557:, writing on his blog in February 2006, agreed with Pillar's assessment of politicization, but suggested that Pillar had mixed motives in limiting "his criticism to the Bush administration during the time period leading up to the invasion in March 2003". Ritter criticizes Pillar for not mentioning "the issue of regime change and the role played by the CIA in carrying out covert action at the instruction of the White House (both Democratic and Republican) to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Because he was the former national intelligence officer for Near East/Middle East affairs, I find this absence both disconcerting and disingenuous. By failing to give due credence to the impact and influence of the CIA's mission of regime change in Iraq on its analysis of Iraqi WMDs, Mr. Pillar continues to promulgate the myth that the CIA was honestly engaged in the business of trying to disarm Iraq".
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wealth that does not generate terrorism, and "frustrated ambition for economic and social advancement, which is." We hear, for example, that economic hardship must not be a root cause of jihadist terrorism because terrorists such as the 9/11 hijackers were not conspicuously poor, and the most prominent jihadist of all, bin Laden, is conspicuously wealthy. In like manner, he argues that authoritarianism is not a cause, because terrorist acts often happen in liberal democracies. And we hear that authoritarian politics must not have much to do with it either because jihadist terrorism takes place at least as often as anywhere else within liberal democracies, in places like New York, Madrid, or London. Pillar's explanation is that it is much easier to stage a terrorist attack in an open society than in the police states in the Middle East.
417:... the intelligence-policy relationship. But the oversight should be conducted by a nonpartisan office modeled on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Such an office would have a staff, smaller than that of the GAO or the CBO, of officers experienced in intelligence and with the necessary clearances and access to examine questions about both the politicization of classified intelligence work and the public use of intelligence. As with the GAO, this office could conduct inquiries at the request of members of Congress. It would make its results public as much as possible, consistent with security requirements, and it would avoid duplicating the many other functions of intelligence oversight, which would remain the responsibility of the House and Senate intelligence committees.
481:, wrote that Pillar's remarks had been made at an off-the-record dinner party. Pillar had said, at the party, that the CIA had warned the White House, in January 2003, that war with Iraq "could unleash a violent insurgency in the country". Sullivan wrote "Novak wasn't at the dinner, which was conducted under established background rules—the substance of Pillar's remarks could be reported, but not his identity or his audience. But someone there told Novak about it. So Novak, apparently feeling bound by no rules, outed Pillar by identifying him as the speaker. It's a trick he uses often—others attend off-the-record meetings or briefings, tell him about it, and he reports not just what was said, but fingers those who spoke as well."
321:(WMD). "One of the revelations after the invasion and after the inspections began in Iraq was that some of those programs had gone farther than had been believed. The intelligence community had undershot, if you will, in its assessment of just how far along, especially on the nuclear program, the Iraqis had been". Pillar notes, "I did not receive any requests from a policy-maker on Iraq until about a year into the war ... policymakers decided "My goodness, this shows us how much we might not know." And as people like the vice president and others repeatedly reminded in the lead-up to the Operation Iraqi Freedom, "We don't know what we don't know." "
551:. Pillar wrote that the Administration went to war in Iraq "without requesting—and evidently without being influenced by—any strategic-level intelligence assessments on any aspect of Iraq. It has become clear that official intelligence was not relied on in making even the most significant national security decisions, that intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made, that damaging ill will developed between policymakers and intelligence officers, and that the intelligence community's own work was politicized".
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actually read it. (According to several congressional aides responsible for safeguarding the classified material, no more than six senators and only a handful of House members got beyond the five-page executive summary.) As the national intelligence officer for the Middle East, I was in charge of coordinating all of the intelligence community's assessments regarding Iraq; the first request I received from any administration policymaker for any such assessment was not until a year into the war.
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didn't support the case for war. If that was truly so, no one was better positioned to make the case against war within the government than Mr. Pillar himself". Christensen suggested that Pillar could have sent personal observations, with all relevant classified data, to senior
Executive Branch officials. Further, Christensen suggested "that analysis with every single member of Congress by writing less-classified summaries of the conclusions, as is often done".
356:, "Intelligence affects the nation's interests through its effect on policy. No matter how much the process of intelligence gathering itself is fixed, the changes will do no good if the role of intelligence in the policymaking process is not also addressed ... But a few steps, based on the recognition that the intelligence-policy relationship is indeed broken, could reduce the likelihood that such a breakdown will recur."
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401:", Pillar described the function as informally defined, and primarily listening to internal concern about politicization, and summarizing this for senior CIA officials. While he believes the intelligence oversight committees should have an important role, "the heightened partisanship that has bedeviled so much other work on Capitol Hill has had an especially inhibiting effect in this area".
490:, John B. Roberts II described Pillar is "a longstanding intellectual opponent of the policy options chosen by President Bush to fight terrorism". Roberts questioned Pillar's suitability to lead the writing of the NIE on Iraq, accusing him of disclosing, to academics and other nongovernmental personnel with whom the National Intelligence Council speaks, the advice given to President Bush.
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published—published in the sense of a classified paper—intelligence assessment goes through usually multiple levels of review, various supervisors, branch chiefs and so on, weighing in, approving or disapproving, remanding, forcing changes. That can be a speedy process or it can be a long, very torturous process". He said the
Commission found that assessments that tended to justify a
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340:, "responsible for production and coordination throughout the U.S. Intelligence Community of National Intelligence Estimates and other Community assessments". After December 2004, the National Intelligence Council, to which national intelligence officers report, moved from the CIA to the Office of the
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Social, economic and political conditions contribute to terrorism, but there is much confusion here. Pillar argues with those that claim poverty must not (typo ... original quote?) a claim because the 9/11 hijackers, and Bin Laden himself, is wealthy. He argues there is a difference between a lack of
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It is energized by "energy from friction along the fault line between the Muslim world and the West." Themes causing friction including cultural imperialism, oppression of
Muslims, and lack of respect for religion. Controversy accelerates polarization, as seen in the Danish disturbance over cartoons
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Pillar suggested that an
American equivalent of the issues "should take the form of a congressional resolution and be seconded by a statement from the White House. Although it would not have legal force, such a statement would discourage future administrations from attempting to pull the intelligence
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wrote: " offers a unique introspective of the breadth of radical islam and counterterrorism. ... Pillar's documentations involving the improvement of U.S. Homeland
Security policy, such as observing the full range of capabilities of terrorist, as opposed to solely focusing on nuclear, biological or
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op-ed criticized Pillar's choices in releasing information. Its author observed that "CIA officers on the cusp of retirement often enroll in a seminar that is supposed to help them adjust to life after the agency—teaching them, for example, how to write a résumé. I've begun to wonder if part of that
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questions why "A senior, unelected CIA official—Paul Pillar—was given agency approval to anonymously attack Bush administration policies less than two months before the
November 2, 2004 presidential election ... His was not an isolated case; CIA officials routinely trashed Bush administration policy
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editorial page criticized "CIA insurgents", including Pillar, for "engaging in a policy debate" and were "clearly trying to defeat
President Bush and elect John Kerry". The piece asserted that Pillar had a "lousy track record" in assessing the terrorist threat and that he rejected the "war" metaphor
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is an essential guide to more effective coordination between conventional foreign policy and efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and activities. This paperback edition includes a new, extensive, and provocative post-9/11 introduction, along with the author's in-depth analyses of current terrorist
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with Iraq went through approval faster than those that did not support war. Pillar agreed, but said the
Commission also should have asked why this occurred. According to Pillar, "I think the most important reason, besides the overall mind-set that turned out to be erroneous, was the desire to avoid
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The proper relationship between intelligence gathering and policymaking sharply separates the two functions. ... Congress, not the administration, asked for the now-infamous
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's unconventional weapons programs, although few members of Congress
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wrote, "I reported on Sept. 27 that Paul R. Pillar, the CIA's national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, told a private dinner on the West Coast of secret, unheeded warnings to Bush about going to war. I learned of this because of leaks from people who attended, but many other
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Pillar emphasized that jihadist terror will continue to become more decentralized, but not wane, after the core of al-Qaeda is disrupted and pursued. with Al Qaeda waning, the larger terrorist threat from radical
Islamists is not. Al Qaeda-inspired or trained groups will operate locally, and both
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article. Pillar said that the Silberman-Robb commission did not go into as much depth on the "differential treatment that different draft intelligence assessments get as they go through the procedure of being coordinated and approved. And you have to remember, anything that sees light of day as a
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Another critic of Pillar's speaking against Administration policy, focused around the dinner speech cited by Novak, suggested that CIA management, as a whole, might have been politicized against the Bush Administration. Observing that Pillar's speech was preapproved by CIA management, Stephen F.
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article, Christensen questions if that was the place to publicize that he thought the war was a bad idea and the President and advisors ignored him. He makes the assumption that But Pillar "actually did change his mind about all that work he'd done, and that he really did think the intelligence
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Joscelyn reasserted the conjecture that Saddam Hussein had a cooperative relationship with al-Qaeda. However, the official conclusions of investigations by the CIA, FBI, NSA, State Department, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the independent 9/11 Commission have all confirmed
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accepted a commission of inquiry's conclusions that intelligence and policy had been improperly commingled in such exercises as the publication of the "dodgy dossier", the British counterpart to the United States' Iraqi WMD white paper". The National Intelligence Council, and its National
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According to the publisher, "Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures".
521:, and was held February 25–26, 2005. Conference participants included representatives from government agencies involved in the U.S. war on terrorism, students and faculty members from other universities". Pillar coauthored a monograph from SSI, entitled
771:, as well as established groups such as the Iraq-centered Ansar al-Islam and the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiya). Even while having local focus, they tend to share anti-Americanism. Individuals may operate with limited help from organizations.
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for counterterrorism, comparing it instead to "the effort by public health authorities to control communicable diseases". The editorial also asserted that Pillar commented in a public lecture at Johns Hopkins University that "secular"
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sets an example "where discussion of this issue has been more forthright, by declaring once and for all that its intelligence services should not be part of public advocacy of policies still under debate. In the UK, Prime Minister
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When the administration did finally ask for an intelligence assessment, Mr. Pillar led the effort, which concluded in August 2004 that Iraq was on the brink of disaster. Officials then leaked his authorship to the columnist
655:, wrote, "Pillar demonstrates that he himself is a master of the art of politicizing intelligence. Far from being a dispassionate analyst, Pillar practices the very same 'manipulations and misuse' he claims to expose".
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In 2007, Novak decried Pillar's alleged leaking to the media of portions of a National Intelligence Estimate he viewed as supporting his policy path, though he acknowledged that Pillar denied leaking the report. The
830:, Pillar is critical of two recently published books on purported systemic failures of the intelligence community and the necessity for organizational reform. In an article in the January/February 2012 issue of
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His 1990 and early 1991 experience were described in a 2006 interview, in which he spoke of the CIA role in assessing Iraq in preparation for the 1991 war. At that time, according to Pillar, the
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editorial page defended Pillar, noting that the Bush administration did not even ask the CIA for an assessment of the consequences of invading Iraq until a year after the invasion.
373:", and routinely consult with experts outside government. Pillar has been criticized for leaking the NIC's advice to President George W. Bush in the course of such consultations.
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573:" and noted that this article was "the first time that such a senior intelligence officer has so directly and publicly condemned the administration's handling of intelligence".
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Pillar criticized Congress both for not using the intelligence made available to it, as well as not necessarily asking questions about information not provided to them.
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In any beliefs or similar movements, the most unfortunate and indiscreet are the ones that garner the most headlines. Until a more suitable ideology emerges,
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624:. The idea was that Mr. Pillar was not to be trusted because he dissented from the party line. Somehow, this sounds like a story we have heard before.
250:'s Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. He was a visiting professor at Georgetown University from 2005 to 2012. He is a contributor to
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community into policy advocacy. It would also give some leverage to intelligence officers in resisting any such future attempts."
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says: "The book's strength is its nuanced sense of how Washington's counterterrorism policy actually works, day in and day out."
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chemical warfare, and interrupting radical islamist operations worldwide, should be noted in the counterterrorism effort."
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At the CIA, Pillar served in a variety of positions, including Executive Assistant to Director of Central Intelligence
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Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
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called Pillar's critique "one of the most severe indictments of White House actions by a former Bush official since
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Pillar was a major participant in a conference "sponsored by the John Bassett Moore Society of International Law,
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decisions, often with official approval, in the months leading up to the Iraq War and again before the election".
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threats, the status of terrorism in world politics, counterterrorism tools available to the United States,
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U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Transcript
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The author, Guillermo Christensen, agrees Pillar was central in the CIA's analysis of Iraq. Regarding the
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He emphasized the need for "a clear delineation between intelligence and policy", suggesting that the
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had been deprecated as a term for terrorist organizations, but that grows increasingly true. (See
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on a worldwide basis. He described the threat as being generated by three complementary factors:
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Pillar's interest in the relationship between intelligence and policy resulted in the 2011 book,
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Paul Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East between 2000 and 2005, wrote, in
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Beyond the U.S. War on Terrorism: Comparing Domestic Legal Remedies to an International Dilemma
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There have been a series of press comments, for and against Pillar, starting before the
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program now includes a writing seminar on how to beat up on the Bush administration."
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article, Pillar said that the legislative branch is the proper place for monitoring
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the unpleasantness of putting unwelcome assessments on the desks of policymakers".
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first published in 1999 and updated in 2004. The back cover of the book reads:
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Observations and recommendations about Congressional oversight of intelligence
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senior Agency officials were covertly but effectively campaigning for Sen.
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Interview with Paul Pillar on "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq"
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Intelligence and US Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform
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Pillar's view that there was no collaborative relationship between
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1497:"Intelligent Design? The Unending Saga of Intelligence Reform"
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Boyne, Shawn; German, Michael; Pillar, Paul R (July 1, 2005),
1129:"Bob in Paradise: How Novak created his own ethics-free zone."
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317:(IC) judged that Iraq had active programs for development of
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Un-Intelligence: Dodgy disclosures from a former CIA officer
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may be in need of reorganization to comply with Knowledge's
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a discussion of the nontraditional clandestine cell system
949:(Penguin, 2005 revised edition), pp. 257, 375, 451, 457.
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may stay as a major focus of radical Islamist activists.
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from 1999-2000. From 2000 to 2005, Pillar worked at the
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Law vs. War: Competing Approaches to Fighting Terrorism
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Pillar's interest in foreign policy resulted in a book
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Law vs. War: Competing Approaches to Fighting Terrorism
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Prior to joining the CIA in 1977, Pillar served as a
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groups (e.g., the organization that had been led by
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1478:Second IRRI Conference on International Terrorism
405:Recommendation for improved legislative oversight
465:and the Baathists now cooperating in Fallujah."
457:would never cooperate with fundamentalists like
824:In an article in the March/April 2008 issue of
461:. The editorial writer asserted, "Tell that to
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332:as the national intelligence officer for the
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1328:Christensen, Guillermo (February 17, 2006),
1232:"Ex-CIA Official Faults Use of Data on Iraq"
302:He became chief of analysis at the Agency's
1035:"Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq"
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791:Royal Institute of International Relations
789:Participating in a 2006 conference at the
238:is an academic and 28-year veteran of the
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1579:People of the Central Intelligence Agency
793:, he analyzed and assessed the threat of
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324:He was a Federal Executive Fellow at the
175:Learn how and when to remove this message
157:Learn how and when to remove this message
99:Learn how and when to remove this message
1211:"Still Cherry-Picking the Facts on Iraq"
961:The Darkside: Interview with Paul Pillar
428:2004 United States Presidential election
1150:Hayes, Stephen F. (February 10, 2006),
1015:Roberts, John B. II (October 1, 2004),
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533:In early 2006, he wrote an article for
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749:Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy.
268:(1969), and received the B.Phil from
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1495:Pillar, Paul R. (March–April 2008).
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742:Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy
511:University of Virginia School of Law
292:, on active duty from 1971 to 1973.
986:United States Department of Defense
1374:Our Secret American Security State
272:(1971) and an M.A. and Ph.D. from
264:Pillar earned an A.B. degree from
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1499:. Foreign Affairs. Archived from
1434:"Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda"
1393:Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy
714:Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy
707:Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy
700:Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy
342:Director of National Intelligence
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1113:CIA: 'Dysfunctional' and 'rogue'
484:In an October 2004 op-ed in the
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1344:Joscelyn, Thomas (2006-02-23).
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1001:, Council on Global Terrorism
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682:The New York Review of Books
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547:intelligence to justify the
1523:"Think Again: Intelligence"
1152:"Paul Pillar Speaks, Again"
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661:Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda
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319:weapons of mass destruction
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576:In an interview with the
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1017:"White House-CIA breach"
725:A review of the book in
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1083:"The CIA's Insurgency"
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244:Georgetown University
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999:Members: Paul Pillar
769:Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
622:The Washington Times
463:Abu Musab al Zarqawi
274:Princeton University
221:Princeton University
1087:Wall Street Journal
976:Rumsfeld, Donald H.
631:Wall Street Journal
541:Bush Administration
468:In September 2004,
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219:Oxford University,
217:Dartmouth College,
81:editing the article
1484:on October 6, 2007
1387:Zelikow, Philip D.
1346:"Rogue Bureaucrat"
1133:Washington Monthly
930:2013-11-12 at the
870:2016-03-04 at the
479:Washington Monthly
297:William H. Webster
286:U.S. Army Reserves
925:Paul R. Pillar CV
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276:(1975 and 1978).
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33:Please help
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1550:Appearances
1532:January 19,
1283:A Rogue CIA
943:Coll, Steve
592:casus belli
438:Before the
308:Cofer Black
288:officer in
206:Nationality
1563:Categories
1507:2008-02-27
1360:2007-02-05
1314:2007-02-05
1093:2007-02-05
1069:2007-10-30
840:References
677:Steve Coll
513:, and the
475:John Kerry
371:think tank
366:Tony Blair
338:South Asia
260:Background
226:Occupation
36:improve it
1461:109053957
1395:(Review)"
798:terrorism
671:Pillar's
649:, in the
565:reporter
451:Baathists
399:ombudsman
334:Near East
42:talk page
1415:20050261
1215:AlterNet
1059:20031908
928:Archived
868:Archived
808:jihadism
795:jihadist
459:al-Qaeda
209:American
620:and to
517:(SSI),
409:In the
290:Vietnam
1554:C-SPAN
1459:
1413:
1263:May 7,
1057:
776:ad hoc
765:ad hoc
442:, The
280:Career
1457:S2CID
1437:(PDF)
1411:JSTOR
1055:JSTOR
694:Books
1534:2012
1265:2006
782:and
732:The
667:2011
600:2007
543:for
529:2006
505:2005
455:Iraq
434:2004
336:and
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