852:(the same issue also contains a reply by Fehr and Schmidt and a rejoinder by Binmore and Shaked). A problem of inequity aversion models is the fact that there are free parameters; standard theory is simply a special case of the inequity aversion model. Hence, by construction inequity aversion must always be at least as good as standard theory when the inequity aversion parameters can be chosen after seeing the data. Binmore and Shaked also point out that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) pick a distribution of alpha and beta without conducting a formal estimation. The perfect correlation between the alpha and beta parameters in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is an assumption made in the appendix of their paper that is not justified by the data that they provide.
859:. The results are mixed. Some authors have found beta larger than alpha, which contradicts a central assumption made by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Other authors have found that inequity aversion with Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) distribution of alphas and betas explains data of contract-theoretic experiments not better than standard theory; they also estimate average values of alpha that are much smaller than suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Moreover, Levitt and List (2007) have pointed out that laboratory experiments tend to exaggerate the importance of pro-social behaviors because the subjects in the laboratory know that they are being monitored.
730:) are willing to spend their own money to reduce the income of wealthier group members and increase the income of poorer group members even when there is no cooperation at stake. Thus, individuals who free ride on the contributions of fellow group members are likely to be punished because they earn more, creating a decentralized incentive for the maintenance of cooperation.
749:β The subject chooses how a reward should be split between themself and another subject. If the dictator acted self-interestedly, the split would consist of 0 for the partner and the full amount for the dictator. While the most common choice is indeed to keep everything, many dictators choose to give, with the second most common choice being the 50:50 split.
925:(though see a recent study questioning this interpretation). The latest study shows that chimpanzees play the Ultimatum Game in the same way as children, preferring equitable outcomes. The authors claim that we now are near the point of no difference between humans and apes with regard to a sense of fairness. Recent studies suggest that animals in the
765:β The same result as found in the dictator game shows up when the dictator's initial endowment is provided by their partner, even though this requires the first player to trust that something will be returned (reciprocity). This experiment often yields a 50:50 split of the endowment, and has been used as evidence of the inequity aversion model.
755:β The dictator game is played, but the recipient is allowed to veto the entire deal, so that both subjects receive nothing. The partner typically vetoes the deal when low offers are made. People consistently prefer getting nothing to receiving a small share of the pie. Rejecting the offer is in effect paying to punish the dictator (called the
373:
777:
The last such experiment was identical to the former, where 40% were turned into a gang of robbers, with one catch: the two players were forced to earn the money by stuffing envelopes. In this last experiment, more than two thirds of the players neither took nor gave a cent, while just over 20% still
773:
modified these experiments slightly to determine if something in the construction of the experiments was prompting specific behaviors. When given a choice to steal money from the other player, even a single dollar, the observed altruism all but disappeared. In another experiment, the two players were
711:
Fehr and
Schmidt showed that disadvantageous inequity aversion manifests itself in humans as the "willingness to sacrifice potential gain to block another individual from receiving a superior reward". They argue that this apparently self-destructive response is essential in creating an environment in
820:
within the labor pool, to the benefit of the average employee. However, a 2008 paper by Pedro Rey-Biel shows that this assumption can be subverted, and that an employer can use inequity aversion to get higher performance for less pay than would be possible otherwise. This is done by moving away from
781:
In 2011, Ert, Erev and Roth ran a model prediction competition on two datasets, each of which included 120 two-player games. In each game player 1 decides whether to "opt out" and determine the payoffs for both players, or to "opt in" and let player 2 decide about the payoff allocation by choosing
878:
Bolton and
Ockenfels recommended that the ERC model would benefit from a dynamic theory support and additional research in order to effectively explain more complex games and games that occur over longer time spans. An advanced definition on social preference and a more formal quantitative model
68:
was used in the places of inequity aversion. The discourses in social studies argue that "inequality" pertains to the gap between the distribution of resources, while "inequity" pertains to the fundamental and institutional unfairness. Therefore, the choice between using inequity or inequality
782:
between actions "left" or "right". The payoffs were randomly selected, so the dataset included games like the
Ultimatum, Dictator, and Trust, as well as other games. The results suggested that inequity aversion could be described as one of many strategies that people might use in such games.
386:
for advantageous inequality in the final term. The results suggested that a small fraction of selfish behaviors may influence the majority with a fair mind to act selfishly in some scenarios, while a minority of fair-minded behaviors may also affect selfish players to cooperate in games with
406:
ompetition) in 2000. The model built on the premise that not only pecuniary but also relative payoff can motivate behaviors. In this model, all payoffs are monetary and nonnegative and players aim to maximize the expected value of motivation function. The motivation function of individual
639:
88:
Research on inequity aversion began in 1978 when studies suggested that humans are sensitive to inequities in favor of as well as those against them, and that some people attempt overcompensation when they feel "guilty" or unhappy to have received an undeserved reward.
92:
A more recent definition of inequity aversion (resistance to inequitable outcomes) was developed in 1999 by Fehr and
Schmidt. They postulated that people make decisions so as to minimize inequity in outcomes. Specifically, consider a setting with individuals
114:
774:
given a sum of money and the choice to give or take any amount from the other player. In this experiment, only 10% of the participants gave the other person any money at all, and fully 40% of the players opted to take all of the other player's money.
905:) showed that the subjects would prefer receiving nothing to receiving a reward awarded inequitably in favor of a second monkey, and appeared to target their anger at the researchers responsible for the inequitable distribution of food.
874:
Fehr and
Schmidt proposed that additional research on the inequity aversion should emphasize explicitly formalizing the role of intentions and conducting more thorough testing of the theory against alternative hypotheses.
1458:-choice games to multi-party dealing. It suggests that this could be explained by altruism and a concern for an equitable distribution among all parties (fairness). This paper also used the phrase 'inequity aversion'
487:
712:
which bilateral bargaining can thrive. Without inequity aversion's rejection of injustice, stable cooperation would be harder to maintain (for instance, there would be more opportunities for successful
832:
for inequity aversion employees is less generous at the optimal production level than contracts for "standard agents" (who don't have inequity aversion) in an otherwise identical two-employee model.
482:
368:{\displaystyle U_{i}(\{x_{1},...,x_{n}\})=x_{i}-{\frac {\alpha _{i}}{n-1}}\times \sum _{j\neq i}{\max(x_{j}-x_{i},0)}-{\frac {\beta _{i}}{n-1}}\times \sum _{j\neq i}{\max(x_{i}-x_{j},0)},}
693:
785:
Other research in experimental economics addresses risk aversion in decision making and the comparison of inequality measures to subjective judgments on perceived inequalities.
844:
of
Inequity Aversion" that attacked the inequity aversion papers of Fehr & Schmidt. In 2010, Shaked has published an extended version of the criticism together with
801:
but also relative performance against that of co-workers. Where these comparisons lead to guilt or envy, inequity aversion may lower employee morale. According to
2100:
1907:
722:
and his colleagues also argue that inequity aversion is essential for cooperation in multilateral settings. In particular, they show that subjects in
2115:
1506:
1251:
695:
is the total pecuniary payout. The results showed that the behaviors in various games, including unknown pie-size games, best-shot games,
1038:
921:, though others believe that this is learned behavior or explained by other mechanisms. There is also evidence for inequity aversion in
387:
punishment. In addition, the inequity aversion mindset may affect market outcomes even in the presence of very competitive competition.
809:
create formal pay structures is so that the inter-employee comparison is seen to be "fair", which they considered "key" for morale and
1915:
634:{\displaystyle \sigma _{i}=\sigma _{i}(y_{i},c,n)={\begin{cases}y_{i}/c,&{\text{if }}c>0\\1/n,&{\text{if }}c=0\end{cases}}}
61:. Researches on inequity aversion aim to explain behaviors that are not purely driven by self-interests but fairness considerations.
1492:
1291:
1358:
Dawes, Christopher T.; Fowler, James H.; Johnson, Tim; McElreath, Richard; Smirnov, Oleg (2007). "Egalitarian motives in humans".
1682:
2110:
2104:
1004:
inequality (at the same total spending) is separate from the case for public healthcare on the grounds of inequity aversion.
1214:
996:"Hospitals for the poor become poor hospitals" directly objects to a predicted decline in medical care, not the health-care
855:
More recently, several papers have estimated Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion parameters using estimation techniques such as
888:
990:
1683:"Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities"
418:
1950:
1268:
2145:
2135:
41:
for fairness and resistance to incidental inequalities. The social sciences that study inequity aversion include
1968:
957:
2140:
1452:
Do Unto Others: A Theory and
Experimental Test of Interpersonal Factors in Decision Making Under Uncertainty
825:
644:
1653:
1616:
1579:
1515:
739:
1410:
1411:"A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction"
1187:
382:
for disadvantageous inequality in the first nonstandard term, and Ξ² parametrizes the distaste of person
2090:
1307:
Fowler, James H.; Johnson, Tim; Smirnov, Oleg (2005). "Egalitarian motive and altruistic punishment".
2130:
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1367:
1316:
1018:
822:
696:
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1658:
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that is supposed to cause it. The argument that average medical outcomes improve with reduction in
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1999:
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1391:
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family also recognize a basic level of fairness, stemming from living in cooperative societies.
1721:
2050:
1991:
1942:
1880:
1827:
1607:
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. (2010). "On inequity aversion: A reply to
Binmore and Shaked".
1552:
1488:
1383:
1332:
1287:
1269:"The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism β Experimental Evidence and New Theories"
1247:
1142:
922:
866:
and the structure of inequality could lead either to acceptance or to aversion of inequality.
727:
38:
1556:
1170:"Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments"
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1983:
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1134:
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1756:"What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?"
1418:
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934:
894:
845:
810:
794:
719:
1868:
1722:"Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study"
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1320:
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An alternative to the concept of a general inequity aversion is the assumption that the
738:
Inequity aversion is broadly consistent with observations of behavior in three standard
2045:
2018:
1937:
971:
906:
752:
1283:
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that inequity aversion is very important to them. Employees compare not only relative
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games, guessing games etc., can be in fact deduced from ultimatum and dictator games.
2124:
2111:
Sarah
Brosnan's Emory University homepage listing her inequity research publications.
1698:
1644:
Binmore, Ken; Shaked, Avner (2010). "Experimental
Economics: Where Next? Rejoinder".
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2003:
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17:
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970:, but a distinction should be drawn between inequity aversion's "guilt" and
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Fehr and Schmidt's model may partially explain the widespread opposition to
914:
82:
78:
46:
42:
2054:
1995:
1946:
1928:
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Binmore, Ken; Shaked, Avner (2010). "Experimental economics: Where next?".
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1908:"Tolerance for inequity may increase with social closeness in chimpanzees"
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841:
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58:
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Inequity aversion should not be confused with the arguments against the
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Inequity aversion research on humans mostly occurs in the discipline of
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1987:
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1102:
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Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels provided a more general model called
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Brosnan, S.F.; de Waal, F.B.M. (2003). "Monkeys reject unequal pay".
1472:
Thinking about Inequality: Personal Judgment and Income Distributions
1432:
993:
798:
1969:"Are Apes Inequity Averse? New Data on the Token-Exchange Paradigm"
1504:
Rey-Biel, P. (June 2008). "Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives".
27:
Preference for fairness and resistance to incidental inequalities
828:
as incentives for extra performance. He shows that the optimal
816:
It is natural to think of inequity aversion leading to greater
2094:
1681:
Bellemare, Charles; KrΓΆger, Sabine; Van Soest, Arthur (2008).
2116:
Fehr & Schmidt's March 2005 response to Shaked's critique
1276:
Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity
840:
In 2005 Avner Shaked distributed a "pamphlet" entitled "The
793:
Surveys of employee opinions within firms have shown modern
2091:
Summary of the "Monkeys like fair play" Capuchin experiment
1551:
Shaked, Avner (2005). "The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion".
627:
1906:
Brosnan, S. F.; Schiff, H. C.; de Waal, F. B. M. (2005).
1123:"ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition"
647:
490:
421:
117:
2070:"Dogs Understand Fairness, Get Jealous, Study Finds"
1798:"A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation"
1076:"A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation"
2023:
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA
687:
633:
476:
367:
1648:. On the Methodology of Experimental Economics.
1611:. On the Methodology of Experimental Economics.
1574:. On the Methodology of Experimental Economics.
323:
236:
1646:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
1609:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
1572:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
1466:
1464:
477:{\displaystyle v_{i}=v_{i}(y_{i},\sigma _{i})}
1409:Ert, Eyal; Erev, Ido; Roth, Alvin E. (2011).
850:Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
69:aversion may depend on the specific context.
8:
2101:"Monkeys Show Sense Of Fairness, Study Says"
1967:BrΓ€uer, J.; Call, J.; Tomasello, M. (2009).
378:where Ξ± parametrizes the distaste of person
169:
131:
1720:Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013).
1116:
1114:
1112:
1454:examines the increased risk aversion from
2068:Greenfieldboyce, Nell (9 December 2009).
2044:
2034:
1936:
1821:
1657:
1620:
1583:
1519:
1431:
1177:
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116:
1121:Bolton, Gary E; Ockenfels, Axel (2000).
707:Punishing unjust success and game theory
1796:Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. (1999).
1754:Levitt, Steven D; List, John A (2007).
1485:Why wages don't fall during a Recession
1470:Yoram Amiel (author), Frank A. Cowell:
1267:Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. (2006).
1060:
909:suggest that this research indicates a
778:took some of the other player's money.
1446:Berg, Joyce E., and Thomas A. Rietz's
1196:
1185:
1066:
1064:
688:{\displaystyle c=\sum _{j=1}^{n}y_{j}}
2019:"Chimpanzees play the ultimatum game"
1507:The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
941:"equity" and "justice" as opposed to
937:have not found similar importance on
870:Limitations and future investigations
641:is i's relative share of payoff, and
7:
1215:"Health inequities and their causes"
989:of inequality. For example, the pro-
978:", which does not necessarily imply
821:formal pay structures and using off-
64:In some literature, the terminology
1168:D., Engelmann; M., Strobel (2002).
1039:Reciprocity (cultural anthropology)
879:would also be worth investigating.
1916:Proceedings of the Royal Society B
1802:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
1083:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
25:
2017:Proctor, D.; et al. (2013).
1278:. Vol. 1. pp. 615β691.
97:} who receive pecuniary outcomes
1763:Journal of Economic Perspectives
1699:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00860.x
1530:10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.00540.x
1976:American Journal of Primatology
917:sense of social "fair play" in
1729:The Review of Economic Studies
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514:
471:
445:
358:
326:
271:
239:
172:
128:
1:
1284:10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01008-6
805:(1999), the main reason that
104:. Then the utility to person
81:though it is also studied in
1487:. Harvard University Press,
1450:Discussion Paper, from 1997
1127:The American Economic Review
933:studies in other biological
889:Inequity aversion in animals
1244:Equity: theory and research
991:publicly funded health care
2162:
2107:News, September 17, 2003).
1668:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.11.008
1631:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.12.001
1594:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.019
955:
886:
726:games (closely related to
1074:; Schmidt, K.M. (1999).
958:Social inequity aversion
952:Social inequity aversion
2036:10.1073/pnas.1220806110
1814:10.1162/003355399556151
1179:10.26481/umamer.2002013
1095:10.1162/003355399556151
1929:10.1098/rspb.2004.2947
1195:Cite journal requires
734:Experimental economics
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478:
369:
1741:10.1093/restud/rdt010
740:economics experiments
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479:
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1775:10.1257/jep.21.2.153
1139:10.1257/aer.90.1.166
1019:Behavioral economics
789:Studies of companies
645:
488:
419:
415:players is given by
115:
2105:National Geographic
2093:for kids, from the
1877:10.1038/nature01963
1869:2003Natur.425..297B
1380:10.1038/nature05651
1372:2007Natur.446..794D
1329:10.1038/nature03256
1321:2005Natur.433Q....F
1246:. Allyn and Bacon.
1034:Norm of reciprocity
1024:Equality of outcome
964:economic inequality
108:would be given by
66:inequality aversion
18:Inequality aversion
1483:Bewley, T. (1999)
1448:University of Iowa
1049:Social preferences
857:maximum likelihood
728:public goods games
685:
631:
626:
474:
365:
321:
234:
1988:10.1002/ajp.20639
1366:(7137): 794β796.
1253:978-0-205-05929-4
893:An experiment on
883:Non-human studies
613:
579:
306:
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219:
214:
31:Inequity aversion
16:(Redirected from
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2146:Moral psychology
2136:Cognitive biases
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2008:
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1949:. Archived from
1940:
1923:(1560): 253β58.
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1863:(6955): 297β99.
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907:Anthropologists
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811:job performance
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2085:External links
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2029:(6): 2070β75.
2009:
1959:
1956:on 2005-04-09.
1898:
1845:
1808:(3): 817β868.
1788:
1746:
1735:(4): 1516β44.
1712:
1673:
1636:
1599:
1562:
1543:
1521:10.1.1.319.476
1514:(2): 297β320.
1496:
1476:
1460:
1439:
1426:(3): 257β276.
1401:
1350:
1299:
1292:
1259:
1252:
1230:
1206:
1197:|journal=
1160:
1133:(1): 166β193.
1108:
1059:
1058:
1056:
1053:
1052:
1051:
1046:
1041:
1036:
1031:
1026:
1021:
1016:
1009:
1006:
972:egalitarianism
956:Main article:
953:
950:
884:
881:
871:
868:
837:
834:
826:bonus payments
790:
787:
767:
766:
760:
753:Ultimatum game
750:
735:
732:
708:
705:
682:
678:
672:
667:
664:
661:
657:
653:
650:
628:
623:
620:
617:
609:
607:
604:
600:
596:
593:
592:
589:
586:
583:
575:
573:
570:
566:
560:
556:
552:
551:
549:
544:
541:
538:
535:
532:
529:
524:
520:
516:
511:
507:
503:
498:
494:
473:
468:
464:
460:
455:
451:
447:
442:
438:
434:
429:
425:
376:
375:
364:
360:
357:
354:
349:
345:
341:
336:
332:
328:
325:
319:
316:
313:
309:
305:
299:
296:
293:
287:
283:
277:
273:
270:
267:
262:
258:
254:
249:
245:
241:
238:
232:
229:
226:
222:
218:
212:
209:
206:
200:
196:
190:
185:
181:
177:
174:
171:
166:
162:
158:
155:
152:
149:
146:
141:
137:
133:
130:
125:
121:
100:
74:
71:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2158:
2147:
2144:
2142:
2139:
2137:
2134:
2132:
2129:
2128:
2126:
2117:
2114:
2112:
2109:
2106:
2102:
2099:
2096:
2092:
2089:
2088:
2084:
2075:
2071:
2064:
2061:
2056:
2052:
2047:
2042:
2037:
2032:
2028:
2024:
2020:
2013:
2010:
2005:
2001:
1997:
1993:
1989:
1985:
1982:(2): 175β81.
1981:
1977:
1970:
1963:
1960:
1952:
1948:
1944:
1939:
1934:
1930:
1926:
1922:
1918:
1917:
1909:
1902:
1899:
1894:
1890:
1886:
1882:
1878:
1874:
1870:
1866:
1862:
1858:
1857:
1849:
1846:
1841:
1837:
1833:
1829:
1824:
1819:
1815:
1811:
1807:
1803:
1799:
1792:
1789:
1784:
1780:
1776:
1772:
1769:(2): 153β74.
1768:
1764:
1757:
1750:
1747:
1742:
1738:
1734:
1730:
1723:
1716:
1713:
1708:
1704:
1700:
1696:
1693:(4): 815β39.
1692:
1688:
1684:
1677:
1674:
1669:
1665:
1660:
1655:
1652:(1): 120β21.
1651:
1647:
1640:
1637:
1632:
1628:
1623:
1618:
1615:(1): 101β08.
1614:
1610:
1603:
1600:
1595:
1591:
1586:
1581:
1578:(1): 87β100.
1577:
1573:
1566:
1563:
1558:
1554:
1547:
1544:
1539:
1535:
1531:
1527:
1522:
1517:
1513:
1509:
1508:
1500:
1497:
1494:
1493:0-674-95241-3
1490:
1486:
1480:
1477:
1473:
1467:
1465:
1461:
1457:
1453:
1449:
1443:
1440:
1434:
1429:
1425:
1421:
1420:
1412:
1405:
1402:
1397:
1393:
1389:
1385:
1381:
1377:
1373:
1369:
1365:
1361:
1354:
1351:
1346:
1342:
1338:
1334:
1330:
1326:
1322:
1318:
1314:
1310:
1303:
1300:
1295:
1293:9780444506979
1289:
1285:
1281:
1277:
1270:
1263:
1260:
1255:
1249:
1245:
1241:
1234:
1231:
1220:
1216:
1210:
1207:
1202:
1189:
1180:
1175:
1171:
1164:
1161:
1156:
1152:
1148:
1144:
1140:
1136:
1132:
1128:
1124:
1117:
1115:
1113:
1109:
1104:
1100:
1096:
1092:
1089:(3): 817β68.
1088:
1084:
1077:
1073:
1067:
1065:
1061:
1054:
1050:
1047:
1045:
1044:Risk aversion
1042:
1040:
1037:
1035:
1032:
1030:
1029:Equity theory
1027:
1025:
1022:
1020:
1017:
1015:
1012:
1011:
1007:
1005:
1003:
999:
995:
992:
988:
983:
981:
977:
973:
969:
965:
959:
951:
949:
947:
944:
940:
936:
932:
928:
924:
920:
916:
912:
908:
904:
900:
896:
890:
882:
880:
876:
869:
867:
865:
860:
858:
853:
851:
847:
843:
835:
833:
831:
827:
824:
819:
814:
812:
808:
804:
800:
796:
788:
786:
783:
779:
775:
772:
764:
761:
758:
754:
751:
748:
747:Dictator game
745:
744:
743:
741:
733:
731:
729:
725:
724:random income
721:
717:
715:
706:
704:
702:
698:
680:
676:
670:
665:
662:
659:
655:
651:
648:
621:
618:
615:
605:
602:
598:
594:
587:
584:
581:
571:
568:
564:
558:
554:
547:
542:
536:
533:
530:
527:
522:
518:
509:
505:
501:
496:
492:
466:
462:
458:
453:
449:
440:
436:
432:
427:
423:
414:
410:
405:
401:
397:
393:
388:
385:
381:
362:
355:
352:
347:
343:
339:
334:
330:
317:
314:
311:
307:
303:
297:
294:
291:
285:
281:
275:
268:
265:
260:
256:
252:
247:
243:
230:
227:
224:
220:
216:
210:
207:
204:
198:
194:
188:
183:
179:
175:
164:
160:
156:
153:
150:
147:
144:
139:
135:
123:
119:
111:
110:
109:
107:
103:
96:
90:
86:
84:
80:
73:Human studies
72:
70:
67:
62:
60:
56:
52:
48:
44:
40:
36:
32:
19:
2073:
2063:
2026:
2022:
2012:
1979:
1975:
1962:
1951:the original
1920:
1914:
1901:
1860:
1854:
1848:
1805:
1801:
1791:
1766:
1762:
1749:
1732:
1728:
1715:
1690:
1687:Econometrica
1686:
1676:
1649:
1645:
1639:
1612:
1608:
1602:
1575:
1571:
1565:
1546:
1511:
1505:
1499:
1484:
1479:
1471:
1451:
1442:
1423:
1417:
1404:
1363:
1359:
1353:
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1275:
1262:
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1218:
1209:
1188:cite journal
1163:
1130:
1126:
1086:
1082:
987:consequences
986:
984:
979:
961:
942:
938:
915:evolutionary
892:
877:
873:
863:
861:
854:
849:
839:
815:
792:
784:
780:
776:
768:
756:
737:
723:
718:
710:
412:
408:
403:
399:
395:
391:
389:
383:
379:
377:
105:
98:
94:
91:
87:
76:
65:
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55:anthropology
34:
30:
29:
2131:Game theory
1219:www.who.int
968:democracies
923:chimpanzees
846:Ken Binmore
823:equilibrium
714:free riders
2125:Categories
1823:10535/6398
1224:2023-04-20
1103:10535/6398
1055:References
1002:healthcare
976:compassion
911:biological
903:de Waal, F
899:Brosnan, S
887:See also:
836:Criticisms
818:solidarity
763:Trust game
51:psychology
39:preference
1832:0033-5533
1654:CiteSeerX
1617:CiteSeerX
1580:CiteSeerX
1538:210561618
1516:CiteSeerX
1240:Berscheid
1238:Walster;
1147:0002-8282
998:apartheid
980:injustice
771:John List
769:In 2005,
656:∑
506:σ
493:σ
463:σ
340:−
315:≠
308:∑
304:×
295:−
282:β
276:−
253:−
228:≠
221:∑
217:×
208:−
195:α
189:−
93:{1,2,...,
83:sociology
79:economics
47:economics
43:sociology
37:) is the
2055:23319633
2004:14622479
1996:19021260
1947:15705549
1885:13679918
1783:26940779
1707:55369709
1388:17429399
1337:15637787
1242:(1978).
1072:Fehr, E.
1014:Altruism
1008:See also
943:absolute
939:relative
919:primates
842:Rhetoric
830:contract
807:managers
799:salaries
757:proposer
697:Bertrand
612:if
578:if
59:ethology
2046:3568338
1938:1634968
1893:4425495
1865:Bibcode
1840:2586885
1456:lottery
1368:Bibcode
1345:4413236
1317:Bibcode
946:utility
927:canidae
848:in the
701:Cournot
398:quity,
2053:
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2002:
1994:
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1856:Nature
1838:
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1360:Nature
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1309:Nature
1290:
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1155:117286
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994:slogan
935:orders
864:degree
803:Bewley
484:where
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2000:S2CID
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1954:(PDF)
1911:(PDF)
1889:S2CID
1836:JSTOR
1779:S2CID
1759:(PDF)
1725:(PDF)
1703:S2CID
1534:S2CID
1419:Games
1414:(PDF)
1392:S2CID
1341:S2CID
1272:(PDF)
1151:JSTOR
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2051:PMID
1992:PMID
1943:PMID
1881:PMID
1828:ISSN
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1384:PMID
1333:PMID
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1143:ISSN
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901:and
699:and
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2031:doi
2027:110
1984:doi
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1925:doi
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