481:
members of national communities; and for the establishment of a fair judicial system". They went on to say that "a political framework is now in place" leaving the further work of finalizing "the implementation
Chapters of the Agreement, including the modalities of the invited international civilian and military presence in Kosovo". However, this assessment was at best overly optimistic, and at worst absolutely ignored the divergence of interests between the two major parties. The Albanians were unwilling to accept a solution that would retain Kosovo as part of Serbia, while the Serbs did not want to see the pre-1990 status quo restored, and they were implacably opposed to any international role in the governance of the province, including the offer of a face-saving measure wherein blue-helmeted UN peacekeeping troops would be used instead of NATO troops. To add to the problem, the NATO Contact Group countries were desperate to avoid having to make good on their threat of force—Greece and Italy were opposed to the idea. Consequently, when the talks failed to achieve an agreement by the original deadline of 19 February, they were extended by another month.
490:
NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on
Yugoslav territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. In addition, NATO forces would have the right to use local roads, ports, railways, and airports without payment of duties, dues, tolls or charges, as well as the right to use the electromagnetic spectrum without payment. NATO would also have the right to requisition public facilities for its use free of cost. NATO forces would have the right to hire local personnel who upon employment with NATO would be exempt from local laws in respect to acts performed in their official capacity, national service obligations, local labor laws, and taxes on their salaries. Local infrastructure would be subjected to improvements or modifications to by NATO forces when deemed necessary to facilitate the mission. According to Tim Judah, the Serbian side used Annex B only later on as a reason for the failure of talks; at the time, the Serbs rejected any discussion of the involvement of foreign troops, let alone the extensive rights that would have been afforded them by Annex B.
108:
192:"NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations."
155:, where it was initially proposed in early 1999. Among other things, the accords called for 30,000 NATO peacekeeping troops in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. The Kosovo Albanian side signed the agreement on 18 March 1999, however the refusal of the Yugoslav and Serbian side to sign the accords led to the
1260:
1250:
198:"Yugoslavia and Kosovo shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommunications services, including broadcast services, needed for the Operation, as determined by NATO, This shall include the right to utilize such means and services as required to assure full ability to communicate and the right to use all of the electromagnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of cost."
174:"Kosovo will have the authority to make laws not subject to revision by Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including levying taxes, instituting programs of economic, scientific, technological, regional and social development, conducting foreign relations within its area of responsibility in the same manner as a Republic."
1386:
489:
In the end, on 18 March 1999, the Kosovo
Albanian, American and British delegation signed what became known as the 'Rambouillet Accords' while the Serbian and Russian delegations refused. The accords called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous region within Yugoslavia; a force of 30,000
267:
Kosovo was to have a constitutional court, a supreme court, district courts, and communal courts. The constitutional court and supreme court would each have 9 judges. An office of the prosecutor, led by a chief prosecutor, would be responsible for prosecuting individuals who violate the criminal laws
599:
wrote that as the Kosovo
Albanian delegation signed the agreement on the 18th, the Yugoslav delegation boycotted the ceremony and declared its opposition to the plan and that military maneuvers were being planned, so that by March 20 there were more than 26,000 Serbian troops inside the province and
534:
were withdrawn on 22 March for fear of the monitors' safety ahead of the anticipated bombing by NATO. On 23 March, the
Serbian assembly issued a resolution that condemned the withdrawal of the OSCE monitors, and accepted the principle of "autonomy" for Kosovo and non-military part of the agreement.
480:
of the negotiation process put out a statement saying that the negotiations "have led to a consensus" on substantial autonomy for Kosovo, including on mechanisms for free and fair elections to democratic institutions, for the governance of Kosovo, for the protection of human rights and the rights of
296:
Communal police units would be established throughout Kosovo with responsibility police patrols, crime prevention, criminal investigations, arrest and detention of criminal suspects, crowd control, and traffic control. Communal police officers may be equipped with a sidearm, handcuffs, a baton, and,
228:
Kosovo would have the authority to make laws in areas it has competence including levying taxes, instituting programs of economic, scientific, technological, regional and social development, and could conduct foreign relations within its area of responsibility in the same manner as a republic within
591:
For the Serbs, signing the
Rambouillet agreement would actually have been signing away all Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. It was not even a "take it or leave it" proposition, as Secretary of State Albright emphasized back in February 1999; rather, it was "sign it or get bombed." There were, in
249:
Kosovo was to have an 120 member assembly of which 80 would be directly elected. Of the remaining 40 members, 10 would be elected by communities representing between 0.5 and 5% and 30 would be shared equally between the
Albanian and Serb communities. The assembly would be led by a president, two
232:
The
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would have competency over territorial integrity, maintaining a common market, monetary policy, defense, foreign policy, customs services, federal taxation, and federal elections. Serbia would have competence republic level elections in Kosovo. Kosovo would be
558:
The
Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that
297:
a radio and would be required to wear a badge, picture identification, and name tag. Each unit would be led by a communal commander, appointed by the local communal assembly. A criminal justice administration would be established to coordinate law enforcement operations across Kosovo.
587:
A former hand on the State
Department's Yugoslavia desk, George Kenney, reported in May 1999 that a senior State Department official had briefed journalists off the record that " deliberately set the bar higher than the Serbs could accept".
258:
Kosovo would have had a president elected by the assembly for a three year term renewable once. Executive power would be exercised by a government led by a prime minister, proposed by the president and confirmed by the assembly.
219:
The Rambouillet Agreement included provisions for creating a system of democratic self-governance in Kosovo. It would have established three branches of government, a system of local government and law enforcement institutions.
207:"NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the Parties, jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal or disciplinary offenses which may be committed by them in the FRY."
680:
1216:
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of Kosovo. With the exception of immigration and customs related crimes, any person arrested within Kosovo would subject to the jurisdiction of the Kosovo courts. The rights and freedoms set forth in the
189:"Three years after the implementation of the Accords, an international meeting will be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo on the basis of the will of its People."
233:
entitled to at least 10 seats in the federal parliament and at least 20 seats in the Serbian parliament. The federal government would maintain border crossings at Kosovo's external borders with
186:"The Chief of the CIM has the authority to issue binding directives to the Parties on all important matters he sees fit, including appointing and removing officials and curtailing institutions."
1381:
201:"In the conduct of the Operation, NATO may need to make improvements or modifications to certain infrastructure in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and utility systems."
1371:
1238:
410:
took over the leadership when he joined the delegation at the beginning of the second week of negotiations, on 13 February. The deligation included Federal Deputy Prime Minister
531:
1163:
1318:
177:"Yugoslav army forces and Serb security forces will withdraw completely from Kosovo, except for a limited border guard force (active only within a 5 kilometer border zone)."
1041:
183:"The international community will play a role in ensuring that these provisions are carried out through a Civilian Implementation Mission (CIM) appointed by NATO".
1164:
Beginning of discussion (May 14, 1999 to June 8, 1999, specifically) of Appendix B of the Rambouillet Treaty on H-Diplo, the academic diplomatic history forum
1465:
1231:
538:
NATO leaders had expected that a brief bombing campaign would lead to Serb forces withdrawing from Kosovo, hence ending the humanitarian crisis; but
1546:
180:"The parties invite NATO to deploy a military force (KFOR), which will be authorized to use necessary force to ensure compliance with the accords."
1366:
806:
1405:
195:"NATO is granted the use of airports roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees, duties, dues, tolls, or charges occasioned by mere use."
1093:
1035:
958:
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1415:
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171:"Kosovo will have a president, prime minister, and government, an assembly, its own Supreme Court, constitutional court and other courts."
269:
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132:
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975:
148:
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on 18 March 1999. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia did not sign the agreement.
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609:
753:
1158:
210:"NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY."
1511:
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156:
542:
may have gambled that his government and armed forces could withstand a few days of bombing without serious harm.
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1313:
152:
112:
1410:
592:
fact, no negotiations at all, and no sovereign, independent state would have signed the Rambouillet agreement.
285:
539:
1052:
Herring, Eric (2000). "From Rambouillet to the Kosovo Accords: NATO'S War against Serbia and Its Aftermath".
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614:
107:
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the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was initially led by Serbian Deputy Prime Minister
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810:
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377:(the leader of the ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo), philosophy professor and Rugova confidant
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1069:
700:
624:
519:
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447:
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Events proceeded rapidly after the failure at Rambouillet. The international monitors from the
439:
1089:
1031:
954:
577:
477:
394:
318:
82:
867:"Representation and agency in diplomacy: How Kosovo came to agree to the Rambouillet accords"
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and would exercise authority in connection with the enforcement of federal immigration laws.
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1061:
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92:
1153:
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204:"NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or criminal."
46:
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908:
434:, the representative of the Turkish national community and the Turkish Democratic Party
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would continue to exist and would elect their own assemblies and executive councils.
1181:, By Richard Becker, Western Regional Co-Director of the International Action Center
866:
596:
511:
507:
386:
382:
17:
837:"Rambouillet Agreement -Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo"
276:
institution would be established to protect human and community rights in Kosovo.
1030:. Washington D.C.-Chicago-Ottawa: The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies.
581:
378:
64:
1339:
1065:
696:
473:
310:
78:
1202:
1189:
550:
In commentary released to the press, former United States Secretary of State
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1081:
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140:
1179:
The Rambouillet Accord: A Declaration of War Disguised as a Peace Agreement
1138:
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99:
1259:
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809:. Office of the High Representative. 23 February 1999. Archived from
345:
314:
144:
68:
106:
426:, Member of the Kosovo and Methoja Provisional Executive Council
1220:
127:, was a proposed peace agreement between the delegation of the
681:"NATO's Intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"
336:
the Contact Group, which included representatives from the
1086:
The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia
807:"Contact Group Statement – Rambouillet, 23 February 1999"
600:
another 15,000 stationed just beyond its eastern border.
580:
supports this view, asserting that the terms of the 1914
438:, representative of the national community of the Gorans
125:
Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo
38:
Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo
1382:
Advisory opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence
1372:
2008 protests against Kosovo declaration of independence
454:, the representative of the Egyptian national community
446:, President of the Democratic Reform Party of Albanians
953:(2012 ed.). London: Allen Lane. pp. 456–457.
1088:(3rd ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
430:, the representative of the national Muslim community
450:, the representative of the Roma national community
1431:
1332:
1319:
Kosovo and Serbia economic normalization agreements
1284:
1268:
907:. Serbian Government. 24 March 1999. Archived from
88:
74:
60:
52:
42:
37:
871:Journal of International Relations and Development
332:Three parties were involved in the negotiations:
1174:Minutes of the British inquiry in the Kosovo war
1115:(1999). "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo".
951:The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went To War In 1914
787:
785:
442:, President of the Kosovo Democratic Initiative
393:, former Rugova employee and KLA representative
556:
365:the 16-member delegation of Kosovo Albanians:
1232:
584:appear lenient compared to the NATO demands.
8:
848:
846:
422:, Chairman of the Socialist Party in Kosovo
32:
924:"Serbia's anniversary is a timely reminder"
793:World: Europe Kosovo talks: The negotiators
724:
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718:
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1466:Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija
1239:
1225:
1217:
748:
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648:
646:
644:
167:The provisions of the agreement included:
31:
1054:The International Journal of Human Rights
778:. U.S. Department of State. 1 March 1999.
514:on behalf of "Kosovo" in the presence of
1004:
1367:2008 Kosovo declaration of independence
887:
640:
418:, Serbian Deputy Government Spokesman
135:on the one hand and the delegation of
852:
823:
472:On 23 February 1999, the co-chairmen
7:
1047:from the original on 1 October 2020.
582:Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia
147:on the other. It was drafted by the
1154:Full text of the proposed agreement
901:"Conclusions of Serbian parliament"
772:"Fact Sheet on Rambouillet Accords"
754:"Future Political Status of Kosovo"
685:Leiden Journal of International Law
654:"The Rambouillet text - Appendix B"
272:would apply directly in Kosovo. An
270:European Convention on Human Rights
27:Proposed peace agreement for Kosovo
1276:Liaison Office of Kosovo, Belgrade
839:. US State Department. March 1999.
321:. At times, US Secretary of State
149:North Atlantic Treaty Organization
25:
1491:Unification of Albania and Kosovo
1406:Belgrade–Mitrovica train incident
305:The negotiations were chaired by
115:where the negotiations took place
1481:Serbian Coordination Directorate
1471:Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija
1258:
1248:
1159:Full text of Rambouillet Accords
414:, Federal Deputy Prime Minister
1547:1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
1416:North Kosovo crisis (2022–2024)
1401:North Kosovo crisis (2011–2013)
922:Bancroft, Ian (24 March 2009).
620:1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
1476:Office for Kosovo and Metohija
1292:Belgrade–Pristina negotiations
974:Kenney, George (27 May 1999).
739:. United Nations. 7 June 1999.
129:Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
1:
329:also took part in the talks.
1486:2012 North Kosovo referendum
1360:Death of the Bytyqi brothers
976:"Rolling Thunder: the Rerun"
498:The agreement was signed by
325:and German Foreign Minister
215:Proposed autonomy for Kosovo
1024:Kosovo: The Score 1999-2009
949:Clark, Christopher (2012).
610:Kosovo Verification Mission
1563:
1449:Serbian enclaves in Kosovo
1444:Political status of Kosovo
406:before Serbian President
157:1999 bombing of Yugoslavia
1461:Balkania (proposed state)
1314:Brussels Agreement (2013)
1066:10.1080/13642980008406901
1021:Hatchett, Ronald (2009).
697:10.1017/S0922156500000133
151:(NATO) and named for the
137:political representatives
98:
1411:2021 North Kosovo crisis
1345:Clark-Naumann agreement
1297:Kosovo–Serbia land swap
1255:Kosovo–Serbia relations
1131:10.1111/1468-2346.00069
615:Clark-Naumann agreement
143:majority population of
1396:2010 Mitrovica attacks
1324:Ohrid Agreement (2023)
1203:48.645389°N 1.817417°E
865:Wille, Tobias (2019).
574:
371:Kosovo Liberation Army
153:Château de Rambouillet
116:
113:Château de Rambouillet
1377:2008 unrest in Kosovo
1350:Rambouillet Agreement
1118:International Affairs
813:on 26 September 2007.
796:BBC, 6. Februar 1999.
730:"Rambouillet Accords"
121:Rambouillet Agreement
110:
100:Rambouillet Agreement
33:Rambouillet Agreement
1527:Kosovo peace process
911:on 14 February 2008.
1439:Partition of Kosovo
1208:48.645389; 1.817417
1199: /
986:on 22 December 2018
569:The Daily Telegraph
436:Zejnelabidin Kurejs
301:Negotiating parties
34:
18:Rambouillet Accords
1355:Kumanovo Agreement
679:Suy, Eric (2000).
625:Kumanovo Agreement
520:Wolfgang Petritsch
354:Wolfgang Petritsch
323:Madeleine Albright
309:Foreign Secretary
284:Kosovo's existing
245:Legislative branch
133:Republic of Serbia
117:
1512:History of Kosovo
1499:
1498:
1095:978-0-300-15826-7
1037:978-1-892478-05-4
960:978-0-713-99942-6
737:peacemaker.un.org
578:Christopher Clark
428:Guljbehar Sabović
424:Vojislav Živković
408:Milan Milutinović
317:Foreign Minister
250:vice-presidents.
105:
104:
16:(Redirected from
1554:
1455:Kosovo is Serbia
1269:Diplomatic posts
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1169:Goldstone Report
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1060:(3–4): 224–245.
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982:. Archived from
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760:. 12 April 1999.
758:assembly.coe.int
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516:Christopher Hill
420:Vladimir Stambuk
389:, KLA spokesman
350:Christopher Hill
280:Local government
254:Executive branch
229:the federation.
56:23 February 1999
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1105:Further reading
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660:. 28 April 1999
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565:Henry Kissinger
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554:declared that:
552:Henry Kissinger
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496:
487:
470:
465:
432:Refik Senadović
416:Vladan Kutlešić
412:Nikola Šainović
397:, among others.
369:(leader of the
356:for the EU and
327:Joschka Fischer
303:
294:
292:Law enforcement
282:
265:
263:Judicial branch
256:
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239:North Macedonia
226:
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123:, formally the
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47:Peace agreement
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1542:1999 in France
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1537:1999 documents
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1517:1999 in Serbia
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1148:External links
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1125:(2): 211–251.
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691:(1): 193–205.
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630:Ahtisaari Plan
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576:The historian
571:, 28 June 1999
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500:Ibrahim Rugova
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478:Hubert VĂ©drine
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404:Ratko Marković
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391:Jakup Krasniqi
375:Ibrahim Rugova
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358:Boris Majorski
342:European Union
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928:The Guardian
927:
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888:Herring 2000
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504:Hashim Thaçi
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456:Cerim Abazi
448:Sokolj Cuse
444:Faik Jasari
379:Fehmi Agani
65:Rambouillet
1522:Kosovo War
1506:Categories
1340:Kosovo War
1194:1°49′2.7″E
1082:Judah, Tim
980:The Nation
905:SerbiaInfo
853:Judah 2009
824:Judah 2009
636:References
595:Historian
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452:Ljuan Koka
311:Robin Cook
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1387:reactions
1333:Incidents
1285:Diplomacy
1074:144283529
776:state.gov
705:145232986
664:5 October
546:Reactions
540:Milošević
526:Aftermath
440:Ibro Vait
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559:form.
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1090:ISBN
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