24:
134:
The
Commission's report also described systemic analytical, collection, and dissemination flaws that led the intelligence community to erroneous assessments about Iraq's alleged WMD programs. Chief among these flaws were "an analytical process that was driven by assumptions and inferences rather than
120:
The
Intelligence Community's performance in assessing Iraq's pre-war weapons of mass destruction programs was a major intelligence failure. The failure was not merely that the Intelligence Community's assessments were wrong. There were also serious shortcomings in the way these assessments were made
224:
and other relevant agencies or organizations concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of Iraq relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and related
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served as the
Executive Director for the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction sometimes called the Iraq Intelligence Commission. He also served as the first Director of the
538:
149:
One of the main and crucial intelligence sources for the case in Iraq was an informant named
Curveball. Curveball had never been interviewed by American intelligence until after the war and was instead handled exclusively by
204:
The report also looked forward, recommending a large number of organizational and structural reforms. Of the 74 recommendations to the
President, he fully accepted 69 in a public statement released on June 29, 2005.
146:
the report notes in several places that the commission's mandate did not allow it "to investigate how policymakers used the intelligence they received from the
Intelligence Community on Iraq's weapons programs,"
195:'s top aides, the Commission, while discovering that at least two INC defectors were fabricators, said it was "unable to uncover any evidence that the INC or any other organization was directing Curveball."
370:
444:
135:
data", failures by certain agencies to gather all relevant information and analyze fully information on purported centrifuge tubes, insufficient vetting of key sources, particularly the source "
385:
The first seven members of the panel were appointed on
February 6, 2004, the date of the executive order which created it. The final two members, Vest and Rowen, were appointed on February 13.
556:
786:
27:
President Bush holds a press briefing at the White House on Friday, February 6, 2004, announcing the formation of the commission. He is flanked by commission co-chairs
Senator
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The 601-page document detailed many U.S. intelligence failures and identified intelligence breakdowns in dozens of cases. Some of the conclusions reached by the report were:
96:
Following intense study of the
American Intelligence Community, the Commission delivered its report to the President on March 31, 2005, the so-called Robb-Silberman Report.
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Footnote 274 elaborates, explaining that 'when pressed for access to Curveball, said that Curveball disliked Americans and that he would refuse to speak to them.'
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Unclassified Version of the Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
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The Commission's mission is, in part, "to ensure the most effective counter-proliferation capabilities of the United States and response to the
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73:. President Bush therefore formed the Commission, but gave it a broad mandate not only to look into any errors behind the
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154:, who regarded his statements as unconvincing. An October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that concluded Iraq "has"
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The impetus for the Commission lay with a public controversy occasioned by statements, including those of Chief of the
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582:"The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction"
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41:
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
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and "related threats." However, the commission was not directed to examine the extent to which the
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was "based almost exclusively on information obtained" from Curveball, according to the report.
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65:, that the Intelligence Community had grossly erred in judging that Iraq had been developing
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in a nuclear weapons program were found by the commission to be used for conventional
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to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom and compare it with the findings of the
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419:, announced a similar commission to investigate British intelligence, known as the
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216:, the commission was meant to "specifically examine the Intelligence Community's
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180:" purporting to show a contract between the countries. There were "flaws in the
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While there were many reports that Curveball was actually the cousin of one of
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188:, misspelled words, incorrect titles for individuals and government entities".
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62:
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Days before the American commission was announced, the government of the
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intelligence, but also to look into intelligence on WMD programs in
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22:
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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
139:," and somewhat overheated presentation of data to policymakers.
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213:
74:
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Commission on the Prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism
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and the ongoing threat of terrorist activity." With regard to
176:
was due to American intelligence believing "transparently
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was wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about
426:
The commission was independent and separate from the
401:
and founded and served as the first Commander of the
104:Regarding Iraq, the Commission concluded that the
642:"Intelligence Analysts Whiffed on a 'Curveball'"
618:"Republicans Still Denying Bush Lied About Iraq"
161:Information about aluminum tubes to be used as
127:Unclassified version of the commission's report
118:
735:International Herald Tribune February 6, 2004
475:Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq
8:
640:Greg Miller and Bob Drogin (April 1, 2005).
787:George W. Bush administration controversies
738:Not everyone got it wrong on Iraq's weapons
110:Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction
635:
633:
631:
629:
627:
678:"Big Lies, Blind Spies, and Vanity Fair"
553:Federal Government of the United States
513:Federal Government of the United States
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93:may have manipulated the intelligence.
480:Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
316:" shortly after the Commission formed.
415:, the U.S.'s primary ally during the
210:September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
69:(WMD) before the March 2003 start of
7:
762:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
616:Chait, Jonathan (February 9, 2015).
450:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
106:United States Intelligence Community
792:United States national commissions
112:and that this constituted a major
14:
680:. sundaytelegraph. Archived from
504:United States Department of State
322:, Democrat, retired judge of the
121:and communicated to policymakers.
395:National Counterterrorism Center
291:, Republican, U.S. Senator from
1:
535:Office of the Press Secretary
375:National Intelligence Council
312:. Cutler changed status to "
18:United States government body
744:p521 of War and Decision by
67:weapons of mass destruction
813:
348:Deputy Director of the CIA
152:German intelligence agents
797:2004 in the United States
727:October 31, 2013, at the
265:Ambassador to Yugoslavia
233:Commission members are:
174:Niger Yellowcake scandal
714:Text of Executive Order
465:Office of Special Plans
253:Deputy Attorney General
71:Operation Iraqi Freedom
423:or the Butler Review.
360:, former President of
132:
43:is a panel created by
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537:(February 11, 2004).
267:, et al., co-Chairman
246:U.S. Court of Appeals
45:Executive Order 13328
26:
777:Classified documents
732:". February 6, 2004.
620:. New York Magazine.
559:on November 22, 2016
470:Operation Rockingham
332:, then-President of
283:Governor of Virginia
225:means of delivery."
114:intelligence failure
54:in February 2004.
684:on November 6, 2007
377:, and President of
352:Director of the NSA
324:DC Court of Appeals
302:White House counsel
300:, Democrat, former
91:Bush administration
722:Intelligence Probe
719:Online NewsHour, "
590:The New York Times
515:. February 6, 2004
403:United States Navy
373:, Chairman of the
238:Laurence Silberman
229:Commission members
218:intelligence prior
156:biological weapons
37:
33:Laurence Silberman
676:(April 7, 2005).
654:on August 3, 2007
647:Los Angeles Times
460:Iraq Survey Group
255:under Presidents
222:Iraq Survey Group
186:forged signatures
87:WMD proliferation
59:Iraq Survey Group
31:(left) and Judge
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716:(whitehouse.gov)
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597:. March 31, 2005
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455:Iraq Study Group
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178:forged documents
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413:United Kingdom
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557:the original
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384:
310:Bill Clinton
306:Jimmy Carter
298:Lloyd Cutler
279:U.S. Senator
271:Charles Robb
232:
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29:Charles Robb
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674:Vest, Jason
406:Fifth Fleet
289:John McCain
261:Gerald Ford
163:centrifuges
79:Afghanistan
756:Categories
486:References
330:Rick Levin
314:Of Counsel
244:, retired
242:Republican
182:letterhead
369:, former
346:, former
281:from and
277:, former
137:Curveball
63:David Kay
782:Iraq War
725:Archived
688:July 24,
658:July 24,
601:April 9,
563:April 9,
519:April 9,
434:See also
417:Iraq War
339:Retired
275:Democrat
124:—
100:Findings
35:(right).
570:Alt URL
341:Admiral
293:Arizona
167:rockets
129:, p. 46
585:(PDF)
249:judge
83:Libya
690:2007
660:2007
603:2017
565:2017
521:2017
379:RAND
350:and
308:and
259:and
214:Iraq
172:The
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