620:
996:
mission in
January 1973 and delegations representing the Promotion of International Trade (Kokubosoku). According to the Ministry of Finance, there was an 83% increase of trade between China and Japan in 1973 compared to the previous year. This can be explained by several reasons. For one, the Tanaka government of Japan made credits available for the Export-Import Bank of China. At the same time, Peking was increasing its efforts to accelerate its five-year economic plan which lasted from 1971 to 1975. It was also suggested that China felt apprehensive about Japan's potential involvement in the Soviet-proposed multi-dimensional development plan in Siberia.
36:
632:(a peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan), by which Japan and the Republic of China (ROC) government of Chiang Kai-shek had already established the end of World War II. Japan negotiated to emphasize the existence of a peaceful relationship between the two countries and leave the specific timing of the end of the state of war unspecified. Although Japan's standpoint on the Treaty of Taipei did not change, if diplomatic normalization between Japan and China were to be established, Japan was willing to terminate the Treaty of Taipei.
386:
1053:
Communique, which reaffirmed that Sino-Japanese security cooperation could place Japan ahead of the US. Even after the establishment of the communique that represented the normalized Sino-Japanese relations, Japan's China policy was still affected by that of the US, as Japan depended on the US for security. Additionally, Sino-Japanese trade continued to boom, and Peking continued to pressure Japan to sign a peace treaty containing the anti-hegemony language of the 1972 normalization agreement. Overall, during the
370:, "the Japanese government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime in China", and later the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty was signed. During this time in the early 1950s, Japan was put under pressure by the US to not recognize the newly established PRC which was at war with the US in Korea, and instead recognized the government of ROC led by Chiang Kai-shek as the legitimate government of China. Tokyo then signed a peace treaty with Taipei as a proof to this close tie.
926:
1000:
957:, in his inaugural speech on June 13, 1972, reassured citizens at a time of national diversity by confirming the stance of Nationalist China (ROC) that there were only "one conflict" (the struggle between the humanitarian rule of the Three Principles of the People and the tyrannical rule of Chinese communists), "one war" (the recovery of the mainland), "one responsibility" (the elimination of the communists), and "one outcome" (the victory of Nationalist China).
1027:
East Asian
Relations Association on Taipei's side ("Japan" and "Taiwan" are avoided in the names of both associations). The two associations carried out functions that were normally handled by consular institutions. For example, Taipei's high-ranking civil servants accompanying commercial missions to Japan were introduced as simple experts with ordinary passports. In short, Tokyo–Taipei's relations were relegated to the private sector.
908:
feelings toward China after the Joint
Communique was agreed upon. This was mainly because of China's withdrawal of any war compensation claims made to the Japanese people in addition to their approval of the United States–Japan Security Treaty. In 1980, the same survey was conducted on the Japanese people, which showed, 78.6% had "friendly feelings toward China" and just 14.7% did "not have friendly feelings toward China".
676:(JCP) accepted the first three points without reservation. However, the LDP was hesitant to approve China's proposal, especially since the first two points suggested Japan would have to abolish their peace treaty with Taiwan. Furthermore, in addition, point 4 was beyond Japan's capacity, as they hold no sovereign power over US maritime activity in the region. Lastly, point 5 lost its relevance after
596:
230:
753:(The Government of Japan is deeply repentant over the damages that Japanese militarism has caused on the people of China in the past. At the same time, the Government of Japan fully recognizes the Three Principles for the Restoration of Relations submitted by the Government of the People's Republic of China. From this standpoint diplomatic normalization between China and Japan will be conducted.)
443:
811:
768:(The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the solely lawful government of representing China) The Government of the People's Republic of China once more declares that Taiwan is an indivisible part of the territory of China. (The Government of Japan endorses, based on the Cairo Declaration, the Government of China's standpoint.)
45:
881:
each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. The two
Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.
421:. Prime Minister Tanaka made the restoration of relations between Japan and China an issue of priority in his agenda, hence his pursuing of the Joint Communique. This was beneficial for China as well, since it could lead to a smooth entry back into the international society and economy and could end the state of war between China and Japan. The February
1031:
billion, a drop of $ 235 million compared to 1974 but nearly double Taiwan's overall 1975 deficit of $ 611 million. Moreover, a strong sense of antagonism intensely arose and harmed
Japanese businesses in Taiwan; for example, Japan Airlines soon had to take special precautions against sabotage on every flight to and from Taiwan.
917:
government had made a decision without consulting with the population first. In response to this, the
Chinese government clarified the terms of the Joint Communique. They emphasized that although the Chinese government cannot demand compensation, Chinese citizens as individuals still have the right to demand compensation.
1086:
873:
The
Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in
853:
The
Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two
707:
The
Government of Japan fully recognizes the Three Principles for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China that was presented by the Government of the People's Republic of China, and also fully recognizes that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole and
1030:
In terms of economic impacts of the communique, despite the deteriorated diplomatic relations with Japan, Taiwan's trade with many countries continued to flourish. However, in 1974, Taiwan had a $ 1.336 billion trade deficit with Japan. In the following year, the trade deficit with Japan was $ 1.101
916:
In the 1990s, criticism and dissatisfaction over the terms of the Joint
Communique started to become a topic of discussion between the Chinese people. This was mainly towards the terms agreed upon regarding war reparations and compensation by the Japanese to the Chinese. Chinese people felt that the
880:
The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in
869:
The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stance of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand
778:
The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish a permanent, friendly relationships following the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, nonintervention in domestic issues, equality and mutual
749:
China and Japan are only separated by a sea, and a perpetual and traditionally friendly relationship existed in the history between the two countries. The peoples of both countries long to correct the extremely anomalous state that existed between the two countries. The reestablishment of diplomatic
979:
loans, grants, and the transfer of technological materials. This ODA helped grow and open up the Chinese economy. Normalization also allowed for Japanese companies to pursue business in the large Chinese market, which benefited the Japanese economy. These efforts led to increased dependency on both
970:
The normalization of diplomatic relationships between China and Japan was said to have contributed greatly to the prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and peace. Since normalization, both economic and cultural exchange started to improve. The interactions between the people of China and Japan also
790:
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan will conclude individual agreements on commerce, shipping, air traffic, fisheries, weather, post, and science and technology on the basis of need and in accordance to preexisting agreements in order to develop the economic
728:
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan, prior to the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty, will conclude agreements on commerce, shipping, air traffic, weather, post, fisheries, and science and technology on the basis of need and preexistence in order to
581:
government as the sole legitimate government of China, but only as the government of Taiwan, and that Japan was ready to shift recognition to Peking. In short, Taipei's failure to remain in the UN's Security Council and the General Assembly, along with the Sino-US rapprochement, pushed the Japanese
1034:
In the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese supporters of Taiwan continued to advocate for the country's independence movement. Pro-Taiwan voices were down in the 1970s but were never totally gone. These supporters acted as check-and-balance mechanisms to prevent the Japanese government from going too far in
888:
The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace
1052:
was the golden period of US–China–Japan cooperation; however, always within the context of the US–China security relationship. Sino-US relations constrained their respective policies toward third parties, especially Japan. There were suggestions that Washington might not be pleased with the Joint
1026:
After Tokyo and Peking normalized relations in 1972, there was a formal disengagement of the Japanese authorities from Taiwan. On December 26, 1972, two private associations were created to supervise bilateral exchanges between Tokyo and Taipei: the Interchange Association on Tokyo's side and the
1039:
in June 1989 temporarily ruptured Sino-Japanese relations, Beijing's intolerance of democratic ideas made democratized Taiwan more favorable in Japanese eyes. Japan-based pro-independence activists promoted Japanese popular awareness of Taiwan as an independent country. Additionally, during this
849:
Japan and China are neighboring countries, separated only by a strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship. The people of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the
756:
The Government of the People's Republic of China welcomes this. Although the social policies of China and Japan differ, the two countries should and can have peaceful and friendly relations. The renewed establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan and the development of friendly
405:
From 1950 to 1972, trade between Japan and China existed but was relatively limited. At first, trade was restricted due to events such as the Korean War, a Chinese embargo on Japan in 1958, and tensions regarding the recognition of Taiwan. Later, the 1960 "Japan-China Trade Principle" led to the
995:
In terms of economic and trade relations, many economic delegations and representatives of banks and firms of both countries subsequently visited each other. Within the first year of normalized relations, 28 Japanese Economic and Trade missions visited China. This included the Yasuhiro Nakasone
907:
A survey conducted by the Japanese Cabinet in 1978 showed that 62.1% of Japanese people who participated in the survey had "friendly feelings toward China" and 25.6% did "not have friendly feelings toward China". These survey results showed that a large proportion of the population had improved
892:
The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental
401:
Despite this, Japan was interested in restoring relations with China due to cultural, security, and economic interests. Japan and China have been neighboring countries for almost two thousand years and share many cultural, historic, and religious heritages. In terms of security interests, Japan
771:
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government Japan have decided to establish diplomatic relations from September (date) 1972. In line with international law and international custom, both Governments of the respective countries will establish in each other's capitals the
573:
voted to admit the PRC and to expel the ROC. The 17 UN members during the General Assembly declared that the existence of the PRC was "a reality that could not be changed to suit the myth of a so-called Republic of China, fabricated out of a portion of Chinese territory", and that the ROC were
857:
In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the
715:
Both parties agree to treat relations between China and Japan on the basis of the Five Principles: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual nonaggression; mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. In
627:
Japan explained that they should raise the issue of the state of war between China and Japan in Clause 1. Japan explained to China that they could not accept China's interpretation of officially ending the state of war in this joint declaration. This was because China was not bound by the
355:
Cabinet lost its hope of establishing substantial relations with Peking, and instead began taking into consideration the prospect of signing a peace treaty and establishing diplomatic normalization with Taipei. Japan at the time also carried the debt of gratitude to Nationalist China, as
884:
The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such
782:
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan declare that both countries shall not seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and that both countries will oppose any country or group of countries that seek to establish hegemony in this
574:"unlawful authorities" that remained there only because of the permanent presence of the US Armed Forces. PRC, therefore, assumed the ROC's place in the General Assembly as well as its place as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
566:, Washington lost its grip on the UN and could no longer sustain the moratorium. Thus, the Chinese representation issue was considered as an "important question" which required a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly for a resolution to pass.
933:
Before the announcement of the communique, there were signs of public anxiety toward expanded US–Sino relations. PM Tanaka's trip to Peking (September 25–30) was greeted with anger. Taipei delayed the mission of Tanaka's special envoy,
974:
From 1979 onwards, Japan started offering Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China. This was done with numerous projects, such as energy development, infrastructure development, and environmental protection, using low-interest
322:
from World War II. In addition, it concluded various administrative agreements between the two countries in trade, fisheries, aviation, and navigation, amongst others. The document firmly maintains its stance under Article 8 of the
987:
wrestlers toured China in April 1973, and in the same month China dispatched 55 members for a goodwill mission in Japan. A Chinese cultural delegation visited Japan in June 1973 to view Chinese art treasures which belonged to the
1057:, the triangular US-China-Japan relations continued to prevail. However, under the influence of the US, Peking "lacked the leverage to persuade Japan to adopt a China policy fundamentally different from that of the US".
854:
countries from the stand of fully understanding 'the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.
711:
Both parties declare that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan conforms to the long-term wishes of their respective citizens and that it is in line with the benefit of the peoples of the
301:(ROC) in Taiwan. The document produced nine articles in a joint statement, showing compromises on previously ambiguous principles enunciated by both sides. Of these, four points are particularly worthy of attention:
786:
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government Japan have agreed to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship in order to develop the peaceful and friendly relations between the peoples of both
844:
on the question of normalizing relations between Japan and China, as well as other problems and matters of interest between the two countries. In the end, they agreed to issue the following Joint Communique:
1964:
850:
aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.
757:
neighbor relations is not only in line with the fundamental interest of the citizens of both countries, but is also useful for the relaxation of tensions in Asia and for the protection of world peace.
877:
The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that, in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparations from Japan.
700:
The outline proposal in which the Foreign Minister of Japan, Masayoshi Ōhira, and Foreign Minister of China, Ji Pengfei, agreed upon for the Japan–China Joint Declaration can be seen as follows:
950:, he was greeted with rare mass demonstrations. His picture was neither on TV nor in the press, in contrast with the wide coverage of another concurrent visitor, the Mayor of Seoul.
2042:
1097:
1023:" more clearly and timely in 1971, PM Tanaka would not have been so keen on normalizing relations with Beijing in 1972 and Taipei would have avoided severing relations with Tokyo.
719:
Both parties declare that neither China nor Japan will seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and will oppose any country or group of countries that seek hegemony in this manner.
460:
725:
For the sake of the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan, the Government of the People's Republic of China abandons its right to demand war reparations from Japan.
1007:
Although Japan and China's economic relationship has remained largely stable, other issues have caused friction within their relationship, such as historical problems and the
644:
party visited Beijing and announced in a joint statement with the China–Japan Friendship Association that there were five preconditions for relations between Japan and China:
318:
The document ended the "abnormal relations between Japan and China", recognized the People's Republic of China as the "sole government of China", and renounced any claim for
722:
Both parties agree to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship that is based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence after the establishment of diplomatic relations.
1218:
863:
The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communique is issued.
543:
removed travel and trading barriers, as well as proposed a more serious dialogue with Peking due to Cold War politics and the US–Soviet situation. Secondly, in 1971, the
775:
For the sake of friendly relations between the peoples of China and Japan, the Government of the People's Republic of China renounces its claims for war reparations.
716:
accordance with the Five Principles, disputes between China and Japan will be resolved through peaceful dialogue and without the use of force or the threat of force.
17:
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YUAN, Chengyi (2013-06-01). "The re-examination of Chiang Kai-shek's returning virtue for malice policy towards Japan after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War".
1936:
Hiroshi, Nakanishi; Curtis, Gerald L.; Matake, Kamiya; Jia, Qingguo; Oksenberg, Michel; Zhang, Tuosheng; Ross, Robert S.; Yoshihide, Soeya; Zhang, Baijia (2002).
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From 1945 until 1971, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime occupied the so-called "China seat" as an original member and one of the five permanent members of the
2037:
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government towards achieving normalization with Peking through establishing the Joint Communique and ultimately severing diplomatic relations with the ROC.
413:" in 1971, Chinese businesses became more attractive for the Japanese economy than previously. Eventually, Prime Minister Sato resigned, which led to the
507:
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and did not represent anything new to what China had long been asking of Japan. In fact, these proposals date back to 1953. Dissenting members in the
479:
829:. Accompanying PM Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ōhira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido, and other government officials.
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arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.
772:
embassies and other establishments necessary to carry out their functions. In addition, they agree to exchange ambassadors as quickly as possible.
486:
660:
the legitimate rights of the People's Republic in all United Nations organizations must be restored and the representatives of Taiwan expelled.
1779:
1947:
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1937:
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2052:
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there is only one China, and the government of the People's Republic is the sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people;
475:
2067:
765:
On the date of the announcement of the joint declaration, the state of war between the People's Republic of China and Japan will end.
239:
526:
272:
840:
PM Tanaka and FM Ōhira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Zhou Enlai and Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs
429:, also played a role. The surprising Sino-American rapprochement boosted the possibility of a communique between China and Japan.
874:
their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.
669:
1091:
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551:
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wanted to restore its relations with China in order to set the tone for a peaceful diplomatic relationship after years of war.
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Before normalization from 1952 to 1972, Japan only had diplomatic relations with Taiwan and not China. Although Prime Minister
1036:
464:
414:
76:
866:
The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.
641:
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677:
500:
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was signed on September 29, 1972, in Beijing. The communique established and normalized diplomatic relations between
925:
2032:
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1071:
1054:
344:
1066:
539:
1971 witnessed an erosion of Taiwan's international position and a shift in Japan–ROC–PRC relations. Firstly, the
453:
1797:
243:
942:, an infamous episode in the difficult course of Sino–Japanese relations. When Shiina met with new ROC Premier
673:
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201:
35:
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relations between China and Japan will open a new page for the history of relations between the two countries.
382:
was in support of Taiwan, he regarded China as a threat, in keeping with the United States' policy on China.
1307:
Wang, Qingxin Ken (2000). "Taiwan in Japan's Relations with China and the United States after the Cold War".
1264:
Wang, Qingxin Ken (2000). "Taiwan in Japan's Relations with China and the United States after the Cold War".
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interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.
1008:
989:
830:
385:
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After the UN General Assembly vote on Peking and Taipei, it was hinted that Japan no longer recognized the
2062:
2057:
1753:
426:
1651:"MOFA: Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China"
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The state of war between Japan and the People's Republic of China ends on the date of the declaration.
18:
Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China
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The Governments of both countries have reached the following agreements through friendly discussion:
2072:
1790:
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growth in selective trade that became more regularized after diplomatic relations resumed in 1972.
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zong1 waa4 jan4 men4 gong6 wo4 gwok3 zing3 fu2 jyu3 jat6 bun2 zing3 fu2 dik1 lyun4 hap6 sing1 ming4
2017:"Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China"
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Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China
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1529:"Woodrow Wilson Center Digital Archive. Nuclear Proliferation International History Project".
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the United States must withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area;
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improving Japan–China relations at the expense of sacrificing Taiwan's interests. After the
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954:
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629:
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against Communist China (PRC). However, due to decolonization and the admission of numerous
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113:
366:) and repatriated all the Japanese troops. As a result, on 25 April 1952, according to the
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the statement that Japan "understands and respects stance" that Taiwan is part of the PRC;
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578:
357:
352:
319:
1572:
Hsiao, Gene T. (1974). "The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence".
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and cultural relations between the two countries and to expand the exchange of people.
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2004:
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The governments of Japan and China agreed upon a draft Joint declaration as follows:
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1754:"1972 System" to "Strategic Mutual Benefits" - Japan's Foreign Policy toward China"
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1965:"International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: U.S.-China Relations since 1972"
1460:"EXCERPT OF MAO ZEDONG'S CONVERSATION WITH JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER KAKUEI TANAKA"
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1891:"Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of Adaptation and Viability"
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297:(PRC), resulted in the severing of official relations between Japan and the
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Had Chiang Kai-shek managed to keep the UN "China seat" by abandoning his "
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Taiwan is a province of China and an inalienable part of Chinese territory;
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141:
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Kim, Hong N. (1975). "Sino-Japanese Relations since the Rapprochement".
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period, the booming of tourism and mainstream media returned to Taiwan.
1996:
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467: in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
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127:
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Zhèngfǔ yǔ Rìběn Zhèngfǔ de Liánhé Shēngmíng
1483:
Appleton, Sheldon L. (1972). "Taiwan: The Year It Finally Happened".
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Fuchs, Eckhardt; Kasahara, Tokushi; Saaler, Sven, eds. (2017-12-04).
938:, so that it coincided with the 41st anniversary of the September 18
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The sections in parentheses are as appears in the original document.
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October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly led by Albania
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Mengin, Françoise (1997-03-01). "Taiwan's non-official diplomacy".
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Masayoshi Ōhira, Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister of Japan
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From September 25 to September 30, 1972, Japanese Prime Minister
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Nippon-koku Seifu to Chūkajinmin-kyōwakoku Seifu no Kyōdō Seimei
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promote the human exchange the economic and cultural relations.
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Liu, William H. (2016-07-26). "Taiwan After Chiang Kai-shek".
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the "Japan-Chiang Treaty " is illegal and must be abrogated;
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The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle, 1972-1989
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Jacobs, J. Bruce (1973). "Taiwan 1972: Political Season".
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Jacobs, J. Bruce (1973). "Taiwan 1972: Political Season".
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made the announcement of "returning virtue for malice" (
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In 1971, a Japanese delegation of politicians from the
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Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China
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the desire for a peace treaty between Japan and China;
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In response to the situation, Chiang Kai-shek's son,
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Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1948
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Ji Pengfei (right), former Foreign Minister of China
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Japan's reversal of relations with China and Taiwan.
608:On September 26–27, 1972, Japan's Foreign Minister
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837:met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27.
664:These principles were approved by Chinese premier
616:met to negotiate a proposal for the declaration.
1787:European Association of Taiwan Studies Conference
1356:Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science
1103:List of war apology statements issued by Japan
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1048:From 1972 to 1978, some have argued that the
1044:US–China–Japan relations after the communique
814:Kakuei Tanaka, former Prime Minister of Japan
672:(LDP), opposition parties, and the left-wing
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81:
8:
1352:"China-Japan Trade and Investment Relations"
870:under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.
1219:"Taiwan in Japan's Security Considerations"
2043:Treaties of the People's Republic of China
1780:"Taiwan's break with Japan: 1972 Revisted"
253:. Please do not remove this message until
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104:
983:In terms of cultural exchanges, Japanese
824:Premier of the People's Republic of China
527:Learn how and when to remove this message
273:Learn how and when to remove this message
2019:The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
924:
809:
618:
594:
249:Relevant discussion may be found on the
1436:"Michael Schaller: Working Paper No. 2"
1114:
1551:
1540:
185:にほんこくせいふと ちゅうかじんみんきょうわこくせいふの きょうどうせいめい
58:
1621:
1619:
1567:
1565:
1087:Japan-China Joint Declaration of 1998
822:visited the PRC at the invitation of
351:, the Japanese government during the
311:an Asia-Pacific anti-hegemony clause;
7:
1535:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim010030016
1126:
1124:
1122:
1120:
1118:
547:voted to admit the PRC into the UN.
465:adding citations to reliable sources
423:1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China
2038:Foreign relations of Post-war Japan
554:under the auspices of the US and a
417:and next cabinet of Prime Minister
363:uramini mukuiruni tokuwo motte suru
27:1972 treaty between Japan and China
779:benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
684:Negotiations between Japan and PRC
432:
373:
335:
25:
1404:A New Modern History of East Asia
1176:Journal of Modern Chinese History
389:Chinese Communist Party chairman
53:Joint Communiqué of PRC and Japan
441:
228:
43:
34:
1631:digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org
1627:"Wilson Center Digital Archive"
1464:digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org
1092:Official development assistance
1003:Disputed Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands
545:United Nations General Assembly
452:needs additional citations for
147:
1778:Kijima, Joji (18 April 2004).
1752:Kokubun, Ryosei (March 2017).
476:"Japan–China Joint Communiqué"
207:
126:
96:
82:
1:
1942:. Harvard Univ Asia Center.
1188:10.1080/17535654.2013.780734
62:Japan–China Joint Communiqué
1889:Bellows, Thomas J. (1976).
1082:Foreign relations of Taiwan
990:Japanese Imperial Household
708:lawful government of China.
612:and PRC's Foreign Minister
362:
255:conditions to do so are met
2089:
2053:Treaties concluded in 1972
1813:Diplomacy & Statecraft
1796:on 2020-02-05 – via
1731:10.1177/000944557501100304
1077:Foreign relations of Japan
1072:Foreign relations of China
734:Draft of joint declaration
397:(right), February 21, 1972
374:Japan's relations with PRC
336:Japan's relations with ROC
295:People's Republic of China
1825:10.1080/09592299708406036
1798:SOAS University of London
1586:10.1017/S0305741000010961
1235:10.1017/S0009443901000079
1217:Yoshihide, Soeya (2001).
347:from 1895 to 1945. After
218:
191:
184:
170:
103:
66:
1963:Ross, Robert S. (1986).
1761:Nihon No Gaiko Dai 4 Kan
670:Liberal Democratic Party
77:Traditional Chinese
1350:Morino, Tomozo (1991).
898:Reactions of the public
831:Chinese Communist Party
433:UN's recognition of PRC
91:Simplified Chinese
1550:Cite journal requires
1412:10.14220/9783737007085
1009:Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands
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674:Japan Communist Party
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388:
331:Before the communique
2068:China–Japan treaties
1789:: 13. Archived from
541:Nixon administration
461:improve this article
409:After the economic "
171:日本国政府と中華人民共和国政府の共同声明
1574:The China Quarterly
1223:The China Quarterly
1015:Japan–ROC relations
966:Japan–PRC relations
946:and Vice President
678:China joined the UN
586:Terms of communique
427:Shanghai Communiqué
325:Potsdam Declaration
242:of this article is
97:中华人民共和国政府与日本政府的联合声明
83:中華人民共和國政府與日本政府的聯合聲明
1440:nsarchive2.gwu.edu
1037:Tiananmen Massacre
1005:
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2033:Treaties of Japan
1949:978-0-674-00960-8
1421:978-3-8471-0708-8
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591:Initial proposals
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1969:World Politics
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450:This section
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419:Kakuei Tanaka
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395:Richard Nixon
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1791:the original
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1725:(3): 33–50.
1722:
1719:China Report
1718:
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1675:
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1658:. Retrieved
1654:
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1634:. Retrieved
1630:
1577:
1573:
1543:cite journal
1491:(1): 32–37.
1488:
1485:Asian Survey
1484:
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1467:. Retrieved
1463:
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1443:. Retrieved
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1362:(2): 87–94.
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459:Please help
454:verification
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202:Romanization
121:Hanyu Pinyin
71:Chinese name
1229:: 130–146.
560:Third World
411:Nixon shock
380:Eisaku Sato
2073:Zhou Enlai
2027:Categories
1767:: 111–142.
1660:2020-02-06
1636:2020-02-06
1469:2021-09-15
1445:2021-09-15
1109:References
971:improved.
842:Ji Pengfei
835:Mao Zedong
827:Zhou Enlai
787:countries.
666:Zhou Enlai
614:Ji Pengfei
556:moratorium
487:newspapers
391:Mao Zedong
343:was under
263:April 2022
240:neutrality
2005:153491476
1989:1086-3338
1915:0004-4687
1868:0004-4687
1833:0959-2296
1739:153699407
1696:0004-4687
1610:154847154
1594:0305-7410
1505:0004-4687
1376:0065-0684
1329:0030-851X
1286:0030-851X
1251:154299453
1243:1468-2648
1204:144958541
1196:1753-5654
1153:0004-4687
1011:dispute.
961:Aftermath
885:hegemony.
833:chairman
680:in 1971.
251:talk page
1061:See also
1050:Cold War
415:election
293:and the
244:disputed
142:Jyutping
1997:2010238
1923:2643160
1876:2642996
1704:2642996
1513:2642917
1384:1173880
1337:2672024
1294:2672024
1161:2643340
980:sides.
783:manner.
642:Komeito
501:scholar
353:Yoshida
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341:Taiwan
2001:S2CID
1993:JSTOR
1919:JSTOR
1872:JSTOR
1794:(PDF)
1783:(PDF)
1757:(PDF)
1735:S2CID
1700:JSTOR
1606:S2CID
1598:JSTOR
1509:JSTOR
1380:JSTOR
1333:JSTOR
1290:JSTOR
1247:S2CID
1200:S2CID
1157:JSTOR
1094:(ODA)
903:Japan
604:Japan
508:JSTOR
494:books
291:Japan
165:Kanji
1985:ISSN
1944:ISBN
1911:ISSN
1864:ISSN
1829:ISSN
1692:ISSN
1590:ISSN
1556:help
1501:ISSN
1416:ISBN
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