168:
preferences result in a collective decision. The collective approach has been used to provide theoretical results for various household issues, such as labor supply, consumption and savings, household production, and intra-household allocation. The key idea underlying the
Collective Model is that household decisions result from a bargaining process among household members, subject to a household budget constraint. This model allows for a more realistic representation of household decision-making, as it acknowledges the potential for conflicting interests and preferences among household members. It also allows for the possibility of changes in the distribution of resources within the household based on negotiations between members, rather than assuming a single decision-maker acting in the best interest of the entire household. The Collective Model has been applied to various household issues and has provided valuable insights into the complex dynamics of intra-household resource allocation and decision-making. However, it's important to note that while the Collective Model provides a more nuanced understanding of household decision-making, it also requires more detailed data on individual preferences and outside options, which may not always be readily available
159:
Nash-bargaining model, finding evidence that bargaining may influence allocation within households. In particular, he observed that in households where mothers contribute a larger share of non-labor income, children seem to be better nourished . This suggests that the Nash-bargaining model can provide valuable insights into the complex dynamics of intra-household resource allocation and decision-making, capturing the potential influence of individual preferences and bargaining power on household outcomes. The Nash-bargaining model is considered more realistic than the altruism models as it acknowledges the potential for conflicting interests and preferences among household members. It also allows for the possibility of changes in the distribution of resources within the household based on negotiations between members, rather than assuming a single decision-maker acting in the best interest of the entire household.
281:. This concept is used to understand the power dynamics within a household, where the individual with a stronger fallback position, or better alternatives, has more bargaining power and influence over decisions. The fallback position refers to the best alternative an individual has if the current cooperative arrangement within the household fails. For instance, a woman with a good income has a stronger fallback position than a woman with no individual earnings. This is because she has better alternatives if the marriage ends, giving her more bargaining power.
142:
potential influence of individual preferences and bargaining power on divorce outcomes. Another example is the separate spheres bargaining model, which differs from divorce threat bargaining models by considering the distribution of resources within marriage and how it affects the bargaining process during divorce. This model acknowledges that spouses may have different spheres of influence and control over resources within the marriage, which can impact the negotiation process and outcomes during divorce.
357:
order to own land individuals must obtain a certain level of education, which women have traditionally not had access to, and owning land and enforcing laws depends upon one's "economic and physical access to legal machinery" as well as access to government officials. Due to the unequal gender rights to land ownership, South Asian women are less capable of providing income to the household which lessens their bargaining power in the household.
96:
behind people's decisions to redistribute income to others. Becker's model has been influential in shaping research in the economics of the family, despite some criticism. His approach to the family leads to a conclusion that the institutions depicted are benign, and that government intervention would be useless at best and probably harmful .
356:
In South Asian societies land is one of the most valuable individual assets that can increase an individual's bargaining power, yet it is more uncommon and difficult for women to own land than men for a number of reasons: inheritance laws that allow women to inherit land are not strongly enforced, in
232:
arise. These conflicts of interest make bargaining a necessary part of family life and produce a setting where altruism is not always the guiding principle. These conflicts of interest have the potential to create a spectrum of intra-household dynamics, ranging from a non-cooperative to a cooperative
158:
model applied to household decision-making. This model is based on the idea that household members negotiate and reach agreements on the allocation of resources, taking into account their individual preferences and outside options Thomas proposed a test to distinguish between altruism models and the
141:
of resources as an outcome of bargaining processes among household members, taking into account their individual preferences and outside options. This model can provide valuable insights into the complex dynamics of intra-household resource allocation and decision-making during divorce, capturing the
55:
These models consider the household as a single decision-making unit with common preferences, which contrasts with bargaining models that acknowledge individual member preferences.Here, the dominant earner or the head of the household is perceived to act selflessly, prioritizing decisions that cater
338:
and "perceptions about needs, contributions, and other determinants of deservedness".The social acceptability (or lack thereof) of leaving the household or living in a non-traditional household, the perceived social needs of individuals within the household, and the low valuation of certain tasks,
248:
is "the relative capacity of each of the parties to a negotiation or dispute to compel or secure agreements on its own terms". In its simplest definition, ‘bargaining’ is a socio-economic phenomenon involving two parties, who can cooperate towards the creation of a commonly desirable surplus, over
95:
Becker's model of the altruistic dictator has been used in various economic experiments, such as the
Dictator Game. In this game, one individual (the dictator) decides how to distribute a sum of money between themselves and another person (the recipient). This game is used to study the motivations
37:
and is sometimes used in place of direct monetary exchange. In its simplest definition, ‘bargaining’ is a socio-economic phenomenon involving two parties, who can cooperate towards the creation of a commonly desirable surplus, over whose distribution the parties are in conflict. Bargaining process
167:
The
Collective Model of household decision-making, as opposed to the unitary model, assumes that each individual in the household has specific preferences, and the outcome of the decision process is Pareto efficient . This model focuses on the individuality of household members and how individual
372:
Due to the traditional role of women in South Asia as caretakers in the household rather than workers bringing an income to the household, women are not socially perceived as deserving of more opportunities because worth correlates with wealth and not the quality or amount of work one has done.
260:
is the relative fallback positions or "threat points" of the individuals in the bargaining process; that is, which bargainer has more to lose (economically, socially, etc.)? In the context of intra-household bargaining, an individual's bargaining power and fallback position are defined by one's
111:
of all other members. As a result, resources get distributed based on this member's perception of what benefits the household collectively, which may not always align with individual preferences. However, critics argue that the model might neglect potential intra-household power imbalances and
145:
Critics of these models argue that they may not fully capture the complexities of divorce negotiations, as they often rely on simplified assumptions about individual preferences and power dynamics. However, bargaining models of divorce can still provide valuable insights into the factors that
184:
and non-cooperative. In cooperative bargaining models (also called collaborative decision making), the outcomes of negotiations are more equally beneficial to all members of the household, and have therefore been considered a more "natural" means of analyzing the family unit in comparison to
381:
Unequal access to strong fallback positions creates a situation in which different individuals within the household have more or less bargaining power, and therefore have more or less influence over household decision-making. When considering the factors that determine fallback position in
284:
In the context of economic society, the concept of threat point or fallback position can be applied to understand the dynamics of power and negotiation within different societal structures, such as households, labor markets, and even countries. It provides a framework for understanding how
352:
The access one has to individual assets, both economic (such as property, land, wealth, or earning ability) and personal (such as labor), determines fallback position because it is directly linked to one's capability of surviving outside the household.
249:
whose distribution the parties are in conflict. In other words, "if both parties are on equal footing in a debate, then they will have equal bargaining power", and, conversely, if one party has an advantageous position in the debate, the parties have
76:'s work refers to a theoretical model in household economics where one person, often referred to as a benevolent dictator, controls the household's resources and has altruistic preferences, meaning they care about other family members. This person's
189:. In non-cooperative bargaining models (also called unitary decision making), personal interests motivate individuals within the household rather than the desire to work in a collaborative manner and maximize the benefit of all household members.
120:
Bargaining models of divorce focus on the negotiations between spouses during the process of divorce. These models aim to understand how individual preferences, power dynamics, and external factors influence the outcomes of
306:: Communal resources are entities such as village commons or public forests from which individuals and households alike may acquire resources (e.g., firewood or water) that are necessary for daily subsistence.
42:. Bargaining also plays a role in the functioning and decision making of households, where agreements and decisions do not often have direct monetary values and affect various members of the household.
321:, and any other social groupings from which one derives emotional support, benefiting the individual's overall health and increasing their ability to survive well outside of the household.
1150:
Saelens, Dieter (February 2022). "Unitary or collective households? A nonparametric rationality and separability test using detailed data on consumption expenditures and time use".
285:
individuals or groups negotiate and make decisions based on their best alternatives, and how this affects their wellbeing and influence within their respective societal structures.
107:, making decisions that they believe benefit the entire household. This model assumes that the happiness or satisfaction of the altruistic member is intrinsically linked to the
298:
The structural support, whether institutional or societal, an individual has outside of the household determines how capable one would be of surviving outside the household.
343:, all regulate the bargaining power an individual has within the household, because these factors directly impact the individual's ability to survive outside the household.
233:
household (which is directly reflective of game theoretic bargaining models). In the non-cooperative model, each household member acts in order to maximize his or her own
1651:
SS Staff Group 3: Human
Resources and Local Development. Union for Radical Political Economy (URPE) and the International Association for Feminist Economics (IAFFE)
435:
225:, in the case of intra-household bargaining, in which members of the household are considered to be one unit, the household is generally synonymous.
425:
1418:
Peters, H. Elizabeth (September 1995). "An
Economic Approach to the Study of Child Well-Being: Gary Becker on Altruism and Household Production".
1497:
1314:
1251:
946:
464:
390:
communities shows that their women have less access to strong bargaining power and their interests are not reflected in household decisions.
894:
McElroy, Marjorie B.; Horney, Mary Jean (June 1981). "Nash-Bargained
Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand".
699:
Bolton, Gary E.; Katok, Elena (30 November 1998). "An experimental test of the crowding out hypothesis: The nature of beneficent behavior".
1207:
Mishra, Khushbu; Sam, Abdoul G. (February 2016). "Does Women's Land
Ownership Promote Their Empowerment? Empirical Evidence from Nepal".
481:
2048:
2017:
1926:
1894:
1734:
1402:
1339:
146:
influence divorce outcomes and help inform policies and interventions aimed at promoting fair and equitable divorce settlements.
237:; in the cooperative model, households act as a unit to "maximize the welfare of their members" (described above as altruism).
332:. The work of states, NGOs, and a social safety net can increase "access to employment, assets, credit, infrastructure, etc.".
64:
of the other members. Critics note that this model may overlook intra-household power disparities and potential inequalities.
257:
250:
205:
manner towards the benefit and functioning of the entire household. The household is "the basic residential unit in which
325:
1234:
Agarwal, Bina (14 February 1991). "Social
Security and the Family: Coping with Seasonality and Calamity in Rural India".
686:
European
University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)Department of Business Administration and Economics Discussion Paper No. 232
27:
in order to arrive at decisions regarding the household unit, like whether to spend or save or whether to study or work.
1970:
1270:
Fortin, Bernard; Lacroix, Guy (1 July 1997). "A Test of the
Unitary and Collective Models of Household Labour Supply".
2167:
186:
2172:
328:(NGOs): State and NGO support could increase an individual's intra-household bargaining power by the creation of a
278:
2100:(October 1994). "Gender and command over property: a critical gap in economic analysis and policy in South Asia".
2162:
1619:
138:
361:
1007:"Cooperative Models in Action: Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation"
415:
405:
210:
1835:
Lundberg, Shelly; Pollak, Robert A (December 1993). "Separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market".
1679:
Friedberg, Leora; Webb, Anthony (2006). "Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households".
134:
1807:
206:
181:
155:
122:
1750:
1722:
594:
Manser, Marilyn; Brown, Murray (1980). "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis".
303:
229:
1812:
1878:
400:
89:
1713:(1999), "Social security and the family: coping with seasonality and calamity in rural India", in
1243:
1987:
1860:
1852:
1770:
1692:
1598:
1563:
1435:
1287:
1167:
1132:
1093:
1044:
Lundberg, Shelly; Pollak, Robert A (1 November 1996). "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage".
1026:
987:
911:
845:
837:
790:
716:
666:
658:
611:
410:
1968:
Iversen, Vegard (2003). "Intra-household inequality: A challenge for the capability approach?".
1078:"Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence"
201:
that "works as a group for its own good", meaning all members of the household contribute in an
2139:
2044:
2013:
1922:
1890:
1730:
1493:
1453:
Doss, C. (2013). "Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries".
1398:
1335:
1310:
1247:
979:
942:
876:
829:
782:
650:
528:
460:
420:
335:
329:
85:
103:
model of intra-household bargaining, the primary earner or household head is presumed to act
2109:
2079:
1979:
1950:
1844:
1817:
1762:
1684:
1658:
1590:
1555:
1528:
1485:
1462:
1427:
1390:
1364:
1279:
1239:
1216:
1159:
1124:
1085:
1053:
1018:
971:
934:
903:
821:
774:
743:
708:
642:
603:
576:
520:
512:
382:
intra-household bargaining and what populations have access to positive fallback positions,
245:
77:
39:
2131:
430:
60:
of the entire household. The primary decision-maker's happiness is inherently tied to the
33:
is traditionally defined in economic terms as the negotiating conditions of a purchase or
1581:
Ebert, Udo; Moyes, Patrick (October 2009). "Household decisions and equivalence scales".
1546:
Ebert, Udo; Moyes, Patrick (October 2009). "Household decisions and equivalence scales".
1186:
1077:
734:
Pollak, Robert (2002). "Gary Becker's Contributions to Family and Household Economics".
1883:
1394:
1283:
1006:
963:
864:
314:
310:
104:
712:
684:
Kritikos, Alexander (2005). "Utility-Based Altruism: Evidence in Favour Gary Becker".
221:, and shelter are organized and carried out". Though it is not always synonymous with
2156:
2138:. Washington, DC: Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. World Bank.
2113:
1991:
1864:
1774:
1718:
1602:
1567:
1532:
1439:
1368:
1291:
1171:
1136:
1112:
1097:
991:
849:
198:
130:
1696:
1030:
720:
670:
2127:
2097:
2067:
2036:
1941:
Shelton, Beth Anne; John, Daphne (August 1996). "The division of household labor".
1914:
1795:
1710:
1516:
1220:
383:
270:
1954:
2005:
1983:
1910:
1714:
1489:
1480:
Way, Megan McDonald (2018). "Families: Economic Functions and Decision-Making".
938:
865:"Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining"
214:
177:
81:
73:
20:
1431:
1163:
2083:
1798:(1997). ""Bargaining" and gender relations: within and beyond the household".
1594:
1559:
387:
108:
84:. Each household member then maximizes their own preferences subject to their
57:
30:
2143:
2136:
Engendering economics: new perspectives on women, work and demographic change
983:
880:
833:
786:
654:
532:
1821:
1766:
1128:
778:
580:
340:
274:
218:
24:
560:
501:"Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries"
1466:
516:
1089:
1057:
975:
929:
Ott, Notburga (1992). "A Nash bargaining model for household decisions".
202:
100:
34:
1519:(February 1986). "Hearts and spades: paradigms of household economics".
1022:
794:
762:
1856:
1753:(October 1999). "Social support, physiological processes, and health".
915:
841:
809:
763:"Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress"
662:
630:
615:
524:
234:
126:
61:
1674:
1672:
1662:
1265:
1263:
1071:
1069:
1067:
222:
907:
607:
500:
2043:. Cambridge England New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
1848:
1688:
1646:
825:
646:
1387:
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
747:
318:
133:
arrangements. One example of a bargaining model of divorce is the
554:
552:
550:
548:
546:
544:
542:
459:(1. publ ed.). Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
1729:, New Delhi London: Oxford University Press, pp. 171–246,
1380:
1378:
482:"Kitchen Conversations: How Households Make Economic Choices"
2012:. Oxford New York: Clarendon Press Oxford University Press.
2010:
Poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation
1385:
Yanagisako, Sylvia J. (2015). "Households in Anthropology".
1334:(13. ed.). Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
2070:(1986). "Women, poverty and agricultural growth in India".
1614:
1612:
176:
Within the household unit and in the mathematical study of
2041:
A field of one's own: gender and land rights in South Asia
1885:
Village women of Bangladesh--prospects for change: a study
1113:"Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results"
180:, scholars have defined two distinct types of bargaining:
154:
The Nash-Bargaining Model, as described by McElroy , is a
92:, resulting in the household behaving as one individual.
863:
Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess; Small, Deborah (3 February 2017).
273:
or fallback position is a key component in the field of
228:
Because a household is composed of various individuals,
1921:, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 123–148,
565:
and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household"
80:
includes the preferences of other family members as a
1647:"Power in Households: Disentangling Bargaining Power"
1194:
Population and Poverty Research Network WORKING PAPER
810:"Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market"
197:
The household is traditionally described as a single
1919:
Persistent inequalities: women and world development
1076:
Donni, Olivier; Molina Chueca, Jose Alberto (2018).
317:): Social support systems are friendship, familial,
256:More specifically, what determines the equality or
38:within a family is one of the important aspects of
1882:
261:ability to survive and thrive outside the family.
1482:Family Economics and Public Policy, 1800s–Present
72:The term "Altruistic Dictator" in the context of
1511:
1509:
1305:Donni, Olivier; Chiappori, Pierre-André (2011).
2062:
2060:
1913:(1990), "Gender and cooperative conflicts", in
1889:. Oxford Oxfordshire New York: Pergamon Press.
701:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
455:Durlauf, Steven N.; Blume, Lawrence E. (2010).
931:Intrafamily Bargaining and Household Decisions
1185:Hotz, V. Joseph; Peet, Evan; Thomas, Duncan.
8:
1790:
1788:
1786:
1784:
1645:Mabsout, Ramzi; van Staveren, Irene (2009).
808:Lundberg, Shelly; Pollak, Robert A. (1993).
2031:
2029:
1755:Current Directions in Psychological Science
761:Stevenson, Betsey; Wolfers, Justin (2006).
1332:Cultural anthropology: the human challenge
1005:Bargain, Olivier; Moreau, Nicolas (2005).
1811:
1244:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198233008.003.0005
933:. Microeconomic Studies. pp. 33–45.
869:Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality
289:Factors that determine fallback positions
116:Bargaining models of marriage and divorce
436:Work–family balance in the United States
426:Shared earning/shared parenting marriage
360:In some societies, there is a custom of
1727:Social security in developing countries
1236:Social Security in Developing Countries
447:
1111:Vermeulen, Frederic (September 2002).
962:Apps, Patricia F.; Rees, Ray (2007).
7:
736:Review of Economics of the Household
368:Social norms and gender perceptions
1395:10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.12088-4
1284:10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00001.x
767:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
125:, such as the division of assets,
14:
631:"A Theory of Social Interactions"
265:Threat point or fallback position
1881:; Zeidenstein, Sondra A (1982).
1455:The World Bank Research Observer
1369:10.1111/j.1545-5300.1983.119_8.x
1046:Journal of Economic Perspectives
377:Inequalities in bargaining power
23:that occur between members of a
1583:Journal of Population Economics
1548:Journal of Population Economics
1187:"Decision-making by households"
277:, particularly in the study of
2072:The Journal of Peasant Studies
1221:10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2015.10.003
964:"Cooperative Household Models"
559:Agarwal, Bina (January 1997).
499:Doss, Cheryl (February 2013).
326:non-governmental organizations
302:Individual's rights/access to
258:inequality of bargaining power
1:
1330:Haviland, William A. (2011).
896:International Economic Review
713:10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00091-2
596:International Economic Review
279:household bargaining dynamics
2114:10.1016/0305-750X(94)90031-0
1955:10.1146/annurev.soc.22.1.299
1837:Journal of Political Economy
1749:Uchino, Bert N; Uno, Darcy;
1533:10.1016/0305-750X(86)90056-2
1355:"A Treatise On The Family".
1307:Household economic behaviors
814:Journal of Political Economy
635:Journal of Political Economy
505:World Bank Research Observer
364:as a counter to inequality.
1984:10.1080/1354570032000080868
1490:10.1057/978-1-137-43963-5_2
1117:Journal of Economic Surveys
939:10.1007/978-3-642-45708-1_4
324:Support from the state and
187:Non-cooperative game theory
2189:
1943:Annual Review of Sociology
1620:"Definition of BARGAINING"
1432:10.1177/019251395016005005
1309:. New York, NY: Springer.
1164:10.1007/s00181-021-02033-3
294:Extra-household parameters
139:intra-household allocation
17:Intra-household bargaining
2084:10.1080/03066158608438309
1681:NBER Working Paper Series
1595:10.1007/s00148-008-0186-7
1560:10.1007/S00148-008-0186-7
150:The Nash-Bargaining Model
1420:Journal of Family Issues
629:Becker, Gary S. (1974).
362:housewife hidden savings
251:unequal bargaining power
51:Common preference models
46:Theoretical perspectives
2134:; Berquó, Elza (1995).
1879:Abdullah, Tahrunnessa A
1822:10.1080/135457097338799
1767:10.1111/1467-8721.00034
1624:www.merriam-webster.com
1129:10.1111/1467-6419.00177
1082:SSRN Electronic Journal
1011:SSRN Electronic Journal
968:SSRN Electronic Journal
581:10.1080/135457097338799
486:www.philadelphiafed.org
416:Feminization of poverty
406:Cooperative game theory
137:, which interprets the
1751:Holt-Lunstad, Julianne
1725:; et al. (eds.),
1363:(1): 127. March 1983.
156:cooperative bargaining
779:10.1093/qje/121.1.267
230:conflicts of interest
135:Nash-bargaining model
1272:The Economic Journal
1090:10.2139/ssrn.3286175
1058:10.1257/jep.10.4.139
976:10.2139/ssrn.1032105
163:The Collective Model
1626:. 29 September 2023
1467:10.1093/wbro/lkt001
1152:Empirical Economics
1023:10.2139/ssrn.664506
517:10.1093/wbro/lkt001
480:Hertzberg, Andrew.
401:Capability approach
207:economic production
172:Types of bargaining
123:divorce settlements
90:benevolent dictator
68:Altruistic dictator
2168:Feminist economics
1971:Feminist Economics
1800:Feminist Economics
569:Feminist Economics
411:Feminist economics
386:research in rural
313:systems (see also
304:communal resources
193:Household dynamics
2173:Bargaining theory
2108:(10): 1455–1478.
2102:World Development
1521:World Development
1499:978-1-137-43961-1
1316:978-1-4419-9430-1
1253:978-0-19-823300-8
1209:World Development
948:978-3-642-45710-4
466:978-0-230-23890-9
421:Gender inequality
348:Individual assets
330:social safety net
86:budget constraint
2180:
2163:Family economics
2148:
2147:
2132:Haddad, Lawrence
2124:
2118:
2117:
2094:
2088:
2087:
2064:
2055:
2054:
2033:
2024:
2023:
2002:
1996:
1995:
1965:
1959:
1958:
1938:
1932:
1931:
1907:
1901:
1900:
1888:
1875:
1869:
1868:
1832:
1826:
1825:
1815:
1792:
1779:
1778:
1746:
1740:
1739:
1707:
1701:
1700:
1676:
1667:
1666:
1642:
1636:
1635:
1633:
1631:
1616:
1607:
1606:
1589:(4): 1039–1062.
1578:
1572:
1571:
1554:(4): 1039–1062.
1543:
1537:
1536:
1513:
1504:
1503:
1477:
1471:
1470:
1450:
1444:
1443:
1415:
1409:
1408:
1382:
1373:
1372:
1352:
1346:
1345:
1327:
1321:
1320:
1302:
1296:
1295:
1278:(443): 933–955.
1267:
1258:
1257:
1231:
1225:
1224:
1204:
1198:
1197:
1191:
1182:
1176:
1175:
1147:
1141:
1140:
1108:
1102:
1101:
1073:
1062:
1061:
1041:
1035:
1034:
1002:
996:
995:
959:
953:
952:
926:
920:
919:
891:
885:
884:
860:
854:
853:
805:
799:
798:
758:
752:
751:
731:
725:
724:
696:
690:
689:
681:
675:
674:
641:(6): 1063–1093.
626:
620:
619:
591:
585:
584:
556:
537:
536:
496:
490:
489:
477:
471:
470:
452:
246:Bargaining power
241:Bargaining power
78:utility function
40:family economics
2188:
2187:
2183:
2182:
2181:
2179:
2178:
2177:
2153:
2152:
2151:
2126:
2125:
2121:
2096:
2095:
2091:
2066:
2065:
2058:
2051:
2035:
2034:
2027:
2020:
2004:
2003:
1999:
1978:(2–3): 93–115.
1967:
1966:
1962:
1940:
1939:
1935:
1929:
1909:
1908:
1904:
1897:
1877:
1876:
1872:
1843:(6): 988–1010.
1834:
1833:
1829:
1813:10.1.1.472.6354
1794:
1793:
1782:
1748:
1747:
1743:
1737:
1709:
1708:
1704:
1678:
1677:
1670:
1644:
1643:
1639:
1629:
1627:
1618:
1617:
1610:
1580:
1579:
1575:
1545:
1544:
1540:
1515:
1514:
1507:
1500:
1479:
1478:
1474:
1452:
1451:
1447:
1417:
1416:
1412:
1405:
1384:
1383:
1376:
1354:
1353:
1349:
1342:
1329:
1328:
1324:
1317:
1304:
1303:
1299:
1269:
1268:
1261:
1254:
1233:
1232:
1228:
1206:
1205:
1201:
1189:
1184:
1183:
1179:
1149:
1148:
1144:
1110:
1109:
1105:
1075:
1074:
1065:
1043:
1042:
1038:
1004:
1003:
999:
961:
960:
956:
949:
928:
927:
923:
908:10.2307/2526280
893:
892:
888:
862:
861:
857:
820:(6): 988–1010.
807:
806:
802:
760:
759:
755:
733:
732:
728:
698:
697:
693:
683:
682:
678:
628:
627:
623:
608:10.2307/2526238
593:
592:
588:
558:
557:
540:
498:
497:
493:
479:
478:
474:
467:
454:
453:
449:
445:
440:
431:Sibling rivalry
396:
379:
370:
350:
315:social networks
296:
291:
269:The concept of
267:
243:
195:
174:
165:
152:
118:
70:
53:
48:
12:
11:
5:
2186:
2184:
2176:
2175:
2170:
2165:
2155:
2154:
2150:
2149:
2119:
2089:
2078:(4): 165–220.
2056:
2049:
2025:
2018:
1997:
1960:
1933:
1927:
1902:
1895:
1870:
1849:10.1086/261912
1827:
1780:
1761:(5): 145–148.
1741:
1735:
1702:
1689:10.3386/W12367
1668:
1637:
1608:
1573:
1538:
1527:(2): 245–255.
1505:
1498:
1472:
1445:
1426:(5): 587–608.
1410:
1403:
1374:
1357:Family Process
1347:
1340:
1322:
1315:
1297:
1259:
1252:
1226:
1199:
1177:
1158:(2): 637–677.
1142:
1123:(4): 533–564.
1103:
1063:
1052:(4): 139–158.
1036:
997:
954:
947:
921:
886:
855:
826:10.1086/261912
800:
773:(1): 267–288.
753:
726:
707:(3): 315–331.
691:
676:
647:10.1086/260265
621:
586:
538:
491:
472:
465:
446:
444:
441:
439:
438:
433:
428:
423:
418:
413:
408:
403:
397:
395:
392:
384:Bina Agarwal's
378:
375:
369:
366:
349:
346:
345:
344:
333:
322:
311:social support
307:
295:
292:
290:
287:
266:
263:
242:
239:
194:
191:
173:
170:
164:
161:
151:
148:
117:
114:
112:inequalities.
105:altruistically
69:
66:
52:
49:
47:
44:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2185:
2174:
2171:
2169:
2166:
2164:
2161:
2160:
2158:
2145:
2141:
2137:
2133:
2129:
2128:Folbre, Nancy
2123:
2120:
2115:
2111:
2107:
2103:
2099:
2098:Agarwal, Bina
2093:
2090:
2085:
2081:
2077:
2073:
2069:
2068:Agarwal, Bina
2063:
2061:
2057:
2052:
2050:9780521429269
2046:
2042:
2038:
2037:Agarwal, Bina
2032:
2030:
2026:
2021:
2019:9780198284635
2015:
2011:
2007:
2001:
1998:
1993:
1989:
1985:
1981:
1977:
1973:
1972:
1964:
1961:
1956:
1952:
1948:
1944:
1937:
1934:
1930:
1928:9780195061581
1924:
1920:
1916:
1915:Tinker, Irene
1912:
1906:
1903:
1898:
1896:9780080267951
1892:
1887:
1886:
1880:
1874:
1871:
1866:
1862:
1858:
1854:
1850:
1846:
1842:
1838:
1831:
1828:
1823:
1819:
1814:
1809:
1805:
1801:
1797:
1796:Agarwal, Bina
1791:
1789:
1787:
1785:
1781:
1776:
1772:
1768:
1764:
1760:
1756:
1752:
1745:
1742:
1738:
1736:9780195651522
1732:
1728:
1724:
1720:
1716:
1712:
1711:Agarwal, Bina
1706:
1703:
1698:
1694:
1690:
1686:
1682:
1675:
1673:
1669:
1664:
1660:
1656:
1652:
1648:
1641:
1638:
1625:
1621:
1615:
1613:
1609:
1604:
1600:
1596:
1592:
1588:
1584:
1577:
1574:
1569:
1565:
1561:
1557:
1553:
1549:
1542:
1539:
1534:
1530:
1526:
1522:
1518:
1517:Folbre, Nancy
1512:
1510:
1506:
1501:
1495:
1491:
1487:
1483:
1476:
1473:
1468:
1464:
1460:
1456:
1449:
1446:
1441:
1437:
1433:
1429:
1425:
1421:
1414:
1411:
1406:
1404:9780080970875
1400:
1396:
1392:
1388:
1381:
1379:
1375:
1370:
1366:
1362:
1358:
1351:
1348:
1343:
1341:9780495810827
1337:
1333:
1326:
1323:
1318:
1312:
1308:
1301:
1298:
1293:
1289:
1285:
1281:
1277:
1273:
1266:
1264:
1260:
1255:
1249:
1245:
1241:
1237:
1230:
1227:
1222:
1218:
1214:
1210:
1203:
1200:
1195:
1188:
1181:
1178:
1173:
1169:
1165:
1161:
1157:
1153:
1146:
1143:
1138:
1134:
1130:
1126:
1122:
1118:
1114:
1107:
1104:
1099:
1095:
1091:
1087:
1083:
1079:
1072:
1070:
1068:
1064:
1059:
1055:
1051:
1047:
1040:
1037:
1032:
1028:
1024:
1020:
1016:
1012:
1008:
1001:
998:
993:
989:
985:
981:
977:
973:
969:
965:
958:
955:
950:
944:
940:
936:
932:
925:
922:
917:
913:
909:
905:
901:
897:
890:
887:
882:
878:
874:
870:
866:
859:
856:
851:
847:
843:
839:
835:
831:
827:
823:
819:
815:
811:
804:
801:
796:
792:
788:
784:
780:
776:
772:
768:
764:
757:
754:
749:
748:10.3386/w9232
745:
741:
737:
730:
727:
722:
718:
714:
710:
706:
702:
695:
692:
687:
680:
677:
672:
668:
664:
660:
656:
652:
648:
644:
640:
636:
632:
625:
622:
617:
613:
609:
605:
601:
597:
590:
587:
582:
578:
574:
570:
566:
564:
555:
553:
551:
549:
547:
545:
543:
539:
534:
530:
526:
522:
518:
514:
510:
506:
502:
495:
492:
487:
483:
476:
473:
468:
462:
458:
451:
448:
442:
437:
434:
432:
429:
427:
424:
422:
419:
417:
414:
412:
409:
407:
404:
402:
399:
398:
393:
391:
389:
385:
376:
374:
367:
365:
363:
358:
354:
347:
342:
337:
334:
331:
327:
323:
320:
316:
312:
309:Existence of
308:
305:
301:
300:
299:
293:
288:
286:
282:
280:
276:
272:
264:
262:
259:
254:
252:
247:
240:
238:
236:
231:
226:
224:
220:
219:child rearing
216:
212:
208:
204:
200:
199:economic unit
192:
190:
188:
183:
179:
171:
169:
162:
160:
157:
149:
147:
143:
140:
136:
132:
128:
124:
115:
113:
110:
106:
102:
97:
93:
91:
87:
83:
79:
75:
67:
65:
63:
59:
50:
45:
43:
41:
36:
32:
28:
26:
22:
18:
2135:
2122:
2105:
2101:
2092:
2075:
2071:
2040:
2009:
2006:Sen, Amartya
2000:
1975:
1969:
1963:
1946:
1942:
1936:
1918:
1911:Sen, Amartya
1905:
1884:
1873:
1840:
1836:
1830:
1803:
1799:
1758:
1754:
1744:
1726:
1715:Sen, Amartya
1705:
1680:
1654:
1650:
1640:
1628:. Retrieved
1623:
1586:
1582:
1576:
1551:
1547:
1541:
1524:
1520:
1481:
1475:
1461:(1): 52–78.
1458:
1454:
1448:
1423:
1419:
1413:
1386:
1360:
1356:
1350:
1331:
1325:
1306:
1300:
1275:
1271:
1235:
1229:
1212:
1208:
1202:
1193:
1180:
1155:
1151:
1145:
1120:
1116:
1106:
1081:
1049:
1045:
1039:
1017:(1): 77–86.
1014:
1010:
1000:
967:
957:
930:
924:
899:
895:
889:
872:
868:
858:
817:
813:
803:
770:
766:
756:
739:
735:
729:
704:
700:
694:
685:
679:
638:
634:
624:
602:(1): 31–44.
599:
595:
589:
572:
568:
562:
508:
504:
494:
485:
475:
456:
450:
380:
371:
359:
355:
351:
336:Social norms
297:
283:
271:threat point
268:
255:
244:
227:
196:
175:
166:
153:
144:
129:, and child
119:
98:
94:
71:
54:
29:
21:negotiations
16:
15:
1949:: 299–322.
1806:(1): 1–51.
1723:Hills, John
1719:Drèze, Jean
1389:: 228–232.
1238:: 171–244.
1215:: 360–371.
575:(1): 1–51.
525:10986/19492
457:Game theory
388:South Asian
215:inheritance
211:consumption
182:cooperative
178:game theory
88:set by the
82:normal good
74:Gary Becker
2157:Categories
1663:1765/18284
902:(2): 333.
875:(1): 109.
563:Bargaining
443:References
203:altruistic
109:well-being
58:well-being
31:Bargaining
19:refers to
2144:775084857
1992:154524788
1865:154525602
1808:CiteSeerX
1775:145347173
1630:5 October
1603:155007641
1568:155007641
1484:: 23–44.
1440:146444521
1292:154346678
1172:253711969
1137:152487904
1098:158508511
992:153050905
984:1556-5068
881:0737-089X
850:154525602
834:0022-3808
787:0033-5533
655:0022-3808
533:1564-6971
511:: 52–78.
341:care work
275:economics
25:household
2039:(1994).
2008:(1982).
1697:14899114
1031:15309202
795:25098790
721:55873432
671:17052355
394:See also
339:such as
101:altruist
35:contract
1917:(ed.),
1857:2138569
916:2526280
842:2138569
663:1830662
616:2526238
235:utility
131:custody
127:alimony
99:In the
62:welfare
56:to the
2142:
2047:
2016:
1990:
1925:
1893:
1863:
1855:
1810:
1773:
1733:
1695:
1601:
1566:
1496:
1438:
1401:
1338:
1313:
1290:
1250:
1170:
1135:
1096:
1029:
990:
982:
945:
914:
879:
848:
840:
832:
793:
785:
719:
669:
661:
653:
614:
531:
463:
223:family
1988:S2CID
1861:S2CID
1853:JSTOR
1771:S2CID
1693:S2CID
1657:(5).
1599:S2CID
1564:S2CID
1436:S2CID
1288:S2CID
1190:(PDF)
1168:S2CID
1133:S2CID
1094:S2CID
1027:S2CID
988:S2CID
912:JSTOR
846:S2CID
838:JSTOR
791:JSTOR
717:S2CID
667:S2CID
659:JSTOR
612:JSTOR
319:caste
2140:OCLC
2045:ISBN
2014:ISBN
1923:ISBN
1891:ISBN
1731:ISBN
1632:2023
1494:ISBN
1399:ISBN
1336:ISBN
1311:ISBN
1248:ISBN
980:ISSN
943:ISBN
877:ISSN
830:ISSN
783:ISSN
651:ISSN
529:ISSN
461:ISBN
2110:doi
2080:doi
1980:doi
1951:doi
1845:doi
1841:101
1818:doi
1763:doi
1685:doi
1659:hdl
1591:doi
1556:doi
1529:doi
1486:doi
1463:doi
1428:doi
1391:doi
1365:doi
1280:doi
1276:107
1240:doi
1217:doi
1160:doi
1125:doi
1086:doi
1054:doi
1019:doi
972:doi
935:doi
904:doi
822:doi
818:101
775:doi
771:121
744:doi
709:doi
643:doi
604:doi
577:doi
521:hdl
513:doi
2159::
2130:;
2106:22
2104:.
2076:13
2074:.
2059:^
2028:^
1986:.
1974:.
1947:22
1945:.
1859:.
1851:.
1839:.
1816:.
1802:.
1783:^
1769:.
1757:.
1721:;
1717:;
1691:.
1683:.
1671:^
1655:38
1653:.
1649:.
1622:.
1611:^
1597:.
1587:22
1585:.
1562:.
1552:22
1550:.
1525:14
1523:.
1508:^
1492:.
1459:28
1457:.
1434:.
1424:16
1422:.
1397:.
1377:^
1361:22
1359:.
1286:.
1274:.
1262:^
1246:.
1213:78
1211:.
1192:.
1166:.
1156:62
1154:.
1131:.
1121:16
1119:.
1115:.
1092:.
1084:.
1080:.
1066:^
1050:10
1048:.
1025:.
1015:34
1013:.
1009:.
986:.
978:.
970:.
966:.
941:.
910:.
900:22
898:.
873:26
871:.
867:.
844:.
836:.
828:.
816:.
812:.
789:.
781:.
769:.
765:.
742:.
738:.
715:.
705:37
703:.
665:.
657:.
649:.
639:82
637:.
633:.
610:.
600:21
598:.
571:.
567:.
541:^
527:.
519:.
509:28
507:.
503:.
484:.
253:.
217:,
213:,
209:,
2146:.
2116:.
2112::
2086:.
2082::
2053:.
2022:.
1994:.
1982::
1976:9
1957:.
1953::
1899:.
1867:.
1847::
1824:.
1820::
1804:3
1777:.
1765::
1759:8
1699:.
1687::
1665:.
1661::
1634:.
1605:.
1593::
1570:.
1558::
1535:.
1531::
1502:.
1488::
1469:.
1465::
1442:.
1430::
1407:.
1393::
1371:.
1367::
1344:.
1319:.
1294:.
1282::
1256:.
1242::
1223:.
1219::
1196:.
1174:.
1162::
1139:.
1127::
1100:.
1088::
1060:.
1056::
1033:.
1021::
994:.
974::
951:.
937::
918:.
906::
883:.
852:.
824::
797:.
777::
750:.
746::
740:1
723:.
711::
688:.
673:.
645::
618:.
606::
583:.
579::
573:3
561:"
535:.
523::
515::
488:.
469:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.