grenfell, believing that it was Building Control's job to check his drawings for compliance. He

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After the companies' opening statements were read, Richard Millett criticised them for failing to admit any mistakes: "With the sole exception of RBKC, not a single core participant involved in the primary refurbishment of Grenfell Tower has felt able to make any unqualified admission against its own

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The combustible cladding panels made by Arconic, which contained the flammable polyethylene core, were chosen as part of an attempt to cut £454,000 from the budget by KCTMO. The architect, builders and fire engineer who worked on the refurbishment knew the cladding system would fail in the event of a

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The TMO specified system failed building regs, and should not have been approved by Kensington and Chelsea building control. The London fire brigade had warned building control. There had also been a non-fatal fire in 2011. Days before the fire, the main refurbishment contractor, Rydon, reported the

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The CEO gave evidence on 21 June 2021: he blamed his staff for his failings. He explained that they had failed to keep the records up to date. Robert Black told the inquiry that “Information should have been updated by staff,” “The whole thing that I suffered throughout my career working with people

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A key theme of this stage would be “RBKC’s leadership, culture and purpose insofar as they influenced fire safety”, the inquiry was told. The professional competence of one of the key independent expert witnesses, Colin Todd, was questioned when he endorsed the unregistered Carl Stokes, KCTMO's fire

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The inquiry continued on 10 March 2021, with three empty chairs. Millet, the Counsel to the inquiry, continued to present the evidence he would have used if the Arconic executives had attended. In doing so, he told the court that in 2007, Gerard Sontag (the Arconic executive) attended a seminar by a

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the one offered. Claude Wehrle (Arconic’s technical manager), Peter Froehlich, and Gwenaëllfe Derrendinger are not cooperating with the inquiry, claiming to be covered by French law. It is alleged the Wehrle had instructed French about which technical details she was allowed to release to customers.

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The first contractor appointed reported that it could not do the job for the amount tendered and it would require a further £1.5 million. The second contractor appointed was Rydon. Rydon's refurbishment manager, Stephen Blake, and Peter Maddison, the TMO's director of assets, had a longstanding

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The owners of the block, RBKC had delegated all responsibility for maintenance to the TMO, the landlord, so deny any responsibility for the disaster. The TMO claim that their choice of contractors for the refurbishment, decided by competitive tender, was blocked as RBKC had underpriced the job, and

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at RBKC, reported councillors had signed off substantial cuts to the building control department. It was “swamped” with work as austerity-driven cuts slashed the staff numbers. The key surveyor was left handling 130 projects. He was assigned Grenfell Tower, which should have been handled by a senior

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David Gibson, head of capital investment from KCTMO recalls making a spelling correction to the minutes on a meeting with Rydon in early 2015. Those minutes cannot be found. He recalls raising the panel safety issue with Lawrence who said the plastic-filled panels were inert. Lawrence denies having

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The council-owned tenant management organisation, the architect, main contractor and cladding contractor assumed the council's building control department was ensuring that refurbishment did comply with the building regulations. Hogan was unaware of that, or about a series of fire risks embedded in

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Evidence was given by the project manager Ben Bailey, 23 at the time, the son of the owner of Harley who were sub-contracting for Rydon. Celotex RS5000 came on the market as he was sourcing materials, He was not aware that changing materials for the project required consent from Rydon which had not

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Simon Lawrence, an executive of Rydon, the principal contractor was testifying. He explained he knew that RBKC was attempting to save £800,000 on the job and to win the contract offered to save £293,368 by switching from the originally specified zinc cladding to the plastic-filled aluminium panels.

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link to a folder of documents from Studio E that contained the drawings and early plans for the recladding, but that he had not accessed the FTP link. He said that an FTP link was sent to various members of the design team. He was copied to the email but this was the standard scattergun approach on

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Project emails show that Rydon, Exova, and the architects Studio E discussed the fire safety of the cladding before its installation, including warnings it might fail. Tony Pearson, of Exova, told the architects: “If significant flames are ejected from the windows, this would lead to failure of the

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Neil Crawford, the lead architect for Studio E, revealed that Studio E had been on the point of terminating Exova in 2012 for failing to adequately scrutinise early proposals, and that a promised report on the safety of the revised cladding never arrived. In Crawford's opinion, Celotex had actively

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Irish insulation manufacturer Kingspan changed the make-up of its Kooltherm K15 insulation after 2005 without amending the marketing material stating it was suitable for use on buildings over 18 metres and had passed a relevant fire test, the inquiry has heard. The new version of the phenolic foam

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In the week beginning 17 May the Conservative councillors with responsibility for housing at RBKC gave evidence and were cross-examined. Rock Feilding-Mellen, (deputy-leader) the councillor in charge of the Grenfell Tower refurbishment, was informed of plans to save money by swapping zinc cladding

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The other issue investigated was the role of the American parent company, what they knew and when and whether they chose 'inaction'. In June 2015, the US company’s French subsidiary produced an assessment of the safety of the cladding panels at the request of Diana Perreiah, president of Arconic’s

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In 2014, a test had shown one of his PE products to have fire rated at E, but the Grenfell PE product was marketed as a B (from a 2005 test). Schmidt had not been aware of the test, and thought that not notifying the British Board of Agrément was a serious misleading oversight but not intentional.

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Schmidt continued to sell the PE panels and did not issue a warning to his customers as he believed it to be superfluous, as everyone knew PE was flammable – and he was not aware that his competitors were about to. With ten years hindsight, issuing a warning would now seem to have been the correct

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Debbie French, a former sales executive at Arconic who had sold the panels to Grenfell, explained that Arconic also sold a fire retardant version of the panel, but the default version of the panel, which was cheaper, was highly flammable. The British preferred to use the cheaper panel, so that was

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Claire Williams, who worked for Grenfell landlords the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), left her job a year after Grenfell. She said she had cleared her desk, destroying earlier notebooks. She did not think anything important could have been lost as the important points

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The inquiry began to examine the contractor's on-site behaviour. It heard that the contractors referred to the residents who criticised their workmanship as rebels and aggressive rebels. There were claims that the residents had threatened the contractors, who were using inappropriate behaviour and

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An email was produced from Kate Cooney of Exova the fire consultants, four years before the project was signed off, suggesting that there were concerns about the safety of the "ff shaft/MoE" making an already unsafe building worse, but they could massage the scheme to mitigate the dangers. Sounes

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suggested that the companies' response had been to "blame each other." Millett added: "Any member of the public reading these statements and taking them all at face value would be forced to conclude that everyone involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower did what they were supposed to do and

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Grenfell had a smoke ventilation system that was designed to keep the communal area free of smoke in event of fire that failed. It was installed at the same time as the panels. The assumption was that any fire would have been contained in one flat, and that the barriers would not be breached. The

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Survivors claim council knowingly housed people with disabilities on some of tower’s highest floors, and did not discuss an individualised fire rescue plan with them as they were obliged to do. The inquiry heard that 52 of the 120 flats had disabled occupants and 15 of the 37 residents classed as

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Wehrle, who refused to participate, had shared technical reports from 2015 about 10 high-rise fires in different parts of the world using similar cladding panels, warning of the risks. Wehrle had received reports and written notes the Melbourne Lacrosse Tower cladding fire, that took out thirteen

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During the adjournment, Peter Wilson, managing director of Kingspan's insulation boards division and director of the plc announced he was stepping down, and Gene Murtagh, the chief executive, told staff the company was trying to ensure “weaknesses in our testing and marketing of K15 can never be

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A senior technician, Ivor Meredith, responsible for safety tests on combustible insulation used on Grenfell Tower, had “a serious drug habit” and fell asleep at work. He had used drugs since 2010. Kingspan, his employer, knew but the problem was “brushed off” until he was sacked in 2015. Meredith

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Hoban identified two problems that afflicted his department and had led to the fire safety aspects of the cladding being missed. These were the austerity cuts between 2013 and 2017, that had led to ten experienced officers being replaced by one graduate trainee, and the stripping back of building

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On day three and four, witnesses involved in the tower's refurbishment have asked for confirmation that any evidence they give will not be used against them in any criminal proceedings that might take place, before they will give evidence. At the hearing on 6 February, the chairman ruled that the

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Black instructed his colleague Barbara Matthews to do nothing, when Ed Daffarn had posted on a blog in November 2016 the prediction that: “Only an incident that results in serious loss of life ... will shine a light on the practices that characterise the malign governance of this non-functioning

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Paget-Brown explained why he had not listened to Ed Daffarn, a 16th-floor resident who predicted the disaster on the Grenfell Action Blog. He found he made “wild and inaccurate allegations about what the council is planning to do”. Daffarn had criticised the councils spending priorities, putting

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On 8 December 2020, the inquiry saw evidence that in November 2016, Kingspan technical staff had acknowledged internally that Kingspan was selling its Kooltherm K15 foam insulation product as less flammable than it really was. A version of K15 had correctly tested safe in 2005, but Kingspan had

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On 16 November, Jonathan Roper, a former assistant product manager for Celotex, who worked on two fire tests of the foam panels and the subsequent sales plans, said the company behaved in a “completely unethical” way. When the first test failed, they re-tested inserting additional fire retardant

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It was claimed by the barristers that the companies viewed the safety certificates as marketing tools and of little other importance. A research paper by Saint-Gobain, the parent company of Celotex, said adding fire retardant to the test samples was done “in order to pass unrealistic fire safety

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to the project, one as a mechanical and electrical systems clerk of works, Tony Batty, and a general building clerk of works, Jonathan White. They were not employed to fulfil an end to end role but to act as part time consultants. Rydon had a design and build contract and was responsible for the

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Celotex, which made the bulk of the combustible foam insulation used, displayed a “widespread culture … of ignoring compliance”, which included distorting a full-scale fire test of its materials. A former Celotex manager who had been involved agreed that the company's actions were "deliberately

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Madison, of the TMO, explained the process used in these contracts and how he had delivered the project on budget, a sign that the contract had been correctly priced. He was not aware that the panels were flammable. A further 50% reduction had been extracted from the manufacturer, and Rydon had

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Carl Stokes was a fire assessor employed by the TMO. He admitted that the post-nominal letters he used on his application form were for show. His job was to walk around the tower commenting on fire fighting equipment, fire doors and blocked escape routes which then reported. His job was not to

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Claude Schmidt, Arconic SAS's French president, spoke of the two versions of the Reynobond PE (poly ethylene) panel, the riveted version and the cassette version, and that the regulatory document issued by the British Board of Agrement (BBA) in 2008 did not distinguish between the two types of

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Vince Meakins, the UK sales manager in 2015 as the refurbishment was nearing completion, explained that, until the fire, there was nothing said to him about not selling the PE product. He had not seen, or known about the email circulating in France from Alain Flacon in May 2016 instructing all

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time. He explained to the victims and families that the right not to self-incriminate was enshrined in English law. This is not the same as being given immunity from prosecution. However the suspension dragged on with the Attorney General wishing to ascertain how many witnesses would demanding

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Phase 2 is expected to take 18 months. 200,000 unseen documents, from private emails to phone transcripts and commercial agreements, will be released, illustrating decisions taken by the May government, borough councils, and private companies in the months before the fire, and in the immediate

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Lawyers for Rydon introduced emails that showed that Celotex knew that their combustible insulation product was not safe to use with ACM panels as a suitable fire barrier was not available. They produced internal emails from Arconic from 2011 showing that the fire-rating of their Reynobond PE

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On 2 March, a further attempt was made to reopen the inquiry. The attorney general had given the assurance, and Moore-Bick explained that the undertaking meant that “no one will be able to justify refusing to answer questions on the grounds that to do so would or might expose him or herself

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There had been an annotated internal email from Wehrle, with a press report of the fire involving a rival's similar product. It was titled “Cladding blamed in skyscraper fire – sounds like something our customers make”. It was noted that “all PE composites react in the same way”. A rival

214:, the manufacturer of the panels. Mehra helped draft the application for the grant, which was the largest donation the charity had received that year. Following criticism from opposition politicians and survivors, Mehra expressed regret for her oversight, and resigned on 25 January. 899:

Quentin Marshall, (chair of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s housing scrutiny committee) told the inquiry: “I don’t think we saw the bigger picture. I don’t think we addressed the emotional side and I think we lacked a little humanity … We could have done better.”

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There was certain disquiet that phase two would not address the bigger issues of race and class discrimination and the austerity-driven housing crisis believed to have underpinned the disaster. Replacing on the panel, an expert on social housing with an engineer, was seen by

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On 30 November 2020, the inquiry learned that Kingspan director Philip Heath had said, in 2008, that consultants who raised concerns about the combustibility of its product could "go f*ck themselves", and that they were "getting me confused with someone who gives a dam ".

150:, with the immediate priority "to establish the facts of what happened at Grenfell Tower in order to take the necessary action to prevent a similar tragedy from happening again". She promised that "No stone will be left unturned by this inquiry." On 15 August 2017, the 784:

cladding expert, who had predicted that if a “building made out of polyethylene (PE) core” cladding were to catch fire, would kill “60 to 70 persons”. Sontag reported back to the company that Arconic should consider only selling panels with a fire retardant (FR) core.

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against rival companies' products. The campaign involved secretly using non-standard test rigs to artificially create the appearance that non-flammable rival products might in fact be flammable, and hiring lobbyists to push the results before policymakers such as the

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it would be significantly over budget. The objectives changed as price became more important than quality. Rydon were selected. The landlord rejected a 30,000 offer to inspect the exterior of the tower for building regs compliance - doing it itself to save money.

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in the margin of the test report in 2014 when she discovered that the fire safety tests had been rigged. The modifications were not included in the marketing literature relied on by architects. A photograph of the test rig showed the inclusion of fire-resistant

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French explained that there had been other high rise fires involving these panels, and discussions had taken place on whether the product should be withdrawn, but the profit margin was far higher on the flammable Grenville style panels so no action was taken.

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He reminded them that Celotex and Kingspan made and sold the insulation and Arconic made and sold the cladding. From the evidence given to the inquiry, Celotex and Kingspan “abused” the fire safety testing regimes and Arconic acted similarly. The privatised

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The bid was accepted. Lawrence was not aware of the increased danger and hadn't researched it. However, the saving was £419,627, but this was never mentioned to the client. Rydon itself had undercosted the job and was trying to make up a £212,000 shortfall.

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as evidence that their views were about to be sidelined. “They are not listening and they don't want to listen,” said Nabil Choucair. “The inquiry should be designed to look at the aspects we want them to look at.” Choucair lost six relatives in the fire.

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tried to deceive by saying, in an architect's information sheet, that the material was “acceptable for use in buildings above 18m in height” whereas in fact that statement actually referred to a different product. Crawford used the metaphor that 'it was

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Wehrle noted that the medical centre fire in Saudi Arabia that used FR panels was contained. “In PE, the fire would have spread over the entire height of the tower, while in this case only the area near the fire is affected. Long live FR :-)”

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In June 2011, Arconic warned a Spanish customer not to use its PE panels because they had fire performance rating E, then in 2014, Arconic sold the PE panels to the Grenfell project explaining they had UK B rated fire performance certificate.

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QC. In opening statements they accused RBKC of prioritising cost over safety, and years of neglect which formed “a landmark act of discrimination against disabled and vulnerable people” with elements of class and racial discrimination.

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Three key witnesses have refused to testify, and are hiding in France, citing a legitimate 51 year old French blocking statute as an excuse for refusing to attend the inquiry. They were employees of Arconic. On Monday 14 December,

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said so. There were discussions on the optimum fixing system, KCTMO held out for the more expensive "cassette-fix" which gave a smoother finish while Lawrence tried to persuade them to save £75,000 by using the 'face-fix' method.

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tests”. Stephanie Barwise QC explained that this demonstrated that “Each of the manufacturers fully appreciated the inherent flammability of their products and unsuitability for use over 18 metres, as was illustrated by events.”

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Arconic, which made the cladding sheets that were the main cause of the fire's spread, obtained a certificate for its plastic-filled panels on “a false premise” by supplying test reports for a more fire-retardant version of the

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David Collins, who rented a 21st-floor flat, and chaired the Grenfell Compact, a form of residents’ association. He was considered “a problem” by the TMO when he questioned the quality of the installation work of the cladding

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The inquiry heard the fire engineer, Terry Ashton of Exova, say that his responsibilities on the project had been limited to the reconstruction of the tower, and not on the plans to reclad it. He said he had received an

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Claude Schmidt, the most senior Arconic executive who had agreed to attend, was back in the witness box. The issue being investigated was: why the firm kept selling the plastic-filled panels after the 2012 fire at the

602:, which made the rest of the insulation, carried out tests that involved either “concealing components in a manner designed to facilitate a pass and/or using materials that were not as described in the test reports,” 167:

Campaigners had argued that the inquiry should include an advisory panel to assist Moore-Bick. In May 2018, it was announced that two panelists would sit alongside Moore-Bick for the second stage of the inquiry.

883:. In both cases the fire brigade turned up and did the evacuations and it worked and no one was hurt: the council stuck with its stay-put policy. As there was not going to be an evacuation no plans were needed. 400:

The inquiry heard claims that during the planning process Simon Lawrence, a key executive of Rydon, failed to respond to concerns that the cladding might be dangerous and that it could lead to a repeat of the

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director of housing or cabinet member, he passed it to planning. Dexter's warning highlighted compartmentation failures due to breaches by pipework, problems with smoke extraction and missing fire stopping.

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Youssef Khalloud, who lived on the 11th floor with his wife and three children. They escaped through thick black smoke at 1.28am but lost several family friends including five members of the El Wahabi family.

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On 5 Nov 2020, the inquiry started to examine the manufacturing, safety, testing and marketing of the cladding products. Barristers for the victims, in their opening statements repeated the charges that:

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Hoban had made handwritten notes and handwritten project sheets and remembered putting all his notes into the Acolaid system, including coming in at the weekend to do so. These were now all missing.

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On the final Monday before Easter, 29 March 2021, the inquiry started examining the culpability of the landlords and how they fulfilled their duty of care. It was revealed that fire chiefs had told

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Edward Daffarn, the 16th-floor resident who predicted the disaster on a blog months ahead of the disaster. The TMO had accused Daffarn who ran the Grenfell action group of 'souring relationships'.

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vents were not working. A quote to fix it was ignored. The result was that the common area was filled with thick black smoke – and the principal cause of death in the fire was smoke inhalation.

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professional relationship. At an un-minuted meeting in March 2014, before they were appointed, Rydon agreed with TMO how a further £800,000 could be shaved off a contract awarded to them in a

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culture spending before people. Called to account Paget-Brown had not understood the conditions that the people had to accept with regards to 'decanting before the refurbishment'.

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Evidence was produced that the three manufacturers were aware of the deficiency of their product and worried about preventing these facts damaging their marketing and sales.

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and the regulations and building act and bylaws we had at the time, and a support network of experts that administered the regulations, I don't think we would be here. ...”.

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The inquiry was told that in November 2014, an official at KCTMO asked Simon Lawrence to clarify the “fire retardance of the new cladding” but that Lawrence did not respond.

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officer. He had never worked before on highrise overcladding of a block. He had resigned before the fire because he had “had enough" and it wasn't the job he trained to do.

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social distancing rules now in place, not all the members of the public who wished to attend were allowed to do so, but were able to view the proceedings via a video link.

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This started with evidence, from Studio E. A lot of this was about who knew what, and whether they were qualified to do what they did. On 3 March 2020 the inquiry heard:

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With Wehrle and Sontag raising these issues, why hadn't Arconic withdrawn the product - and what had senior management done about these warnings, asked Millet.

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changed the formula for a more flammable foam; marketing it on the old safety certificate. Kooltherm K15 was present in the cladding that caught fire.

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Emma O’Connor, a disabled woman who relied on crutches but lived on the 20th floor, had asked about the fire rating of the cladding and was fobbed off

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employees not to sell it, and to ask their managers for the information needed to persuade clients to change the specifications of existing orders.

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announced that it withdrew all PE panels from sale after Tamweel and another UAE fire in 2013. Schmidt doubted the veracity of that statement.

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believed that, as building control had signed off the system, it was acceptable. Sounes was taken ill and was not cross-examined further.

646:. She reported her concerns to her line manager but later, still uncomfortable, helped word the documentation that was submitted to the 525: 2748: 1288: 1365: 1181: 637:

A Celotex executive, Deborah Berger, says she was shocked by firm's approach to test three years before blaze and wrote the acronym

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regulations and enforcement byelaws together with a weaker building act. He said, “If we had a regulatory body like we had with the

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The second phase of the inquiry opened on 27 January 2020 at a new venue in Paddington, with Arconic's lawyer making a statement.

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misleading and dishonest", saying he had been made to "lie for commercial gain" with the approval of Celotex's senior executives.

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immunity, and the chairman pointed out this was of the greatest urgency as a health and safety issue affect hundreds of lives.

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Hoban had received no training or technical industry guidance and said reading professional magazines was considered as their

300:(polyester filled) panels had dropped to class E from class B and so were "unsuitable for use on building façades" in Europe. 3629: 3575: 498:

quality of its finished work. The John Rowan clerks of works were there to provide site monitoring and supervision services.

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for product approval. The photograph showing the fire-resistant materials was later removed under pressure from Celotex.

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of the Inquiry were announced. The second phase of the inquiry opened on 27 January 2020 at a new venue in Paddington.

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reported that in 2017 the charity had received a £71,000 grant from the Arconic Foundation, an organisation linked to

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with a two-hour rating. Studio E architects found this unnecessary claiming the job was done by the cavity barriers.

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on the afternoon of 16 March 2020, the panel decided on the same day to hold no further hearings for the time being.

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The lead architect had no experience of cladding high rise buildings or polyethylene composite materials.(cladding)

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This was the first time survivors and bereaved had spoken to the inquiry, and were represented by the barristers,

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surfaced in January 2020. A few weeks earlier, one of the phase 2 panelists had stepped down and Prime Minister

402: 3496: 1990:"Fire performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multistorey buildings, third edition (BR 135)" 1392:"Firms involved in botched Grenfell Tower revamp refuse to accept responsibility for tragedy, inquiry hears" 2276:"Celotex manager told to 'lie for commercial gain' over safety test of insulation sold for use on Grenfell" 613:

On 11 November 2020, it was revealed in a conflict of interest statement, that subsequent to the fire, the

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in Dubai that had sent “fireballs” to the ground, and why they did not warn customers of possible risks.

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exercise, in spite of the TMO's lawyers warning that renegotiation prior to appointment was contrary to

309: 177: 831: 3551: 3476: 840: 189: 2513:"We will not rest until the companies behind the Grenfell fire are held to account | Karim Mussilhy" 827: 3608: 3536: 289: 281: 125: 3427: 709:, to exert moral pressure. A van displaying a red white and blue tri-colour poster drove past the 2564:"Staff at insulation firm that supplied Grenfell Tower materials joked about product test 'lies'" 1109: 1030: 688:

On 9 December 2020, the inquiry learned that after the Grenfell fire, Kingspan had invested in a

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The inquiry also heard that Studio E manipulated its fees to avoid the contract being put out to

357: 151: 2892:"Grenfell firm continued selling cladding despite high-rise fires in Middle East, inquiry hears" 3439: 1624: 3488: 2775: 1935: 1090: 823: 760: 706: 558: 394: 265: 147: 86: 1890: 312:

had made errors, while Celotex admitted its marketing of the insulation had been misleading.

3462: 2258:"Celotex: The Suffolk firm behind Grenfell fire insulation | East Anglian Daily Times" 1865:"Consultant tells Grenfell Inquiry it was 'clearly' not providing full clerk of works role" 3169:"Grenfell chiefs failed to discuss fire escape plans with disabled tenants, inquiry hears" 2179:"Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 19: 'And that was intentional, deliberate, dishonest?'" 702: 173: 3451: 2583:"Staff joked safety claims about material used on Grenfell were 'all lies', inquiry told" 2764:"Kingspan hired lobbyists and 'gamed' tests in aftermath of Grenfell fire, inquiry told" 3531: 1917:"Contractor for window surrounds 'assumed materials were fine', Grenfell Inquiry hears" 851:

On Monday 19 April seven survivors will be cross-examined on their treatment by KCTMO.

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The testing, certification and marketing of the cladding panels and external insulation

129: 121: 38: 2609:"Kingspan boss denies putting occupants of K15 towers at risk, Grenfell Inquiry hears" 2372:"'A raging inferno': testimony reveals how deadly cladding ended up on Grenfell Tower" 509:

or confirmed the plan with the architects. He assumed that others would have checked.

3658: 2469:"Grenfell inquiry: Kingspan manager said fire consultants could 'go f*ck themselves'" 929:

firefighters ran hoses through doors, and propped other ones open to provide egress.

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inquiry should be suspended till at least 24 February to allow the attorney general

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cladding system, with the external surface falling away and exposing the cavity.”

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The management of Grenfell Tower, including how residents' complaints were handled

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May announced on 29 June 2017, that the inquiry would be chaired by retired judge

416: 375: 140: 3482: 3034:"US executive was told Grenfell panels were unsafe on buildings over 12 metres" 3005:"US executive was told Grenfell panels were unsafe on buildings over 12 metres" 2918:"UK manager 'unaware' French had been told not to recommend flammable cladding" 2689:"Grenfell contractors 'joked about "lies" over how combustible insulation was'" 3254:"'I wish things had been done differently', councillor tells Grenfell inquiry" 2840:"Former Arconic executive tells Grenfell inquiry she knew cladding could burn" 3346:"CEO of Grenfell Tower management blames staff for outdated fire safety plan" 2945:"Grenfell Tower cladding firm 'dismissed failed safety test as rogue result'" 2797:"Kingspan lobbied MPs with 'gamed' test results of rival insulation products" 2539:"Kingspan directors cashed in £6m of shares before airing of Grenfell claims" 1094: 2812:"Grenfell survivors push for French witnesses to testify with embassy stunt" 2638:"Director of Grenfell firm quits after evidence it used outdated fire tests" 2484:"Celotex executive wrote 'WTF?' on fire test report, Grenfell inquiry hears" 2417:"Fire test for Grenfell foam cladding panels was rigged, admits ex-employee" 2123:"Director at Grenfell Tower TMO describes how fatal cladding saved £800,000" 2094:"Grenfell Tower landlord had 'secret' meeting on cost cutting, inquiry told" 1289:"Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase 2: Who is involved and what will be examined?" 1209:"Boris Johnson's pick to help lead Grenfell inquiry linked to cladding firm" 717:. The white panel was replaced by the emotive image of the burnt-out tower. 314: 3483:

Grenfell: dramatisation based on words spoken at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry

3421: 3143:"'Rebel residents' finally get their chance to testify to Grenfell inquiry" 2240:"Suffolk firm misled over insulation, sales manager tells Grenfell inquiry" 2324:"Kingspan insulation product used on Grenfell Tower failed 2007 fire test" 1238:"Grenfell survivors consider boycotting inquiry over conflict of interest" 101: 3433: 3315:"Grenfell fire risk assessor added letters after his name, inquiry hears" 2391:"Group linked to Grenfell foam supplier awarded building safety contract" 976: 950: 3195:"Grenfell landlord 'did not create escape plans for disabled residents'" 2704:"Grenfell Inquiry: What Kingspan and Celotex ex-staff told us this week" 2443:"Technician for Grenfell Tower insulation firm had 'serious drug habit'" 1574:"Grenfell engineers set out to 'massage' fire safety plan, inquiry told" 1548:"Grenfell firm set fees to avoid contract going out to tender – inquiry" 3445: 3226:"Grenfell: councillor was told about cheaper cladding plan before fire" 2723:"Firm rigged tests of rival product after Grenfell blaze, inquiry told" 2346:"Grenfell Tower suppliers knew their cladding would burn, inquiry told" 1131:"Calls for Grenfell Tower inquiry to change way it deals with families" 1083:"Victory for Grenfell survivors as Theresa May agrees to inquiry panel" 285: 277: 211: 3091:"Council 'prioritised cost over safety', Grenfell Tower inquiry hears" 3060:"Company that sold Grenfell panels was warned in 2007 they could kill" 1807:"Grenfell refurbishment firm called residents who complained 'rebels'" 1755:"Grenfell firm took some of cladding savings for itself, inquiry told" 1057:"Grenfell Tower: local people should be on inquiry panel, bishop says" 3372:"Grenfell landlord boss told colleagues to ignore resident's warning" 3285:"Grenfell inquiry: Tory housing chief says council 'lacked humanity'" 2971:"Grenfell cladding makers did not reveal 'disastrous' fire test data" 2068:"Grenfell landlord rejected outside check on plans 'to save £30,000'" 1963:"Grenfell surveyor had to handle 130 projects at once, inquiry hears" 1519:"Grenfell Tower inquiry halted by protesters calling it a 'cover-up'" 676:

Gilbert McCarthy and Peter Wilson made £1.8M and £1.6M respectively.

72: 3117:"Grenfell expert witness is father of council's head of fire safety" 2042:"Grenfell: inquiry hears council at heart of cost-cutting decisions" 1836:"Grenfell insulation was sold at almost 50% discount, inquiry hears" 2016:"Building inspector 'truly heartbroken' for Grenfell Tower victims" 1264:"Grenfell inquiry panellist steps down over cladding company links" 2298:"Makers of Grenfell cladding abused testing regimes, inquiry told" 1781:"Grenfell project manager denies saying cladding 'would not burn'" 501:

The inquiry took evidence from Mark Dixon of SB Plastering on the

269: 1441:"People who worked on Grenfell Tower 'could face life sentences'" 3469:

Secrets that retain the power to shock Observer Opinion May 2021

3394:"Grenfell smoke ventilation 'woefully inadequate', inquiry told" 2867:"A perspective on high rise building fires involving the façade" 1157:"Grenfell inquiry to restart with statements from private firms" 638: 3492: 2221:"Inquiry into fatal fire points to misleading tests by Celotex" 26:

Second phase of the public inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire

1722:"Grenfell architect clashed with council over fire prevention" 1493:"Grenfell public inquiry delayed again over evidence concerns" 1341:"Grenfell refurbishers knew cladding would fail, inquiry told" 1315:"Grenfell cladding maker 'knew it fell below safety standard'" 405:

in south London in 2009 which caused the death of six people.

1703:"Grenfell Tower fire engineer did not look at cladding plans" 1656:"Grenfell Tower inquiry distancing rules anger the bereaved" 1600:"Designer compares Grenfell insulation to horsemeat scandal" 916:

Kensington and Chelsea Tenants Management Organisation (TMO)

667:

did not pick this up which question their other judgements.

2664:"Grenfell Inquiry: Another uncomfortable week for Kingspan" 2200:"Grenfell insulation fire test made employee comment 'wtf'" 2149:"Grenfell Tower project manager admits 'binning' notebooks" 1467:"Grenfell inquiry on hold for 18 days over witness wrangle" 3547:

Criticism of the response to the Grenfell Tower fire

1366:"'Buck-passing' firms blame each other for Grenfell fire" 264:

The second phase opened with statements from lawyers for

252:

Remaining evidence from bereaved, survivors and residents

977:"London fire: Prime minister orders full public inquiry" 1182:"Grenfell survivors angered by an inquiry panel change" 705:

delivered a letter appealing to the French Ambassador,

239:

Central and local government responses to the disaster

3599:

Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation

817:

Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation

615:

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

3614:

Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities

3463:

Designing Buildings Appraisal of Grenfell Tower Fire

3622: 3591: 3563: 3524: 695:

Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee

352:

The Point of contact was not a qualified architect.

96: 79: 68: 45: 3339: 3337: 3335: 1681:"Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Transcript, 8 July 2020" 1415:"Grenfell witnesses threaten to withhold evidence" 1031:"Update from the Inquiry | Grenfell Tower Inquiry" 2194: 2192: 2291: 2289: 1291:. Construction Manager Magazine. 28 January 2020 3084: 3082: 3080: 3053: 3051: 3049: 3047: 3028: 3026: 2749:"Kingspan lobbied MPs with 'rigged' fire tests" 196:(who had succeeded May in July 2019) appointed 3387: 3385: 807:Module 3: Kensington and Chelsea and the KCTMO 3604:Kensington and Chelsea London Borough Council 3504: 2762:Hopkirk2020-12-10T07:29:00+00:00, Elizabeth. 2215: 2213: 2173: 2171: 2169: 1308: 1306: 1081:Reporter, Sean O’Neill, Chief (11 May 2018). 319:nobody made any serious causative mistakes." 200:to fill the post. Mehra was the chair of the 136:, London, on 14 June 2017. It was ordered by 8: 1114:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 951:"Grenfell Tower fire: Who were the victims?" 217:Phase 2 will be divided into eight modules: 31: 3519:Grenfell Tower, the fire, and its aftermath 3040:. 22 February 2021. Event occurs at 21.00. 2780:: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list ( 2702:Dunton, Jim; Lowe, Tom (27 November 2020). 2116: 2114: 1940:: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list ( 578:had been recorded in the official minutes. 3511: 3497: 3489: 3011:. 22 February 2021. Event occurs at 18.00 2999: 2997: 2995: 2993: 2991: 2662:Dunton, Jim; Lowe, Tom (8 December 2020). 1829: 1827: 1748: 1746: 1744: 1742: 1231: 1229: 1025: 1023: 30: 3542:Aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire 2631: 2629: 1957: 1955: 1953: 1951: 1858: 1856: 574:reduced its price by a further £800 000. 3458:Guardian Inquiry September 2020 Synopsis 2865:Petrus, Peter Placidus (10 April 2017). 779:Norwegian seminar and three empty chairs 3308: 3306: 3279: 3277: 3275: 3248: 3246: 3219: 3217: 3215: 1649: 1647: 1645: 1541: 1539: 1003:"Grenfell Tower Fire Written Statement" 942: 813:Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 493:John Rowan & Partners supplied two 360:, or that aluminum cladding could burn. 294:Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 268:, the architects of the refurbishment; 134:Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 128:, which killed 72 people and destroyed 3670:Public inquiries in the United Kingdom 2773: 2607:Hopkirk, Elizabeth (8 December 2020). 1933: 1915:Dunton2020-09-30T09:27:00+01:00, Jim. 1394:. The Daily Telegraph. 27 January 2020 1107: 292:. There were also statements from the 3428:Grenfell Tower Inquiry hearing videos 2834: 2832: 2506: 2504: 2238:Papworth, Andrew (11 November 2020). 7: 3440:Grenfell Tower Inquiry Daily Podcast 2511:Mussilhy, Karim (27 November 2020). 2322:Hornall, Thomas (30 November 2020). 887:Module 4: Councillors cross examined 246:Building regulations and enforcement 1834:Booth, Robert (21 September 2020). 1055:Sherwood, Harriet (4 August 2017). 865:when it appeared that she wouldn't. 526:continuing professional development 243:The response of London Fire Brigade 178:Hillsborough families support group 2943:Kirk, Tristan (16 February 2021). 2810:Booth, Robert (14 December 2020). 2636:Booth, Robert (17 December 2020). 2537:Booth, Robert (27 November 2020). 2482:Booth, Robert (26 November 2020). 2441:Booth, Robert (24 November 2020). 2415:Booth, Robert (16 November 2020). 2389:Booth, Robert (11 November 2020). 1491:Booth, Robert (23 February 2020). 308:interests." RBKC had admitted its 14: 2969:Media, P. A. (17 February 2021). 2747:Staff, C. N. (10 December 2020). 2721:Booth, Robert (9 December 2020). 2581:Booth, Robert (8 December 2020). 2467:Weinfass, Ian (1 December 2020). 2296:Booth, Robert (5 November 2020). 2260:. 9 December 2020. Archived from 2121:Booth, Robert (26 October 2020). 2092:Booth, Robert (15 October 2020). 1465:Booth, Robert (6 February 2020). 1439:Booth, Robert (30 January 2020). 1413:Booth, Robert (29 January 2020). 1339:Booth, Robert (28 January 2020). 1313:Booth, Robert (27 January 2020). 1262:Booth, Robert (25 January 2020). 1236:Booth, Robert (24 January 2020). 1207:Booth, Robert (16 January 2020). 1155:Booth, Robert (26 January 2020). 1129:Booth, Robert (26 January 2020). 3641: 3640: 2066:Booth, Robert (7 October 2020). 2040:Booth, Robert (6 October 2020). 2014:Booth, Robert (1 October 2020). 37: 3167:Booth, Robert (20 April 2021). 3141:Booth, Robert (18 April 2021). 3115:Booth, Robert (31 March 2021). 3089:Booth, Robert (29 March 2021). 3058:Booth, Robert (10 March 2021). 2147:P. A. Media (19 October 2020). 1035:www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk 665:Building Research Establishment 648:Building Research Establishment 143:on the day following the fire. 3630:United Kingdom cladding crisis 3392:Booth, Robert (30 June 2021). 3370:Booth, Robert (28 June 2021). 3344:Booth, Robert (23 June 2021). 2795:Ing, Will (10 December 2020). 1805:Booth, Robert (22 July 2020). 1779:Booth, Robert (21 July 2020). 1753:Booth, Robert (20 July 2020). 1720:Robert, Booth (13 July 2020). 1598:Booth, Robert (9 March 2020). 1572:Booth, Robert (4 March 2020). 1546:Booth, Robert (3 March 2020). 1517:Booth, Robert (2 March 2020). 1007:UK Parliament Official Website 132:, residential building in the 22:Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 1: 3434:Grenfell Tower: What happened 3313:Booth, Robert (25 May 2021). 3224:Booth, Robert (17 May 2021). 1654:Booth, Robert (6 July 2020). 521:what was designed and built. 442:Building regulations approval 238: 235: 231: 226: 221: 3193:Booth, Robert (6 May 2021). 1994:www.designingbuildings.co.uk 1701:Booth, Booth (8 July 2020). 57:– 4 September 2024 874:Residents with Disabilities 204:charity from 2015 to 2018. 202:Women's Engineering Society 49:14 September 2017 3691: 1625:"Update from the Chairman" 383:Prime Minister's statement 15: 3638: 514:building control surveyor 249:Remaining expert evidence 222:The 2015–16 refurbishment 36: 3448:Official Twitter account 2244:East Anglian Daily Times 819:(KCTMO) marked ("FYI"). 403:Lakanal House tower fire 389:Resumption – 6 July 2020 3452:Official phase 1 report 288:, who had supplied the 188:A second allegation of 3571:Grenfell Tower Inquiry 3422:Grenfell Tower Inquiry 1891:"Window reveal design" 1688:Grenfell Tower Inquiry 1629:Grenfell Tower Inquiry 881:Hammersmith and Fulham 644:magnesium oxide panels 537:Greater London Council 296:(RBKC) and the KCTMO. 282:combustible insulation 118:Grenfell Tower Inquiry 32:Grenfell Tower Inquiry 18:Grenfell Tower Inquiry 847:The residents testify 378:horse meat as beef'. 310:building control body 148:Sir Martin Moore-Bick 104:.grenfelltowerinquiry 87:Sir Martin Moore-Bick 3477:New Providence Wharf 841:conflict of interest 381:In the light of the 190:conflict of interest 3675:2017 in British law 3665:Grenfell Tower fire 3609:London Fire Brigade 3537:Grenfell Tower fire 3258:Warrington Guardian 2378:. 16 December 2020. 2264:on 9 December 2020. 2227:. 25 November 2020. 2206:. 26 November 2020. 1969:. 30 September 2020 512:John Hoban, senior 280:, who had made the 126:Grenfell Tower fire 33: 2949:www.standard.co.uk 2924:. 15 February 2021 2898:. 12 February 2021 2691:. 9 December 2020. 2570:. 8 December 2020. 1895:House Plans Helper 1188:. 24 December 2019 152:terms of reference 3652: 3651: 3485:(Channel 4, 2022) 3479:-On going reports 2871:Asia Pacific Fire 2846:. 9 February 2021 2352:. 9 November 2020 1372:. 28 January 2020 832:Stephanie Barwise 824:Michael Mansfield 707:Catherine Colonna 559:value engineering 395:COVID-19 pandemic 369:Week 9 March 2020 356:had not heard of 276:, the buildings; 114: 113: 3682: 3644: 3643: 3592:Involved parties 3513: 3506: 3499: 3490: 3446:@grenfellinquiry 3424:Official website 3409: 3408: 3406: 3404: 3389: 3380: 3379: 3367: 3361: 3360: 3358: 3356: 3341: 3330: 3329: 3327: 3325: 3310: 3301: 3300: 3298: 3296: 3281: 3270: 3269: 3267: 3265: 3250: 3241: 3240: 3238: 3236: 3221: 3210: 3209: 3207: 3205: 3190: 3184: 3183: 3181: 3179: 3164: 3158: 3157: 3155: 3153: 3138: 3132: 3131: 3129: 3127: 3112: 3106: 3105: 3103: 3101: 3086: 3075: 3074: 3072: 3070: 3055: 3042: 3041: 3030: 3021: 3020: 3018: 3016: 3001: 2986: 2985: 2983: 2981: 2966: 2960: 2959: 2957: 2955: 2940: 2934: 2933: 2931: 2929: 2914: 2908: 2907: 2905: 2903: 2888: 2882: 2881: 2879: 2877: 2862: 2856: 2855: 2853: 2851: 2836: 2827: 2826: 2824: 2822: 2807: 2801: 2800: 2792: 2786: 2785: 2779: 2771: 2759: 2753: 2752: 2744: 2738: 2737: 2735: 2733: 2718: 2712: 2711: 2699: 2693: 2692: 2685: 2679: 2678: 2676: 2674: 2659: 2653: 2652: 2650: 2648: 2633: 2624: 2623: 2621: 2619: 2604: 2598: 2597: 2595: 2593: 2578: 2572: 2571: 2560: 2554: 2553: 2551: 2549: 2534: 2528: 2527: 2525: 2523: 2508: 2499: 2498: 2496: 2494: 2479: 2473: 2472: 2464: 2458: 2457: 2455: 2453: 2438: 2432: 2431: 2429: 2427: 2412: 2406: 2405: 2403: 2401: 2386: 2380: 2379: 2368: 2362: 2361: 2359: 2357: 2342: 2336: 2335: 2319: 2313: 2312: 2310: 2308: 2293: 2284: 2283: 2272: 2266: 2265: 2254: 2248: 2247: 2235: 2229: 2228: 2217: 2208: 2207: 2196: 2187: 2186: 2175: 2164: 2163: 2161: 2159: 2144: 2138: 2137: 2135: 2133: 2118: 2109: 2108: 2106: 2104: 2089: 2083: 2082: 2080: 2078: 2063: 2057: 2056: 2054: 2052: 2037: 2031: 2030: 2028: 2026: 2011: 2005: 2004: 2002: 2000: 1988:B. R. E. Group. 1985: 1979: 1978: 1976: 1974: 1959: 1946: 1945: 1939: 1931: 1929: 1927: 1912: 1906: 1905: 1903: 1901: 1886: 1880: 1879: 1877: 1875: 1860: 1851: 1850: 1848: 1846: 1831: 1822: 1821: 1819: 1817: 1802: 1796: 1795: 1793: 1791: 1776: 1770: 1769: 1767: 1765: 1750: 1737: 1736: 1734: 1732: 1717: 1711: 1710: 1698: 1692: 1691: 1685: 1677: 1671: 1670: 1668: 1666: 1651: 1640: 1639: 1637: 1635: 1621: 1615: 1614: 1612: 1610: 1595: 1589: 1588: 1586: 1584: 1569: 1563: 1562: 1560: 1558: 1543: 1534: 1533: 1531: 1529: 1514: 1508: 1507: 1505: 1503: 1488: 1482: 1481: 1479: 1477: 1462: 1456: 1455: 1453: 1451: 1436: 1430: 1429: 1427: 1425: 1410: 1404: 1403: 1401: 1399: 1388: 1382: 1381: 1379: 1377: 1362: 1356: 1355: 1353: 1351: 1336: 1330: 1329: 1327: 1325: 1310: 1301: 1300: 1298: 1296: 1285: 1279: 1278: 1276: 1274: 1259: 1253: 1252: 1250: 1248: 1233: 1224: 1223: 1221: 1219: 1204: 1198: 1197: 1195: 1193: 1178: 1172: 1171: 1169: 1167: 1152: 1146: 1145: 1143: 1141: 1126: 1120: 1119: 1113: 1105: 1103: 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Knowledge (XXG)

Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2

Index