27:
523:) held that logical statements such as these contained the most formal reality, since they are always true and unchanging, Hume held that, while true, they contain no formal reality, because the truth of the statements rests on the definitions of the words involved, and not on actual things in the world, since there is no such thing as a true triangle or exact equality of length in the world. So for this reason, relations of ideas cannot be used to prove matters of fact.
527:
cannot be used to prove matters of fact. Because of this, matters of fact have no certainty and therefore cannot be used to prove anything. Only certain things can be used to prove other things for certain, but only things about the world can be used to prove other things about the world. But since we can't cross the fork, nothing is both certain and about the world, only one or the other, and so it is impossible to prove something about the world with certainty.
534:(for example) as a matter of fact. If God is not literally made up of physical matter, and does not have an observable effect on the world , making a statement about God is not a matter of fact. Therefore, a statement about God must be a relation of ideas. In this case if we prove the statement "God exists," it doesn't really tell us anything about the world; it is just playing with words. It is easy to see how Hume's fork voids the causal argument and the
511:
dropped on Earth it went down, this does not make it logically necessary that in the future rocks will fall when in the same circumstances. Things of this nature rely upon the future conforming to the same principles which governed the past. But that isn't something that we can know based on past experience—all past experience could tell us is that in the past, the future has resembled the past.
510:
Second, Hume claims that our belief in cause-and-effect relationships between events is not grounded on reason, but rather arises merely by habit or custom. Suppose one states: "Whenever someone on earth lets go of a stone it falls." While we can grant that in every instance thus far when a rock was
514:
Third, Hume notes that relations of ideas can be used only to prove other relations of ideas, and mean nothing outside of the context of how they relate to each other, and therefore tell us nothing about the world. Take the statement "An equilateral triangle has three sides of equal length." While
526:
The results claimed by Hume as consequences of his fork are drastic. According to him, relations of ideas can be proved with certainty (by using other relations of ideas), however, they don't really mean anything about the world. Since they don't mean anything about the world, relations of ideas
538:
for the existence of a non-observable God. However, this does not mean that the validity of Hume's fork would imply that God definitely does not exist, only that it would imply that the existence of God cannot be proven as a matter of fact without worldly evidence.
351:
Hume's fork remains basic in Anglo-American philosophy. Many deceptions and confusions are foisted by surreptitious or unwitting conversion of a synthetic claim to an analytic claim, rendered true by necessity but merely a tautology, for instance the
554:, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but
402:
discoverable by the mere operation of thought ... Matters of fact, which are the second object of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing.
503:
does not exist in science. First, Hume notes that statements of the second type can never be entirely certain, due to the fallibility of our senses, the possibility of deception (see e.g. the modern
286:—combining meanings of terms with states of facts, yet known true without experience of the particular instance—replacing the two prongs of Hume's fork with a three-pronged-fork thesis (
316:
entailing both necessity and aprioricity via logic on one side and, on the other side, demand empirical verification, altogether restricting philosophical discourse to claims
1126:
332:, as every term in any statement has its meaning contingent on a vast network of knowledge and belief, the speaker's conception of the entire world. By the early 1970s,
312:
and asserted Hume's fork, so called, while hinging it at language—the analytic/synthetic division—while presuming that by holding to analyticity, they could develop a
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197:—that no amount of examination of cases will logically entail the conformity of unexamined cases—and supported Hume's aim to position
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theory) and other arguments made by philosophical skeptics. It is always possible that any given statement about the world is false.
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359:. Simply put, Hume's fork has limitations. Related concerns are Hume's distinction of demonstrative versus probable reasoning and
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426:
226:
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are the same star, they are the same star by necessity, but this is known true by a human only through relevant experience.
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595:
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325:
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703:
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while combatting allegedly rampant "sophistry and illusion" by philosophers and religionists. Being a
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49:'s emphatic, 1730s division between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact." (Alternatively,
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Hume rejected the idea of any meaningful statement that did not fall into this schema, saying:
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202:
143:
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All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit,
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155:
150:, whereas a synthetic statement, concerning external states of affairs, may be false, like
729:
317:
421:
Hume's fork is often stated in such a way that statements are divided up into two types:
189:, whereas assertions of "real existence" and traits, being synthetic, are contingent and
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into the experience of space and time. Kant thus reasoned existence of the synthetic
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468:
360:
261:
64:
55:
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257:
137:
121:
38:
240:. Still, Hume's fork is a useful starting point to anchor philosophical scrutiny.
488:, and ideas of mathematics and logic. Into the second class fall statements like
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430:
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230:
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221:." In the 1930s, the logical empiricists staked Hume's fork. Yet in the 1950s,
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279:
249:
46:
624:
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520:
500:
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71:, Hume's fork asserts that all statements are exclusively either "analytic
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1780s characterization of Hume's thesis, and furthered in the 1930s by the
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547:
388:
198:
672:
392:
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The first distinction is between two different areas of human study:
142:. An analytic statement is true via its terms' meanings alone, hence
60:
516:
345:
341:
278:
by the mind's aligning the environmental input by arranging those
178:
25:
363:. Hume makes other, important two-category distinctions, such as
530:
If accepted, Hume's fork makes it pointless to try to prove the
923:
459:
In modern terminology, members of the first group are known as
87:
or, however apparently probable, are unknowable without exact
919:
726:"The problem of metaphysics: The 'new' metaphysics; Modality"
174:
is knowable only upon, experience in the area of interest.
328:
undermined the analytic/synthetic division by explicating
177:
By Hume's fork, sheer conceptual derivations (ostensibly,
162:, whereas the contingent hinges on the world's state, a
615:
ch. 2 "Hume's theory of knowledge (I): 'Hume's fork' "
274:, where Kant attributed to the mind a causal role in
83:," which, respectively, are universally true by mere
620:
30:
Hume's fork contrasted with Kant's trident/pitchfork
1127:
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence
1105:
1052:
1026:
957:
833:
745:Leah Henderson, "The problem of induction", sec. 2
594:, rev 2nd edn (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984),
818:Nicholas Bunnin & Jiyuan Yu. "Hume's Fork".
445:Statements about the world. These are synthetic,
193:. Hume's own, simpler, distinction concerned the
640:Nicholas Bunnin & Jiyuan Yu, "Hume's fork",
807:Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy
980:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
844:Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, "Hume's Fork".
642:The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy
631:introducing Kant's formulation of Hume's fork.
1034:Argument for the existence of God from design
935:
480:Into the first class fall statements such as
8:
846:Blackwell's Dictionary of Western Philosophy
820:Blackwell's Dictionary of Western Philosophy
724:& Meghan Sullivan, "Metaphysics", § 3.1
942:
928:
920:
973:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
901:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
561:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
411:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
515:some earlier philosophers (most notably
387:. Of the first kind are the sciences of
209:, Kant asserted both the hope of a true
793:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
573:
217:by defying Hume's fork to declare the "
987:Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary
870:Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
858:Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
583:
581:
579:
577:
546:If we take in our hand any volume; of
371:Relations of ideas and matters of fact
252:, as in Hume's fork as well as Hume's
53:may refer to what is otherwise termed
1121:A Treatise of Human Nature (Abstract)
1001:Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
300:, Newton's theory fell to Einstein's
292:Newton's law of universal gravitation
215:Newton's law of universal gravitation
185:), being analytic, are necessary and
7:
881:
782:
780:
704:"The analytic/synthetic distinction"
695:
693:
691:
664:
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660:
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606:
604:
19:For the novel of the same name, see
904:. London: A. Millar. Archived from
751:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
734:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
709:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
425:Statements about ideas. These are
14:
367:and as impressions versus ideas.
170:is knowable without, whereas the
120:, and the statement's purported
884:, p. 166, emphasis removed
809:. Clarendon Press, 2004. p. 28.
678:History of Philosophy Quarterly
158:, the necessary is true in all
490:"the sun rises in the morning"
467:. This terminology comes from
227:analytic/synthetic distinction
94:By Hume's fork, a statement's
41:, is a tenet elaborating upon
1:
764:The Suasive Art of David Hume
486:"all bachelors are unmarried"
463:and members of the latter as
1015:The History of Great Britain
302:general theory of relativity
1097:Price–specie flow mechanism
790:, in Edward N. Zalta, ed.,
749:, in Edward N. Zalta, ed.,
706:, in Edward N. Zalta, ed.,
256:, was taken as a threat to
1184:
966:A Treatise of Human Nature
768:Princeton University Press
592:A Dictionary of Philosophy
336:established the necessary
308:rejected Kant's synthetic
18:
1075:The Missing Shade of Blue
499:Hume wants to prove that
482:"all bodies are extended"
304:. In the late 1920s, the
1148:Concepts in epistemology
623:(London & New York:
213:, and a literal view of
102:analytic or is synthetic
1158:Conceptual distinctions
673:"Hume's fork revisited"
474:Critique of Pure Reason
326:Willard Van Orman Quine
324:. In the early 1950s,
271:Critique of Pure Reason
266:Transcendental Idealism
207:transcendental idealist
148:Bachelors are unmarried
1153:Philosophy of language
1087:Scottish Enlightenment
1008:The History of England
835:, 2nd Edition, p. 218.
565:
494:"all bodies have mass"
465:synthetic propositions
365:beliefs versus desires
330:ontological relativity
260:'s theory of motion.
31:
898:Hume, David (1777) .
872:, Section IV, Part I.
544:
461:analytic propositions
29:
1039:Problem of induction
646:Blackwell Publishing
536:ontological argument
254:problem of induction
229:. And in the 1970s,
195:problem of induction
108:—its agreement with
822:. Blackwell, 2004.
747:"Hume on induction"
306:logical positivists
264:responded with his
152:Bachelors age badly
69:logical empiricists
21:Hume's Fork (novel)
994:Four Dissertations
848:. Blackwell, 2004.
381:relations of ideas
290:) and thus saving
276:sensory experience
219:synthetic a priori
154:. By mere logical
144:true by definition
104:, the statement's
43:British empiricist
32:
16:English philosophy
1135:
1134:
831:Garrett Thomson,
722:Peter van Inwagen
471:(Introduction to
203:empirical science
63:.) As phrased in
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1060:Hume's principle
1044:Is–ought problem
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766:(Princeton, NJ:
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666:
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558:and illusion. —
532:existence of God
355:No true Scotsman
288:Kant's pitchfork
233:established the
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77:" or "synthetic
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805:Hanna, Robert,
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730:Edward N. Zalta
720:
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698:
689:
667:
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609:
602:
586:
575:
570:
477:, Section IV).
449:, and knowable
385:matters of fact
373:
340:, since if the
246:
225:undermined its
166:basis. And the
160:possible worlds
135:
127:
65:Immanuel Kant's
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796:(Spring 2013).
786:James Fetzer,
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753:(Spring 2020).
738:
736:(Spring 2020).
714:
687:
669:Georges Dicker
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611:Georges Dicker
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505:brain in a vat
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314:logical syntax
248:Hume's strong
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110:the real world
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908:on 2018-07-10
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860:, Section II.
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788:"Carl Hempel"
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262:Immanuel Kant
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223:W. V. O Quine
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59:, a tenet of
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1114:Hume Studies
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910:. Retrieved
906:the original
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712:(Fall 2018).
707:
685:(4):327–342.
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545:
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452:a posteriori
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346:Evening Star
342:Morning Star
338:a posteriori
337:
309:
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269:
268:in his 1781
247:
237:a posteriori
236:
201:on par with
191:a posteriori
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172:a posteriori
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164:metaphysical
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138:a posteriori
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80:a posteriori
78:
72:
54:
50:
45:philosopher
39:epistemology
34:
33:
1081:Of Miracles
1070:Hume's fork
762:M. A. Box,
700:Georges Rey
681:, 1991 Oct;
588:Antony Flew
552:metaphysics
334:Saul Kripke
231:Saul Kripke
211:metaphysics
183:mathematics
112:—either is
51:Hume's fork
35:Hume's fork
1163:David Hume
1142:Categories
1092:Empiricism
1065:Hume's law
1053:Philosophy
951:David Hume
912:2015-08-31
892:References
550:or school
447:contingent
397:Arithmetic
361:Hume's law
320:as either
318:verifiable
280:sense data
250:empiricism
235:necessary
126:either is
118:contingent
100:either is
89:experience
85:definition
56:Hume's law
47:David Hume
1168:Humeanism
1027:Criticism
882:Hume 1777
772:pp. 39–41
770:, 1990),
648:, 2004),
627:, 1998),
625:Routledge
556:sophistry
521:Descartes
501:certainty
431:necessary
123:knowledge
114:necessary
548:divinity
439:a priori
435:knowable
427:analytic
389:Geometry
344:and the
310:a priori
284:a priori
199:humanism
187:a priori
168:a priori
156:validity
130:a priori
74:a priori
1106:Related
732:, ed.,
393:Algebra
298:In 1919
244:History
146:, like
97:meaning
596:p. 156
492:, and
433:, and
395:, and
383:, and
258:Newton
134:or is
116:or is
61:ethics
958:Books
728:, in
650:p 314
629:p. 41
568:Notes
517:Plato
179:logic
106:truth
37:, in
519:and
469:Kant
357:move
181:and
399:...
1144::
779:^
702:,
690:^
675:,
671:,
657:^
617:,
613:,
603:^
590:,
576:^
496:.
484:,
429:,
408:—
391:,
294:.
91:.
1083:"
1079:"
943:e
936:t
929:v
915:.
774:.
683:8
652:.
598:.
455:.
442:.
23:.
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