Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963–1969

2109:

major offensives in late 1966 and in early 1967, and more troops were needed to support these and other planned operations. As a result of these deployments, United States forces were scattered from the DMZ to the Mekong Delta by mid-1967. Opposition to the war, meanwhile, was mounting in the United States; and among the Vietnamese facing one another in the South, the rising cost of men and resources was beginning to take its toll on both sides. The level of PLAF volunteers declined to less than 50 percent in 1967 and desertions rose, resulting in an even greater increase in northern troop participation. Morale declined among communist sympathizers and Saigon government supporters alike. In elections held in South Vietnam in September 1967, former generals Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Nguyen Cao Ky were elected president and vice president, respectively. A number of popular candidates, including Buddhists and peace candidates, were barred from running, and newspapers were largely suppressed during the campaign. Even so, the military candidates received less than 35 percent of the vote, although the election took place only in areas under the Saigon government's control. When proof of widespread election fraud was produced by the defeated candidates, students and Buddhists demonstrated and demanded that the elections be annulled.

2233:

forced out of all of the towns and cities, except Huế, within a few weeks. Nevertheless, the offensive emphasized to the Johnson administration that victory in Vietnam would require a greater commitment of men and resources than the American people were willing to invest. The American public was shocked and dismayed; for the newly anti-war side, they realized that the American military command had been dangerously overoptimistic in its appraisal of the situation in Vietnam, and dishonest in their reports to the public. For the pro-war side, the Tet Offensive was proof that the military was being

264: 483: 844:, INR saw the priority during this period as more a matter of establishing a viable, sustainable political structure for South Vietnam, rather than radically improving the short-term security situation. It saw the Minh-Tho government as enjoying an initial period of popular support as it removed some of the most disliked aspects of the Diem government. During this time, the increase in VC attacks was largely coincidental; they were resulting from the VC having reached a level of offensive capability rather than capitalizing on the overthrow of Diem. 409: 309: 495: 219: 171: 287: 321: 360: 434: 347: 383: 183: 159: 1936: 147: 1810:

influenced by his experience during the Korean War. Mac Bundy saw this as a fascinating set of operational problems. I think he assumed that we were so clever, somehow we could find the key hook. For myself, I had a whole different set of experiences. As a practicing lawyer, I had had among my clients various agencies of the French government when they went through the Indo-Chinese experience. I had heard everything before.

470: 396: 207: 195: 4117: 4107: 1068:, rejected, if they seriously considered, the protracted war doctrine stated by Mao and restated by the DRV leadership, mirror-imaging that they would be reasonable by American standards, and see that they could not prevail against steady escalation. They proposed to defeat an enemy, through attrition of his forces, who guided by the Maoist doctrine of Protracted War, which itself assumed it would attrit the 458: 446: 234: 1697:

because "what the situation requires may exceed what the Vietnamese can be expected to do." He proposed a U.S. division be sent preferentially to the Central Highlands (II Vietnamese corps area; Kon Tum, Pleiku, and Darlac provinces) or to the Bien Hoa/Tan Son Nhut area nearer to Saigon. McNamara, however, did not think such action would make enough ARVN troops available and preferred that a

58: 276: 421: 521: 508: 334: 4127: 1282:

seize the opportunities to win victories in a not too long a period of time...There is no contradiction in the concept of a protracted war and the concept of taking opportunities to gain victories in a short time." Protracted war theory, however, does not urge rapid conclusion. Palmer suggests that there might be at least two reasons beyond a simple speedup:

1996:

technical aid, local self-government, and land distribution to peasant farmers. A majority of tenant farmers received title to their own land in one of the most successful transfer projects in any nation. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of peasants entered squalid refugee camps when CORDS moved them out of villages that could not be protected.

922:

and limited strikes on logistical targets supporting DRV operations against South Vietnam and Laos, to strikes (if necessary) on a growing number of DRV military and economic targets. In the absence of all-out strikes by the DRV or Communist China, the measures foreseen would not include attacks on population centers or the use of nuclear weapons.

254: 1524:, to organize the effort in the south. The sending of a headquarters, however, is not obvious. North Vietnamese combat units started deploying in October, but, again, this was preparation. Reasonably, they wanted to know the outcome of the November 1964 Presidential election before assessing the potential for U.S. action. 1729:, wrote to McNamara and others that the ROLLING THUNDER campaign was not a serious deterrent to the DRV, and warned against putting more U.S. troops into combat roles. McCone said that this would merely encourage the Soviets and Chinese to take a low-risk course of supporting infiltration. Khanh, in mid-April, met with 1826:, 50 miles northeast of Saigon near the Cambodian border. Its capital, Songbe, was overrun. Song Be was primarily defended by irregular ARVN units, although supported by a Special Forces team and several miscellaneous units. An unprecedented amount of air support, including the first use of a company-sized 1484:. Pike said he could almost hear Trường Chinh saying, "You see, it's what I mean. You're not going to win militarily on the ground in the South. You've just proven what we've said; the way to win is in Washington." Alternatively, Giáp, in September 1967, had written what might well have been a political 2169:

Subsequent actions in April and May were more holding actions than anything decisive; again, the goal may have been simply to pin forces while affecting American public opinion and politics. The North Vietnamese 320th Division fought the U.S. 3rd Marine Division i the area north of Dong Ha, resulting

2108:

In mid-1967, with United States troop levels close to the half million mark, Westmoreland requested 80,000 additional troops for immediate needs and indicated that further requests were being contemplated. United States forces in Tây Ninh, Bình Định, Quảng Ngãi, and Dinh Tuong provinces had initiated

1842:

Westmoreland, on 7 June, sent a message to CINCPAC that a VC summer offensive was underway, not yet at its full potential, both to destroy RVN forces and isolate (but not hold) key towns. He doubted the South Vietnamese capability to cope, largely due to recent troop losses. To prevent what he called

1704:

GEN Johnson said a decision was needed "now to determine what the Vietnamese should be expected to do for themselves and how much more the U.S. must contribute directly to the security of South Vietnam." Secretary McNamara noted in the margin: "Policy is: anything that will strengthen the position of

1512:

covert operations were small-unit, weather was not a determining factor. started, although these were primarily psychological warfare at first. Planning for guerilla operations in the North and, although no Americans knew the North Vietnamese fear of such, actions against the Trail in Laos were still

926:

Further assumptions is that the U.S. would inform the DRV, China, and the Soviet Union that these attacks were of limited purpose, but show serious intent by additional measures including sending a new 5,000 troops and air elements to Thailand; deploying strong air, naval, and ground strike forces to

811:

There were numerous ARVN and VC raids, of battalion size, for which only RVN losses or body count is available. They took place roughly monthly. In the great casualty lists of a war, 100–300 casualties may not seem an immense number, but these have to be considered as happening at least once a month,

2173:

A second Tet assault on Saigon, complete with rocket attacks, was launched in May. Through these and other attacks in the spring and summer of 1968, the Communists kept up pressure on the battlefield in order to strengthen their position in a projected a series of four-party peace talks scheduled to

1970:

1966 was the year of considerable improvement of command relationships, still under Westmoreland, for what Westmoreland considered the less interesting "other war" of rural development. There were frequent changes of names of aspects of this mission, starting in 1964, but eventually, the GVN and US

965:

Despite differences in were both sides believe their centres of gravity were, the NVA and Viet Cong would retain strategic initiative throughout this period, choosing when and were to attack, and being capable of controlling their losses quite widely. They were estimated to have initiated 90% of all

2228:

The Nixon Administration embarked upon a policy of "Vietnamization", or turning over ground combat to the South Vietnamese. Despite the name, significant numbers of American troops continued to fight in Vietnam in 1969 and onward; the scaling back was gradual, and the US continued to support South

1922:

McNamara also observed that the Administration's approach to air war against the North, Rolling Thunder, had not "produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that SVN is on the run and near collapse;

1918:

At Defense, McNamara agreed the situation was worse, but believed the situation might be retrieved: "The situation in SVN is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. . . . The central highlands could well

1889:

It is clear that no military personnel were part of the inner circle of discussion, but there are different descriptions of the degree to which they were consulted. McNamara said "I spent countless hours with the Joint Chiefs" debating Westmoreland's thinking. McNamara did have a small staff group,

1850:

Even then, he told Lyndon Johnson, they would be a stopgap, with at least 100,000 more needed in 1966. For Johnson, it was a choice between deeper involvement or defeat. McNamara said this cable was the most disturbing of the war; it forced a major decision and discussions with the President on the

1800:

The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment becomes unreliable, the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. So long as the South Vietnamese are prepared to fight

1788:

Westmoreland, in early June, saw the situation as close to collapse without a major commitment of ground troops, in addition to the ARVN. This triggered several weeks of intense debate among the President's close civilian advisers, with McNamara controlling all direct military input to the process.

1696:

to assess the situation, already doubting the air offensive before it seriously began. GEN Johnson reported, in Vietnam between 5 and 12 March, reported back on 14 March. He was seriously concerned about the situation, and proposed external forces be brought in to free the ARVN for offensive action

1281:

stated the conflict as less the classic, protracted war of Maoist doctrine, and the destabilization of doctrine under Khrushchev, than a decision that it was possible to accelerate. "on the one hand we must thoroughly understand the guideline for a protracted struggle, but on the other hand we must

794:

led a reconnaissance mission of specialists reporting directly to the Politburo, who said, in a 1981 interview with Stanley Karnow, that he saw the only choice was escalation including the use of conventional troops, capitalizing on the unrest and inefficiency from the series of coups in the South.

693:

And since we still did not recognize the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and North Vietnamese as nationalist in nature, we never realized that encouraging public identification between Khanh and the U.S. may have only reinforced in the minds of many Vietnamese that his government drew its support not

2075:

In 1967, the NVA organization in the northwest was under two Military Regions (MR), MR-4 north and south of the DMZ, and MR-5 (also known as MR-S) for Communist units in the northern part of South Vietnam. Essentially, the MR-4 command was conventional while MR-5 was guerilla. MR-4 commanded five

1833:

On 10 June, the VC made another two-regiment attack on Đồng Xoài, north of Saigon, using one regiment against the town and Special Forces camp, while preparing an ambush for an ARVN relief force with the other. ARVN leadership disintegrated, and, contrary to policy, American advisers took command.

1721:

As these proposals were made to the North, on 13 April 1965, joint RVN-US discussions agreed that the ARVN force levels were inadequate. The manning level was increased, to increase RVN infantry battalions from 119 to 150. The new battalions were generally added to existing regiments, to avoid the

1668:

Ambassador Taylor, a retired general with extensive combat experience, objected. His calculation was that one battalion would protect the base from any plausible direct VC ground attack, but that six, not three, battalions would be necessary to establish a sufficiently large area to prevent the VC

1596:

plan, which had not yet officially started. Alternatively, the North Vietnamese may have accepted the risk of being bombed, correctly predicting that even if ground troops were introduced, the U.S. would not risk the North's greatest fear: large-scale ground operations, beyond the South Vietnamese

1516:

The February 1964 attack on U.S. forces at Kon Tum signaled a policy change; the North Vietnamese had previously not struck directly at Americans. As well as raids, terrorist attacks against Americans increased, in keeping with the changed political theory, or, as Truong Chinh put it, to "properly

1268:

Westmoreland complained that, "we are not engaging the VC with sufficient frequency or effectiveness to win the war in Vietnam." He said that American troops had shown themselves to be superb soldiers, adept at carrying out attacks against base areas and mounting sustained operations in populated

1257:

To pacify the Republic of Vietnam by destroying the VC—his forces, organization, terrorists, agents, and propagandists—while at the same time reestablishing the government apparatus, strengthening GVN military forces, rebuilding the administrative machinery, and re-instituting the services of the

957:

of the opposition, rather than the political opposition or the security of the populace. In contrast, the North Vietnamese took a centre of gravity built around gradual and small-scale erosion of US capabilities, closing the enormous technological disadvantage with surprise attacks and strategies,

921:

The actions to be taken, primarily air and naval, with the GVN (US-assisted) operations against the DRV and Communist-held Laos, and might subsequently include overt US military actions. They would be on a graduated scale of intensity, ranging from reconnaissance, threats, cross-border operations,

860:

Col. Don Si Nguyen brought in battalions of engineers to improve the Trail, principally in Laos, with up-to-date Soviet and Chinese construction equipment, with a goal, over several years, of building a supply route that could pass 10 to 20,000 soldiers per month. At this time, the U.S. had little

847:

During this period, INR observed, in a 23 December paper, the U.S. needed to reexamine its strategy focused on the Strategic Hamlet Program, since it was getting much more accurate – if pessimistic – from the new government than it had from Diem. Secretary McNamara, however, testified to the House

831:

Ambassador Lodge resigned on 23 June, with General Taylor named to replace him. In the next two days, the ARVN would succeed with Operation Thang Lang-Hai Yen 79 on the Dinh Tuong–Kien Phuong Sector border, killing 99 VC, followed the next day by an attack on a training camp in Quảng Ngãi, killing

2084:

In Saigon, the political situation began to calm in 1967, with the rise of Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to the head of the South Vietnamese government. Thieu's ascent to the presidency stabilized the government and ended a long series of military juntas that had administered the country since Diem's removal.

1995:

Westmoreland was principally interested only in covert military operations, while Abrams looked at a broader picture. MACV advisors did work closely with 900,000 local GVN officials in a well-organized pacification program called CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development.) It stressed

1580:

In December 1964, the Viet Cong launched coordinated attacks throughout Vietnam, including a Christmas Eve attack on a Saigon hotel (killing two Americans, wounding 58 others) and 28 December 1964 occupation of the Catholic village of Binh Gia 40 miles SE of Saigon. Ultimately seven battalions of

1488:

argument: the U.S. was faced with two unacceptable alternatives: invading the North or continue a stalemate. Invasion of "a member country of the Socialist camp" would enlarge the war, which Giap said would cause the "U. S. imperialists...incalculable serious consequences." As for reinforcements,

1329:

capability of the 1st Cav, so BG Man revised a plan to bring to try to fight the helicopter-mobile forces on terms favorable to the North Vietnamese. They fully expected to incur heavy casualties, but it would be worth it if they could learn to counter the new U.S. techniques, inflict significant

883:

appeared on the organization charts. Its overt name was "MACV Studies and Operations Group". In reality, it was the Special Operations Group, with CIA agent programs for the North gradually moving under MACV control – although SOG almost always had a CIA officer in its third-ranking position, the

2232:

The Tet offensive is widely viewed as a turning point in the war despite the high cost to the communists (approximately 32,000 killed and about 5,800 captured) for what appeared at the time to be small gains. Although they managed to retain control of some of the rural areas, the communists were

1983:

RD is the integrated military and civil process to restore, consolidate and expand government control so that nation building can progress throughout the Republic of Vietnam. It consists of those coordinated military and civil actions to liberate the people from Viet Cong control; restore public

1885:

ruled out withdrawal, but did not think escalation would help, unless the ARVN did netter; he was concerned that too large an intervention would create a "white man's war", with the U.S. replaying the role of the French in the endgame in Indochina. Ball, in his oral history interview, deprecated

1527:

Both sides, in mid-1964, were misreading one another. On the U.S. side, the Defense Department's Joint War Gaming Agency conducted the Sigma II-64 war game in mid-September, which concluded that the full air attack program proposed by the JCS would not have a major effect. Neither bombing of the

717:

promised more aid and additional money, weapons, and supplies were sent with little effect. Some policy-makers in Washington began to believe that Diem was incapable of defeating the communists, and some even feared that he might make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. Discussions then began in Washington

1809:

Bob McNamara was analyzing this thing as a man who was trained in quantification, who believed in systems analysis, who believed in application of games theory to strategy, who was enormously persuaded by the disparity in military power... Rusk, it was quite a different thing. He was enormously

1113:

There were, however, changes in the overall situation from early 1964 to the winter of 1965–1966, from 1966 to late 1967, and from late 1968 until the U.S. policy changes with the Nixon Administration. Nixon's papers show that in 1968, as a presidential candidate, he ordered Anna Chennault, his

807:

In February and March 1964, confirming the December decision, there was more emphasis on military action and less attention to negotiation. As opposed to many analysts who believed the North was simply unaware of McNamara's "signaling"; INR thought that the North was concerned of undefined U.S.

782:

INR determined that the North Vietnamese had, in December, adopted a more aggressive stance toward the South, which was in keeping with Chinese policy. This tended to be confirmed with more military action and less desire to negotiate in February and March 1964 Duiker saw the political dynamics

909:

To understand factors that contributed to the heightened readiness in the Gulf, it must be understood that MACV-SOG OPPLAN 34A naval operations had been striking the coast in the days immediately before the incident, and at least some North Vietnamese naval patrols were deployed against these.

2052:

Starting in mid-February 1966, patrols detected indications of a pending VC attack against the A Shau Special Forces camp, whose mission was surveillance of infiltration from the nearby Laotian border. Continuous attacks on 9–10 March overran the camp, with a disorderly retreat losing several

1600:

The Pleiku attack seems to have been a vital decision point for the U.S. While the introduction of U.S. ground troops had been discussed for years, there were no specific plans. Bundy's memorandum to Johnson about the attack, on 7 February, did not propose the introduction of combat troops.

1633:. While there were occasional strikes on the DMZ and the southern part of the DRV from bases in the South, especially when South Vietnamese aircraft participated, the U.S. bases in the RVN primarily supported operations there. Da Nang was the primary South Vietnamese base for such strikes. 641:, a widespread campaign by the communist forces to attack across all of South Vietnam; while the offensive was largely repelled, it was a strategic success in seeding doubt as to the long-term viability of the South Vietnamese state. This phase of the war lasted until the election of 1919:

be lost to the NLF during this monsoon season. Since 1 June, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken...The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is "executive agent" for a directorate of generals."

1644:

of only a few miles' range. As Flaming Dart progressed and the detailed planning for the major air escalation of Rolling Thunder, Westmoreland was concerned about the security of the exposed U.S. air bases in the south. On 22 February, he sent his deputy, Lieutenant General

1456:

never let them develop the "second wave" or "third phase" "We don't ever know what the second wave was; we have never been able to find out because probably only a couple of dozen people knew it." The description of the three fighting methods is consistent with the work of

2112:

Late in 1967, Westmoreland said that it was conceivable that in two years or less U.S. forces could be phased out of the war, turning over more and more of the fighting to the ARVN. He should have known better. This readiness of the enemy to remain fixed in place inspired

1905:

gave him all the authority he needed, and, indeed, Senators both opposed and supporting the escalation did not believe it was a proper matter for Congressional debate. Much later, McNamara wrote that it was wrong not to have that debate, even if it encouraged the enemy.

1713:

Johnson's main public announcement at the time, however, was an 7 April speech, in which he offered economic support to North Vietnam, and Southeast Asia in general, if it would stop military action. This offer was quite in keeping with his goals for development, the

652:

One of the main problems that the joint forces faced was continuing weakness in the South Vietnamese government, along with a perceived lack of stature among the generals who rose up to lead it after the original government of Diem was deposed. Coups in

1914:

Before the 1 July 1965 presentation to Johnson, McGeorge Bundy suggested that he "listen hard to George Ball and then reject his proposal", and pick between McNamara's and William Bundy's recommendations; McNamara would "tone down" his recommendations.

1359:

Putting simultaneous pressure on Plei Me and Pleiku, so II CTZ would need to call in U.S. reinforcements; this is what became the Battle of the Ia Drang in popular Western terms, but has been called either the U.S. Battle of the Ia Drang or the Pleiku

2144:

Robert E. Cushman Jr., who had relieved General Walt, was "unduly complacent." worried about what he perceived as the Marine command's "lack of followup in supervision", its employment of helicopters, and its generalship. Westmoreland sent his deputy

2120:

Most of the PAVN/NLF operational capability was possible only because of the unhindered movement of men along the Hồ Chí Minh Trail. Indeed, the PAVN was doing just that. MACV used this opportunity to field its latest technology against the PAVN.

1834:

The VC ambushes were extremely effective against ARVN relief forces, which were committed one battalion at a time, until the ARVN ran out of reserves. Among the forces destroyed was the 7th Airborne Battalion, one of the best units in the ARVN.

1779:

division replacing the Marines in central Vietnam, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade for the Bien Hoa/Vũng Tàu area near Saigon. Early, CINCPAC had objected to the use of the 173rd, since it was the primary strategic reserve for Pacific Command.

2752: 1528:

North itself, nor of the Ho Chi Minh trail, greatly threatened thinking in the Politburo. Unknown to the U.S., their greatest fear was a major ground operation to cut the trail, which, indeed, would have meant entering Laos and Cambodia.

4160: 2539:

Director of Central Intelligence for the U.S. Intelligence Board (25 May 1964), "Special National Intelligence Estimate 50-2-64: Probable Consequences with Respect to Certain U.S. Actions toward Vietnam and Laos", in Prados, John (ed.),

1234:

Even with these three approaches, there was still significant doubt, in the U.S. government, that the war could be ended with a military solution that would place South Vietnam in a strongly anticommunist position. In July, two senior

1660:

The President approved sending two Marine battalions on 26 February. Other than possibly Westmoreland, they were seen purely as defensive troops. Westmoreland denies assuming they would be available for missions outside the base. The

1760:

Westmoreland obtained Taylor's agreement on a plan for reinforcement. It had three phases, the first two establishing security for Allied bases and then an offensive strategy, beginning with enclaves on the coast, and moving inland.

3287: 1500:

Throughout the intensified war, it should be noticed the Vietnamese weather enforced seasonal offensives. Typically, there was a winter-spring offensive, from perhaps November to March, and a summer offensive, separated by rainy or

1465:. Trà's analysis (see above) was that while the concept of the General Offensive-General Uprising was drawn up by the Politburo in 1965, the orders to implement it did not reach the operational headquarters until late October 1967. 2011:

There was an increasing intensity to use air power in Cambodia and Laos, accelerating in July. In some, but not all cases, the Cambodian or Laotian governments were secretly consulted, but in other cases, U.S. aircraft, especially

1628:

It must be emphasized that for most of the war, the bulk of the attacks on the North came, at first, from Navy carriers offshore. When the bombing escalated, they were joined by U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers flying from bases in

1757:, about 100 miles from Saigon, on 11 May. Much farther in the north, later in the month, they ambushed an ARVN force in the north, near Quảng Ngãi, badly hurting ARVN relief troops and leaving two battalions combat ineffective. 1546:

North Vietnam received foreign military aid shipments through its ports and rail system. This materiel (and PAVN manpower) was then shuttled south down the logistical corridor called by the Americans the Ho Chi Minh Trail (the

808:

action on the North and sought Chinese support. If INR's analysis is correct, the very signals mentioned in the March 1965 McNaughton memo, which was very much concerned with Chinese involvement, may have brought it closer.

1551:

Strategic Supply Route to the North Vietnamese). At the end of an arduous journey the men and supplies entered South Vietnam's border areas. Beginning in December 1964, however, the U.S. began a covert aerial interdiction

1604:

Johnson made no public announcements, although the U.S. press reported it. The attack was carried out by U.S. Navy aviators from an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea. Flaming Dart II was a response to an attack on

930:

It was estimated that while there would be a strong diplomatic and propaganda response, the DRV and its allies would "refrain from dramatic new attacks, and refrain from raising the level of insurrection for the moment."

1215:. Westmoreland, in a 26 March message, said that it would take six months for air attacks to take effect, and third-country ground troops were needed immediately. Westmoreland stated "search and destroy" as a goal in May 966:

contacts and engagement firefights, in which 46% of all engagements were NVA/VC ambushes against US forces. A different study by the department of defence breaks down the types of engagements from a periodic study here.

2190:

doctrine that tends to use air rather than substantial artillery. The 3rd would usually colocate an infantry battalion command post with the firebase, from which the infantry companies would move by foot or helicopter.

3502: 927:

the Western Pacific and South China Sea; and providing substantial reinforcement to the South. The U.S. would avoid further Geneva talks until it was established that they would not improve the Communist position.

1536:

What worries me most is that they will send in troops or use choppers to send some commandos or drop paratroopers, who would then occupy a chunk of the trail. This would throw the entire complicated system out of

1375:, and used obvious helicopters to cause the PAVN to retreat onto very reasonable paths to break away from the Americans – but different Americans had silently set ambushes, earlier, across those escape routes. 815:

For example, on 23 March 1964, ARVN forces in Operation Phuong Hoang 13-14/10, Dien Phong Sector, raids a VC battalion in a fortified village, killing 126. On 13 April, however, the VC overran Kien Long (near

1890:

headed by John McNaughton, who obtained technical assistance from the Joint Staff, but did not have participation from the JCS proper. McMaster, however, cites George Ball as saying that McNamara lied to the

1293:

They may also have believed the long-trumpeted U.S. maxim of never getting involved in a land war in Asia, and that the U.S. was too concerned with Chinese intervention to use airpower outside South Vietnam.

1843:

collapse, he wanted to double the size of his forces, with 34 U.S. and 10 South Korean battalions comprising 175,000 men; thus the message has been called the "44 battalion request." The State Department's

2202:

North Vietnamese actions certainly were dependent on the result of the U.S. 1968 Presidential election, and what they saw as a new environment under Nixon. Several factors caused change in U.S. strategy:

2140:, consisting of what amounted to two Army divisions, two reinforced Marine Divisions, a Marine aircraft wing, and supporting forces, numbering well over 100,000. GEN Westmoreland believed that Marine 2765: 2045:

Starting on 20 December 1965, the non-Communist forces held an 84-hour ceasefire for Tet, which was the culmination of a psychological warfare program to encourage Communist defections under the

2412: 1718:, in the United States, and was likely a sincere offer. That he saw such an offer as attractive to the enemy, however, is an indication of his lack of understanding of the opposing ideology. 4012: 1681:

plan on 13 March, the Da Nang security force arrived on 8 March. in response to Westmoreland's request of 22 February reflecting a concern with VC forces massing near the Marine air base at

3300: 1665:

suggest he did see a wider mission, but there is no strong evidence that he did; these troops were the first U.S. land combat forces committed to the Asian mainland since the Korean War.

1657:

and supporting elements, were needed to ensure its defense. Westmoreland, according to Davidson, believed a two-battalion MEB was more politically acceptable, but submitted that request.

1868: 1138:, or "struggle", where the goal coupling military and political initiatives alongside each-other; there are both military and organisational measures that support the political goal. 1131: 959: 953:, in selecting a strategy in 1965, had assumed the enemy forces were assumed that much as the defeat of the Axis military had won the Second World War, the Communist military was the 1378:

By late 1966, however, North Vietnam began a buildup in the northwest area of the theater, in Laos, the southernmost part of the DRV, the DMZ, and in the northern part of the RVN.

1669:

firing on Da Nang with standard and easily portable 81mm mortars. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed, and forwarded Westmoreland's request, with their agreement, on 26 February.

3892: 1489:"Even if they increase their troops by another 50,000, 100,000 or more, they cannot extricate themselves from their comprehensive stalemate in the southern part of our country." 4164: 3537: 1072:. An alternative view, considering overall security as the center of gravity, was shared by the Marine leadership and some other U.S. government centers of opinion, including 629:

countries increased their support, sending large scale combat forces into South Vietnam; at its height in 1969, slightly more than 400,000 American troops were deployed. The

1584:

If the Politburo had assumed the U.S. would not use airpower against the North, they were disabused by the outcome of a 6 February 1965 VC attack attacked U.S. facilities at

1867:

Considerable internal discussion took place among the President's key civilian advisers, with the main four papers presented to Johnson on 1 July, with a covering memo from

4120: 774:, on 21 December, to select the least risky operations on 21 December, which delivered a report on 2 January 1964, for the first operational phase to begin on 1 February. 726:

allegedly aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow Diem. To help deal with the post-coup chaos, Kennedy increased the number of US advisors in South Vietnam to 16,000.

2149:

to take command of I Corps, and gave his Air Force commander control of Marine aviation. The Marines protested vehemently but were rebuffed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3683: 1984:

security; initiate political, economic and social development; extend effective Government of Vietnam authority; and win the willing support of people toward these ends.

1425:

January–March 1968: "independent" fighting methods, often small, such as the squads that hit the U.S. Embassy. The operational message was that there were no safe areas.

1099:. The former was the priority for U.S. forces, as of 1965, assuming the South Vietnamese had to take the lead in pacification. Arguably, however, there were three wars: 637:

fought back, keeping to countryside strongholds while the anti-communist allied forces tended to control the cities. The most notable conflict of this era was the 1968

884:

second-in-command being an Air Force officer. The U.S. had a shortage of covert operators with Asian experience in general. Ironically, Assistant Secretary of State

2093:

Laos and Cambodia also had their own indigenous communist insurgencies to deal with. These regular government forces were supported by the CIA and the bombs of the

1492:

The answer may be somewhere in between: Giáp indeed wanted to draw American forces away from the coastal urban areas, but tried too hard for a victory at Khe Sanh.

1461:, who commanded forces in the south but died, possibly of natural causes, in 1967; Thanh may very well have been among those couple of dozen. Thanh was replaced by 898:

has components from all the services, there is a regional Special Operations Component, alongside Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Components, in every geographic

760:

Paramilitary operations, such as raids and sabotage against facilities that were significant to the admittedly weak economy, and stronger security, of North Vietnam

3522: 605:. At the start of the decade, United States aid to South Vietnam consisted largely of supplies with approximately 900 military observers and trainers. After the 3342: 2174:

begin in January 1969 that called for representatives of the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front to meet in Paris.

1196:

Some fundamental decisions about U.S. strategy, which would last for the next several years, took place in 1965. Essentially, there were three alternatives:

4024: 2163: 2003:(part of CORDS with a strong CIA component) GVN police identified and arrested (and sometimes killed) the NLF secret police agents engaged in assassination. 1363:

An ARVN counteroffensive against the PAVN troops retreating into Cambodia, an action fought by the ARVN Airborne Brigade with U.S. air and artillery support.

1286:

The Politburo wanted to prevent Southern Communist dominance in an eventual victory, so by introducing Northern troops, they could take away that opportunity

677:, the Party concluded, the "United States was forced to introduce its own troops because it was losing the war. It had lost the political game in Vietnam." 662: 1701:

division be sent rather than U.S. troops. GEN Johnson also suggested a four-division force be raised under the SEATO treaty and used to block infiltration.

1330:

casualties on the U.S. Army, and, if very lucky, still cut II CTZ in half. That planned movement was very similar to the successful PAVN maneuver in 1975.

1805:

Second, the principals viewed the situation with their own experiential and analytical filters, well articulated by Ball in an oral history interview.

1126:

While the discussion following splits into military and political/civil strategies, that is a Western perspective. North Vietnamese forces took a more

879:

Before the operations scheduled by the Krulak committee could be attempted, there had to be an organization to carry them out. An obscure group called

4266: 4060: 1851:

9th and 10th. In a telephone conversation afterwards, McNamara told Johnson that he personally had limitations in mind, but he did not think that the

1371:

approximately a month later, which extended into 1966, 1st Cav drew their own lessons from what they believed the PAVN developed as countertactics to

1114:

liaison to the South Vietnam government, to persuade them to refuse a cease-fire being brokered by President Lyndon Johnson. This action violated the

649:, or ending the direct involvement and phased withdrawal of U.S. combat troops and giving the main combat role back to the South Vietnamese military. 4316: 4186: 4017: 3235: 1730: 1689: 895: 2790: 1768:

U.S. forces, in coordination with the RVN, would make deep patrols and limited offensives, still centered on the bases, to pre-empt direct threats.

4281: 3948: 3697: 1297:

Once the elections were over, North Vietnam developed a new plan to move from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia, in central Vietnam (i.e., ARVN

1145:

and with US Withdrawal, once the United States was no longer likely to intervene, the North Vietnamese changed to a conventional, combined-arms

766:

Selected raids as well as reconnaissance to direct air strikes, with more of a tactical goal than the economic and security actions of category

3462: 2475: 2101:

made a deal with the Chinese in 1965 that allowed North Vietnamese forces to establish permanent bases in his country and to use the port of

1891: 1879:

was the most strongly opposed to escalation. Ball had been, since October 1964, sending Johnson memoranda saying "we should cut our losses."

903: 747: 2085:

Despite this, the Americanization of the war clearly showed that the South Vietnamese were incapable of defending the country on their own.

3547: 2978: 1322: 1212: 1092: 1077: 914: 3991: 3270: 2565:"The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 4, Chapter 2, "US Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965–1968, pp. 277–604, 4th section" 1886:

William Bundy's influence, "he was not one of the top three or four people that were always talking to the President about these things."

2030:

was effectively a continuation a month later. These were significant for a variety of reasons, first because the Communists first used a

4311: 4286: 4276: 4075: 4042: 3720: 3115: 2502: 2372: 2297: 1844: 1588:, killing 8 and destroying 10 aircraft. President Johnson, on 7–8 February, responded with the first specifically retaliatory air raid, 1419: 666: 2564: 1173:, as well as joint "search and destroy" operations against Communists. During this period, the U.S. concept of the joint war developed. 848:

Armed Service Committee, on 27 December, that only a maximum effort of American power could salvage the situation. Two days later, the

817: 743:

organization had not yet been created. There were five broad categories, to be planned in three periods of 4 months each, over a year:

4087: 3931: 3706: 3658: 3016: 2941: 1244: 812:

with a population of perhaps 10 million. It was a grinding war of attrition, with no decision, as death and destruction ground along.

658: 3379: 2194:

The 320th, in August, again moved against the 3rd, south of the Bến Hải River and north of Route 9, between Cam Lo and the Rockpile.

1118:, banning private citizens from intruding into official government negotiations with a foreign nation, and thus constituted treason. 865:, under Russell, was prohibited from any operations in Laos, although SOG was eventually authorized to make cross-border operations. 4306: 4271: 3653: 3416: 3389: 2910: 2269: 1081: 894:

Jack Singlaub, to become the third commander of SOG, argued that special operators needed to form their own identity; while today's

625:

made a policy commitment to safeguard the South Vietnamese regime directly. The American military forces and other anti-communist

1406:

were to fit. If there was a larger plan, to what extent were North Vietnamese actions in the period of this article a part of it?

4321: 4296: 4007: 3648: 3613: 3527: 1726: 1353: 462: 450: 1263:

Source: Directive 525-4 (MACJ3) 17 September 1965: Tactics and Techniques for Employment of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam

4261: 3516: 2900: 1150: 438: 4221: 4216: 4211: 4206: 4201: 4196: 4191: 3557: 3552: 3406: 2871: 1830:

unit, allowed a successful defense. Higher command, however, was concern that this large a VC unit could take an initiative.

1452:

as an analogy for the third phase, although Dien Bien Phu was an isolated, not urban, target. Losing elite troops during the

1161:

Military developments in this period should be considered in several broad phases that do not fit neatly into a single year:

849: 770:

Lyndon Johnson agreed with the idea, but was cautious. He created an interdepartmental review committee, under Major General

2615: 1765:

The first phase extended the security perimeter of the bases so that the facilities were out of range of light artillery. I

4301: 3880: 3070: 2234: 1722:

need of creating more headquarters units. By the end of 1965, twenty-four were either in the field or in training areas.

1313:. This goal at first seemed straightforward, but was reevaluated when major U.S. ground units entered the area, first the 1165:

Gradual intensification, and North Vietnamese exploration of a changed ground environment. Significant events include the

954: 940: 622: 594: 413: 3964: 1855:

had them. Still, McNamara briefed the press on the 16th. Polls supported the escalation, and, when asked for his advice,

913:

Possible consequences of such actions, although not explicitly addressing the OPPLAN34A operations, were assessed by the

704: 4291: 3897: 3643: 2187: 1395: 3820: 2284: 3887: 3532: 2445: 1179:

The 1967–68 campaign, which appears to have had a broader concept, not executed, than the most obvious aspects of the

1073: 757:

Psychological operations against the north to increase tension and division; Colby had already started such operations

3498: 3348: 630: 487: 482: 3909: 1823: 1754: 1277:

In December 1963, the Politburo apparently decided that it was possible to strike for victory in 1965. Theoretician

709:

The situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate with corruption rife throughout the Diem government and the

4256: 4251: 4246: 4241: 4236: 4231: 4226: 4065: 3870: 3734: 3480: 3296: 2761: 2636: 1975:, which was to continue in a variety of development activities. The term, apparently coined by Premier and general 1314: 1302: 1088: 841: 670: 654: 2720: 1741:

to permit the Marines to go beyond static defense, and to start offensive sweeps to find and engage enemy forces.

1625:

they would not be used. In fact, the missiles were used, setting off upward spiral of air attack and air defense.

1428:

Something identified in their message against a large target, a "psychological backbreaker" against a target like

1414:

October–November 1967: "concentrated" fighting methods, with raids against small to medium military bases such as

4070: 4037: 3936: 3739: 3715: 3455: 2019:

VC attacks ranged in size from local bombings to multi-regimental operations, and use of longer-range artillery.

1902: 1678: 1593: 939:

The U.S/RVN and North Vietnam had strategic goals, with very different, and often inaccurate, definitions of the

899: 3585: 2026:, beginning in November 1965, was a response to the start of the 1965–66 Communist winter-spring offensive; the 1801:

for themselves, we cannot abandon them without disaster to peace and to our other interests throughout the world

4092: 3969: 3678: 3542: 3119: 2506: 2376: 2301: 2065:, starting in November 1965, was the first of many "search and destroy" missions launched by the U.S., such as 1236: 832:

50. These successes, however, must be balanced by the Buddhist crisis and the increased instability of Diem.

828:

On 25 April, GEN Westmoreland was named to replace GEN Harkins; an ARVN ambush near Plei Ta Nag killed 84 VC.

3221:

Notes for Memorandum from McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam,"

2328:(1993), "Tet: The 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising", in Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (ed.), 1521: 1458: 3943: 3802: 3711: 3632: 3241: 3131:, vol. George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 121, INR-VN5 2518:, vol. George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 121, INR-VN4 2388:, vol. George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 121, INR-VN4 2313:, vol. George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 121, INR-VN4 2094: 2066: 1569: 1469: 800: 618: 4130: 2325: 1477: 1462: 682: 674: 3974: 3926: 3638: 1976: 1737:, and told them that the war will eventually have to be taken to the North. In April, Johnson changed the 1618: 1589: 1298: 1269:

areas. Yet, the operational initiative— decisions to engage and disengage—continued to be with the enemy.

1166: 906:, but special operators were regarded as outcasts, unlikely to rise high in rank, during the Vietnam War. 714: 3829: 3788: 2815:

the Secret War against Hanoi: The Untold Story of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam

2796: 2070: 1852: 1565: 1561: 1557: 1200:

Bombing, enclave and rural security, principally supported by U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, General

888:, who had been a guerilla in Asia during the Second World War, was forced out of office on 24 February. 1792:

There were two drivers among the inner circle. First, some, but not all, were fervent believers in the

17: 3431: 1258:

Government. During this process security must be provided to all of the people on a progressive basis.

4181: 4110: 3448: 2102: 1898:, to ensure that Wheeler did not attend the meeting when the Ball and McNamara drafts were reviewed. 1856: 1693: 1646: 1223: 1208: 1061: 751: 286: 3901: 2543:

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later: Flawed Intelligence and the Decision for War in Vietnam

2447:

Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)

1481: 1278: 686: 4032: 3981: 3811: 3624: 3580: 2166:, said "I felt, and I think that most Marines felt, that the time had come to get out of Vietnam." 2062: 2031: 1876: 1738: 1609:

on 10 March. In response, initially unknown to the U.S., the North Vietnamese received their first

1306: 1146: 115: 3850: 2481: 1822:

Mid-May saw a new series of Communist offensives, all over the country. Much of the action was in

3775: 3761: 3105:

MACV cable 19118, Westmoreland to Sharp and Wheeler "Deployment", quoted in McNamara, pp. 187–188

2664: 2153: 2141: 2027: 2023: 1775:

Westmoreland assumed he would have III Marine Expeditionary Force, the new airmobile division, a

1622: 1399: 1368: 1338: 1334: 1310: 1180: 1170: 3765: 2984: 2207:

There was no plausible way of inflicting a decisive defeat with the politically plausible forces

1581:

South Vietnamese forces were engaged resulting in almost 200 soldiers and 5 US advisors killed.

1325:, the "First Cav". In particular, the PAVN were not sure of the best tactics to use against the 1250:, at the same time, saw the situation as bad but potentially retrievable with major escalation. 902:. Today, officers from the special operations community have risen to four-star rank, including 3267: 1814:

Johnson gave the go-ahead in July, but then sent McNamara and others to study actions further.

1091:, but it was increasingly irrelevant in the face of larger and larger VC conventional attacks. 3855: 3748: 3575: 3412: 3385: 2940:"Chapter 4, "American Troops Enter the Ground War, March–July 1965", Section 1, pp. 389–433", 2906: 2810: 2656: 2265: 2183: 2159:

devotes Chapter 13 of his memoirs to the dispute. Douglas Kinnard also discusses the tension.

1776: 1750: 1698: 1553: 1532:, the North Vietnamese general running trail operations, was less concerned with bombing than 1240: 1219: 1096: 1069: 958:

while building and consolidating political control over the rural areas of South Vietnam. See

111: 2162:

General Cushman, formerly the III Marine Amphibious Corps commander in Vietnam and, in 1969,

1350: 739:

OPPLAN 34A was finalized around 20 December, under joint MACV-CIA leadership; the subsequent

3865: 3797: 3618: 3608: 3590: 3219: 2648: 2572: 2146: 2098: 2076:

divisions north of the DMZ, three operational, one reserve, and one recovering from battle.

2038:

forces, also in division strength, in response. The Ia Drang also involved the first use of

1989: 1827: 1346: 673:

all shook faith in the government and reduced the trust of civilians. According to General

4155: 3022: 2947: 4081: 3986: 3905: 3692: 3274: 2344: 2238: 2000: 1641: 1637: 1247: 950: 678: 614: 364: 313: 223: 96: 2541: 2510: 2380: 2305: 2105:

for delivery of military supplies in exchange for payments and a proportion of the arms.

1685:, 3500 Marine ground troops arrived, the first U.S. large ground combat unit in Vietnam. 3123: 3015:"Chapter 1, "U.S. Programs in South Vietnam, Nov. 1963-Apr. 1965,"Section 1, pp. 1–56", 2042:

bombers integrated into a tactical plan, rather than on independent ARC LIGHT missions.

1305:, splitting South Vietnam in half. For this large operation, the PAVN created its first 784: 3860: 3834: 3784: 2223: 1872: 1614: 1548: 1529: 1201: 1176:

A North Vietnamese strategic buildup for what they saw as decisive actions in 1967–1968

1127: 1065: 946: 861:

intelligence collection capability to detect the start of this project. Specifically,

646: 433: 138: 120: 45: 3628: 2404: 1935: 1653:; Throckmorton reported that a full Marine Expeditionary Brigade, with three infantry 4175: 3757: 3512: 3494: 2980:

Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950–1972

2668: 2156: 2130: 1895: 1882: 1715: 1453: 1449: 1403: 1227: 1184: 1142: 891: 885: 771: 642: 638: 610: 606: 590: 269: 164: 152: 92: 88: 62: 1356:

camp, ambushing the expected heavy rescue force and possibly attracting the 1st Cav,

1095:

began to refer to the "two wars", one against conventional forces, and the other of

791: 3875: 2697: 1407: 1398:) One of the great remaining questions is if this was a larger plan into which the 475: 388: 227: 2259: 2034:-sized organization in conventional warfare, and second the U.S. first used true 1517:

punish a number of reactionaries and tyrants who owe blood debts to the people."

593:

began a period of gradual escalation and direct intervention referred to as the "

3471: 2035: 1793: 1606: 1372: 1326: 602: 401: 291: 212: 200: 188: 57: 41: 3076: 2053:

helicopters and resulting in a number of friendly personnel missing in action.

1610: 280: 2660: 970:

Pentagon Papers, Department of Defence Studies on types of engagements, 1967

3506: 2409:

Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, F1954-1963

2046: 1796:

doctrine, especially Rusk. McNamara quoted Rusk's direct appeal to Johnson:

1734: 1654: 1636:

Bases in SVN, however, were accessible to the VC, by ground attack, or with

1415: 1115: 634: 257: 246: 176: 2451: 2754:

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

2652: 2213:

The South Vietnamese were better mobilized and organized than ever before.

1901:

Congress, as an institution, also was not consulted. Johnson believed the

1103:

Ground combat in South Vietnam, including air operations in direct support

1013:

Unplanned US attacks on a VC/NVA defensive perimeter, US Forces surprised

3240:, Center of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army, archived from 2182:

Starting in June, Marine operations made more extensive use of artillery

1630: 1509: 1429: 880: 874: 862: 740: 586: 457: 445: 239: 100: 49: 2977:

Collins, James Lawton Jr., "Chapter I: The Formative Years, 1950–1959",

2595: 1433: 1422:, essentially as large raids: "not a decisive battle but a punitive one" 1289:

They thought they would be defeated if they did not take decisive action

1682: 1650: 1502: 1437: 1318: 713:

unable to effectively combat the Viet Cong. In 1961, the newly elected

689:, in January 1964, reflected differing U.S. and Vietnamese priorities. 500: 2705:

Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945–1975

2477:

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Command History Chronology – 1964

1207:

Attrition of VC bases and secondarily personnel, the focus of General

2097:. Believing that the triumph of communism in Vietnam was inevitable, 1585: 1441: 719: 526: 352: 326: 2698:"Chapter 7 – A Springtime of Trumpets: SIGINT and the Tet Offensive" 2637:"Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents." 795:

The Politburo ordered infrastructure improvements to start in 1964.

621:

in 1964 and amid continuing political instability in the South, the

253: 1988:"Search and Destroy" gave way after 1968 to "clear and hold", when 1386:

It is known that the North Vietnamese planned something called the

2137: 626: 513: 408: 339: 308: 1923:

they show no signs of settling for less than complete takeover."

1087:

Roughly until mid-1965, the SVN-US strategy still focused around

763:

Encouraging the development of an underground resistance movement

3432:

The Vietnam Wars, Section 8: The Tet Offensive and its Aftermath

2760:(Second Printing, 1985 ed.), History and Museums Division, 2114: 2039: 2013: 1749:

A VC unit, estimated to be in two-regiment strength, fought the

710: 426: 359: 275: 218: 3444: 2049:

program. MACV announced 106 Communist violations of the truce.

1556:

that would continue until the end of the conflict in 1973 (see

3440: 2967:

PntV3Ch4389-433, EMBTEL (Embassy Telegram) of 22 February 1965

1930: 723: 3286:

Telfer, Gary L.; Rogers, Lane; Fleming, V. Keith Jr. (1984),

4161:

Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License

3289:

U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967

2117:

to send reinforcements from other sectors of South Vietnam.

2285:

Statistical information about casualties of the Vietnam War

1026:

Planned US attack against known VC/NVA defensive perimeter

79:(5 years, 2 months, 3 weeks and 6 days) 4159:, which is licensed in a way that permits reuse under the 2707:, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency 1520:

In September 1964, North Vietnam sent a Politburo member,

992:

Planned VC/NVA attacks represent 66.2% of all engagements

986:

Hot landing zone. VC/NVA attacks US Troops as they deploy

1869:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

1592:(or, more specifically, Flaming Dart I), of the broader 4150: 1946: 1301:), with a goal of driving through to the seacoast over 1239:

officials formally recommended withdrawal to President

2509:, "IV. Time of Decision: November 1963 – March 1965", 2379:, "IV. Time of Decision: November 1963 – March 1965", 2304:, "IV. Time of Decision: November 1963 – March 1965", 2261:

War without fronts: the American experience in Vietnam

1771:"Search and destroy plus reserve reaction operations." 1032:

Planned US attacks represent 14.3% of all engagements

3408:

The War Managers American Generals Reflect on Vietnam

3347:, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, archived from 3213: 3211: 1847:

disagreed with the MACV assessment of near-collapse.

997:

Planned VC/NVA attack against US defensive perimeter

722:. This was accomplished on 2 November 1963, when the 3125:

Vietnam 1961–1968 as interpreted in INR's Production

3122:, "V – Trial by Force: March 1965 – February 1965", 2512:

Vietnam 1961–1968 as interpreted in INR's Production

2382:

Vietnam 1961–1968 as interpreted in INR's Production

2330:

The Vietnam War: American and Vietnamese Perspective

2307:

Vietnam 1961–1968 as interpreted in INR's Production

2136:

By mid-January 1968, III MAF was the size of a U.S.

4053: 4000: 3957: 3919: 3843: 3667: 3601: 3568: 3487: 2450:, vol. FRUS 193, 10 March 1965, archived from 2422: 2420: 1410:believed the TCK/TCN was to have three main parts: 869:

U.S. and GVN covert action planning and preparation

3072:Unit History of the 334th Armed Helicopter Company 2935: 2933: 2931: 2795:, Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., archived from 2218:Aftermath and scaling back of American involvement 2789:Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head, ed. (1996), 2349:In Retrospect: the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam 2747: 2745: 2237:. The Tet Offensive came to embody the growing 2229:Vietnam heavily in supplies and with air power. 1341:, but Ia Drang actually had three major phases: 1130:view than did the U.S. and South Vietnam with a 3005:Apr 65 CIA Director Memo to SecDef & others 2946:, vol. 3 (Gravel ed.), archived from 2470: 2468: 2061:To act before the 1966–67 Communist offensive, 1859:agreed that the reinforcements should be sent. 1807: 1733:GEN Earl Wheeler, joined by Secretary of State 1255: 718:regarding the need to force a regime change in 34: 3237:Vietnam Studies: Command and Control 1950–1969 2630: 2628: 2616:"George Will Confirms Nixon's Vietnam Treason" 1677:Shortly before Johnson approved the sustained 1005:VC/NVA ambushes or encircles a moving US Unit 3456: 3344:The Marine War: III MAF in Vietnam, 1965–1971 3018:The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3 2210:Communist forces had taken massive casualties 1218:Emphasis on rural security, from a number of 694:from the people, but from the United States. 8: 2728:, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library 2241:at the heart of U.S. government statements. 3992:Normalization of US–Vietnam relations 1309:headquarters, under then-brigadier general 1153:, and taking and holding land permanently. 4156:"Joint warfare in South Vietnam 1964–1969" 3463: 3449: 3441: 3336: 3334: 1382:North Vietnamese plans for decisive action 1222:officer including then-Lieutenant General 935:Strategic Initiative and Centre of Gravity 31: 2133:, which caused immense Communist losses. 1649:, to inspect the Marine aviation base at 1496:Fighting continues; 1964 winter offensive 1468:Pike described it as consistent with the 975:TYPE OF ENGAGEMENTS IN COMBAT NARRATIVES 1480:but opposed by the politically oriented 1045:Chance engagement, neither side planned 968: 896:United States Special Operations Command 787:in charge and Ho becoming a figurehead. 778:North Vietnam decides on intensification 35:Joint warfare in South Vietnam 1963–1969 4013:Opposition to United States involvement 2889:, Viking Press: New York (1982), p. 423 2722:Oral History interview by Ted Gittinger 2250: 1597:border, against the Ho Chi Minh trail. 1037:US Forces ambushes moving VC/NVA Units 820:), killing 300 ARVN and 200 civilians. 378: 304: 77:1 November 1963 – 28 January 1969 18:Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963–69 4167:. All relevant terms must be followed. 2902:Vietnam at War: The History: 1946–1975 2351:, Times Books division of Random House 754:collection from locations in the north 699:Frustrations and assassination of Diem 3264:Reorganizing for pacification support 3051:Dean Rusk, quoted by McNamara, p. 195 2559: 2557: 2555: 1892:Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1333:The resulting campaign is called the 904:Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 824:Command changes and continued actions 735:Johnson approval of covert operations 7: 4126: 3218:McNamara, Robert S. (20 July 1965), 2080:Political situation in South Vietnam 1253:Westmoreland's "ultimate aim", was: 1213:Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 1106:Air operations against North Vietnam 1093:Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 1078:Agency for International Development 915:United States Intelligence Community 589:in the 1960s, the United States and 3730:U.S. escalation / "Americanization" 3116:Bureau of Intelligence and Research 2503:Bureau of Intelligence and Research 2373:Bureau of Intelligence and Research 2298:Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1845:Bureau of Intelligence and Research 3659:1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt 2764:, 1974, p. 97, archived from 1396:General Offensive-General Uprising 1273:North Vietnamese strategic buildup 1019:Virtual surprise to US Commanders, 25: 4153:, this article uses content from 3654:North Vietnamese invasion of Laos 3363:Westmoreland, William C. (1976), 1082:United States Army Special Forces 645:and the change of U.S. policy to 4267:Wars involving the United States 4125: 4116: 4115: 4106: 4105: 4008:Draft evasion in the Vietnam War 3295:, History and Museums Division, 2685:, Presidio Press, pp. 63–65 1934: 1727:Director of Central Intelligence 1323:1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 978:Percentage of total engagements 519: 506: 493: 481: 468: 456: 444: 432: 419: 407: 394: 381: 358: 345: 332: 319: 307: 285: 274: 262: 252: 232: 217: 205: 193: 181: 169: 157: 145: 56: 4317:Wars involving the Soviet Union 4187:Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson 3644:Vietnamese migration of 1954–55 2332:, M.E. Sharpe, Tran Van Tra-Tet 2125:1968 North Vietnamese offensive 2007:1965–66 winter–spring offensive 1151:Army of the Republic of Vietnam 917:in late May, on the assumption 681:suggests that the overthrow of 4282:Wars involving the Philippines 3893:United States prisoners of war 2905:, Oxford University Press US, 2600:Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung 2164:Commandant of the Marine Corps 1979:, was agreed to be defined as 1973:Revolutionary Development (RD) 1673:Rolling Thunder buildup, March 1621:, although civilian officials 599:joint warfare in South Vietnam 1: 4076:Henry Kissinger’s involvement 2899:Davidson, Phillip B. (1991), 1392:Tong Kong Kich/Tong Kong Ngia 1109:Pacification in South Vietnam 1089:pacification in South Vietnam 1021:being well-concealed/alerted 623:Lyndon Johnson Administration 617:close to the end of 1963 and 3234:Eckhardt, George S. (1991), 2842:, Cambridge University Press 2719:Douglas Pike (4 June 1981), 2347:; Vandermark, Brian (1995), 2188:Marine Air-Ground Task Force 960:the protracted warfare model 842:Diem's fall in November 1963 3684:Independence Palace bombing 2739:Tran Van Tra-Tet, pp. 38–40 2641:Journal of Military History 1074:Central Intelligence Agency 4338: 4312:Wars involving North Korea 4287:Wars involving New Zealand 4277:Wars involving South Korea 4066:Canada and the Vietnam War 3735:1965 South Vietnamese coup 3543:People's Republic of China 3523:International participants 3297:United States Marine Corps 2817:, Harper Collins Perennial 2762:United States Marine Corps 2696:Hanyok, Robert J. (2002), 2221: 1863:Discussion before decision 1731:Chief of Staff of the Army 1690:Chief of Staff of the Army 1688:President Johnson ordered 1542:Flow of communist supplies 1315:United States Marine Corps 872: 799:Late 1963 to 1964 (before 729: 702: 4101: 4071:CIA activities in Vietnam 3478: 3405:Kinnard, Douglas (1991), 3384:, Naval Institute Press, 2635:Carland, John M. (2004), 2602:, Foreign Languages Press 2258:Thomas C. Thayer (1985). 2170:in heavy NVA casualties. 1903:Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 1784:U.S. decision to escalate 1705:the GVN will be sent..." 1679:Operation Rolling Thunder 1594:Operation Rolling Thunder 1337:, with a followup at the 1064:, and to a lesser extent 1031: 991: 900:Unified Combatant Command 568: 563: 535: 130: 69: 55: 39: 4307:Wars involving Nicaragua 4272:Wars involving Australia 4093:Women in the Vietnam War 4025:United States news media 3970:Indochina refugee crisis 3965:Cambodian–Vietnamese War 3740:Bombing of North Vietnam 3679:Strategic Hamlet Program 3120:U.S. Department of State 2681:Palmer, Dave R. (1978), 2507:U.S. Department of State 2377:U.S. Department of State 2302:U.S. Department of State 2235:"held back" from winning 1838:The 44 battalion request 1576:1964–65 winter offensive 1237:U.S. Department of State 1132:protracted warfare model 856:North Vietnamese buildup 748:Clandestine human-source 705:War in Vietnam (1959–63) 631:People's Army of Vietnam 65:, Military Regions, 1967 4322:20th century in Vietnam 4297:Wars involving Thailand 3712:Gulf of Tonkin incident 3633:Battle of Dien Bien Phu 3378:Krulak, Victor (1999), 3324:Westmoreland, William, 3273:15 January 2010 at the 2186:, a variant on typical 2095:United States Air Force 2067:Operation Junction City 1992:replaced Westmoreland. 1709:Carrot and stick, April 1619:surface-to-air missiles 1570:Operation Commando Hunt 801:Gulf of Tonkin incident 619:Gulf of Tonkin incident 27:Part of the Vietnam War 4262:Wars involving Vietnam 4121:Battles and operations 4061:Awards and decorations 3975:Vietnamese boat people 3944:Impact of Agent Orange 3932:Body count controversy 3639:1954 Geneva Conference 3060:Ball, pp. I-20 to I-21 2811:Shultz, Richard H. Jr. 2683:Summons of the Trumpet 2614:Fitrakis, Bob (2014), 2287:The National Archives. 1986: 1943:This section is empty. 1927:Quagmire and attrition 1812: 1803: 1590:Operation Flaming Dart 1539: 1299:II Corps Tactical Zone 1266: 1211:, commanding general, 1167:Battle of the Ia Drang 1134:, in their concept of 1122:North Vietnamese views 924: 715:Kennedy Administration 696: 4222:1969 in South Vietnam 4217:1968 in South Vietnam 4212:1967 in South Vietnam 4207:1966 in South Vietnam 4202:1965 in South Vietnam 4197:1964 in South Vietnam 4192:1963 in South Vietnam 3830:1975 spring offensive 3789:ARVN campaign in Laos 3785:Vietnamization policy 3395:, pp. 195-204 online. 3196:McNamara, pp. 191–192 3178:McMaster, pp. 301–302 2873:The Ho Chi Minh Trail 2653:10.1353/jmh.2004.0024 2594:Mao Tse-tung (1967), 2071:Operation Cedar Falls 2016:acted at direct U.S. 1981: 1853:Joint Chiefs of Staff 1798: 1613:(NATO reporting name 1566:Operation Tiger Hound 1562:Operation Steel Tiger 1558:Operation Barrel Roll 1534: 1226:, then Major General 919: 691: 564:Casualties and losses 4302:Wars involving Spain 4163:, but not under the 3949:Environmental impact 3821:Battle of Phước Long 3586:Cold War (1962–1979) 3262:Thomas W. Scoville, 3079:on 10 September 2005 2838:Moyar, Mark (2006), 2129:1968 began with the 1857:Dwight D. Eisenhower 1245:Secretary of Defense 1209:William Westmoreland 1204:(U.S. Army, retired) 1062:William Westmoreland 752:signals intelligence 4292:Wars involving Laos 4029:In popular culture 3982:Sino-Vietnamese War 3812:Paris Peace Accords 3625:First Indochina War 3614:Japanese occupation 3581:Cambodian Civil War 3306:on 5 September 2009 3151:Karnow, pp. 423–424 3096:Karnow, pp. 421–422 3042:8 May 65 MACV 15182 3025:on 26 February 2010 2943:The Pentagon Papers 2799:on 17 December 2005 2596:"On Protracted War" 2454:on 28 December 2009 2401:Ho Chi Minh: A Life 2399:William J. Duiker, 2063:Operation Attleboro 1971:agreed on the term 1824:Phước Long Province 1818:May and June combat 1755:Phước Long Province 1745:RVN reverses in May 1739:rules of engagement 1476:theory espoused by 971: 943:of the opposition. 850:Minh Tho government 116:Cambodian Civil War 3803:Christmas bombings 3776:Cambodian campaign 3244:on 19 October 2017 2950:on 17 January 2010 2887:Vietnam: A History 2876:by John T. Correll 2862:Moyar, pp. 323–324 2345:Robert S. McNamara 2264:. Westview Press. 2184:fire support bases 2057:Winter–spring 1967 2028:Battle of Bong Son 2024:Battle of Ia Drang 1910:Decision and worry 1400:Battle of Khe Sanh 1369:Battle of Bong Son 1339:Battle of Bong Son 1335:Battle of Ia Drang 1181:Battle of Khe Sanh 1171:Battle of Bong Son 969: 836:Post-Diem activity 4257:Conflicts in 1969 4252:Conflicts in 1968 4247:Conflicts in 1967 4242:Conflicts in 1966 4237:Conflicts in 1965 4232:Conflicts in 1964 4227:Conflicts in 1963 4139: 4138: 3856:Ho Chi Minh trail 3749:Buddhist Uprising 3707:Coup against Minh 3698:Coup against Diem 3621:(1949–1955) 3576:Laotian Civil War 3569:Related conflicts 3548:Republic of China 3411:, Da Capo Press, 3365:A Soldier Reports 3351:on 21 August 2006 3341:Shulimson, Jack, 3326:A Soldier Reports 2885:Karnow, Stanley. 2792:The Tet Offensive 2529:Shultz, pp. 46–48 2484:on 3 October 2008 2435:INR-IV, pp. 29–31 2426:Shultz, pp. 45–46 2362:Shultz, pp. 38–39 1963: 1962: 1777:Republic of Korea 1753:, the capital of 1751:Battle of Song Be 1699:Republic of Korea 1647:John Throckmorton 1241:Lyndon B. Johnson 1220:U.S. Marine Corps 1157:Military strategy 1070:counterinsurgents 1054: 1053: 955:center of gravity 941:center of gravity 583: 582: 551:: ~600,000 (1969) 126: 125: 112:Laotian Civil War 16:(Redirected from 4329: 4129: 4128: 4119: 4118: 4109: 4108: 3866:Operation Popeye 3798:Easter Offensive 3619:State of Vietnam 3609:French Indochina 3591:Cold War in Asia 3499:Việt Minh / PAVN 3465: 3458: 3451: 3442: 3435: 3434:, Edwin E. Moïse 3429: 3423: 3421: 3402: 3396: 3394: 3375: 3369: 3367: 3360: 3354: 3352: 3338: 3329: 3328: 3321: 3315: 3314: 3313: 3311: 3305: 3299:, archived from 3294: 3283: 3277: 3260: 3254: 3252: 3251: 3249: 3231: 3225: 3224: 3215: 3206: 3205:McMaster, p. 302 3203: 3197: 3194: 3188: 3187:McMaster, p. 411 3185: 3179: 3176: 3170: 3169:McNamara, p. 192 3167: 3161: 3158: 3152: 3149: 3143: 3140: 3134: 3132: 3130: 3112: 3106: 3103: 3097: 3094: 3088: 3087: 3086: 3084: 3075:, archived from 3067: 3061: 3058: 3052: 3049: 3043: 3040: 3034: 3033: 3032: 3030: 3021:, archived from 3012: 3006: 3003: 2997: 2995: 2994: 2992: 2983:, archived from 2974: 2968: 2965: 2959: 2958: 2957: 2955: 2937: 2926: 2925:Davidson, p. 344 2923: 2917: 2915: 2896: 2890: 2883: 2877: 2869: 2863: 2860: 2854: 2853:McNamara, p. 153 2851: 2845: 2843: 2840:Triumph Forsaken 2835: 2829: 2826: 2820: 2818: 2807: 2801: 2800: 2786: 2780: 2779: 2778: 2776: 2770: 2759: 2749: 2740: 2737: 2731: 2730:, pp. I-1 to I-3 2729: 2727: 2716: 2710: 2708: 2702: 2693: 2687: 2686: 2678: 2672: 2671: 2632: 2623: 2622: 2611: 2605: 2603: 2591: 2585: 2584: 2582: 2580: 2571:. Archived from 2561: 2550: 2549: 2548: 2536: 2530: 2527: 2521: 2519: 2517: 2499: 2493: 2492: 2491: 2489: 2480:, archived from 2472: 2463: 2462: 2461: 2459: 2442: 2436: 2433: 2427: 2424: 2415: 2407:; Ilya Gaiduk, 2405:pp 534–37 online 2397: 2391: 2389: 2387: 2369: 2363: 2360: 2354: 2352: 2341: 2335: 2333: 2322: 2316: 2314: 2312: 2294: 2288: 2282: 2276: 2275: 2255: 2147:Creighton Abrams 2099:Norodom Sihanouk 2089:See-saw conflict 1990:Creighton Abrams 1958: 1955: 1945:You can help by 1938: 1931: 1828:armed helicopter 1554:campaign in Laos 1522:Nguyễn Chí Thanh 1470:armed struggle ( 1459:Nguyễn Chí Thanh 1264: 972: 852:was overthrown. 730:LBJ's war begins 545:: 409,111 (1969) 525: 523: 522: 512: 510: 509: 499: 497: 496: 486: 485: 474: 472: 471: 461: 460: 449: 448: 437: 436: 425: 423: 422: 412: 411: 400: 398: 397: 387: 385: 384: 363: 362: 351: 349: 348: 338: 336: 335: 325: 323: 322: 312: 311: 290: 289: 279: 278: 268: 266: 265: 256: 238: 236: 235: 222: 221: 211: 209: 208: 199: 197: 196: 187: 185: 184: 175: 173: 172: 163: 161: 160: 151: 149: 148: 71: 70: 60: 32: 21: 4337: 4336: 4332: 4331: 4330: 4328: 4327: 4326: 4172: 4171: 4140: 4135: 4097: 4082:Pentagon Papers 4049: 3996: 3953: 3915: 3839: 3693:Buddhist crisis 3663: 3649:1955 referendum 3597: 3564: 3483: 3474: 3469: 3439: 3438: 3430: 3426: 3419: 3404: 3403: 3399: 3392: 3377: 3376: 3372: 3362: 3361: 3357: 3340: 3339: 3332: 3323: 3322: 3318: 3309: 3307: 3303: 3292: 3285: 3284: 3280: 3275:Wayback Machine 3261: 3257: 3247: 3245: 3233: 3232: 3228: 3217: 3216: 3209: 3204: 3200: 3195: 3191: 3186: 3182: 3177: 3173: 3168: 3164: 3159: 3155: 3150: 3146: 3141: 3137: 3128: 3114: 3113: 3109: 3104: 3100: 3095: 3091: 3082: 3080: 3069: 3068: 3064: 3059: 3055: 3050: 3046: 3041: 3037: 3028: 3026: 3014: 3013: 3009: 3004: 3000: 2990: 2988: 2976: 2975: 2971: 2966: 2962: 2953: 2951: 2939: 2938: 2929: 2924: 2920: 2913: 2898: 2897: 2893: 2884: 2880: 2870: 2866: 2861: 2857: 2852: 2848: 2837: 2836: 2832: 2827: 2823: 2809: 2808: 2804: 2788: 2787: 2783: 2774: 2772: 2771:on 9 April 2008 2768: 2757: 2751: 2750: 2743: 2738: 2734: 2725: 2718: 2717: 2713: 2700: 2695: 2694: 2690: 2680: 2679: 2675: 2634: 2633: 2626: 2613: 2612: 2608: 2593: 2592: 2588: 2578: 2576: 2575:on 26 June 2019 2563: 2562: 2553: 2546: 2538: 2537: 2533: 2528: 2524: 2515: 2501: 2500: 2496: 2487: 2485: 2474: 2473: 2466: 2457: 2455: 2444: 2443: 2439: 2434: 2430: 2425: 2418: 2413:online pp 203–4 2398: 2394: 2385: 2371: 2370: 2366: 2361: 2357: 2343: 2342: 2338: 2324: 2323: 2319: 2310: 2296: 2295: 2291: 2283: 2279: 2272: 2257: 2256: 2252: 2247: 2239:credibility gap 2226: 2220: 2200: 2180: 2127: 2091: 2082: 2059: 2009: 2001:Phoenix Program 1968: 1966:The "other war" 1959: 1953: 1950: 1929: 1912: 1865: 1840: 1820: 1786: 1747: 1711: 1675: 1663:Pentagon Papers 1578: 1544: 1498: 1384: 1321:, and then the 1275: 1265: 1262: 1248:Robert McNamara 1224:Leonard Cushman 1194: 1159: 1128:grand strategic 1124: 1059: 1020: 951:Robert McNamara 937: 877: 871: 858: 838: 826: 805: 780: 737: 732: 707: 701: 679:Robert McNamara 633:and the allied 615:John F. Kennedy 595:Americanization 575: 573: 558: 546: 531: 520: 518: 507: 505: 494: 492: 480: 469: 467: 455: 443: 431: 420: 418: 406: 395: 393: 382: 380: 377: 376: 369: 357: 346: 344: 333: 331: 320: 318: 306: 303: 302: 284: 283: 273: 272: 263: 261: 260: 233: 231: 230: 226: 224:Kingdom of Laos 216: 215: 206: 204: 203: 194: 192: 191: 182: 180: 179: 170: 168: 167: 158: 156: 155: 146: 144: 118: 103: 78: 61: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 4335: 4333: 4325: 4324: 4319: 4314: 4309: 4304: 4299: 4294: 4289: 4284: 4279: 4274: 4269: 4264: 4259: 4254: 4249: 4244: 4239: 4234: 4229: 4224: 4219: 4214: 4209: 4204: 4199: 4194: 4189: 4184: 4174: 4173: 4170: 4169: 4145: 4144: 4137: 4136: 4134: 4133: 4123: 4113: 4102: 4099: 4098: 4096: 4095: 4090: 4085: 4078: 4073: 4068: 4063: 4057: 4055: 4051: 4050: 4048: 4047: 4046: 4045: 4040: 4035: 4027: 4022: 4021: 4020: 4010: 4004: 4002: 3998: 3997: 3995: 3994: 3989: 3984: 3979: 3978: 3977: 3967: 3961: 3959: 3955: 3954: 3952: 3951: 3946: 3941: 3940: 3939: 3934: 3923: 3921: 3917: 3916: 3914: 3913: 3895: 3890: 3885: 3884: 3883: 3878: 3868: 3863: 3861:Sihanouk Trail 3858: 3853: 3851:Củ Chi tunnels 3847: 3845: 3841: 3840: 3838: 3837: 3835:Fall of Saigon 3832: 3823: 3814: 3805: 3800: 3791: 3778: 3769: 3751: 3742: 3737: 3732: 3723: 3718: 3709: 3700: 3695: 3686: 3681: 3671: 3669: 3665: 3664: 3662: 3661: 3656: 3651: 3646: 3641: 3636: 3622: 3616: 3611: 3605: 3603: 3599: 3598: 3596: 3595: 3594: 3593: 3583: 3578: 3572: 3570: 3566: 3565: 3563: 3562: 3561: 3560: 3555: 3550: 3545: 3540: 3535: 3530: 3520: 3510: 3491: 3489: 3485: 3484: 3479: 3476: 3475: 3470: 3468: 3467: 3460: 3453: 3445: 3437: 3436: 3424: 3417: 3397: 3390: 3381:First to Fight 3370: 3355: 3330: 3316: 3278: 3268:online edition 3255: 3226: 3207: 3198: 3189: 3180: 3171: 3162: 3153: 3144: 3135: 3107: 3098: 3089: 3062: 3053: 3044: 3035: 3007: 2998: 2987:on 8 June 2010 2969: 2960: 2927: 2918: 2911: 2891: 2878: 2864: 2855: 2846: 2830: 2821: 2802: 2781: 2741: 2732: 2711: 2688: 2673: 2647:(2): 553–574, 2624: 2606: 2586: 2551: 2531: 2522: 2494: 2464: 2437: 2428: 2416: 2392: 2364: 2355: 2336: 2317: 2289: 2277: 2270: 2249: 2248: 2246: 2243: 2224:Vietnamization 2222:Main article: 2219: 2216: 2215: 2214: 2211: 2208: 2199: 2198:Winter 1968–69 2196: 2179: 2176: 2126: 2123: 2090: 2087: 2081: 2078: 2058: 2055: 2008: 2005: 1967: 1964: 1961: 1960: 1941: 1939: 1928: 1925: 1911: 1908: 1873:McGeorge Bundy 1864: 1861: 1839: 1836: 1819: 1816: 1785: 1782: 1773: 1772: 1769: 1766: 1746: 1743: 1710: 1707: 1694:Harold Johnson 1674: 1671: 1615:SA-2 Guideline 1577: 1574: 1543: 1540: 1530:Dong Sy Nguyen 1497: 1494: 1478:Võ Nguyên Giáp 1446: 1445: 1426: 1423: 1383: 1380: 1367:In the larger 1365: 1364: 1361: 1357: 1291: 1290: 1287: 1274: 1271: 1260: 1232: 1231: 1216: 1205: 1202:Maxwell Taylor 1193: 1192:The U.S. plans 1190: 1189: 1188: 1177: 1174: 1158: 1155: 1141:Following the 1123: 1120: 1111: 1110: 1107: 1104: 1066:Maxwell Taylor 1058: 1055: 1052: 1051: 1049: 1046: 1042: 1041: 1038: 1034: 1033: 1030: 1027: 1023: 1022: 1017: 1014: 1010: 1009: 1006: 1002: 1001: 998: 994: 993: 990: 987: 983: 982: 979: 976: 947:Lyndon Johnson 936: 933: 873:Main article: 870: 867: 857: 854: 837: 834: 825: 822: 804: 797: 779: 776: 768: 767: 764: 761: 758: 755: 736: 733: 731: 728: 703:Main article: 700: 697: 683:Dương Văn Minh 663:September 1964 647:Vietnamization 581: 580: 566: 565: 561: 560: 559:420,000 (1969) 552: 538: 537: 533: 532: 530: 529: 516: 503: 490: 478: 465: 453: 441: 439:Czechoslovakia 429: 416: 404: 391: 374: 373: 372: 370: 368: 367: 355: 342: 329: 316: 300: 299: 298: 295: 294: 242: 139:Anti-Communist 133: 132: 128: 127: 124: 123: 121:Vietnamization 109: 105: 104: 87: 85: 81: 80: 75: 67: 66: 53: 52: 46:Indochina Wars 37: 36: 26: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 4334: 4323: 4320: 4318: 4315: 4313: 4310: 4308: 4305: 4303: 4300: 4298: 4295: 4293: 4290: 4288: 4285: 4283: 4280: 4278: 4275: 4273: 4270: 4268: 4265: 4263: 4260: 4258: 4255: 4253: 4250: 4248: 4245: 4243: 4240: 4238: 4235: 4233: 4230: 4228: 4225: 4223: 4220: 4218: 4215: 4213: 4210: 4208: 4205: 4203: 4200: 4198: 4195: 4193: 4190: 4188: 4185: 4183: 4180: 4179: 4177: 4168: 4166: 4162: 4157: 4154: 4152: 4147: 4146: 4142: 4141: 4132: 4124: 4122: 4114: 4112: 4104: 4103: 4100: 4094: 4091: 4089: 4086: 4084: 4083: 4079: 4077: 4074: 4072: 4069: 4067: 4064: 4062: 4059: 4058: 4056: 4052: 4044: 4041: 4039: 4036: 4034: 4031: 4030: 4028: 4026: 4023: 4019: 4016: 4015: 4014: 4011: 4009: 4006: 4005: 4003: 3999: 3993: 3990: 3988: 3985: 3983: 3980: 3976: 3973: 3972: 3971: 3968: 3966: 3963: 3962: 3960: 3956: 3950: 3947: 3945: 3942: 3938: 3937:POW/MIA issue 3935: 3933: 3930: 3929: 3928: 3925: 3924: 3922: 3918: 3911: 3907: 3903: 3899: 3896: 3894: 3891: 3889: 3886: 3882: 3879: 3877: 3874: 3873: 3872: 3869: 3867: 3864: 3862: 3859: 3857: 3854: 3852: 3849: 3848: 3846: 3842: 3836: 3833: 3831: 3827: 3824: 3822: 3818: 3815: 3813: 3809: 3806: 3804: 3801: 3799: 3795: 3792: 3790: 3786: 3782: 3779: 3777: 3773: 3770: 3767: 3763: 3759: 3758:Tet Offensive 3755: 3752: 3750: 3746: 3743: 3741: 3738: 3736: 3733: 3731: 3727: 3724: 3722: 3721:December coup 3719: 3717: 3713: 3710: 3708: 3704: 3701: 3699: 3696: 3694: 3690: 3687: 3685: 3682: 3680: 3676: 3673: 3672: 3670: 3666: 3660: 3657: 3655: 3652: 3650: 3647: 3645: 3642: 3640: 3637: 3634: 3630: 3626: 3623: 3620: 3617: 3615: 3612: 3610: 3607: 3606: 3604: 3600: 3592: 3589: 3588: 3587: 3584: 3582: 3579: 3577: 3574: 3573: 3571: 3567: 3559: 3556: 3554: 3551: 3549: 3546: 3544: 3541: 3539: 3536: 3534: 3531: 3529: 3528:United States 3526: 3525: 3524: 3521: 3518: 3514: 3513:South Vietnam 3511: 3508: 3504: 3500: 3496: 3495:North Vietnam 3493: 3492: 3490: 3486: 3482: 3477: 3473: 3466: 3461: 3459: 3454: 3452: 3447: 3446: 3443: 3433: 3428: 3425: 3420: 3418:9780306804496 3414: 3410: 3409: 3401: 3398: 3393: 3391:9781557504647 3387: 3383: 3382: 3374: 3371: 3366: 3359: 3356: 3350: 3346: 3345: 3337: 3335: 3331: 3327: 3320: 3317: 3302: 3298: 3291: 3290: 3282: 3279: 3276: 3272: 3269: 3265: 3259: 3256: 3243: 3239: 3238: 3230: 3227: 3223: 3222: 3214: 3212: 3208: 3202: 3199: 3193: 3190: 3184: 3181: 3175: 3172: 3166: 3163: 3160:Ball, p. I-13 3157: 3154: 3148: 3145: 3139: 3136: 3127: 3126: 3121: 3117: 3111: 3108: 3102: 3099: 3093: 3090: 3078: 3074: 3073: 3066: 3063: 3057: 3054: 3048: 3045: 3039: 3036: 3024: 3020: 3019: 3011: 3008: 3002: 2999: 2986: 2982: 2981: 2973: 2970: 2964: 2961: 2949: 2945: 2944: 2936: 2934: 2932: 2928: 2922: 2919: 2914: 2912:9780195067927 2908: 2904: 2903: 2895: 2892: 2888: 2882: 2879: 2875: 2874: 2868: 2865: 2859: 2856: 2850: 2847: 2841: 2834: 2831: 2828:Palmer, p. 51 2825: 2822: 2816: 2812: 2806: 2803: 2798: 2794: 2793: 2785: 2782: 2767: 2763: 2756: 2755: 2748: 2746: 2742: 2736: 2733: 2724: 2723: 2715: 2712: 2706: 2699: 2692: 2689: 2684: 2677: 2674: 2670: 2666: 2662: 2658: 2654: 2650: 2646: 2642: 2638: 2631: 2629: 2625: 2621: 2620:Common Dreams 2617: 2610: 2607: 2604:, pp. 175–176 2601: 2597: 2590: 2587: 2574: 2570: 2569:mtholyoke.edu 2566: 2560: 2558: 2556: 2552: 2545: 2544: 2535: 2532: 2526: 2523: 2514: 2513: 2508: 2504: 2498: 2495: 2483: 2479: 2478: 2471: 2469: 2465: 2453: 2449: 2448: 2441: 2438: 2432: 2429: 2423: 2421: 2417: 2414: 2410: 2406: 2402: 2396: 2393: 2384: 2383: 2378: 2374: 2368: 2365: 2359: 2356: 2350: 2346: 2340: 2337: 2331: 2327: 2321: 2318: 2309: 2308: 2303: 2299: 2293: 2290: 2286: 2281: 2278: 2273: 2271:9780813371320 2267: 2263: 2262: 2254: 2251: 2244: 2242: 2240: 2236: 2230: 2225: 2217: 2212: 2209: 2206: 2205: 2204: 2197: 2195: 2192: 2189: 2185: 2177: 2175: 2171: 2167: 2165: 2160: 2158: 2157:Victor Krulak 2155: 2150: 2148: 2143: 2139: 2134: 2132: 2131:Tet Offensive 2124: 2122: 2118: 2116: 2110: 2106: 2104: 2103:Sihanoukville 2100: 2096: 2088: 2086: 2079: 2077: 2073: 2072: 2068: 2064: 2056: 2054: 2050: 2048: 2043: 2041: 2037: 2033: 2029: 2025: 2020: 2017: 2015: 2006: 2004: 2002: 1997: 1993: 1991: 1985: 1980: 1978: 1977:Nguyễn Cao Kỳ 1974: 1965: 1957: 1948: 1944: 1940: 1937: 1933: 1932: 1926: 1924: 1920: 1916: 1909: 1907: 1904: 1899: 1897: 1896:Earle Wheeler 1893: 1887: 1884: 1883:William Bundy 1880: 1878: 1874: 1870: 1862: 1860: 1858: 1854: 1848: 1846: 1837: 1835: 1831: 1829: 1825: 1817: 1815: 1811: 1806: 1802: 1797: 1795: 1790: 1783: 1781: 1778: 1770: 1767: 1764: 1763: 1762: 1758: 1756: 1752: 1744: 1742: 1740: 1736: 1732: 1728: 1723: 1719: 1717: 1716:Great Society 1708: 1706: 1702: 1700: 1695: 1691: 1686: 1684: 1680: 1672: 1670: 1666: 1664: 1658: 1656: 1652: 1648: 1643: 1639: 1634: 1632: 1626: 1624: 1620: 1616: 1612: 1608: 1602: 1598: 1595: 1591: 1587: 1582: 1575: 1573: 1571: 1567: 1563: 1559: 1555: 1550: 1541: 1538: 1533: 1531: 1525: 1523: 1518: 1514: 1511: 1506: 1504: 1495: 1493: 1490: 1487: 1483: 1479: 1475: 1473: 1466: 1464: 1460: 1455: 1454:Tet Offensive 1451: 1450:Dien Bien Phu 1443: 1439: 1435: 1431: 1427: 1424: 1421: 1417: 1413: 1412: 1411: 1409: 1405: 1404:Tet Offensive 1401: 1397: 1393: 1389: 1381: 1379: 1376: 1374: 1370: 1362: 1358: 1355: 1352: 1348: 1344: 1343: 1342: 1340: 1336: 1331: 1328: 1324: 1320: 1316: 1312: 1308: 1304: 1300: 1295: 1288: 1285: 1284: 1283: 1280: 1272: 1270: 1259: 1254: 1251: 1249: 1246: 1242: 1238: 1229: 1228:Victor Krulak 1225: 1221: 1217: 1214: 1210: 1206: 1203: 1199: 1198: 1197: 1191: 1186: 1185:Tet Offensive 1182: 1178: 1175: 1172: 1168: 1164: 1163: 1162: 1156: 1154: 1152: 1148: 1144: 1143:Tet Offensive 1139: 1137: 1133: 1129: 1121: 1119: 1117: 1108: 1105: 1102: 1101: 1100: 1098: 1094: 1090: 1085: 1083: 1079: 1075: 1071: 1067: 1063: 1056: 1050: 1047: 1044: 1043: 1039: 1036: 1035: 1028: 1025: 1024: 1018: 1015: 1012: 1011: 1007: 1004: 1003: 999: 996: 995: 988: 985: 984: 980: 977: 974: 973: 967: 963: 961: 956: 952: 948: 944: 942: 934: 932: 928: 923: 918: 916: 911: 907: 905: 901: 897: 893: 889: 887: 886:Roger Hilsman 882: 876: 868: 866: 864: 855: 853: 851: 845: 843: 835: 833: 829: 823: 821: 819: 818:U Minh Forest 813: 809: 802: 798: 796: 793: 788: 786: 777: 775: 773: 772:Victor Krulak 765: 762: 759: 756: 753: 749: 746: 745: 744: 742: 734: 727: 725: 721: 716: 712: 706: 698: 695: 690: 688: 684: 680: 676: 672: 668: 667:December 1964 664: 660: 656: 650: 648: 644: 643:Richard Nixon 640: 639:Tet Offensive 636: 632: 628: 624: 620: 616: 612: 611:Ngo Dinh Diem 608: 607:assassination 604: 600: 596: 592: 591:South Vietnam 588: 578: 577:United States 571: 570:South Vietnam 567: 562: 556: 553: 550: 547: 544: 543:United States 540: 539: 534: 528: 517: 515: 504: 502: 491: 489: 484: 479: 477: 466: 464: 459: 454: 452: 447: 442: 440: 435: 430: 428: 417: 415: 410: 405: 403: 392: 390: 379: 371: 366: 361: 356: 354: 343: 341: 330: 328: 317: 315: 310: 305: 297: 296: 293: 288: 282: 277: 271: 270:North Vietnam 259: 255: 251: 250: 248: 243: 241: 229: 225: 220: 214: 202: 190: 178: 166: 165:United States 154: 153:South Vietnam 143: 142: 140: 135: 134: 129: 122: 119:Beginning of 117: 113: 110: 107: 106: 102: 98: 94: 93:South Vietnam 90: 89:North Vietnam 86: 83: 82: 76: 73: 72: 68: 64: 63:South Vietnam 59: 54: 51: 47: 43: 38: 33: 30: 19: 4158: 4148: 4080: 4054:Other topics 3876:Agent Orange 3825: 3816: 3807: 3793: 3780: 3771: 3753: 3744: 3729: 3725: 3702: 3688: 3674: 3488:Participants 3427: 3422:, pp. 60–61. 3407: 3400: 3380: 3373: 3364: 3358: 3349:the original 3343: 3325: 3319: 3308:, retrieved 3301:the original 3288: 3281: 3263: 3258: 3246:, retrieved 3242:the original 3236: 3229: 3220: 3201: 3192: 3183: 3174: 3165: 3156: 3147: 3138: 3124: 3110: 3101: 3092: 3081:, retrieved 3077:the original 3071: 3065: 3056: 3047: 3038: 3027:, retrieved 3023:the original 3017: 3010: 3001: 2989:, retrieved 2985:the original 2979: 2972: 2963: 2952:, retrieved 2948:the original 2942: 2921: 2901: 2894: 2886: 2881: 2872: 2867: 2858: 2849: 2839: 2833: 2824: 2814: 2805: 2797:the original 2791: 2784: 2773:, retrieved 2766:the original 2753: 2735: 2721: 2714: 2704: 2691: 2682: 2676: 2644: 2640: 2619: 2609: 2599: 2589: 2577:. Retrieved 2573:the original 2568: 2542: 2534: 2525: 2511: 2497: 2486:, retrieved 2482:the original 2476: 2456:, retrieved 2452:the original 2446: 2440: 2431: 2408: 2400: 2395: 2381: 2367: 2358: 2348: 2339: 2334:, pp. 38–40 2329: 2326:Trần Văn Trà 2320: 2306: 2292: 2280: 2260: 2253: 2231: 2227: 2201: 2193: 2181: 2172: 2168: 2161: 2151: 2135: 2128: 2119: 2111: 2107: 2092: 2083: 2074: 2060: 2051: 2044: 2021: 2018: 2014:B-52 bombers 2010: 1998: 1994: 1987: 1982: 1972: 1969: 1951: 1947:adding to it 1942: 1921: 1917: 1913: 1900: 1888: 1881: 1866: 1849: 1841: 1832: 1821: 1813: 1808: 1804: 1799: 1791: 1787: 1774: 1759: 1748: 1724: 1720: 1712: 1703: 1687: 1676: 1667: 1662: 1659: 1635: 1627: 1603: 1599: 1583: 1579: 1545: 1535: 1526: 1519: 1515: 1507: 1499: 1491: 1485: 1482:Trường Chinh 1471: 1467: 1463:Trần Văn Trà 1447: 1408:Douglas Pike 1391: 1388:Tet Mau Than 1387: 1385: 1377: 1366: 1332: 1296: 1292: 1279:Trường Chinh 1276: 1267: 1256: 1252: 1233: 1230:, and others 1195: 1160: 1149:against the 1140: 1135: 1125: 1112: 1097:pacification 1086: 1060: 964: 945: 938: 929: 925: 920: 912: 908: 890: 878: 859: 846: 839: 830: 827: 814: 810: 806: 789: 781: 769: 738: 708: 692: 687:Nguyễn Khánh 675:Trần Văn Trà 659:January 1964 651: 598: 584: 576: 569: 554: 548: 542: 541: 476:East Germany 389:Soviet Union 375:Supported by 301:Supported by 245: 244: 137: 136: 131:Belligerents 40:Part of the 29: 4182:Vietnam War 4143:Attribution 3558:New Zealand 3553:South Korea 3472:Vietnam War 3368:, pp 164–66 3310:17 February 3253:, pp. 64–68 3248:17 February 3083:17 February 3029:17 February 2991:17 February 2954:17 February 2819:, pp. 41–45 2520:, pp. 10–12 2488:17 February 2458:17 February 2390:, pp. 29–30 2315:, pp. 10–18 2178:Summer 1968 1877:George Ball 1794:containment 1373:air assault 1327:air assault 1311:Chu Huy Man 603:Vietnam War 601:during the 585:During the 402:North Korea 292:Khmer Rouge 213:New Zealand 201:South Korea 189:Philippines 42:Vietnam War 4176:Categories 3927:Casualties 3898:War crimes 3881:Land mines 3716:Resolution 3602:Background 3142:Ball, I-11 2245:References 1954:March 2013 1655:battalions 1611:S-75 Dvina 1549:Truong Son 1448:Pike used 1394:(TCK/TCN, 1303:Highway 19 1057:U.S. views 579:47,691 KIA 574:74,416 KIA 281:Pathet Lao 4151:this edit 4001:Reactions 3958:Aftermath 3629:Việt Minh 3538:Australia 3507:Viet Cong 2775:4 October 2669:159926609 2661:0899-3718 2047:Chieu Hoi 2036:airmobile 1735:Dean Rusk 1505:seasons. 1486:dau tranh 1472:dau trinh 1416:Con Thien 1360:Campaign, 1136:dau tranh 1116:Logan Act 635:Viet Cong 258:Viet Cong 247:Communist 177:Australia 4111:Category 4018:Protests 3987:Veterans 3844:Conflict 3762:Khe Sanh 3533:Thailand 3271:Archived 2844:, p. 326 2813:(2000), 2709:, p. 310 2403:(2001), 2353:, p. 112 2032:division 1631:Thailand 1607:Qui Nhơn 1513:denied. 1510:MACV-SOG 1430:Khe Sanh 1420:Lộc Ninh 1307:division 1261:— 1183:and the 1169:and the 1147:conquest 881:MACV-SOG 875:MACV-SOG 863:MACV-SOG 783:putting 741:MACV-SOG 609:of both 587:Cold War 536:Strength 463:Bulgaria 451:Mongolia 240:Thailand 101:Cambodia 84:Location 50:Cold War 4131:Commons 3920:Impacts 3910:Đắk Sơn 3871:Weapons 3481:Outline 3266:(1982) 3133:, p. 10 2996:, p. 64 2579:12 June 2411:(2003) 2152:Marine 1999:In the 1683:Da Nang 1651:Da Nang 1642:mortars 1638:rockets 1623:assumed 1503:monsoon 1438:Kon Tum 1351:Plei Me 1349:on the 1319:Da Nang 792:Bùi Tín 785:Lê Duẩn 249:forces: 141:forces: 4149:As of 3906:My Lai 3668:Events 3415: 3388: 2916:p. 342 2909: 2667: 2659: 2268: 1586:Pleiku 1568:, and 1537:whack. 1508:Since 1442:Saigon 1347:attack 1080:, and 1016:12.5% 1008:23.3% 1000:30.4% 989:12.5% 981:Notes 840:After 720:Saigon 669:, and 555:NVA/VC 527:Sweden 524: 511: 498: 488:Poland 473: 424: 399: 386: 353:Canada 350: 337: 327:Taiwan 324: 267: 237: 210: 198: 186: 174: 162: 150: 108:Result 4088:SEATO 4043:Songs 4038:Games 3304:(PDF) 3293:(PDF) 3129:(PDF) 2769:(PDF) 2758:(PDF) 2726:(PDF) 2701:(PDF) 2665:S2CID 2547:(PDF) 2516:(PDF) 2386:(PDF) 2311:(PDF) 2138:corps 1440:, or 1345:PAVN 1048:7.1% 1040:8.9% 1029:5.4% 627:SEATO 597:" of 514:India 501:Burma 414:China 340:Japan 314:Spain 228:Hmong 4165:GFDL 4033:Film 3888:Rape 3826:1975 3817:1974 3808:1973 3794:1972 3781:1971 3772:1970 3754:1968 3745:1966 3726:1965 3703:1964 3689:1963 3675:1962 3517:ARVN 3413:ISBN 3386:ISBN 3312:2010 3250:2010 3085:2010 3031:2010 2993:2010 2956:2010 2907:ISBN 2777:2013 2657:ISSN 2581:2018 2490:2010 2460:2010 2266:ISBN 2115:MACV 2069:and 2040:B-52 2022:The 1725:The 1692:GEN 1640:and 1402:and 1354:CIDG 949:and 790:COL 750:and 711:ARVN 671:1965 655:1963 613:and 549:ARVN 427:Cuba 365:Iran 97:Laos 74:Date 48:and 3902:Huế 3766:Hue 3503:PRG 2649:doi 2154:LTG 2142:LTG 1949:. 1572:). 1434:Huế 1418:or 1390:or 1317:at 724:CIA 685:by 4178:: 3908:, 3904:, 3828:: 3819:: 3810:: 3796:: 3787:, 3783:: 3774:: 3764:, 3756:: 3747:: 3728:: 3714:/ 3705:: 3691:: 3677:: 3631:, 3505:, 3501:, 3333:^ 3210:^ 3118:, 2930:^ 2744:^ 2703:, 2663:, 2655:, 2645:68 2643:, 2639:, 2627:^ 2618:, 2598:, 2567:. 2554:^ 2505:, 2467:^ 2419:^ 2375:, 2300:, 1894:, 1875:. 1871:, 1617:) 1564:, 1560:, 1436:, 1432:, 1243:; 1084:. 1076:, 962:. 892:MG 665:, 661:, 657:, 114:, 99:, 95:, 91:, 44:, 3912:) 3900:( 3768:) 3760:( 3635:) 3627:( 3519:) 3515:( 3509:) 3497:( 3464:e 3457:t 3450:v 3353:, 2651:: 2583:. 2274:. 1956:) 1952:( 1474:) 1444:. 1187:. 803:) 572:: 557:: 20:)

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.

Knowledge

Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963–1969

Index