Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

1160:) and the ends that they set. All ends that rational agents set have a price and can be exchanged for one another. Ends in themselves, however, have dignity and have no equivalent. In addition to being the basis for the Formula of Autonomy and the kingdom of ends, autonomy itself plays an important role in Kant's moral philosophy. Autonomy is the capacity to be the legislator of the moral law, in other words, to give the moral law to oneself. Autonomy is opposed to heteronomy, which consists of having one's will determined by forces alien to it. Because alien forces could only determine our actions contingently, Kant believes that autonomy is the only basis for a non-contingent moral law. It is in failing to see this distinction that Kant believes his predecessors have failed: their theories have all been heteronomous. At this point Kant has given us a picture of what a universal and necessary law would look like should it exist. However, he has yet to prove that it does exist, or, in other words, that it applies to us. That is the task of Section III. 1129:

such absolute worth, an end in itself, that would be the only possible ground of a categorical imperative. Kant asserts that, “a human being and generally every rational being exists as an end in itself.” The corresponding imperative, the Formula of Humanity, commands that “you use humanity, whether in your own persona or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” When we treat others merely as means to our discretionary ends, we violate a perfect duty. However, Kant thinks that we also have an imperfect duty to advance the end of humanity. For example, making a false promise to another person in order to achieve the end of getting some money treats their rational nature as a mere means to one's selfish end. This is, therefore, a violation of a perfect duty. By contrast, it is possible to fail to donate to charity without treating some other person as a mere means to an end, but in doing so we fail to advance the end of humanity, thereby violating an imperfect duty.

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However, Kant thinks that all agents necessarily wish for the help of others from time to time. Therefore, it is impossible for the agent to will that his or her maxim be universally adopted. If an attempt to universalize a maxim results in a contradiction in conception, it violates what Kant calls a perfect duty. If it results in a contradiction in willing, it violates what Kant calls an imperfect duty. Perfect duties are negative duties, that is duties not to commit or engage in certain actions or activities (for example theft). Imperfect duties are positive duties, duties to commit or engage in certain actions or activities (for example, giving to charity).

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moral worth. Kant contrasts the shopkeeper with the case of a person who, faced with “adversity and hopeless grief”, and having entirely lost his will to live, yet obeys his duty to preserve his life. Because this person acts from duty, his actions have moral worth. Kant also notes that many individuals possess an inclination to do good; but however commendable such actions may be, they do not have moral worth when they are done out of pleasure. If, however, a philanthropist had lost all capacity to feel pleasure in good works but still did pursue them out of duty, only then would we say they were morally worthy.

1093:. For example, suppose a person in need of money makes it his or her maxim to attain a loan by making a false promise to pay it back. If everyone followed this principle, nobody would trust another person when he or she made a promise, and the institution of promise-making would be destroyed. However, the maxim of making a false promise in order to attain a loan relies on the very institution of promise-making that universalizing this maxim destroys. Kant calls this a "contradiction in conception" because it is impossible to conceive of the maxim being universalized. 1258:

and so too of its laws.” In this sense, the world of understanding is more fundamental than, or ‘grounds’, the world of sense. Because of this, the moral law, which clearly applies to the world of understanding, also applies to the world of sense as well, because the world of understanding has priority. As a result, and because the world of understanding is more fundamental and primary, its laws hold for the world of sense too. The categorical imperative, and therefore the moral law, binds us in the intelligible world and in the phenomenal world of appearances.

1245:. From this perspective, the world may be nothing like the way it appears to human beings. We cannot get out of our heads and leave our human perspective on the world to know what it is like independently of our own viewpoint; we can only know about how the world appears to us, not about how the world is in itself. Kant calls the world as it appears to us from our point of view the world of sense or of appearances. The world from a god's-eye perspective is the world of things in themselves or the “world of understanding.” 1072:), by definition, apply universally. From this observation, Kant derives the categorical imperative, which requires that moral agents act only in a way that the principle of their will could become a universal law. The categorical imperative is a test of proposed maxims; it does not generate a list of duties on its own. The categorical imperative is Kant's general statement of the supreme principle of morality, but Kant goes on to provide three different formulations of this general statement. 1266:

appearance, freedom is impossible. So we are committed to freedom on the one hand, and yet on the other hand we are also committed to a world of appearances that is run by laws of nature and has no room for freedom. We cannot give up on either. We cannot avoid taking ourselves as free when we act, and we cannot give up our picture of the world as determined by laws of nature. As Kant puts it, there is a contradiction between freedom and natural necessity. He calls this a dialectic of reason.

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and principles in order to guide their actions. Thus, only rational creatures have practical reason. The laws and principles that rational agents consult yield imperatives, or rules that necessitate the will. For example, if a person wants to qualify for nationals in ultimate frisbee, he will recognize and consult the rules that tell him how to achieve this goal. These rules will provide him with imperatives that he must follow as long as he wants to qualify for nationals.

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are treating the person with whom you are interacting. The Formula of Autonomy combines the objectivity of the former with the subjectivity of the latter and suggests that the agent ask what he or she would accept as a universal law. To do this, he or she would test his or her maxims against the moral law that he or she has legislated. The Principle of Autonomy is, “the principle of every human will as a will universally legislating through all its maxims.”

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understanding to explain how freedom is possible or how pure reason could have anything to say about practical matters because we simply do not and cannot have a clear enough grasp of the world of the understanding. The notion of an intelligible world does point us towards the idea of a kingdom of ends, which is a useful and important idea. We just have to be careful not to get carried away and make claims that we are not entitled to.

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when it comes to evaluating their motivations for acting, and therefore even in circumstances where individuals believe themselves to be acting from duty, it is possible they are acting merely in accordance with duty and are motivated by some contingent desire. However, the fact that we see ourselves as often falling short of what morality demands of us indicates we have some functional concept of the moral law.

1021:. Hypothetical imperatives provide the rules an agent must follow when he or she adopts a contingent end (an end based on desire or inclination). So, for example, if I want ice cream, I should go to the ice cream shop or make myself some ice cream. However, notice that this imperative only applies if I want ice cream. If I have no interest in ice cream, the imperative does not apply to me. 25: 1232:, Kant, examining phenomena with a philosophical eye, is forced to “admit that no interest impels me to do so.” He says that we clearly do “regard ourselves as free in acting and so to hold ourselves yet subject to certain laws,” but wonders how this is possible. He then explains just how it is possible, by appealing to the two perspectives that we can consider ourselves under. 2193: 1262:

cannot be derived from our phenomenal experience. We can be sure that this concept of freedom doesn't come from experience because experience itself contradicts it. Our experience is of everything in the sensible world and in the sensible world, everything that happens does so in accord with the laws of nature and there is no room for a free will to influence events.

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this law is only binding on the person who wants to qualify for nationals in ultimate frisbee. In this way, it is contingent upon the ends that he sets and the circumstances that he is in. We know from the third proposition, however, that the moral law must bind universally and necessarily, that is, regardless of ends and circumstances.

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understanding that it makes sense to talk of free wills. In the world of appearances, everything is determined by physical laws, and there is no room for a free will to change the course of events. If you consider yourself as part of the world of appearances, then you cannot think of yourself as having a will that brings things about.

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the perspective of the world of the senses or appearances, natural laws determine everything that happens. There is no contradiction because the claim to freedom applies to one world, and the claim of the laws of nature determining everything applies to the other. The claims do not conflict because they have different targets.

565:, followed by three sections. Kant begins from common-sense moral reason and shows by analysis the supreme moral law that must be its principle. He then argues that the supreme moral law in fact obligates us. The book is famously difficult, and it is partly because of this that Kant later, in 1788, decided to publish the 2196: 917:

interpretation asserts that the proposition is that an act has moral worth only if the principle acted upon generates moral action non-contingently. If the shopkeeper in the above example had made his choice contingent upon what would serve the interests of his business, then his act has no moral worth.

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So, Kant argues, we are committed to two incompatible positions. From the perspective of practical reason, which is involved when we consider how to act, we have to take ourselves as free. But from the perspective of speculative reason, which is concerned with investigating the nature of the world of

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Later, at the beginning of Section Two, Kant admits that it is in fact impossible to give a single example of an action that could be certainly said to have been done from duty alone, or ever to know one's own mind well enough to be sure of one's own motives. The important thing, then, is not whether

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On Kant's view, the categorical imperative is possible because, although we as rational agents can be thought of as members of both the intelligible and the phenomenal world (understanding and appearance), it is the intelligible world of understanding that “contains the ground of the world of sense

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thesis, which states that a will is bound by the moral law if and only if it is free. That means that if you know that someone is free, then you know that the moral law applies to them, and vice versa. Kant then asks why we have to follow the principle of morality. Although we all may feel the force

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Second, a maxim might fail by generating what Kant calls a "contradiction in willing." This sort of contradiction comes about when the universalized maxim contradicts something that rational agents necessarily will. For example, a person might have a maxim never to help others when they are in need.

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The first formulation states that an action is only morally permissible if every agent could adopt the same principle of action without generating one of two kinds of contradiction. This is called the Formula for the Universal Law of Nature, which states that one should, “act as if the maxim of your

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What would the categorical imperative look like? We know that it could never be based on the particular ends that people adopt to give themselves rules of action. Kant believes that this leaves us with one remaining alternative, namely that the categorical imperative must be based on the notion of a

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Kant begins his new argument in Section II with some observations about rational willing. All things in nature must act according to laws, but only rational beings act in accordance with the representation of a law. In other words, only rational beings have the capacity to recognize and consult laws

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Kant believes that all of our actions, whether motivated by inclination or morality, must follow some law. For example, if a person wants to qualify for nationals in ultimate frisbee, he will have to follow a law that tells him to practice his backhand pass, among other things. Notice, however, that

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n action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realization of the object of the action but merely upon the principle of volition in accordance with which the action is

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The way Kant suggests that we should deal with this dialectic is through an appeal to the two perspectives we can take on ourselves. This is the same sort of move he made earlier in this section. On one perspective, the perspective of the world of understanding, we are free, whereas from the other,

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of freedom: a free will, Kant argues, gives itself a law—it sets its own ends, and has a special causal power to bring them about. A free will is one that has the power to bring about its own actions in a way that is distinct from the way that normal laws of nature cause things to happen. According

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The second formulation of the categorical imperative is the Formula of Humanity, which Kant arrives at by considering the motivating ground of the categorical imperative. Because the moral law is necessary and universal, its motivating ground must have absolute worth. Were we to find something with

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are determined by the particular ends we set and tell us what is necessary to achieve those particular ends. However, Kant observes that there is one end that we all share, namely our own happiness. Unfortunately, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know exactly what will make us happy or how to

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by criticizing attempts to begin moral evaluation with empirical observation. He states that even when we take ourselves to be behaving morally, we cannot be at all certain that we are purely motivated by duty and not by inclinations. Kant observes that humans are quite good at deceiving themselves

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rational reflection. Thus, a correct theoretical understanding of morality requires a metaphysics of morals. Kant believes that, until we have completed this sort of investigation, “morals themselves are liable to all kinds of corruption” because the “guide and supreme norm for correctly estimating

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takes something important from both the Formula for the Universal Law of Nature and the Formula of Humanity. The Formula for the Universal Law of Nature involves thinking about your maxim as if it were an objective law, while the Formula of Humanity is more subjective and is concerned with how you

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Kant combines these two propositions into a third proposition, a complete statement of our common sense notions of duty. This proposition is that ‘duty is necessity of action from respect for law.’ This final proposition serves as the basis of Kant's argument for the supreme principle of morality,

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phenomena, like what kind of physical entities there are and the relations in which they stand; the non-empirical part deals with fundamental concepts like space, time, and matter. Similarly, ethics contains an empirical part, which deals with the question of what—given the contingencies of human

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who chooses not to overcharge an inexperienced customer. The shopkeeper treats his customer fairly, but because it is in his prudent self-interest to do so, in order to preserve his reputation, we cannot assume that he is motivated by duty, and thus the shopkeeper's action cannot be said to have

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Kant argues that autonomous rational agents, like ourselves, think of themselves as having free will. This permits such beings to make judgments such as “you ought to have done that thing that you did not do.” Kant claims, in both this work and in the first Critique, that this notion of freedom

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It is the distinction between these two perspectives that Kant appeals to in explaining how freedom is possible. Insofar as we take ourselves to be exercising our free will, Kant argues, we have to consider ourselves from the perspective of the world of understanding. It is only in the world of

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These two different viewpoints allow Kant to make sense of how we can have free wills, despite the fact that the world of appearances follows laws of nature deterministically. Finally, Kant remarks that whilst he would like to be able to explain how morality ends up motivating us, his theory is

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Recall that the moral law, if it exists, must apply universally and necessarily. Therefore, a moral law could never rest on hypothetical imperatives, which only apply if one adopts some particular end. Rather, the imperative associated with the moral law must be a categorical imperative. The

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always already prioritizing the sick, the weakly over the healthy and strong – those capable of valid self-legislation to begin with –, thereby undermining the very possibility of human greatness at its root. But others have stressed many deeper similarities that adherents to a framework of

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Scholars disagree about the precise formulation of the first proposition. One interpretation asserts that the missing proposition is that an act has moral worth only when its agent is motivated by respect for the law, as in the case of the man who preserves his life only from duty. Another

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Kant cautions that we cannot feel or intuit this world of the understanding. He also stresses that we are unable to make interesting positive claims about it because we are not able to experience the world of the understanding. Kant argues that we cannot use the notion of the world of the

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At this point, Kant asks, "what kind of law can that be, the representation of which must determine the will, even without regard for the effect expected from it...?" He concludes that the only remaining alternative is a law that reflects only the form of law itself, namely that of

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In section three, Kant argues that we have a free will and are thus morally self-legislating. The fact of freedom means that we are bound by the moral law. In the course of his discussion, Kant establishes two viewpoints from which we can consider ourselves; we can view ourselves:

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The content and the bindingness of the moral law, in other words, do not vary according to the particularities of agents or their circumstances. Given that the moral law, if it exists, is universal and necessary, the only appropriate means to investigate it is through

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is widely taken to be problematic: it is based on the assumption that our faculties have distinct natural purposes for which they are most suitable, and it is questionable whether Kant's critical philosophy could be consistent with this sort of argument.

546:, which states that one must act only according to maxims which one could will to become a universal law. Kant argues that the rightness of an action is determined by the principle that a person chooses to act upon. This stands in stark contrast to the 1240:

According to Kant, human beings cannot know the ultimate structure of reality. Whilst humans experience the world as having three spatial dimensions and as being extended in time, we cannot say anything about how reality ultimately is, from a

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A nation goes to pieces when it confounds its duty with the general concept of duty. Nothing works a more complete and penetrating disaster than every "impersonal" duty, every sacrifice before the Moloch of abstraction.

795:, but it can be disastrous if a corrupt mind is behind it. In a similar vein, we often desire intelligence and take it to be good, but we certainly would not take the intelligence of an evil genius to be good. The 1208:

Because a free will is not merely pushed around by external forces, external forces do not provide laws for a free will. The only source of law for a free will is that will itself. This is Kant's notion of

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achieve the things that will make us happy. We can only know through experience what certain things will please us and even then, that could change over time. Therefore, Kant argues, we can at best have

3217: 799:, by contrast, is good in itself. Kant writes, “A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its 1120:, Kant suggests that imperfect duties only allow for flexibility in how one chooses to fulfill them. Kant believes that we have perfect and imperfect duties both to ourselves and to others. 920:

Kant states that this is how we should understand the Scriptural command to love even one's enemy: love as inclination or sentiment cannot be commanded, only rational love as duty can be.

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to which human moral reasoning is prone. The search for the supreme principle of morality—the antidote to confusion in the moral sphere—will occupy Kant for the first two chapters of the

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A maxim of an action is its principle of volition. By this, Kant means that the moral worth of an act depends not on its consequences, intended or real, but on the principle acted upon.

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requires that we are morally self-legislating; that we impose the moral law on ourselves. Kant thinks that the positive understanding of freedom amounts to the same thing as the

971:. Thus, Kant arrives at his well-known categorical imperative, the moral law referenced in the above discussion of duty. Kant defines the categorical imperative as the following: 757:’, and ‘moral worth’, will yield the supreme principle of morality (i.e., the categorical imperative). Kant's discussion in section one can be roughly divided into four parts: 908:

Kant thinks our actions only have moral worth and deserve esteem when they are motivated by duty. Kant illustrates the distinction between (b) and (c) with the example of a

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holds for all rational agents, regardless of whatever varying ends a person may have. If we could find it, the categorical imperative would provide us with the moral law.

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to Kant, we need laws to be able to act. An action not based on some sort of law would be arbitrary and not the sort of thing that we could call the result of willing.

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is purely formal—it deals only with the form of thought itself, not with any particular objects. Physics and ethics, on the other hand, deal with particular objects:

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through rational means. However, he also further elaborates what this feeling consists in within his other ethical writings. The most notable discussions are in the

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Kant believes that a teleological argument may be given to demonstrate that the “true vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is good.” As with other

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Ethical philosophy: the complete texts of Grounding for the metaphysics of morals, and Metaphysical principles of virtue, part II of The metaphysics of morals

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Kant opens section III by defining the will as the cause of our actions. According to Kant, having a will is the same thing as being rational, and having a

672:: “That there must be such a philosophy is evident from the common idea of duty and of moral laws.” The moral law must “carry with it absolute necessity.” 1176:

as members of the intellectual world, which is how we view ourselves when we think of ourselves as having free wills and when we think about how to act.

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In Section II, Kant starts from scratch and attempts to move from popular moral philosophy to a metaphysics of morals. Kant begins Section II of the

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philosophy, he was quick and unrelenting in his analysis of the inconsistencies throughout Kant's long body of work. Schopenhauer's early admirer,

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unable to do so. This is because the intellectual world—in which morality is grounded—is something that we cannot make positive claims about.

1109:, Kant says that perfect duties never admit of exception for the sake of inclination, which is sometimes taken to imply that imperfect duties 753:. Kant thinks that uncontroversial premises from our shared common-sense morality, and analysis of common sense concepts such as ‘the good’, ‘ 1782: 369: 205: 988:

such pure virtue ever actually exists in the world; the important thing is that that reason dictates duty and that we recognize it as such.

819:, Kant's teleological argument is motivated by an appeal to a belief or sense that the whole universe, or parts of it, serve some greater 525:—one that clears the ground for future research by explaining the core concepts and principles of moral theory, and showing that they are 79: 3241: 2223: 735:

is to explain what the moral law would have to be like if it existed and to show that, in fact, it exists and is authoritative for us.

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action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.” A proposed maxim can fail to meet such requirement in one of two ways.

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do not depend on any particular experience for their justification. By contrast, physics and ethics are mixed disciplines, containing

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Although Kant never explicitly states what the first proposition is, it is clear that its content is suggested by the following

3524: 3519: 1224: 1223:, and that “a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same.” This is the key notion that later scholars call the 3209: 1640:

Ethical philosophy : the complete texts of grounding for the metaphysics of morals and metaphysical principles of virtue

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or achievement of happiness, which are better served by their natural inclinations. What guides the will in those matters is

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Modified texts and modern "translations" for easier reading (always consult the original translated source texts first)

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First, one might encounter a scenario in which one's proposed maxim would become impossible in a world in which it is

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In essence, Kant's remarks in the preface prepare the reader for the thrust of the ideas he goes on to develop in the

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2019. 'Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals', edited and translated by Christopher Bennett, Joe Saunders and

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Grounding for the metaphysics of morals; with, On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns

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is an attempt to prove, among other things, that actions are not moral when they are performed solely from

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or derive their goodness from something else. For example, wealth can be extremely good if it is used for

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is to prepare a foundation for moral theory. Because Kant believes that any fact that is grounded in

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them are missing.” A fully specified account of the moral law will guard against the errors and

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the case in which a person's actions coincide with duty because he or she is motivated by duty.

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and show that it applies to us. Central to the work is the role of what Kant refers to as the

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the case in which a person's actions coincide with duty, but are not motivated by duty; and

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as members of the world of appearances, which operates according to the laws of nature; or

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unqualified liberalism, prone to condemning Nietzsche from the canon, have overlooked.

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of freedom—it tells us that freedom is freedom from determination by alien forces.

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Kant thinks that, with the exception of the good will, all goods are qualified. By

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Kant believes that the Formula of Autonomy yields another “fruitful concept,” the

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Kant proceeds to motivate the need for the special sort of inquiry he calls a

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and specifically targeted the Categorical Imperative, labeling it cold and

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admit of exception for the sake of inclination. However, in a later work (

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means having a will that is not influenced by external forces. This is a

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I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my

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Kant on the foundation of morality; a modern version of the Grundlegung

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reasoning. It is with this significance of necessity in mind that the

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He takes it to be a peculiar expression of "slavish" egalitarianism,

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Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, and What is Enlightenment?

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The philosophy of Kant; Immanuel Kant's moral and political writings

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and the first of his trilogy of major works on ethics alongside the

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Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is Enlightenment

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morality to the supreme principle of morality, which he calls the

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and non-empirical parts. The empirical part of physics deals with

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Kant posits that there are two types of hypothetical imperative—

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done without regard for any object of the faculty of desire.”

554:

that dominated moral philosophy at the time of Kant's career.

18: 1981:

Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary

1956:

Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary

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The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals

1450:

The Moral Law; Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals

3218:

An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation

2187:

Groundlaying: Kant's Search for the Highest Moral Principle

3446:

For an idea of what Kant means by the feeling of respect (

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the case in which a person clearly acts contrary to duty;

645:

investigation into the nature and substance of morality.

787:, Kant means that those goods are good insofar as they 652:, Kant calls this latter, non-empirical part of ethics 641:, and a non-empirical part, which is concerned with an 536:

Kant proposes to lay bare the fundamental principle of

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The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals

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The fundamental principles of the metaphysic of ethics

618:

with the laws of freedom. Additionally, logic is an

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Fundamental principles of the metaphysics of ethics

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Fundamental principles of the metaphysics of ethics

150: 138: 128: 1642:, tr. J. W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. 1366:Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals 588:Kant opens the preface with an affirmation of the 1510:, tr. L. W. Beck, with critical essays edited by 1480:1949. "Metaphysical Foundations of Morals," tr. 592:idea of a threefold division of philosophy into 1600:, tr. J. W. Ellington, with an introduction by 1133:The Formula of Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends 892:observation. Common sense distinguishes among: 1958:. Cambridge University Press. pp. 26–27. 3454:4:401 where he says that this feeling arises 2247: 1983:. Oxford University Press. pp. 122–126. 1791:Groundlaying toward the Metaphysics of Morals 1402:, tr. T. K. Abbott, edited with revisions by 8: 3194:Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel 142: 114: 51:introducing citations to additional sources 1445:. London: Hutchinson's University Library. 731:. The aim of the following sections of the 2254: 2240: 2232: 1076:The Formula of the Universal Law of Nature 771:the three propositions regarding duty; and 181: 161: 120: 113: 1777:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1488:, edited by Carl J. Friedrich. New York: 245:Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason 62:"Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" 1719:Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals 1692:Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals 1508:Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 1400:Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals 486:Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 217: Question: What Is Enlightenment? 115:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 41:Relevant discussion may be found on the 3439: 3226:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1871: 1763:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1751:Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals 1661:Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals 1571:Grounding for the metaphysics of morals 1452:, translated by H. J. Paton. New York: 829:would certainly not serve a purpose of 498:Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 472:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 173: 1045:Categorical Imperative: Laws of nature 614:is concerned with the laws of nature, 492:Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals 224:Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 2074: 2072: 2047: 2045: 2032: 2030: 2017: 2015: 1979:Allison, Henry E. (October 6, 2011). 1954:Timmermann, Jens (December 9, 2010). 1499:, translated with an introduction by 860:The Three Propositions Regarding Duty 815:, such as the case with that for the 481:Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten 266:On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from 144:Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten 7: 3493:"Nietzsche's Radicalization of Kant" 2002: 2000: 1913: 1911: 1368:, tr. T. K. Abbott, introduction by 950:Categorical Imperative: Universality 16:Philosophical tract by Immanuel Kant 3242:Elements of the Philosophy of Right 2224:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1801:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1292:presents a careful analysis of the 14: 1604:. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. 1383:, tr. T. K. Abbott. Mineola, NY: 1342:English editions and translations 928:Kant's second proposition states: 743:In section one, Kant argues from 3423: 3422: 2213:Cureton, Adam; Johnson, Robert. 2191: 1834: 1820: 1550:, translated with commentary by 1503:. New York: Liberal Arts Press. 1041:, as opposed to outright rules. 456: 34:relies largely or entirely on a 23: 1754:, edited for easier reading by 3210:The Theory of Moral Sentiments 2580:Value monism – Value pluralism 1236:Gods-eye and human perspective 1200:However, Kant also provides a 723:attempts to establish a pure ( 338:Analytic–synthetic distinction 208: Any Future Metaphysics 1: 3491:Sokoloff, William W. (2006). 3476:Nietzsche, Friedrich (1895). 729:supreme principle of morality 3460:Critique of Practical Reason 3274:On the Genealogy of Morality 3234:Critique of Practical Reason 946:the categorical imperative. 567:Critique of Practical Reason 512:Critique of Practical Reason 231:Critique of Practical Reason 2201:public domain audiobook at 1769:, edited and translated by 1463:, tr. H. J. Paton. London: 1310:Kant's philosophical system 1085:Contradiction in conception 774:the categorical imperative. 552:teleological moral theories 3561: 3202:A Treatise of Human Nature 1850:Immanuel Kant bibliography 1702:and Arnulf Zweig. Oxford: 1673:Cambridge University Press 1667:, with an introduction by 1048: 953: 268: Benevolent Motives 3418: 2215:"Kant's Moral Philosophy" 1306:Kant's ethical philosophy 1215:. Thus, Kant's notion of 1116:The Metaphysics of Morals 807:The Teleological Argument 518:The Metaphysics of Morals 507:works on moral philosophy 259:The Metaphysics of Morals 119: 3540:German non-fiction books 3530:Enlightenment philosophy 2553:Universal prescriptivism 1767:A German-English Edition 1556:Indiana University Press 1454:Barnes & Noble Books 1285:On the Basis of Morality 1097:Contradiction in willing 637:nature—tends to promote 3450:), see the footnote in 2342:Artificial intelligence 1704:Oxford University Press 1355:Thomas Kingsmill Abbott 1124:The Formula of Humanity 1013:Imperatives are either 583:method of investigation 358:Hypothetical imperative 300:Transcendental idealism 199:Critique of Pure Reason 3525:Books by Immanuel Kant 3520:1785 non-fiction books 1575:James Wesley Ellington 1359:Longmans, Green and Co 1331: 1304:. Schopenhauer called 1221:categorical imperative 1058:categorical imperative 1051:Categorical imperative 985: 956:Categorical imperative 935: 813:teleological arguments 750:categorical imperative 577:In the preface to the 543:categorical imperative 480: 353:Categorical imperative 143: 3464:Metaphysics of Morals 3266:The Methods of Ethics 2504:Divine command theory 2499:Ideal observer theory 1860:Pure practical reason 1731:Yale University Press 1552:Brendan E. A. Liddell 1326: 1308:the weakest point in 1243:god's-eye perspective 973: 930: 872:and a will guided by 866:teleological argument 842:method of elimination 766:teleological argument 670:metaphysics of morals 664:Metaphysics of morals 658:metaphysics of nature 654:metaphysics of morals 463:Philosophy portal 3462:(5:71–5:76) and the 3383:Political philosophy 1729:, et al. New Haven: 1406:. Peterborough, ON: 1372:. 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Please help 31: 29: 22: 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 3557: 3546: 3543: 3541: 3538: 3536: 3533: 3531: 3528: 3526: 3523: 3521: 3518: 3517: 3515: 3503:(4): 501–518. 3502: 3498: 3494: 3487: 3484: 3479: 3472: 3469: 3466:(6:399–6:418) 3465: 3461: 3457: 3453: 3449: 3443: 3440: 3429: 3421: 3420: 3417: 3411: 3410: 3406: 3404: 3401: 3399: 3396: 3394: 3391: 3389: 3386: 3384: 3381: 3379: 3376: 3374: 3371: 3369: 3366: 3364: 3361: 3359: 3356: 3354: 3351: 3349: 3346: 3344: 3341: 3339: 3336: 3334: 3331: 3330: 3328: 3324: 3315: 3312: 3307: 3304: 3299: 3296: 3291: 3288: 3283: 3280: 3275: 3272: 3267: 3264: 3259: 3256: 3251: 3248: 3243: 3240: 3235: 3232: 3227: 3224: 3219: 3216: 3211: 3208: 3203: 3200: 3195: 3192: 3187: 3184: 3179: 3176: 3175: 3173: 3169: 3163: 3160: 3158: 3155: 3153: 3150: 3148: 3145: 3143: 3140: 3138: 3135: 3133: 3130: 3128: 3125: 3123: 3120: 3118: 3115: 3113: 3110: 3108: 3105: 3103: 3100: 3098: 3095: 3093: 3090: 3088: 3085: 3083: 3080: 3078: 3075: 3073: 3070: 3068: 3065: 3063: 3060: 3058: 3055: 3053: 3050: 3048: 3045: 3043: 3040: 3038: 3035: 3033: 3030: 3028: 3025: 3023: 3020: 3018: 3015: 3013: 3010: 3008: 3005: 3003: 3000: 2998: 2995: 2993: 2990: 2988: 2985: 2983: 2980: 2978: 2975: 2973: 2970: 2968: 2965: 2963: 2960: 2958: 2955: 2953: 2950: 2948: 2945: 2944: 2942: 2940: 2935: 2929: 2926: 2924: 2921: 2919: 2916: 2914: 2911: 2907: 2904: 2902: 2899: 2897: 2894: 2893: 2892: 2889: 2887: 2884: 2882: 2879: 2877: 2874: 2872: 2869: 2867: 2864: 2862: 2859: 2857: 2854: 2852: 2849: 2847: 2844: 2842: 2839: 2837: 2834: 2832: 2829: 2827: 2824: 2822: 2819: 2817: 2814: 2812: 2811:Moral courage 2809: 2807: 2804: 2802: 2799: 2797: 2794: 2792: 2789: 2787: 2784: 2782: 2779: 2777: 2774: 2772: 2769: 2765: 2762: 2760: 2757: 2755: 2752: 2751: 2750: 2749:Good and evil 2747: 2745: 2742: 2740: 2737: 2735: 2734:Family values 2732: 2730: 2727: 2725: 2722: 2720: 2717: 2715: 2712: 2710: 2707: 2705: 2702: 2700: 2697: 2695: 2692: 2690: 2687: 2685: 2682: 2680: 2677: 2675: 2672: 2670: 2667: 2666: 2664: 2660: 2654: 2651: 2649: 2646: 2644: 2641: 2639: 2636: 2634: 2631: 2629: 2626: 2624: 2621: 2619: 2616: 2614: 2611: 2609: 2606: 2604: 2601: 2599: 2596: 2595: 2593: 2589: 2581: 2578: 2577: 2576: 2573: 2571: 2568: 2566: 2563: 2561: 2558: 2554: 2551: 2549: 2548:Quasi-realism 2546: 2544: 2541: 2539: 2536: 2535: 2534: 2531: 2529: 2526: 2524: 2521: 2519: 2516: 2514: 2511: 2505: 2502: 2500: 2497: 2496: 2495: 2492: 2488: 2485: 2483: 2480: 2479: 2478: 2475: 2474: 2473: 2470: 2468: 2465: 2463: 2460: 2459: 2457: 2455: 2451: 2445: 2442: 2440: 2437: 2435: 2432: 2430: 2427: 2425: 2422: 2420: 2417: 2415: 2412: 2410: 2407: 2405: 2402: 2400: 2397: 2395: 2392: 2390: 2387: 2385: 2382: 2378: 2375: 2374: 2373: 2372:Environmental 2370: 2368: 2365: 2363: 2360: 2358: 2355: 2353: 2350: 2348: 2345: 2343: 2340: 2338: 2335: 2334: 2332: 2330: 2326: 2320: 2317: 2315: 2312: 2310: 2307: 2305: 2302: 2300: 2297: 2295: 2294:Particularism 2292: 2290: 2287: 2285: 2282: 2280: 2277: 2276: 2274: 2272: 2268: 2264: 2257: 2252: 2250: 2245: 2243: 2238: 2237: 2234: 2226: 2225: 2220: 2216: 2211: 2209: 2206: 2204: 2200: 2199: 2190: 2188: 2185: 2183: 2182: 2177: 2176: 2172: 2164: 2159: 2156: 2152: 2147: 2144: 2140: 2135: 2132: 2128: 2123: 2120: 2116: 2111: 2108: 2104: 2099: 2096: 2092: 2087: 2084: 2080: 2075: 2073: 2069: 2065: 2060: 2057: 2053: 2048: 2046: 2042: 2038: 2033: 2031: 2027: 2023: 2018: 2016: 2012: 2008: 2003: 2001: 1997: 1992: 1990:9780199691548 1986: 1982: 1975: 1972: 1967: 1965:9780521175081 1961: 1957: 1950: 1947: 1943: 1938: 1935: 1931: 1926: 1923: 1919: 1914: 1912: 1908: 1904: 1899: 1896: 1892: 1887: 1884: 1880: 1875: 1872: 1865: 1861: 1858: 1856: 1853: 1851: 1848: 1847: 1843: 1832: 1829: 1823: 1818: 1813: 1808: 1804: 1800: 1796: 1793: 1792: 1787: 1784: 1780: 1776: 1772: 1768: 1764: 1760: 1757: 1753: 1752: 1747: 1744: 1743:0-300-09487-6 1740: 1739:0-300-09486-8 1736: 1732: 1728: 1724: 1723:Allen W. Wood 1721:, translated 1720: 1716: 1713: 1712:0-19-875180-X 1709: 1705: 1701: 1697: 1694:, translated 1693: 1689: 1686: 1685:0-521-62695-1 1682: 1681:0-521-62235-2 1678: 1674: 1671:. Cambridge: 1670: 1666: 1662: 1658: 1653: 1652:0-87220-320-4 1649: 1648:0-87220-321-2 1645: 1641: 1637: 1634: 1633:0-87220-166-X 1630: 1629:0-87220-167-8 1626: 1622: 1618: 1615: 1614:0-915145-44-8 1611: 1610:0-915145-43-X 1607: 1603: 1599: 1595: 1594: 1592: 1591:0-915145-00-6 1588: 1587:0-915145-01-4 1584: 1580: 1576: 1572: 1568: 1565: 1561: 1557: 1553: 1549: 1545: 1540: 1539:0-02-307825-1 1536: 1532: 1528: 1524: 1520: 1517: 1516:Bobbs-Merrill 1513: 1509: 1505: 1504: 1502: 1498: 1494: 1491: 1487: 1483: 1479: 1474: 1473:0-415-07843-1 1470: 1466: 1462: 1458: 1455: 1451: 1447: 1446: 1444: 1440: 1439:The Moral Law 1436: 1433: 1429: 1425: 1421: 1417: 1416:1-55111-539-5 1413: 1409: 1405: 1401: 1397: 1394: 1393:0-486-44309-4 1390: 1386: 1382: 1378: 1375: 1374:Bobbs-Merrill 1371: 1367: 1363: 1362: 1360: 1356: 1352: 1351: 1346: 1345: 1341: 1339: 1336: 1330: 1325: 1323: 1319: 1315: 1311: 1307: 1303: 1299: 1298:His criticism 1295: 1291: 1287: 1286: 1277: 1275: 1271: 1267: 1263: 1259: 1252: 1250: 1246: 1244: 1235: 1233: 1231: 1226: 1222: 1218: 1214: 1213: 1206: 1203: 1198: 1196: 1192: 1184: 1182: 1175: 1172: 1171: 1170: 1164:Section Three 1163: 1161: 1159: 1155: 1154: 1145: 1143: 1140: 1132: 1130: 1123: 1121: 1119: 1117: 1112: 1108: 1103: 1096: 1094: 1092: 1091:universalized 1084: 1082: 1075: 1073: 1071: 1067: 1061: 1059: 1052: 1044: 1042: 1040: 1035: 1031: 1027: 1022: 1020: 1016: 1008: 1006: 1002: 999: 991: 989: 984: 982: 981:universal law 978: 972: 970: 969: 962: 957: 949: 947: 940: 938: 934: 929: 923: 921: 918: 914: 911: 902: 899: 896: 895: 893: 891: 883: 881: 879: 875: 871: 867: 859: 857: 854: 850: 847: 843: 838: 836: 832: 828: 824: 823: 818: 814: 806: 804: 802: 798: 794: 793:human welfare 790: 786: 779:The Good Will 778: 773: 770: 767: 763: 760: 759: 758: 756: 752: 751: 746: 738: 736: 734: 730: 726: 722: 718: 714: 710: 706: 702: 694: 692: 690: 686: 681: 680: 673: 671: 663: 661: 659: 655: 651: 646: 644: 640: 639:human welfare 635: 631: 627: 623: 622: 617: 613: 609: 605: 603: 599: 595: 591: 590:Ancient Greek 586: 584: 580: 572: 570: 568: 564: 560: 555: 553: 549: 545: 544: 539: 534: 532: 528: 524: 520: 519: 514: 513: 508: 504: 503:Immanuel Kant 500: 499: 494: 493: 488: 487: 482: 478: 474: 473: 464: 453: 450: 449: 442: 439: 437: 434: 433: 427: 426: 419: 416: 414: 411: 409: 406: 404: 401: 399: 396: 394: 391: 390: 384: 383: 376: 373: 371: 368: 365: 361: 359: 356: 354: 351: 349: 346: 344: 341: 339: 336: 334: 333: 329: 325: 323: 320: 318: 315: 313: 312: 308: 306: 303: 301: 298: 297: 294: 290: 285: 284: 277: 276: 275:Opus Postumum 272: 269: 263: 261: 260: 256: 254: 253: 249: 247: 246: 242: 240: 239: 235: 233: 232: 228: 226: 225: 221: 218: 215:Answering the 212: 210: 209: 203: 201: 200: 196: 195: 189: 188: 184: 180: 179: 176: 175:Immanuel Kant 172: 168: 164: 163: 155: 149: 145: 141: 137: 134: 133:Immanuel Kant 131: 127: 123: 118: 106: 95: 92: 88: 85: 81: 78: 74: 71: 67: 64: – 63: 59: 58:Find sources: 52: 48: 44: 38: 37: 36:single source 32:This article 30: 26: 21: 20: 3535:Ethics books 3500: 3496: 3486: 3477: 3471: 3463: 3459: 3455: 3451: 3447: 3442: 3407: 3363:Human rights 3306:After Virtue 3225: 3032:Schopenhauer 2806:Moral agency 2679:Common sense 2575:Universalism 2543:Expressivism 2523:Intuitionism 2494:Subjectivism 2439:Terraforming 2414:Professional 2222: 2197: 2180: 2162: 2158: 2150: 2146: 2138: 2134: 2126: 2122: 2114: 2110: 2102: 2098: 2090: 2086: 2078: 2063: 2059: 2051: 2036: 2021: 2006: 1980: 1974: 1955: 1949: 1941: 1937: 1929: 1925: 1917: 1902: 1898: 1890: 1886: 1878: 1874: 1828:Books portal 1799:Robert Stern 1789: 1766: 1762: 1749: 1718: 1698:, edited by 1696:Arnulf Zweig 1691: 1660: 1639: 1620: 1597: 1570: 1547: 1522: 1507: 1496: 1485: 1460: 1449: 1438: 1430:. New York: 1423: 1399: 1380: 1365: 1348: 1334: 1332: 1327: 1293: 1283: 1282:In his book 1281: 1272: 1268: 1264: 1260: 1256: 1247: 1239: 1216: 1210: 1207: 1201: 1199: 1194: 1188: 1179: 1167: 1152: 1149: 1136: 1127: 1114: 1110: 1106: 1104: 1100: 1088: 1079: 1069: 1065: 1064:law itself. 1062: 1054: 1038: 1033: 1029: 1025: 1023: 1015:hypothetical 1012: 1003: 997: 995: 986: 974: 968:universality 967: 963: 959: 944: 936: 931: 927: 919: 915: 907: 890:common-sense 887: 863: 848: 845: 839: 820: 810: 796: 784: 782: 748: 745:common-sense 742: 732: 728: 724: 720: 716: 704: 701:Groundwork. 700: 698: 688: 677: 674: 669: 667: 657: 653: 649: 647: 642: 619: 615: 611: 607: 606: 587: 578: 576: 566: 558: 556: 541: 535: 516: 510: 497: 496: 491: 490: 485: 484: 471: 470: 469: 408:F. H. Jacobi 393:J. G. Fichte 332:a posteriori 331: 327: 309: 273: 257: 250: 243: 236: 229: 222: 204: 197: 100: 90: 83: 76: 69: 57: 33: 3181:(c. 322 BC) 3047:Kierkegaard 2866:Stewardship 2643:Rousseauian 2560:Rationalism 2472:Cognitivism 2419:Programming 2394:Meat eating 2367:Engineering 1771:Mary Gregor 1230:consciences 1225:reciprocity 1019:categorical 1009:Imperatives 992:Section Two 870:inclination 835:inclination 739:Section One 695:Pure ethics 311:Sapere aude 192:Major works 3514:Categories 3452:Groundwork 3077:Bonhoeffer 2786:Immorality 2729:Eudaimonia 2689:Conscience 2684:Compassion 2570:Skepticism 2565:Relativism 2482:Naturalism 2462:Absolutism 2434:Technology 2284:Deontology 2181:Groundwork 2179:About the 2163:Groundwork 2151:Groundwork 2139:Groundwork 2127:Groundwork 2115:Groundwork 2103:Groundwork 2091:Groundwork 2079:Groundwork 2064:Groundwork 2052:Groundwork 2037:Groundwork 2022:Groundwork 2007:Groundwork 1942:Groundwork 1930:Groundwork 1918:Groundwork 1903:Groundwork 1891:Groundwork 1879:Groundwork 1855:Kantianism 1564:0253331714 1529:; London: 1404:Lara Denis 1370:Marvin Fox 1357:. London: 1294:Groundwork 1107:Groundwork 998:Groundwork 910:shopkeeper 789:presuppose 733:Groundwork 721:Groundwork 713:contingent 705:Groundwork 689:Groundwork 579:Groundwork 559:Groundwork 505:'s mature 495:, and the 403:David Hume 289:Kantianism 73:newspapers 3338:Casuistry 3250:Either/Or 3157:Korsgaard 3152:Azurmendi 3117:MacIntyre 3057:Nietzsche 2987:Augustine 2982:Confucius 2962:Aristotle 2938:Ethicists 2896:Intrinsic 2861:Suffering 2771:Happiness 2744:Free will 2724:Etiquette 2669:Authority 2613:Epicurean 2608:Confucian 2603:Christian 2538:Emotivism 2362:Discourse 2299:Pragmatic 2271:Normative 1527:Macmillan 1465:Routledge 1191:free will 853:teleology 797:good will 785:qualified 717:a priori 630:empirical 527:normative 375:Teleology 103:June 2023 43:talk page 3456:a priori 3428:Category 3368:Ideology 3333:Axiology 3162:Nussbaum 3112:Frankena 3107:Anscombe 3097:Williams 3052:Sidgwick 2972:Valluvar 2967:Diogenes 2952:Socrates 2876:Theodicy 2871:Sympathy 2836:Pacifism 2826:Morality 2739:Fidelity 2719:Equality 2674:Autonomy 2662:Concepts 2623:Feminist 2598:Buddhist 2528:Nihilism 2467:Axiology 2424:Research 2357:Computer 2352:Business 2203:LibriVox 1814:See also 1593:(pbk.). 1335:de facto 1318:Hegelian 1314:egoistic 1288:(1840), 1212:autonomy 1139:Autonomy 1070:commands 801:volition 725:a priori 711:must be 679:a priori 650:a priori 643:a priori 621:a priori 538:morality 452:Category 348:Category 343:Noumenon 328:A priori 167:a series 165:Part of 3448:Achtung 3326:Related 3072:Tillich 3037:Bentham 3012:Spinoza 3007:Aquinas 2992:Mencius 2906:Western 2881:Torture 2846:Precept 2801:Loyalty 2796:Liberty 2791:Justice 2704:Dignity 2694:Consent 2638:Kantian 2628:Islamic 2591:Schools 2477:Realism 2409:Nursing 2404:Medical 2389:Machine 2329:Applied 2221:(ed.). 1228:of our 1105:In the 840:By the 612:physics 598:physics 573:Preface 563:preface 475:(1785; 87:scholar 3497:Polity 3317:(1984) 3309:(1981) 3301:(1979) 3293:(1971) 3285:(1903) 3277:(1887) 3269:(1874) 3261:(1861) 3253:(1843) 3245:(1820) 3237:(1788) 3229:(1785) 3221:(1780) 3213:(1759) 3205:(1740) 3197:(1726) 3189:(1677) 3147:Taylor 3132:Parfit 3127:Singer 3102:Mackie 2977:Cicero 2918:Virtue 2851:Rights 2776:Honour 2633:Jewish 2429:Sexual 2337:Animal 2319:Virtue 2263:Ethics 2066:4:421n 1987: 1962: 1805: 1788:2013. 1781: 1761:2011. 1748:2005. 1737: 1717:2002. 1710: 1690:2002. 1679: 1659:1998. 1646: 1638:1994. 1627: 1619:1993. 1608: 1596:1983. 1585: 1566:(pbk). 1562: 1546:1970. 1537: 1521:1990. 1506:1969. 1471: 1448:1967. 1437:1948. 1422:1938. 1414: 1398:2005. 1395:(pbk.) 1391: 1379:2005. 1364:1949. 1347:1895. 874:reason 827:reason 616:ethics 602:ethics 600:, and 523:ethics 477:German 387:People 322:Schema 129:Author 89: 82: 75: 68: 60: 3409:Index 3171:Works 3142:Adams 3137:Nagel 3092:Dewey 3087:Rawls 3067:Barth 3062:Moore 3027:Hegel 3002:Xunzi 2957:Plato 2947:Laozi 2928:Wrong 2901:Japan 2891:Value 2886:Trust 2781:Ideal 2648:Stoic 2399:Media 2384:Legal 2217:. In 2165:4:453 2153:4:450 2141:4:449 2129:4:447 2117:4:446 2105:4:432 2093:4:429 2081:4:428 2054:4:424 2039:4:421 2024:4:402 2009:4:400 1944:4:398 1932:4:397 1920:4:396 1905:4:394 1893:4:390 1881:4:389 1866:Notes 1569:1981 1495:1959 1459:1991 977:maxim 822:telos 608:Logic 594:logic 94:JSTOR 80:books 3122:Hare 3082:Foot 3042:Mill 3022:Kant 3017:Hume 2997:Mozi 2913:Vice 2831:Norm 2759:Evil 2754:Good 2714:Duty 2454:Meta 2377:Land 2304:Role 2289:Care 1985:ISBN 1960:ISBN 1803:ISBN 1779:ISBN 1773:and 1735:ISBN 1708:ISBN 1677:ISBN 1644:ISBN 1625:ISBN 1606:ISBN 1583:ISBN 1560:ISBN 1535:ISBN 1469:ISBN 1412:ISBN 1389:ISBN 1302:duty 1068:(or 1066:Laws 1028:and 878:duty 864:The 764:the 755:duty 557:The 550:and 529:for 515:and 330:and 156:1785 66:news 2923:Vow 2653:Tao 2347:Bio 1484:in 1017:or 49:by 3516:: 3501:38 3499:. 3495:. 2071:^ 2044:^ 2029:^ 2014:^ 1999:^ 1910:^ 1765:: 1741:, 1733:. 1706:. 1683:, 1675:. 1650:, 1631:, 1612:, 1589:, 1581:. 1558:. 1533:. 1467:. 1410:. 1387:. 1361:. 1296:. 1111:do 1032:. 846:to 837:. 691:. 660:. 604:. 596:, 585:. 569:. 533:. 489:, 479:: 169:on 2255:e 2248:t 2241:v 2227:. 1993:. 1968:. 1809:. 1785:. 1758:. 1745:. 1714:. 1687:. 1654:. 1635:. 1616:. 1541:. 1518:. 1492:. 1475:. 1456:. 1434:. 1376:. 1118:) 983:. 768:; 366:" 362:" 270:" 264:" 219:" 213:" 105:) 101:( 91:· 84:· 77:· 70:· 53:. 39:.

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