423:
this figure down to 60,177. Prunier, attempting to make sense of these numbers, notes that if a low estimate of the pre-crisis Kibeho population (about 80,000) is taken as correct, this still means that at least 20,000 people "vanished." From this, Prunier concludes that it is likely that 20,000 to 30,000 former residents of Kibeho died after the massacre as a result of being expelled from the comparative safety of the camps. Hundreds of patients were evacuated to, triaged and treated at the UN hospital in Kigali operated by the
Australian Defence Force. All age groups and both genders were represented with Defence clinicians working round the clock with limited staff and consumable resources. All areas of the hospital were overloaded, including wards, ICU and the operating theatre.
350:
nothing, just stare at the
Zambians... The two roads winding through the mountains to Kibeho have been closed. Food and water convoys from aid organisations are being stopped and sent back. The government has forbidden all refugee aid...A group of refugees, about six of them, break away and start running into the valley. Rwandan troops started firing immediately. We see the refugee fall dead. I scream at Capt. Francis "Stop them! Do something!"... He answers "We have been ordered to cooperate with the Rwandan authorities, not shoot at them." "Even if they kill innocent people before your eyes?" "Yes," he answers.
419:
May, without any field visits, the commission reached a conclusion backing the government account of events that criminal or genocidaire elements were in the camp and that the massacre had happened when "there had been firing from the IDPs and the RPA suffered casualties... The RPA responded by firing into the crowd," and noted that they could not determine fatalities because of "logistics and time constraints". The government figure of 338 casualties has never been questioned by any official body.
415:
Zambian officer tried to present him with the figure compiled by the
Australian unit. Both Rwandan government and UN officials minimized the numbers killed, giving public estimates of 330 and 2000 killed respectively. However, a series of photos taken by UN Provost Marshal Mark Cuthbert-Brown show some of the extent of the massacre on the morning of 23 April, as Zambian troops commenced moving bodies.
238:. In January 1995, after RPF fears of Western sanctions had abated and the sanctioned killings had resumed, the IDPs refused to return to their home villages, where they would be vulnerable to the kill squads. By the third week of February, the OIC had basically stopped working and the camps were filling back up with villagers fleeing the violence in the hills. The UN field workers were caught in a
489:(DMI) leaked a memo to the press identifying Sendashunga as linked to "extremist forces", he disbanded the Local Defense Forces (LDF), groups set up to replace police but largely turned into thugs under the direction of RPF rural leaders. Prime Minister Twagiramungu called a special security meeting on 23 August that reached a climax after three days when Sendashonga, Minister of Finance
255:
The IOC situation reports reflected its conflicting responsibilities, blaming a "deliberate campaign of disinformation" for IDPs refusing to leave the camps, while nearly simultaneously reporting "people return to the camps, fearing for their personal safety. There have been reports that some people are fleeing the communes and entering the camps for the first time."
57:
505:. Kagame responded by leaving the room, thus ending the meeting. After two days, Prime Minister Twagiramungu announced his resignation but President Bizimungu, furious at the rebellion within the ranks of the government, got Parliament to fire Twagiramungu on August 28. The next day, Sendashonga, Minister of Transport and Communications
344:, who assured him that he would make sure things stayed under control. The next day soldiers opened fire again, killing twenty and killing sixty before surrounding the camp. Journalist and eyewitness Linda Polman, who was accompanying the approximately 80 Zambian soldiers from UNAMIR at Kibeho, described the situation that day:
324:, held a press conference in which he noted, "There are rumours that if the IDPs return home they will be killed... If that were the government's intention then it would have gone ahead and killed the people within the camps. After all, the camps are within Rwandan territory." In contrast, the Hutu RPF minister of the interior,
448:
An account by Thomas Odom, the US Defence
Attache in Kinshasa, described the cause in the same way: "Hard-liners (in the camp) drove other IDPs like cattle to try to break through RPA lines and the RPA commander lost control of the situation. His report adds; "the camp was heavily populated by people
443:
potential informers. Whatever the reason, this resulted in panic amongst the crowd which began pushing against the RPA cordon. The RPA soldiers, fearing a riot, began to shoot into the crowd and soon most joined in, firing indiscriminately. Their motive soon became less crowd control and more revenge.
422:
Those IDPs who were forced to leave the camps were subject to attacks by crowds seeking vengeance for family killed during the genocide, as well as dehydration and exhaustion. On 24 April, the IOC announced that 145,228 IDPs had returned to Butare
Prefecture from the camps, and two days later revised
314:
On
Tuesday 18 April at 0300 hrs two battalions of RPA soldiers surrounded Kibeho camp. The RPA used the expedient measure of firing shots in the air to move the IDPs along. One woman was shot in the hip and ten people, mostly children, were trampled to death... torched many of the huts so that the
254:
insisted on proper procedures and close cooperation with the RPF government. The former UNREO director would later write, "The government was on board but never fully committed, allowing the humanitarian community to assume responsibility for an 'integrated' approach that in reality never existed."
480:
The Kibeho
Massacre, and its aftermath, began the final fracturing of the government of national unity that had been created in July 1994. Seth Sendashonga came to the conclusion that the Hutu were being collectively treated as murderers and being shot without trial. He proceeded to make himself a
442:
leaders in particular began to become concerned… as imprisonment or execution were very real possibilities for them. As a result, they began to harass the people and then to attack the crowd with machetes. Their reasons were probably two-fold - to create a diversion in order to escape and to silence
233:
In late 1994, the large camps in the former so-called Safe
Humanitarian Zones housed about 350,000 people. The UN set up an Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) to handle the caseload and managed to repatriate about 80,000 IDPs between October 1994 and January 1995. However, this period fortuitously
517:
were fired. Sendashonga and
Twagiramungu were placed under house arrest, but were eventually allowed to leave the country unharmed by the end of the year. While the government of national unity ostensibly continued until the presidential crisis of 2000, these events destroyed it for all practical
418:
Interior
Minister Sendashonga asked for an international commission of inquiry but was rebuffed by Kagame. An Independent International Commission of Inquiry, consisting of members handpicked by the RPF, was formed and led by RPF member Christine Omutonyi. After meeting in Kigali between 3 and 8
384:
Not long after 10 am, in heavy rain, RPA forces began firing into the crowd in the hospital compound, causing a stampede of refugees against razor wire and barricades. RPA forces continued to fire at fleeing refugees for the next two hours. While initially firing into the massed crowd with rifles,
364:
and we certainly weren't wanted. The Government forces made that very, very clear... They insisted we only treat people who had decided to leave the camp... The government forces were extremely aggressive indicating that if we didn't empty the hospital they would... killing people who remained"
550:
to return home before the massacre and being helpless to prevent it once it was underway. However, some commentaries claim that the Australian actions helped reduce the numbers killed and wounded. Writing in the Australian Army Journal, Paul Jordan, has said that: "While there was little that we
414:
Minister Sendashonga had attempted to reach Kibeho on the morning of 23 April but was turned away by the army. President Bizimungu arrived that same afternoon and was told that there had been about three hundred casualties, which he accepted without comment. Bizimungu showed displeasure when a
405:
The RPA began burying bodies during the night of 22–23 April. At daybreak of 23 April, Australian Medical Corps personnel began counting the dead. About 4200 were counted in the areas to which they had access, and they noted evidence that unseen bodies had already been removed. Terry Pickard's
392:
hospital. Despite this, the medical teams continued their work while the infantry sections brought in wounded to the clearing station and hospital, during breaks in the firing. During the morning the hospital was also moved, under fire, into the Zambian compound. Firing continued intermittently
349:
about 150,000 refugees standing shoulder to shoulder on a mountain plateau the size of three football fields... For the last sixty hours the refugees had been forced to relieve themselves where they stand or where they have fallen. The stench takes my breath away... The refugees do nothing, say
521:
Johan Pottier argues that the manner in which the RPF government restricted the access of journalists to information about Kibeho foreshadowed its approach in eastern Zaire later. He states, "Kibeho was a half-way stage in the development of Kagame's doctrine of tight information control."
242:. "The government's hostility to the camps was profound, visceral...A large proportion of those who had taken shelter within Zone Turquoise were seen by the government as perpetrators of the genocide", in the words of the former director of the
410:
posits that "a not unreasonable estimate" would be over 5000 dead. There were also many wounded, but not as many as would be expected as in combat, as most of the dead were bayoneted or shot at close range, and thus died of their wounds.
279:(MSF). The RPA maintained a tight cordon around the camp. Refugees wishing to leave the camp to return home had to pass through a checkpoint, where genocide survivors would point out individuals who had taken part in the 1994 killings.
385:
the RPA later began using 60mm mortars. Corporal Paul Jordan wrote "we watched (and could do little more) as these people were hunted down and shot." The RPA slowed for a while after lunch before resuming fire until about 6 pm.
355:
Several days of mounting tension between those in the camp and the RPF soldiers followed, with the RPF firing (at people and into the air) to control and move the refugees into an increasingly smaller area as processing of
437:
As the processing slowly continued, people became very weary and restless. One casualty we received later told us they had been so crowded in by the RPA, without food or water, that they had been barely able to sit. The
406:
account states the RPA forced Australians to stop counting bodies "when they realised what was going on". The Australians estimated that there were still 400-500 bodies uncounted, not including those removed. Scholar
1112:
467:
that would occur 18 months later: "nontreatment of the consequences of genocide, well-meaning but politically blind humanitarianism, RPF resolve to 'solve the problem' by force, stunned impotence of the
431:
One Australian eyewitness notes that, "the events which occurred on that day are still not completely clear but one theory based on the reports of several eye witnesses and Intel reports is as follows":
393:
throughout the day. Jordan recalls seeing people being "killed all over the camp." The RPA also directed automatic rounds, rocket propelled grenades and .50 calibre machine gun fire at another wave of
372:
force discovered about 100 refugees had been wounded or killed in the night. About half of those injured had gunshot wounds, presumably from RPA soldiers, the remainder machete wounds, presumably from
481:
hindrance to the RPF, declaring that the many people arrested from Kibeho should not be held in crowded cells where they were suffocating to death and then canceling an attempt by Kigali mayor
463:, expresses skepticism of the claims that génocidaires were a significant factor in the massacre and characterizes the Kibeho as being a miniature version of the characteristics of the
32:
797:
551:
could have done to stop the killings, I believe that, if Australians had not been there as witnesses to the massacre, the RPA would have killed every single person in the camp."
486:
1132:
546:. All available accounts indicate that the small Australian team found the event deeply distressing, and were frustrated both by being unable to encourage many of the
1116:
234:
coincided with the period when the new RPF government had reduced the activities of its kill squads after their activities were documented in the officially-denied
726:
Heavily disputed figure with estimates ranging from 50,000 to 150,000. The best estimate of an IOC staffer who followed day to day events was 80,000 to 100,000.
250:
asserts that "the camps sheltered thousands of women and children as well as men who might or might not have been genocidaires." Meanwhile, UN headquarters in
215:
155:
1099:
1195:
698:
Col. P.G. Warfe , "Address on the Kibeho Massacre," Australian Red Cross Conference on Humanitarian Law, Hobart, Australia, July 22–23, 1999, quoted in
332:, held an emergency meeting of the UN and NGOs to arrange transport for the IDPs before the RPA lost all restraint. He further briefed Prime Minister
1092:"Photos of Kibeho IDP camp, Rwanda, April–May 1995 through the lens of Mark Cuthbert-Brown, Provost Marshal of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda"
243:
1074:
1044:
875:
1170:
808:
798:"Australian Women In War: Investigating the experiences and changing roles of Australian women in war and peace operations 1899 – Today"
1136:
497:(all Hutus who had been publicly identified by the DMI as being potential traitors) were joined by Tutsi minister of women's affairs
485:
to distinguish current city residents from those residents returning from Zaire by color-coding their residency permits. After the
1185:
290:
announced that all camps in the prefecture would be closed immediately. The declared aim of this was to forcibly separate known
27:
945:"Guerrillas From the Mist: A Defense Attaché Watches the Rwandan Patriotic Front Transform from Insurgent to Counter Insurgent"
388:
The MSF and Australian medical teams struggled to cope with the large numbers of wounded, many of whom were later evacuated to
360:
continued. One of the Australian medics, Major Carol Vaughan-Evans recalled "I remember getting there four days preceding the
315:
IDPs would not return home. At 1630 hrs the RPA fired warning shots and nine more IDPs were killed in the resulting stampede.
774:
276:
1190:
394:
357:
211:
143:
246:(UNREO), and the RPF was contemptuous of the inadequate programs proposed by the UN bureaucracy. In contrast, scholar
560:
547:
99:
1180:
1175:
1036:
449:"involved in the 1994 genocide... and ... was an active insurgent base." Odom uses the UN estimate of 2000 killed.
77:
514:
1103:
1165:
1066:
510:
469:
223:
159:
195:
183:
163:
130:
543:
542:; Corporal Andrew Miller, Warrant Officer Rod Scott, Lieutenant Thomas Tilbrook and Major (then Captain)
501:
in confronting Kagame, especially over his recent selection of 117 Tutsis out of the 145 newly appointed
376:
who were "trying to terrorise the refugees into remaining in the camp… so as to provide a human shield."
506:
333:
275:
presence at the camp was maintained by a Zambian infantry company, with medical services provided by
531:
490:
993:
565:
494:
321:
61:
158:
estimated at least 4,000 people in the camp were killed by soldiers of the military wing of the
472:
in the face of violence, and, finally, a hypocritical denial that anything much had happened."
1145:
1070:
1054:
1040:
891:
871:
452:
407:
337:
865:
222:) and a number of aid organizations. The new Rwandan government, dominated by the victorious
1059:
Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe
325:
239:
175:
48:
498:
464:
302:
hastily dispatched 32 Australian soldiers and medical officers to support its presence in
287:
1028:
Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century
309:
Colonel P.G. Warfe of the Australian Army would later describe the events of that day:
247:
235:
271:, sprawling for 9 square kilometers and containing between 80,000 and 100,000 people.
1159:
892:"The Kibeho Tragedy (Rwanda, April-May 1995) through the lens of Mark Cuthbert-Brown"
251:
23:
944:
610:
militia were armed and active within the camp. See Paul Jordan’s account for example
1091:
373:
291:
191:
1003:. 22 September 1997. Australian defence force personnel in peacekeeping operations
194:) fled from the RPF controlled areas to zones controlled by the French as part of
1026:
1113:"Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Repatriation Virtually at a Standstill"
925:
607:
539:
482:
439:
341:
227:
1115:. Medicins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders). July 1995. Archived from
673:
328:, rushed to Kibeho the next day to stop the shooting and, upon his return to
210:. When the French withdrew in August 1994, the administration of a number of
1032:
589:
56:
929:
738:
361:
207:
112:
199:
775:"Witness to genocide – A personal account of the 1995 Kibeho massacre"
1062:
867:
Combat Medic: An Australian Eyewitness Account of the Kibeho Massacre
535:
389:
369:
329:
303:
299:
295:
272:
268:
264:
219:
151:
147:
81:
73:
190:, including an unknown number of those who had committed genocide, (
1141:
Official Australian War Artist George Gittoes’ artwork from Rwanda
203:
179:
187:
943:
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, US Army (ret.) (July 2006).
294:
from those who would be sent home via a staging camp in nearby
538:, the first gallantry medals awarded to Australians since the
166:. The Rwandan Government estimated the death toll to be 338.
154:
on 22 April 1995. Australian soldiers serving as part of the
1150:
Major Carol Vaughan-Evans' short interview on the massacre
230:
militia members in the camps who had committed genocide.
847:
845:
843:
841:
805:
Australian Government – Department of Veterans' Affairs
710:
708:
645:
643:
618:
616:
1001:
The Parliament of Australia – House of Representatives
1102:. www.defence.gov.au. November 2005. Archived from
126:
118:
106:
95:
87:
69:
41:
16:
Massacre of refugees by the Rwandan Patriotic Front
1133:"The Preacher - (a portrait of courage and faith)"
737:
870:. Australia: Big Sky Publishing. pp. 80–81.
226:(RPF), wished to identify those individuals and
777:. Queensland: ANZAC Day Commemoration Committee
434:
346:
311:
606:Later Australian accounts confirm that former
8:
216:United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
156:United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
787:Reprinted from the Australian Army Journal.
320:The Tutsi RPF minister of rehabilitation,
38:
768:
766:
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762:
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758:
668:
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980:
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1108:Includes short clip of Kibeho IDP camp
397:who tried to break out after 5.00 pm.
244:United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office
584:
582:
580:
7:
487:Directorate of Military Intelligence
340:and Vice President/Defense Minister
198:and into the neighbouring states of
534:for their distinguished service at
178:and the victory by the army of the
674:"Connor, John: Bravery Under Fire"
530:Four Australians were awarded the
214:(IDP) camps was taken over by the
14:
1196:Aftermath of the Rwandan genocide
1148:. australiansatwar.gov.au. 2001.
55:
736:Linda Polman (September 1999).
594:Australian War Memorial Website
427:Possible causes of the massacre
368:On the morning of 22 April the
590:"Rwanda (UNAMIR), 1993 - 1996"
1:
47:Part of the aftermath of the
1135:. Art Equity. Archived from
807:. p. 97. Archived from
513:and Minister of Information
476:Consequences of the massacre
267:IDP camp was the largest in
212:internally displaced persons
144:internally displaced persons
1171:April 1995 events in Africa
561:List of massacres in Rwanda
1212:
1146:"Eyewitness to a Massacre"
1037:Cambridge University Press
773:Jordan, Paul (June 2003).
596:. Australian War Memorial.
515:Jean-Baptiste Nkuriyingoma
1100:"The senseless slaughter"
680:. Australian War Memorial
380:Massacre of 22 April 1995
64:, where Kibeho is located
54:
46:
493:and Vice Prime Minister
277:Médecins Sans Frontières
1186:Rwandan Patriotic Front
1067:Oxford University Press
1025:Pottier, Johan (2002).
994:"Votes and Proceedings"
864:Pickard, Terry (2008).
470:international community
224:Rwandan Patriotic Front
160:Rwandan Patriotic Front
142:occurred in a camp for
28:Infobox civilian attack
894:. Pbase.com. p. 3
511:Alphonse-Marie Nkubito
509:, Minister of Justice
446:
445:
353:
352:
318:
317:
282:On 17 April 1995, the
184:Rwandan Patriotic Army
164:Rwandan Patriotic Army
131:Rwandan Patriotic Army
76:, Nyaruguru District,
33:considered for merging
739:"The Problem Outside"
435:
347:
312:
298:. Taken by surprise,
928:(9 September 2002).
334:Faustin Twagiramungu
1191:Massacres in Rwanda
1119:on 19 February 2015
544:Carol Vaughan-Evans
532:Medal for Gallantry
263:By early 1995, the
196:Opération Turquoise
186:(RPA), many ethnic
952:Small Wars Journal
566:Our Lady of Kibeho
495:Alexis Kanyarengwe
461:Africa's World War
322:Jacques Bihozagara
62:Nyaruguru District
1181:Massacres in 1995
1176:April 1995 crimes
1139:on 22 April 2009.
1106:on 22 March 2011.
1076:978-0-19-537420-9
1046:978-0-521-52873-3
971:, pp. 44–46.
932:. warriordoc.com.
877:978-0-9803251-2-6
835:, pp. 40–41.
678:Wartime, Issue 39
637:, pp. 38–39.
526:Australian awards
507:Immaculée Kayumba
465:invasion of Zaire
457:The Rwanda Crisis
338:Pasteur Bizimungu
136:
135:
78:Southern Province
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326:Seth Sendashonga
306:, on 18 April.
176:Rwandan genocide
150:, in south-west
59:
49:Rwandan genocide
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36:
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1055:Prunier, GĂ©rard
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814:on 1 March 2017
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499:Aloysia Inyumba
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162:, known as the
140:Kibeho massacre
109:
65:
42:Kibeho massacre
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1166:1995 in Rwanda
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1085:External links
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408:GĂ©rard Prunier
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248:Gerard Prunier
236:Gersony Report
174:Following the
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1137:the original
1121:. Retrieved
1117:the original
1104:the original
1094:. Pbase.com.
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1027:
1005:. Retrieved
1000:
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981:Pottier 2002
976:
969:Prunier 2009
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926:Smart, Tracy
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913:Prunier 2009
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833:Prunier 2009
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809:the original
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750:Prunier 2009
748:, quoted in
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684:25 September
682:. Retrieved
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292:GĂ©nocidaires
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192:GĂ©nocidaires
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127:Perpetrators
26:
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608:Interahamwe
540:Vietnam War
503:bourmestres
483:Rose Kabuye
440:Interahamwe
342:Paul Kagame
259:Kibeho Camp
228:Interahamwe
182:-dominated
108:Attack type
22:‹ The
1160:Categories
1019:References
518:purposes.
401:Casualties
122:338–4,000+
1033:Cambridge
572:Footnotes
31:is being
1057:(2009).
930:"Kibeho"
752:, p. 40.
702:, p. 39.
555:See also
362:massacre
240:Catch-22
208:Tanzania
113:Massacre
70:Location
35:. ›
24:template
200:Burundi
170:History
1073:
1063:Oxford
1043:
874:
744:Granta
536:Kibeho
390:Kigali
370:UNAMIR
330:Kigali
304:Kibeho
300:UNAMIR
296:Butare
288:Butare
284:préfet
273:UNAMIR
269:Rwanda
265:Kibeho
220:UNAMIR
206:, and
152:Rwanda
148:Kibeho
119:Deaths
96:Target
82:Rwanda
74:Kibeho
1123:5 May
1007:5 May
997:(PDF)
948:(PDF)
898:6 May
818:5 May
812:(PDF)
801:(PDF)
781:8 May
204:Zaire
188:Hutus
180:Tutsi
146:near
1125:2017
1071:ISBN
1041:ISBN
1009:2017
958:(2).
900:2017
872:ISBN
820:2017
783:2017
686:2008
459:and
138:The
102:camp
88:Date
548:IDP
395:IDP
358:IDP
286:of
100:IDP
1162::
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