968:
103:
943:
955:
25:
2083:
is an apportionment method where we begin by assigning every state its lower quota of seats. Then, we add seats one-by-one to the state with the highest votes-per-seat average, so long as adding an additional seat does not result in the state exceeding its upper quota. However, quota-capped divisor
2164:
Moreover, quota-capped versions of other algorithms frequently violate the true quota in the presence of error (e.g. census miscounts). Jefferson's method frequently violates the true quota, even after being quota-capped, while
Webster's method and Huntington-Hill perform well even without
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1411:
1212:
2028:
1158:
1357:
996:
1637:
43:
1754:
2415:
1976:
1512:
1585:
1462:
1243:
1696:
1937:
1660:
1554:
1533:
1435:
1307:
1287:
1267:
1091:
1063:
2865:
2633:
687:
1778:
2761:
2613:
719:
581:
576:
2860:
2638:
989:
682:
2623:
2408:
364:
888:
2987:
139:
2670:
982:
2401:
2342:
2310:
2200:
61:
3005:
883:
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2801:
873:
623:
594:
534:
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2982:
605:
130:
3030:
3025:
2781:
668:
310:
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1010:
926:
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469:
390:
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2449:
1246:
358:
340:
181:
2030:. In other words: every part of a fair allocation is fair too. This immediately follows from the min-max inequality.
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233:
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increases, the allocation of each agent weakly increases. This immediately follows from the iterative procedure.
658:
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135:
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375:
1981:
1111:
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484:
1316:
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499:
305:
284:
216:
194:
967:
833:
2920:
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125:
2359:
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is not eligible to a seat in the current iteration, and some third party receives the seat instead.
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2059:
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2509:
1978:, and apply the same method to their combined allocation, then the result is exactly the vector
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are a special case of rank-index methods: a divisor method with divisor function
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1897:{\displaystyle \min _{i:a_{i}>0}r(t_{i},a_{i}-1)\geq \max _{i}r(t_{i},a_{i})}
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representing the total number of items to allocate. It is also called the
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Like all apportionment methods, the inputs of any rank-index method are:
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Because of the greater divisor, the upper quota of some other party
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Every rank-index method can be defined using a min-max inequality:
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is equivalent to a rank-index method with rank-index function
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to which items should be allocated. For example, these can be
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101:
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2301:
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At each iteration, allocate one item to an agent for whom
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is an allocation for the rank-index method with function
1556:. The apportionment is computed iteratively as follows:
39:
2107:. Moreover, quota-capped divisor methods satisfy the
1984:
1952:
1946:. This means that, we take some subset of the agents
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2156:is again eligible to win a seat and it beats party
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may be too technical for most readers to understand
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2114:However, quota-capped divisor methods violate the
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2360:"Statistical Aspects of Equitable Apportionment"
1853:
1783:
2364:Journal of the American Statistical Association
2329:Balinski, Michel L.; Young, H. Peyton (1982).
2297:Balinski, Michel L.; Young, H. Peyton (1982).
2187:Balinski, Michel L.; Young, H. Peyton (1982).
2409:
1476:Every rank-index method is parametrized by a
990:
8:
2866:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
2258:Balinski, M. L.; Young, H. P. (1975-08-01).
2219:Balinski, M. L.; Young, H. P. (1977-12-01).
2103:Every quota-capped divisor method satisfies
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2416:
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1464:is the number of items allocated to agent
1269:, that is, the fraction of items to which
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62:Learn how and when to remove this message
46:, without removing the technical details.
2221:"On Huntington Methods of Apportionment"
2861:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
2639:Sequential proportional approval voting
2174:
89:
2324:
2322:
1406:{\displaystyle \sum _{i=1}^{n}a_{i}=h}
1207:{\displaystyle \sum _{i=1}^{n}t_{i}=1}
2182:
2180:
2178:
2023:{\displaystyle (a_{1},\ldots ,a_{k})}
1153:{\displaystyle (t_{1},\ldots ,t_{n})}
44:make it understandable to non-experts
7:
2337:. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2305:. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2214:
2212:
2195:. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1639:is maximum (break ties arbitrarily).
2671:Indirect single transferable voting
2358:Spencer, Bruce D. (December 1985).
2260:"The Quota Method of Apportionment"
2225:SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics
2152:Then, at the next iteration, party
2054:Every apportionment method that is
2037:Every apportionment method that is
1352:{\displaystyle a_{1},\ldots ,a_{n}}
1313:Its output is a vector of integers
1029:, since they generalize an idea by
14:
2264:The American Mathematical Monthly
1289:is entitled (out of the total of
2122:)—it is possible for a party to
2092:)—it is possible for a party to
966:
953:
941:
889:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
535:Semi-proportional representation
167:First preference plurality (FPP)
23:
2782:Mixed ballot transferable vote
2376:10.1080/01621459.1985.10478188
2276:10.1080/00029890.1975.11993911
2126:a seat as a result of winning
2096:a seat as a result of winning
2017:
1985:
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1632:{\displaystyle r(t_{i},a_{i})}
1626:
1600:
1501:
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1147:
1115:
1025:. These have also been called
927:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
884:Moulin's impossibility theorem
849:Conflicting majorities paradox
16:Class of apportionment methods
1:
1749:{\displaystyle r(t,a)=t/d(a)}
753:Frustrated majorities paradox
2983:Comparison of voting systems
2825:Satisfaction approval voting
2810:Single non-transferable vote
2629:Proportional approval voting
2145:decreases. Therefore, party
2075:Quota-capped divisor methods
2070:must be a rank-index method.
2051:must be a rank-index method.
922:Condorcet dominance theorems
862:Social and collective choice
2589:Graduated majority judgment
2081:quota-capped divisor method
1971:{\displaystyle 1,\ldots ,k}
1942:Every rank-index method is
1913:Every rank-index method is
1093:representing the number of
588:By mechanism of combination
359:Proportional representation
3047:
2841:Condorcet winner criterion
2532:First-past-the-post voting
1031:Edward Vermilye Huntington
786:Multiple districts paradox
517:Fractional approval voting
505:Interactive representation
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2988:Voting systems by country
2891:Mutual majority criterion
2846:Condorcet loser criterion
2792:Vote linkage mixed system
2704:Largest remainders method
2431:
2130:votes. This occurs when:
733:Paradoxes and pathologies
582:Mixed-member proportional
577:Mixed-member majoritarian
572:By results of combination
463:Approval-based committees
2881:Majority loser criterion
2767:Additional member system
2725:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
2644:Single transferable vote
2569:Positional voting system
2505:Minimax Condorcet method
2463:Combined approval voting
1919:. This means that, when
912:Condorcet's jury theorem
713:Double simultaneous vote
688:Rural–urban proportional
683:Dual-member proportional
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601:Parallel (superposition)
493:Fractional social choice
480:Expanding approvals rule
309:
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2906:Resolvability criterion
2896:Participation criterion
2871:Later-no-harm criterion
2687:Highest averages method
2120:population monotonicity
2116:participation criterion
2090:population monotonicity
2086:participation criterion
839:Tyranny of the majority
616:Fusion (majority bonus)
433:Quota-remainder methods
2947:First-preference votes
2886:Monotonicity criterion
2856:Independence of clones
2559:Simple majoritarianism
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1933:
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1507:{\displaystyle r(t,a)}
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1187:
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1108:A vector of fractions
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973:Mathematics portal
879:Majority impossibility
868:Impossibility theorems
664:Negative vote transfer
485:Method of equal shares
106:
3031:Apportionment methods
3026:Mathematical theorems
2851:Consistency criterion
2772:Alternative vote plus
2537:Instant-runoff voting
2025:
1973:
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1587:to 0 for all parties.
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1580:{\displaystyle a_{i}}
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1019:apportionment methods
776:Best-is-worst paradox
765:Pathological response
500:Direct representation
153:Single-winner methods
105:
2921:Seats-to-votes ratio
2692:Webster/Sainte-Laguë
2084:methods violate the
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1691:{\displaystyle d(a)}
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1021:that generalize the
1011:apportionment theory
960:Economics portal
907:Median voter theorem
126:Comparative politics
2901:Plurality criterion
2500:Kemeny–Young method
1760:Min-max formulation
1478:rank-index function
1472:Iterative procedure
1073:A positive integer
1045:A positive integer
948:Politics portal
659:Vote linkage system
630:Seat linkage system
217:Ranked-choice (RCV)
2942:Election threshold
2876:Majority criterion
2552:Supplementary vote
2105:house monotonicity
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844:Discursive dilemma
803:Lesser evil voting
678:Supermixed systems
381:Largest remainders
239:Round-robin voting
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2911:Reversal symmetry
2820:Cumulative voting
2802:Semi-proportional
2777:Mixed single vote
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2619:Mixed single vote
2527:Exhaustive ballot
2490:Copeland's method
2485:Condorcet methods
2425:Electoral systems
1932:{\displaystyle h}
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1772:, if-and-only-if:
1655:{\displaystyle h}
1549:{\displaystyle a}
1528:{\displaystyle t}
1430:{\displaystyle h}
1302:{\displaystyle h}
1282:{\displaystyle i}
1262:{\displaystyle i}
1103:political parties
1086:{\displaystyle n}
1058:{\displaystyle h}
1007:
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894:Gibbard's theorem
834:Dominance paradox
771:Perverse response
475:Phragmen's method
341:Majority judgment
269:Positional voting
227:Condorcet methods
95:electoral systems
72:
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2952:Liquid democracy
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2584:Two-round system
2495:Dodgson's method
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2370:(392): 815–822.
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2138:gets more votes.
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376:Highest averages
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336:Approval voting
324:Cardinal voting
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259:Maximal lottery
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40:help improve it
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2677:
2676:
2674:
2673:
2668:
2663:
2662:
2661:
2656:
2651:
2641:
2636:
2631:
2626:
2621:
2616:
2610:
2608:
2601:
2595:
2594:
2592:
2591:
2586:
2581:
2576:
2571:
2566:
2561:
2556:
2555:
2554:
2549:
2544:
2542:Coombs' method
2534:
2529:
2524:
2523:
2522:
2520:Schulze method
2517:
2512:
2507:
2502:
2497:
2492:
2482:
2480:Bucklin voting
2477:
2472:
2471:
2470:
2465:
2454:
2452:
2446:
2445:
2432:
2429:
2428:
2423:
2421:
2420:
2413:
2406:
2398:
2390:
2389:
2350:
2343:
2318:
2311:
2289:
2270:(7): 701–730.
2250:
2231:(4): 607–618.
2208:
2201:
2173:
2172:
2170:
2167:
2162:
2161:
2150:
2139:
2076:
2073:
2072:
2071:
2061:house-monotone
2052:
2019:
2014:
2010:
2006:
2003:
2000:
1995:
1991:
1987:
1967:
1964:
1961:
1958:
1955:
1928:
1916:house-monotone
1910:
1907:
1893:
1888:
1884:
1880:
1875:
1871:
1867:
1864:
1859:
1855:
1851:
1848:
1845:
1842:
1837:
1833:
1829:
1824:
1820:
1816:
1813:
1808:
1805:
1800:
1796:
1792:
1789:
1785:
1761:
1758:
1745:
1742:
1739:
1736:
1732:
1728:
1725:
1722:
1719:
1716:
1713:
1710:
1707:
1687:
1684:
1681:
1678:
1664:
1663:
1651:
1640:
1628:
1623:
1619:
1615:
1610:
1606:
1602:
1599:
1588:
1574:
1570:
1545:
1524:
1503:
1500:
1497:
1494:
1491:
1488:
1473:
1470:
1451:
1447:
1426:
1402:
1399:
1394:
1390:
1384:
1379:
1376:
1373:
1369:
1346:
1342:
1338:
1335:
1332:
1327:
1323:
1311:
1310:
1298:
1278:
1258:
1232:
1228:
1203:
1200:
1195:
1191:
1185:
1180:
1177:
1174:
1170:
1149:
1144:
1140:
1136:
1133:
1130:
1125:
1121:
1117:
1106:
1099:federal states
1082:
1070:
1069:
1054:
1038:
1035:
1023:divisor method
1005:
1004:
1002:
1001:
994:
987:
979:
976:
975:
963:
962:
950:
937:
934:
933:
930:
929:
924:
919:
914:
909:
897:
896:
891:
886:
881:
876:
865:
860:
859:
856:
855:
852:
851:
846:
841:
836:
821:
820:
818:Turkey-raising
815:
810:
805:
791:
790:
789:
788:
778:
773:
761:
760:
758:Center squeeze
755:
750:
745:
743:Spoiler effect
736:
731:
730:
727:
726:
723:
722:
717:
716:
715:
702:By ballot type
698:
697:
696:
695:
690:
685:
675:
674:
673:
672:
671:
666:
656:
655:
654:
643:
620:
619:
618:
613:
608:
603:
585:
584:
579:
570:
565:
564:
561:
560:
557:
556:
554:Limited voting
551:
550:
549:
530:
529:
524:
519:
514:
513:
512:
507:
488:
487:
482:
477:
472:
458:
457:
452:
447:
442:
428:
427:
426:
425:
423:Localized list
420:
415:
410:
405:
395:
394:
393:
391:Biproportional
388:
383:
378:
362:
357:
356:
353:
352:
349:
348:
343:
338:
333:
319:
318:
303:
288:
264:
263:
262:
261:
256:
251:
246:
236:
222:
221:
220:
219:
208:
195:Instant-runoff
192:
191:
190:
182:Jungle primary
169:
158:Single vote -
156:
151:
150:
147:
146:
144:
143:
133:
128:
123:
118:
112:
109:
108:
98:
97:
87:
86:
70:
69:
31:
29:
22:
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3043:
3032:
3029:
3027:
3024:
3023:
3021:
3008:
3007:
3002:
3001:
2995:
2989:
2986:
2984:
2981:
2980:
2978:
2974:
2968:
2965:
2963:
2960:
2958:
2955:
2953:
2950:
2948:
2945:
2943:
2940:
2938:
2935:
2934:
2932:
2928:
2922:
2919:
2917:
2914:
2912:
2909:
2907:
2904:
2902:
2899:
2897:
2894:
2892:
2889:
2887:
2884:
2882:
2879:
2877:
2874:
2872:
2869:
2867:
2864:
2862:
2859:
2857:
2854:
2852:
2849:
2847:
2844:
2842:
2839:
2838:
2836:
2832:
2826:
2823:
2821:
2818:
2816:
2813:
2811:
2808:
2807:
2805:
2803:
2799:
2793:
2790:
2788:
2785:
2783:
2780:
2778:
2775:
2773:
2770:
2768:
2765:
2763:
2760:
2758:
2755:
2754:
2752:
2750:
2746:
2736:
2733:
2731:
2728:
2726:
2723:
2721:
2718:
2717:
2715:
2711:
2705:
2702:
2698:
2695:
2693:
2690:
2689:
2688:
2685:
2684:
2682:
2678:
2672:
2669:
2667:
2664:
2660:
2657:
2655:
2652:
2650:
2647:
2646:
2645:
2642:
2640:
2637:
2635:
2632:
2630:
2627:
2625:
2622:
2620:
2617:
2615:
2612:
2611:
2609:
2605:
2602:
2600:
2596:
2590:
2587:
2585:
2582:
2580:
2577:
2575:
2572:
2570:
2567:
2565:
2562:
2560:
2557:
2553:
2550:
2548:
2545:
2543:
2540:
2539:
2538:
2535:
2533:
2530:
2528:
2525:
2521:
2518:
2516:
2513:
2511:
2508:
2506:
2503:
2501:
2498:
2496:
2493:
2491:
2488:
2487:
2486:
2483:
2481:
2478:
2476:
2473:
2469:
2466:
2464:
2461:
2460:
2459:
2456:
2455:
2453:
2451:
2450:Single-winner
2447:
2443:
2441:
2437:
2430:
2426:
2419:
2414:
2412:
2407:
2405:
2400:
2399:
2396:
2385:
2381:
2377:
2373:
2369:
2365:
2361:
2354:
2351:
2346:
2344:0-300-02724-9
2340:
2335:
2334:
2325:
2323:
2319:
2314:
2312:0-300-02724-9
2308:
2303:
2302:
2293:
2290:
2285:
2281:
2277:
2273:
2269:
2265:
2261:
2254:
2251:
2246:
2242:
2238:
2234:
2230:
2226:
2222:
2215:
2213:
2209:
2204:
2202:0-300-02724-9
2198:
2193:
2192:
2183:
2181:
2179:
2175:
2168:
2166:
2159:
2155:
2151:
2148:
2144:
2140:
2137:
2133:
2132:
2131:
2129:
2125:
2121:
2118:(also called
2117:
2112:
2110:
2106:
2101:
2099:
2095:
2091:
2088:(also called
2087:
2082:
2074:
2069:
2068:
2063:
2062:
2057:
2053:
2050:
2049:
2044:
2040:
2036:
2035:
2034:
2031:
2012:
2008:
2004:
2001:
1998:
1993:
1989:
1965:
1962:
1959:
1956:
1953:
1945:
1940:
1926:
1918:
1917:
1908:
1905:
1886:
1882:
1878:
1873:
1869:
1862:
1857:
1849:
1843:
1840:
1835:
1831:
1827:
1822:
1818:
1811:
1806:
1803:
1798:
1794:
1790:
1787:
1773:
1771:
1767:
1759:
1757:
1740:
1734:
1730:
1726:
1723:
1717:
1714:
1711:
1705:
1682:
1676:
1668:
1649:
1641:
1621:
1617:
1613:
1608:
1604:
1597:
1589:
1572:
1568:
1559:
1558:
1557:
1543:
1535:
1522:
1498:
1495:
1492:
1486:
1479:
1471:
1469:
1467:
1449:
1445:
1424:
1416:
1415:apportionment
1400:
1397:
1392:
1388:
1382:
1377:
1374:
1371:
1367:
1344:
1340:
1336:
1333:
1330:
1325:
1321:
1296:
1276:
1256:
1248:
1230:
1226:
1217:
1201:
1198:
1193:
1189:
1183:
1178:
1175:
1172:
1168:
1142:
1138:
1134:
1131:
1128:
1123:
1119:
1107:
1104:
1100:
1096:
1080:
1072:
1071:
1068:
1052:
1044:
1043:
1042:
1036:
1034:
1032:
1028:
1024:
1020:
1017:are a set of
1016:
1012:
1000:
995:
993:
988:
986:
981:
980:
978:
977:
974:
969:
961:
956:
951:
949:
944:
939:
938:
936:
935:
928:
925:
923:
920:
918:
917:May's theorem
915:
913:
910:
908:
905:
904:
903:
902:
895:
892:
890:
887:
885:
882:
880:
877:
875:
872:
871:
870:
869:
863:
858:
857:
850:
847:
845:
842:
840:
837:
835:
832:
831:
830:
829:
828:
827:majority rule
825:Paradoxes of
819:
816:
814:
811:
809:
806:
804:
801:
800:
799:
798:
797:
787:
784:
783:
782:
779:
777:
774:
772:
769:
768:
767:
766:
759:
756:
754:
751:
749:
746:
744:
741:
740:
739:
734:
729:
728:
721:
718:
714:
711:
710:
709:
706:
705:
704:
703:
694:
691:
689:
686:
684:
681:
680:
679:
676:
670:
667:
665:
662:
661:
660:
657:
653:
648:
644:
642:
637:
633:
632:
631:
628:
627:
626:
625:
621:
617:
614:
612:
609:
607:
604:
602:
599:
598:
597:
596:
591:
590:
589:
583:
580:
578:
575:
574:
573:
568:
567:Mixed systems
563:
562:
555:
552:
548:
545:
544:
543:
540:
539:
538:
537:
536:
528:
527:Random ballot
525:
523:
520:
518:
515:
511:
508:
506:
503:
502:
501:
498:
497:
496:
495:
494:
486:
483:
481:
478:
476:
473:
471:
468:
467:
466:
465:
464:
456:
453:
451:
448:
446:
443:
441:
438:
437:
436:
435:
434:
424:
421:
419:
416:
414:
411:
409:
406:
404:
401:
400:
399:
396:
392:
389:
387:
384:
382:
379:
377:
374:
373:
372:
371:Apportionment
369:
368:
367:
366:
360:
355:
354:
347:
344:
342:
339:
337:
334:
332:
329:
328:
327:
326:
325:
316:
312:
307:
306:Antiplurality
304:
301:
297:
292:
289:
286:
282:
277:
274:
273:
272:
271:
270:
260:
257:
255:
252:
250:
247:
245:
242:
241:
240:
237:
235:
234:Condorcet-IRV
232:
231:
230:
229:
228:
218:
213:
209:
207:
202:
198:
197:
196:
193:
189:
186:
185:
183:
178:
173:
170:
168:
165:
164:
163:
161:
154:
149:
148:
141:
137:
134:
132:
129:
127:
124:
122:
119:
117:
116:Social choice
114:
113:
111:
110:
104:
100:
99:
96:
92:
91:Social choice
88:
84:
80:
76:
75:
66:
63:
55:
45:
41:
35:
32:This article
30:
21:
20:
3004:
2998:
2614:Mixed-member
2599:Proportional
2574:Score voting
2515:Ranked pairs
2434:Part of the
2433:
2367:
2363:
2353:
2332:
2300:
2292:
2267:
2263:
2253:
2228:
2224:
2190:
2165:quota-caps.
2163:
2157:
2153:
2146:
2142:
2135:
2127:
2123:
2113:
2102:
2097:
2093:
2080:
2078:
2065:
2060:
2055:
2046:
2042:
2038:
2032:
1943:
1941:
1915:
1912:
1775:
1769:
1765:
1763:
1665:
1515:
1477:
1475:
1465:
1414:
1413:, called an
1312:
1216:entitlements
1215:
1094:
1066:
1040:
1026:
1014:
1008:
900:
899:
866:
824:
823:
808:Exaggeration
794:
793:
764:
763:
737:
701:
700:
669:Mixed ballot
624:Compensatory
622:
595:compensatory
592:
587:
571:
533:
532:
491:
490:
461:
460:
431:
430:
418:List-free PR
363:
331:Score voting
322:
321:
267:
266:
254:Ranked pairs
225:
224:
157:
58:
52:January 2024
49:
33:
2957:Spoilt vote
2720:Droop quota
2659:Schulze STV
2634:Rural–urban
2579:STAR voting
2475:Borda count
1662:iterations.
1642:Stop after
1247:entitlement
1067:house size.
708:Single vote
611:Conditional
606:Coexistence
455:Quota Borda
445:Schulze STV
403:Closed list
346:STAR voting
291:Borda count
3020:Categories
2976:Comparison
2730:Hare quota
2680:Allocation
2666:Spare vote
2654:Hare-Clark
2624:Party-list
2169:References
2109:quota rule
2033:Moreover:
1909:Properties
813:Truncation
542:Cumulative
365:Party-list
140:By country
131:Comparison
2967:Unseating
2962:Sortition
2564:Plurality
2440:Economics
2384:0162-1459
2284:0002-9890
2245:0036-1399
2043:symmetric
2002:…
1960:…
1850:≥
1841:−
1368:∑
1334:…
1249:of agent
1169:∑
1132:…
720:Dual-vote
413:Panachage
408:Open list
398:List type
276:Plurality
172:Two-round
160:plurality
83:Economics
2834:Criteria
2787:Scorporo
2436:politics
2067:balanced
2048:balanced
1437:, where
440:Hare STV
79:Politics
77:A joint
3006:Project
2697:D'Hondt
2649:CPO-STV
2607:Systems
2100:votes.
2056:uniform
2039:uniform
1944:uniform
450:CPO-STV
300:Baldwin
249:Schulze
244:Minimax
162:methods
38:Please
3000:Portal
2937:Ballot
2713:Quotas
2442:series
2382:
2341:
2309:
2282:
2243:
2199:
2134:Party
1095:agents
315:Coombs
85:series
2930:Other
2749:Mixed
1359:with
1160:with
652:'MMP'
641:'AMS'
2438:and
2380:ISSN
2339:ISBN
2307:ISBN
2280:ISSN
2241:ISSN
2197:ISBN
2128:more
2124:lose
2098:more
2094:lose
2064:and
2045:and
1804:>
593:Non-
547:SNTV
136:List
93:and
81:and
2762:MMP
2372:doi
2272:doi
2233:doi
1854:max
1784:min
1417:of
1101:or
1033:.
1009:In
311:el.
296:el.
285:IRV
281:el.
42:to
3022::
3003:—
2378:.
2368:80
2366:.
2362:.
2321:^
2278:.
2268:82
2266:.
2262:.
2239:.
2229:33
2227:.
2223:.
2211:^
2177:^
2111:.
2079:A
2058:,
2041:,
1756:.
1468:.
1309:).
1218:-
1013:,
647:NZ
636:UK
212:US
201:UK
184:)
177:US
2417:e
2410:t
2403:v
2386:.
2374::
2347:.
2315:.
2286:.
2274::
2247:.
2235::
2205:.
2160:.
2158:i
2154:j
2147:j
2143:j
2136:i
2018:)
2013:k
2009:a
2005:,
1999:,
1994:1
1990:a
1986:(
1966:k
1963:,
1957:,
1954:1
1927:h
1904:.
1892:)
1887:i
1883:a
1879:,
1874:i
1870:t
1866:(
1863:r
1858:i
1847:)
1844:1
1836:i
1832:a
1828:,
1823:i
1819:t
1815:(
1812:r
1807:0
1799:i
1795:a
1791::
1788:i
1770:r
1766:a
1744:)
1741:a
1738:(
1735:d
1731:/
1727:t
1724:=
1721:)
1718:a
1715:,
1712:t
1709:(
1706:r
1686:)
1683:a
1680:(
1677:d
1650:h
1627:)
1622:i
1618:a
1614:,
1609:i
1605:t
1601:(
1598:r
1573:i
1569:a
1544:a
1523:t
1502:)
1499:a
1496:,
1493:t
1490:(
1487:r
1466:i
1450:i
1446:a
1425:h
1401:h
1398:=
1393:i
1389:a
1383:n
1378:1
1375:=
1372:i
1345:n
1341:a
1337:,
1331:,
1326:1
1322:a
1297:h
1277:i
1257:i
1231:i
1227:t
1202:1
1199:=
1194:i
1190:t
1184:n
1179:1
1176:=
1173:i
1148:)
1143:n
1139:t
1135:,
1129:,
1124:1
1120:t
1116:(
1105:.
1081:n
1053:h
998:e
991:t
984:v
649::
638::
317:)
308:(
302:)
293:(
287:)
278:(
214::
203::
179::
174:(
142:)
138:(
65:)
59:(
54:)
50:(
36:.
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