262:
151:
387:
detailing how an expeditionary force of one cavalry and four infantry divisions might live off the land, destroy the
British home army and capture London. The paper was suppressed by the authorities, reflecting the official military position, as maintained by Tirpitz throughout, that invasion was impossible. Further thought on the concept was limited to a formal evaluation by army and navy staffs, on the orders of Wilhelm, of
29:
215:
completed by the fifteenth day. It was anticipated that the remainder of the
British fleet would arrive and re-establish naval superiority. He stressed that an invasion must quickly force the British to sue for peace, or the Royal Navy would cut off the invading army from re-supply and reinforcement, thus compelling it to surrender.
365:, saw in this an opportunity to gain temporary naval superiority and launch an invasion. His plan, submitted at the end of March, involved the use of a fleet of barges towed by tugs to transport an invasion force. German naval staff did not regard his idea as credible and did not pursue it further, although it was later echoed by
75:, who regarded an invasion to be impractical. His staff estimated that it would require up to 320,000 troops to defeat the British home defences and capture London, and that a quick victory would be necessary if the expeditionary force was not to be cut off and forced to surrender. The plans were opposed throughout by Admiral
352:
In
January 1899, von Knorr concluded that, without allies, the German Empire could not contemplate an invasion. It would, he felt, be impossible to assemble a large enough transport fleet in secrecy or achieve naval superiority, even for the seven days regarded as necessary to complete the landings.
214:
in south-west
Holland as the best port of embarkation and recommended allocating all available troops, limited only by the amount of transport available, to the invasion force. He thought the Thames estuary or areas north of it would be the best place to land and believed that the landing should be
386:
exercises were carried out, the largest of which involved landing 1,700 marines. A British observer, already unimpressed by the size of the force, believed that the exercise had been staged by deliberately holding back the defending force. In the same year, a German staff officer produced a paper
269:
Planners gave detailed consideration to the selection of a landing site. They rejected areas south of Dover due to the concentration of defensive fortifications, and based on the increasing strength of the Dover harbour facilities, they ruled out a landing along the Thames in March 1898. Studies
252:
would be available, but the army estimated in May that up to eight corps, some 320,000 troops, would be necessary for an invasion to succeed. Even if such a large force could be spared in a war against France and Russia, it could not be assembled in secret and it would be years before the German
243:
in June 1897. He regarded von Knorr's plans as reckless and felt that an invasion could not be considered until the German navy was strong enough to rival that of the
British. His thinking on offensive naval action, during planning in 1896 while Chief of the Naval Staff, was limited to a suicide
247:
Planning continued through 1898, based on the hope that the German fleet would one day be a match for the Royal Navy. Studies indicated that, without preparation before the outbreak of war, it would take eight days rather than five to begin landing troops on
British shores. In April, the navy
59:
to establish temporary naval supremacy. This would be followed by an immediate landing, before
British naval reinforcements re-established command of the sea. Subsequent studies determined that the shortest possible sea-crossing would be a prerequisite for success, requiring the use of port
339:
Army planners favoured a location as close as possible to London. Schlieffen concurred with the naval planners' assessment that
British coastal defences ruled out a landing south of Orford Ness. He rejected any plan to invade north of the Humber as too far from any worthwhile objective and
244:
mission immediately after the declaration of war. Designed only to attack merchant vessels and shell London, a slightly modified plan was produced two months later by one of his protegés on von Knorr's staff, who recommended mining the mouth of the Thames instead of shelling London.
226:
was doubled in size. It became the most powerful squadron in the world and its eight modern first-class ships outnumbered the five smaller first-class ships of the entire German fleet. To succeed, the plans for the invasion of
Britain depended on secrecy, but the German seizure of
186:
and link up with the seaborne force at
Antwerp. This and other facilities in the Low Countries would be used as embarkation points for the invasion of the United Kingdom. The operation was to commence at least 24 hours before a formal declaration of war against the United Kingdom.
198:, to respond to the navy's request for comments indicates the army's lack of interest in the project. He did not consider an invasion to be feasible but saw some value in naval operations against Belgium and the Netherlands in his planning for a two-front war against the
173:
undertaken by the naval staff were presented to von Knorr in November. Reasoning that the shortest sea crossing offered the best chance of success, the project called for the violation of Belgian and Dutch sovereignty with a simultaneous land and sea operation to capture
415:, German intelligence over-rated the strength of British coastal defences, leading to the conclusion that even a large raid would involve too much risk for little reward. Naval operations against the British mainland were restricted to shelling coastal locations –
231:
in China in August had shown that it would be impossible to prepare an invasion force in secret. The Kiao-Chow expedition had also exposed Germany's lack of resources; the effort involved in equipping and sending one battalion had exhausted German transport facilities.
87:, German naval operations against the British mainland were restricted to raids, designed to force the Royal Navy to dissipate its superior strength in coastal defence and thereby allow the smaller German navy to engage it on more favourable terms.
166:. It considered that the small German navy would be able to launch a preemptive strike against the Royal Navy on the fifth day of mobilisation, before the British fleet became battle ready, followed immediately by a landing on British shores.
182:. Troops were to be landed from seven steamers assembled under cover of darkness at the mouth of the river, while the VII and VIII Army Corps were to cross the Dutch and Belgian borders and strike west in three columns to capture
83:. They were shelved in 1899 when it became apparent that the German navy and merchant marine were not sufficiently strong to accomplish an invasion without compromising the secrecy considered essential for success. During the
274:
was particularly attractive for its capacity to accommodate larger ships, the lack of nearby forts and the ability to protect operations there with mines. Reconnaissance was carried out on the English coast from
827:
158:
As a result of the increasing rivalry between the two countries, German planners began considering the invasion of the United Kingdom in 1895. A concept was submitted to Wilhelm in May 1897 by Admiral
55:, against a background of increasing Anglo-German rivalry and German naval expansion. Acknowledging the inferiority of the small German fleet, his concept called for a preemptive strike against the
427:
on 24 April 1916. The objective of these operations was purely naval, with the intention of enlisting British public opinion to pressure the Royal Navy into dispersing the
357:. The conflict in South Africa forced the British to denude their home defences, leaving only four battalions of the regular army at home by March 1900. Lieutenant-General
60:
facilities seized in Belgium and the Netherlands to embark the expeditionary force. Reconnaissance of the English east coast was completed and potential landing sites in
420:
218:
By the end of 1897, a number of events revealed how over-ambitious German planning was. The small German fleet was weakened when ships were sent to the
114:
a leading position on the world stage. An example of this shift in policy was the Emperor's demand in January 1896 for German intervention in the
812:
788:
732:
713:
661:
642:
424:
822:
142:
designed to challenge British naval supremacy and to lead to the German Empire supplanting the United Kingdom as the dominant world power.
130:, persuaded Wilhelm not to become militarily involved and convinced him instead to send a telegram congratulating Transvaal President
344:, Suffolk. During the First World War, this was the area which British defence planners judged to be the most likely invasion route.
283:. Four locations were identified as suitable for a landing, based on ease of anchorage and beach approaches, from north to south:
127:
20:
817:
358:
270:
focussed on areas north of the Thames, based on the presence of suitable harbour facilities and their proximity to forts.
280:
240:
139:
80:
261:
779:
Steinberg, J. (2014) . "A German Plan for the Invasion of Holland and Belgium, 1897". In Kennedy, Paul M. (ed.).
366:
228:
681:
353:
Army planners came to the same conclusion, though some interest in the project was revived as a result of the
138:" of 3 January 1896 precipitated a deterioration in Anglo-German relations which was accelerated by a German
375:
199:
807:
119:
110:'s restraint in international affairs and adopted an aggressive foreign policy in an attempt to claim for
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33:
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harbour facilities and merchant marine would be capable of embarking and transporting it.
135:
84:
317:
96:
674:
The Invasion of the United Kingdom: Public Controversy and Official Planning 1888–1918
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223:
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recommended that planning should be based on a landing between Great Yarmouth and
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in defence of the coast, thereby creating an opportunity for the German
451:, Nazi Germany's plan to invade the United Kingdom during World War Two
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321:
302:
271:
179:
175:
763:
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Wilhelm authorised further study, and the results of a project titled
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Areas identified as suitable landing sites, and other key locations.
725:
Preparing for Weltpolitik: German Sea Power Before the Tirpitz Era
708:. Translated by De Bellaigue, Sheila. Cambridge University Press.
260:
249:
183:
149:
27:
202:; a German fleet operating from the Low Countries would deny the
126:
of December 1895–January 1896. The Foreign Secretary,
115:
45:
Imperial German plans for the invasion of the United Kingdom
828:
Military history of the United Kingdom during World War I
742:
Steinberg, J. (July 1966). "The Copenhagen Complex".
635:"Luxury" Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888–1918
248:estimated that 145 ships and less than three army
40:and lead strategist in formulating invasion plans
335:The Suffolk coast from Southwold to Orford Ness.
239:, who had been appointed State Secretary of the
235:Invasion plans were strongly opposed by Admiral
783:. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 155–170.
654:Defending Albion: Britain's Home Army 1908–1919
8:
781:The War Plans of the Great Powers: 1880–1914
19:For other planned and actual invasions, see
379:, published in the United Kingdom in 1903.
361:, commander of the Engineer Corps of the
178:and the forts on both banks of the River
171:Memorandum: an Operation against Antwerp
47:were first conceived in 1897 by Admiral
460:
637:. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books.
7:
727:. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
134:on repelling the British raid. The "
382:In 1901, several combined services
421:Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby
14:
706:Kaiser Wilhelm II: A Concise Life
222:. At the same time, the British
750:(3). Sage Publications: 23–46.
744:Journal of Contemporary History
476:Moon pp. 653, 655, 657–658, 667
128:Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein
671:Moon, Howard Roy (July 1968).
656:. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
397:when it was serialised in the
206:the ability to operate in the
21:Invasions of the British Isles
1:
813:Military of the German Empire
359:Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz
425:Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft
241:German Imperial Naval Office
81:German Imperial Naval Office
823:German Army (German Empire)
723:Sondhaus, Lawrence (1997).
190:The six months it took for
67:Comments were invited from
844:
756:10.1177/002200946600100302
652:Mitchinson, K. W. (2005).
485:Steinberg 2014 pp. 155–156
18:
704:Röhl, John C. G. (2014).
79:, State Secretary of the
16:Imperial german war plans
423:on 16 December 1914 and
411:At the beginning of the
633:Herwig, Holger (1980).
620:Herwig pp. 148–151, 174
376:The Riddle of the Sands
200:Franco-Russian Alliance
281:Scarborough, Yorkshire
266:
155:
41:
682:King's College London
557:Moon pp. 665, 668–669
264:
192:Alfred von Schlieffen
153:
69:Alfred von Schlieffen
31:
818:Imperial German Navy
593:Steinberg 1966 p. 40
494:Sondhaus pp. 218–219
419:on 3 November 1914,
394:The Invasion of 1910
196:German General Staff
164:Imperial German Navy
73:German General Staff
53:Imperial German Navy
38:Imperial German Navy
437:defeat it in detail
162:, commander of the
105:Imperial Chancellor
51:, commander of the
36:, commander of the
449:Operation Sea Lion
348:Shelving the plans
267:
237:Alfred von Tirpitz
156:
77:Alfred von Tirpitz
42:
790:978-0-415-74924-4
734:978-1-55750-745-7
715:978-1-107-07225-1
663:978-1-4039-3825-1
644:978-1-57392-286-9
154:Kaiser Wilhelm II
108:Otto von Bismarck
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602:Mitchinson p. 80
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389:William Le Queux
367:Erskine Childers
288:Flamborough Head
224:Channel Squadron
160:Eduard von Knorr
146:Initial planning
122:, following the
49:Eduard von Knorr
34:Eduard von Knorr
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433:High Seas Fleet
413:First World War
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355:Second Boer War
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210:. He suggested
194:, Chief of the
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140:naval expansion
136:Kruger telegram
95:After becoming
93:
85:First World War
71:, Chief of the
64:were selected.
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467:Röhl pp. 73–79
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417:Great Yarmouth
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371:invasion novel
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318:Great Yarmouth
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301:estuary below
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279:, Suffolk, to
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97:German Emperor
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693:. Retrieved
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627:Bibliography
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314:East Anglian
307:Lincolnshire
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257:Landing site
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170:
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124:Jameson Raid
118:republic of
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66:
44:
43:
25:
530:Moon p. 662
503:Moon p. 658
429:Grand Fleet
316:coast from
277:Orford Ness
204:French navy
132:Paul Kruger
62:East Anglia
802:Categories
680:(Thesis).
456:References
400:Daily Mail
384:amphibious
212:Vlissingen
103:abandoned
101:Wilhelm II
91:Background
57:Royal Navy
772:153914671
407:Aftermath
403:in 1906.
391:'s novel
342:Aldeburgh
326:Southwold
292:Yorkshire
229:Kiao-Chow
208:North Sea
120:Transvaal
99:in 1888,
690:53593359
443:See also
220:Far East
32:Admiral
369:in his
330:Suffolk
322:Norfolk
303:Grimsby
272:Harwich
180:Scheldt
176:Antwerp
112:Germany
787:
770:
764:259934
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731:
712:
695:30 May
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660:
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299:Humber
768:S2CID
760:JSTOR
678:(PDF)
324:, to
250:corps
184:Breda
785:ISBN
729:ISBN
710:ISBN
697:2018
686:OCLC
658:ISBN
639:ISBN
312:The
297:The
116:Boer
752:doi
435:to
804::
766:.
758:.
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684:.
439:.
373:,
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23:.
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