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that
Jaegwon Kim presents supporting the pairing problem says that it is not possible to give a causal explanation to an event between two immaterial entities or an event between an immaterial and a physical entity. As a response to Elizabeth of Bohemia's objections, Descartes asserts that the mind-body relationship is misunderstood. As a counterargument to his critics, he drew an analogy between the mind and gravity, stating that if gravity can have an effect on a material body without physical contact, then the mind can also have an effect on the body. Elizabeth of Bohemia found Descartes's response unsatisfactory because, according to her, the analogy of gravitation explains what occurs between mind and body but does not help us understand how immaterial entities interact with material entities. Elizabeth of Bohemia finds that Descartes's explanations does not explain how the mind associates itself with the body in order to be able to do things such as physical movements of particular body parts. Eventually, after a few correspondences, Descartes's response became more evasive and was deviated on other topics such as the Princess's misconceptions and her health. Despite the fact that Elizabeth of Bohemia is remembered as a critic of René Descartes, she agrees with him on a few points, such as the principle of interactionism meaning the fact that the mind and body can influence each other. In addition to that, she appreciates his reasoning and believes she can learn and expand her knowledge from it.
234:. She questions how an immaterial substance (mind) can interact with a material substance (body) given that they cannot make physical contact. An example of a physical-physical interaction is how when a cue ball hits another billiards ball, it causes it to move. Princess Elisabeth questioned how a mental occurrence, such as intention, can cause a finger to move if immaterial things never come into direct contact with the physical world.
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relativity in physics, which was not the product of accepting Occam's razor but rather of rejecting it and asking the question of whether it could be that a deeper generalization, not required by the currently available data, was true and allowed for unexpected predictions. Most scientific discoveries arise, these authors argue, from ontologically promiscuous conjectures that do not come from current data.
96:(1596–1650), and continues to be associated with him. Descartes posited that the body, being physical matter, was characterized by spatial extension but not by thought and feeling, while the mind, being a separate substance, had no spatial extension but could think and feel. Nevertheless, he maintained that the two interacted with one another, suggesting that this interaction occurred in the
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Interactionism can be distinguished from competing dualist theories of causation. Similar to interactionism, epiphenomenalism admits causation but views causation as unidirectional rather than bidirectional. The theory accepts that the mind is affected by the physical body but not vice-versa. Another
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that Amy Kind also mentions in her book. The pairing problem objects the
Cartesian dualism more particularly interactionism by questioning the possibility of the interaction of immaterial things such as the mind with material things such as the body by showing the difficulty of doing so. The argument
41:
that exert causal effects on one another. An example of your mind influencing your body would be if you are depressed (which is related to your mind), you can observe the effects on your body, such as a slouched posture, a lackluster smile, etc. Another example, this time of your body affecting your
433:
a non-physical mind is unnecessary. Andrew Melnyk argues that overdetermination would require an "intolerable coincidence." However, Vilanayur S. Ramachandran and
William Hirstein (1997) argue that Occam's razor is not useful for scientific discovery. They exemplify the above with the discovery of
384:
held by most physicists, but notes, "There is some irony in the fact that philosophers reject interactionism on largely physical grounds (it is incompatible with physical theory), while physicists reject an interactionist interpretation of quantum mechanics on largely philosophical grounds (it is
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where three snipers each fire a bullet into an
Austrian Chancellor's heart. Regardless if the Chancellor was shot with three bullets or one, the outcome was inevitable. This is an example of overdetermination because it states that both mental and physical causes invoke reactions and like the
213:
Today the problem of causal interaction is frequently viewed as a conclusive argument against interactionism. On the other hand, it has been suggested that given many disciplines deal with things they do not entirely understand, dualists not entirely understanding the mechanism of mind-body
339:
Taking the argument a step further, it has been argued that because physics fully accounts for the causes of all physical movements, there can be no place for a non-physical mind to play a role. The principle, in slightly different iterations, has variously been called
214:
interaction need not be seen as definitive refutation. The idea that causation necessarily depends on push-pull mechanisms (which would not be possible for a substance that did not occupy space) is also arguably based on obsolete conceptions of physics.
157:" as a position worth examining. Rather than invoking two distinct substances, he defines interactionism as the view that "microphysics is not causally closed, and that phenomenal properties play a causal role in affecting the physical world." (See
120:—the physical, the mental, and objective knowledge (outside the mind)—all of which interact, and Eccles adopted this same "trialist" form of interactionism. Other notable recent philosophers to take an interactionist stance have been
375:
effects do not play a role in brain activity. David
Chalmers has noted (without necessarily endorsing) a second possibility within quantum mechanics, that consciousness' causal role is to collapse the wave function as per the
462:, David Chalmers argued that regardless of the mechanism by which the mental might impact the physical if interactionism were true, there was a deeper conceptual issue: the chosen mechanism could always be separated from its
317:, which argues that a mental substance impacting the physical world would contradict principles of physics. In particular, if some external source of energy is responsible for the interactions, it would violate the
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While causal closure remains a key obstacle for interactionism, it is not relevant to all forms of dualism; epiphenomenalism and parallelism are unaffected as they do not posit that the mind affects the body.
416:, and can be explained by either physical or mental causes alone. An overdetermined event is fully accounted for by multiple causes at once. To imagine this argument, Amy Kind refers to a case from
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Descartes' theory that interaction between the mind and the physical world occurred in the pineal gland was seen as inadequate by a number of philosophers in his era, who offered alternate views:
42:
mind would be: If you struck your toe very forcefully on a door (which is related to your body), you would experience terrible pain (which is related to your mind). Interactionism is one type of
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Some philosophers have suggested the influence of the mind on the body could be reconciled with deterministic physical laws by proposing the mind's impacts instead take place at points of
455:
dualist theory of causation is parallelism which denies causation while seeking to explain the semblance of causation by other means such as pre-established harmony or occasionalism.
54:. Many philosophers and scientists have responded to this theory with arguments both supporting and opposing its relevance to life and whether the theory corresponds to reality.
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component, leading to simply a new form of epiphenomenalism. Later, he suggested that while the causal component could be separated, interactionism was like "type-F monism" (
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system in which conservation of energy would apply. It could of course also be argued that the law of conservation of energy is false in systems which realize a mind.
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321:. Two main responses to this have been to suggest the mind influences the distribution but not the quantity of energy in the brain and to deny that the brain is a
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Four varieties of dualist causal interaction. The arrows indicate the direction of causations. Mental and physical states are shown in red and blue, respectively.
1149:
Ramachandran, V. & Hirstein, W. (1997). Three laws of qualia. What neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness, qualia and the self.
474:, and panprotopsychism) in that it gave entities externally characterized by physical relationships the additional intrinsic feature of conscious properties.
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226:– how the two different substances the theory posits, the mental and the physical, can exert an impact on one another. This objection was initially made by
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rejected
Descartes' dualism and proposed that mind and matter were in fact properties of a single substance, thereby prefiguring the modern perspective of
363:. Karl Popper and John Eccles, as well as the physicist Henry Stapp, have theorized that such indeterminacy may apply at the macroscopic scale. (See
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There remains a literature in philosophy and science, albeit a much-contested one, that asserts evidence for
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Another possible resolution is akin to parallelism—Eugene Mills holds that behavioral events are causally
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bullets, no matter if there is a physical cause or a mental cause, the outcome is the same. However,
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Elizabeth of
Bohemia's objection is part of the "pairing problem", a point raised by the philosopher
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In the 20th century, its most significant defenders have been the noted philosopher of science
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356:. This has been the foremost argument against interactionism in contemporary philosophy.
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argues that a non-physical mind and mind-body interaction follow necessarily from the
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have argued that if physical phenomena fully determine behavioral events, then by
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in various domains, which would undermine the principle of causal closure. (See
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396:.) Another option that has been suggested is that the interaction may involve
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69:'s illustration of dualism. Inputs are passed on by the sensory organs to the
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751:– Delivered by Karl Popper at The University of Michigan on April 7, 1978.
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1019:, ed. Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
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967:"Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–80): Correspondence with Descartes (1643)"
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1112:. Philosophy of Mind Series. Oxford University Press, USA. pp.
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dualistic). Taken conjointly, these reasons carry little force...".
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which holds that matter and mind are two distinct and independent
19:
This article is about the philosophy of mind. For sociology, see
2013:
1941:
742:
Three Worlds by Karl Popper – The Tanner
Lecture on Human Values
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of quantum mechanics. He acknowledges this is at odds with the
1140:, ed. S. Stich and T. Warfield, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 85–101.
938:"Kim's Pairing Problem and the Viability of Substance Dualism"
761:
371:
has argued that classical and quantum calculations show that
852:
287:
is also discussed in the context of other positions on the
149:
questioned interactionism. In 2002 he listed it along with
1031:"Importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes"
814:(1st ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1108:
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
73:
in the brain and from there to the immaterial spirit.
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or some other currently unknown scientific process.
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222:One objection often posed to interactionism is the
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209:Mind–body dualism § Arguments against dualism
810:. In Stich, Stephen P.; Warfield, Ted A. (eds.).
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796:
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792:
790:
1099:
1097:
1015:Lycan, William (1996) "Philosophy of Mind" in
988:"Elisabeth's criticisms of Descartes' dualism"
335:Mind-body dualism § Argument from physics
309:Mind-body dualism § Argument from physics
79:Mind-body dualism § Arguments for dualism
50:though more recently also sometimes a form of
1467:
1194:
879:. In Fieser, James and Bradley Dowden (ed.).
303:Compatibility with the conservation of energy
8:
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682:
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218:Objection from Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia
88:Interactionism was propounded by the French
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858:http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05422a.htm
161:.) He argues the most plausible place for
1151:Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4 (5–6)
1138:The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind
1046:
812:The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind
848:
846:
717:Popper, Karl & Eccles, John (2002).
649:
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645:
643:
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639:
637:
445:
116:. Popper, in fact, divided reality into
908:. New York: Routledge. pp. 35–39.
805:"Consciousness and its Place in Nature"
598:
313:A more recent related objection is the
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2075:Philosophy of artificial intelligence
1017:The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy
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769:. McGraw-Hill Book Company. p.
382:interpretations of quantum mechanics
881:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
664:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
621:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1136:Robinson, H. (2003) "Dualism", in
654:Robb, David and John Heil (2014).
540:Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
14:
1173:Varieties of Dualism: Interaction
418:Mission Impossible: Rogue Nation,
378:Von Neumann-Wigner interpretation
1435:
1425:
1424:
16:Theory in the philosophy of mind
694:Encyclopaedia Britannica Online
442:Relationship to other positions
132:, in addition to the physicist
906:Philosophy of Mind: The Basics
765:The Understanding of the Brain
232:Princess Elisabeth's objection
228:Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia
1:
1932:Hard problem of consciousness
565:Integrated information theory
490:Hard problem of consciousness
319:law of conservation of energy
224:problem of causal interaction
203:Problem of causal interaction
167:collapse of the wave function
104:Development of interactionism
2136:Dualism (philosophy of mind)
346:completeness of the physical
268:that mind and body are in a
1406:Dualism (Indian philosophy)
1029:Tegmark, Max (April 2000).
803:Chalmers, David J. (2003).
285:problem of mental causation
2152:
354:physical comprehensiveness
332:
306:
206:
112:and the neurophysiologist
76:
46:, traditionally a type of
18:
2095:
1654:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
1644:David Lewis (philosopher)
1419:
611:Robinson, Howard (2016).
555:Neuroscience of free will
179:New Catholic Encyclopedia
165:to impact physics is the
1104:Chalmers, David (1996).
1065:10.1103/PhysRevE.61.4194
995:University of Notre Dame
974:Texas A&M University
942:Georgia State University
581:Artificial consciousness
515:Phenomenal consciousness
408:Causal Overdetermination
1782:Eliminative materialism
550:Eliminative materialism
535:Identity theory of mind
270:pre-established harmony
2034:Propositional attitude
2029:Problem of other minds
1937:Hypostatic abstraction
856:, vol. 5, pp. 422 ff,
719:The Self and Its Brain
451:
74:
31:interactionist dualism
2105:Philosophers category
2009:Mental representation
1772:Biological naturalism
1659:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
1634:Frank Cameron Jackson
1234:Non-Cartesian dualism
914:10.4324/9781315750903
875:Calef, Scott (2014).
854:Catholic Encyclopedia
571:Philosophy of science
530:Biological naturalism
449:
361:quantum indeterminacy
315:argument from physics
272:. On the other hand,
128:, David Hodgson, and
65:
33:is the theory in the
1787:Emergent materialism
1370:William Homan Thorpe
1320:Edward Francis Kelly
1175:Stanford University.
586:Animal consciousness
495:Philosophical zombie
252:Nicholas Malebranche
1984:Language of thought
1734:Ludwig Wittgenstein
1564:Patricia Churchland
1355:Jeffrey M. Schwartz
1057:2000PhRvE..61.4194T
721:. Springer Verlag.
373:quantum decoherence
153:and what he calls "
1812:Neurophenomenology
1483:Philosophy of mind
1365:Charles Taliaferro
1345:Daniel N. Robinson
904:Kind, Amy (2020).
877:"Dualism and Mind"
747:2014-08-26 at the
656:"Mental Causation"
520:Dual aspect theory
505:Knowledge argument
460:The Conscious Mind
452:
142:The Conscious Mind
75:
35:philosophy of mind
2123:
2122:
2019:Mind–body problem
1917:Cognitive closure
1881:Substance dualism
1499:G. E. M. Anscombe
1449:
1448:
1360:Richard Swinburne
1325:Charles Landesman
1265:Robert F. Almeder
1249:Substance dualism
1239:Predicate dualism
1224:Cartesian dualism
1210:Mind–body dualism
1169:Philosophy Index.
1123:978-0-19-983935-3
997:. August 18, 2023
923:978-1-138-80782-2
831:on 3 October 2017
468:Russellian monism
289:mind-body problem
260:Gottfried Leibniz
186:doctrines of the
171:quantum mechanics
139:In his 1996 book
122:Richard Swinburne
114:John Carew Eccles
48:substance dualism
2143:
1871:Representational
1866:Property dualism
1859:Type physicalism
1824:New mysterianism
1792:Epiphenomenalism
1614:Martin Heidegger
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1270:Mario Beauregard
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1229:Emergent dualism
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297:anomalous monism
293:property dualism
230:and is known as
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52:property dualism
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1385:Dean Zimmerman
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1167:Interactionism
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1161:External links
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1153:, pp. 429–458.
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278:neutral monism
274:Baruch Spinoza
265:The Monadology
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207:Main article:
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147:David Chalmers
118:three "worlds"
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100:of the brain.
94:René Descartes
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2085: /
2081: /
2077: /
1994:Mental image
1989:Mental event
1952:Intelligence
1902:Chinese room
1801:
1748:
1699:Gilbert Ryle
1679:Derek Parfit
1669:Thomas Nagel
1599:Fred Dretske
1519:J. L. Austin
1491:Philosophers
1423:
1410:
1401:Cartesianism
1340:Scott B. Rae
1295:Brie Gertler
1150:
1145:
1137:
1132:
1107:
1084:. Retrieved
1038:
1035:Phys. Rev. E
1034:
1024:
1016:
1011:
999:. Retrieved
994:
982:
973:
946:. Retrieved
941:
932:
905:
884:. Retrieved
880:
853:
833:. Retrieved
826:the original
811:
764:
756:
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718:
697:. Retrieved
693:
667:. Retrieved
663:
624:. Retrieved
620:
510:Chinese room
459:
457:
453:
436:
417:
411:
387:
367:.) However,
365:quantum mind
358:
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98:pineal gland
92:philosopher
87:
30:
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2079:information
2070:Metaphysics
2044:Tabula rasa
1854:Physicalism
1839:Parallelism
1767:Behaviorism
1724:Michael Tye
1719:Alan Turing
1704:John Searle
1579:Dharmakirti
1554:Tyler Burge
1549:C. D. Broad
1375:Peter Unger
1280:John Beloff
1086:18 November
545:Behaviorism
472:panpsychism
402:dark matter
398:dark energy
394:emergentism
369:Max Tegmark
239:Jaegwon Kim
134:Henry Stapp
126:John Foster
110:Karl Popper
90:rationalist
2115:Task Force
2083:perception
1957:Artificial
1907:Creativity
1829:Nondualism
1729:Vasubandhu
1649:John Locke
1619:David Hume
1574:Andy Clark
1330:E. J. Lowe
1305:W. D. Hart
886:15 January
835:21 January
669:15 January
593:References
464:phenomenal
333:See also:
307:See also:
291:, such as
262:argued in
254:suggested
198:Objections
77:See also:
58:Proponents
39:substances
1979:Intuition
1912:Cognition
1876:Solipsism
1539:Ned Block
1509:Armstrong
1504:Aristotle
699:2 January
626:2 January
613:"Dualism"
576:Scientism
390:emergence
192:free will
71:epiphysis
2130:Category
2100:Category
1947:Identity
1890:Concepts
1760:Theories
1744:Zhuangzi
1674:Alva Noë
1430:Category
1258:Dualists
1081:17140058
1073:11088215
745:Archived
525:Idealism
478:See also
184:Catholic
2110:Project
2063:Related
1922:Concept
1777:Dualism
1750:more...
1609:Goldman
1441:Commons
1394:Related
1053:Bibcode
662:(ed.).
619:(ed.).
44:dualism
2054:Zombie
2039:Qualia
1120:
1116:–157.
1079:
1071:
920:
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485:Qualia
352:, and
1962:Human
1684:Plato
1604:Fodor
1217:Types
1077:S2CID
1043:arXiv
1001:5 May
991:(PDF)
970:(PDF)
948:5 May
829:(PDF)
808:(PDF)
658:. In
615:. In
567:(IIT)
2087:self
2024:Pain
2014:Mind
1942:Idea
1118:ISBN
1088:2012
1069:PMID
1003:2023
950:2023
918:ISBN
888:2018
837:2018
816:ISBN
775:ISBN
723:ISBN
701:2018
671:2018
628:2018
425:and
295:and
283:The
190:and
188:soul
176:The
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910:doi
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169:in
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