434:
that
Congress had in unequivocal words declared that 'every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of commerce among the several states,' shall be illegal, and that no distinction, so far as interstate commerce was concerned, was to be tolerated between restraints of such commerce as were undue or unreasonable, and restraints that were due or reasonable. With full knowledge of the then condition of the country and of its business, Congress determined to meet, and did meet, the situation by an absolute, statutory prohibition of 'every contract, combination in the form of trusts or otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce.' Still more; in response to the suggestion by able counsel that Congress intended only to strike down such contracts, combinations, and monopolies as unreasonably restrained interstate commerce, this court, in words too clear to be misunderstood, said that to so hold was 'to read into the act by way of judicial legislation, an exception not placed there by the lawmaking branch of the government.' 'This,' the court said, as we have seen, 'we cannot and ought not to do.'
398:
I have particularly in view the statement in the opinion that 'it does not necessarily follow because an illegal restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize or a monopolization resulted from the combination and the transfer of the stocks of the subsidiary corporations to the New Jersey corporation that a like restraint of trade or attempt to monopolize or monopolization would necessarily arise from agreements between one or more of the subsidiary corporations after the transfer of the stock by the New Jersey corporation.' Taking this language, in connection with other parts of the opinion, the subsidiary companies are thus, in effect, informed—unwisely, I think—that although the New Jersey corporation, being and illegal combination, must go out of existence, they may join in an agreement to restrain commerce among the states if such restraint be not 'undue.'
414:
protect the people against oppression and wrong. Congress, therefore, took up the matter and gave the whole subject the fullest consideration. All agreed that the national government could not, by legislation, regulate the domestic trade carried on wholly within the several states; for power to regulate such trade remained with, because never surrendered by, the states. But, under authority expressly granted to it by the
Constitution, Congress could regulate commerce among the several states and with foreign states. Its authority to regulate such commerce was and is paramount, due force being given to other provisions of the fundamental law, devised by the fathers for the safety of the government and for the protection and security of the essential rights inhering in
45:
320:. Initially, the growth of Standard Oil was driven by superior refining technology and consistency in the kerosene products (i.e., product standardization) that were the main use of oil in the early decades of the company's existence. The management of Standard Oil then reinvested their profits in the acquisition of most of the refining capacity in the Cleveland area, then a center of oil refining, until Standard Oil controlled the refining capacity of that key production market.
1808:
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decision, when interpreted by the language of its opinion, has not only upset the long-settled interpretation of the act but has usurped the constitutional functions of the legislative branch of the government. With all due respect for the opinions of others, I feel bound to say that what the court has said may well cause some alarm for the integrity of our institutions. Let us see how the matter stands.
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394:. 26 Stat. at L. 209, chap. 647, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3200. The evidence in this case overwhelmingly sustained that view and led the circuit court, by its final decree, to order the dissolution of the New Jersey corporation and the discontinuance of the illegal combination between that corporation and its subsidiary companies.
397:
In my judgment, the decree below should have been affirmed without qualification. But the court, while affirming the decree, directs some modifications in respect of what it characterizes as 'minor matters.' It is to be apprehended that those modifications may prove to be mischievous. In saying this,
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in order to show beyond question that the point was there urged by counsel that the anti-trust act condemned only contracts, combinations, trusts, and conspiracies that were in unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce and that the court in clear and decisive language met that point. It adjudged
421:
Guided by these considerations, and to the end that the people, so far as interstate commerce was concerned, might not be dominated by vast combinations and monopolies, having power to advance their own selfish ends, regardless of the general interests and welfare, Congress passed the anti-trust act
353:
The Court concluded that a contract offended the
Sherman Act only if the contract restrained trade "unduly"—that is if the contract resulted in one of the three consequences of monopoly that the Court identified. A broader meaning, the Court suggested, would ban normal and usual contracts, and
413:
controlling, for their own profit and advantage exclusively, the entire business of the country, including the production and sale of the necessaries of life. Such a danger was thought to be then imminent, and all felt that it must be met firmly and by such statutory regulations as would adequately
349:
of
English authorities relevant to the meaning of the term "restraint of trade." Based on this review, the Court concluded that the term "restraint of trade" had come to refer to a contract that resulted in "monopoly or its consequences." The Court identified three such consequences: higher prices,
308:
The main issue before the
Supreme Court was whether it was within the power of Congress to prevent one company from acquiring numerous others through means that might have been considered legal in common law, but still posed a significant constraint on competition by mere virtue of their size and
401:
In order that my objections to certain parts of the court's opinion may distinctly appear, I must state the circumstances under which
Congress passed the anti-trust act, and trace the course of judicial decisions as to its meaning and scope. This is the more necessary because the court by its
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By the 1880s, Standard Oil was using its large market share of refining capacity to begin integrating backward into oil exploration and crude oil distribution and forward into retail distribution of its refined products to stores and, eventually, service stations throughout the United States.
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I concur in holding that the
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and its subsidiary companies constitute a combination in restraint of interstate commerce and that they have attempted to monopolize and have monopolized parts of such commerce,—all in violation of what is known as the
409:, fortunately, as all now feel,—but the conviction was universal that the country was in real danger from another kind of slavery sought to be fastened on the American people; namely, the slavery that would result from aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals and
137:
The
Standard Oil Company conspired to restrain the trade and commerce in petroleum, and to monopolize the commerce in petroleum, in violation of the Sherman Act, and was split into many smaller companies. Several individuals, including John D. Rockefeller, were
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Standard Oil allegedly used its size and clout to undercut competitors in a number of ways that were considered "anti-competitive," including underpricing and threats to suppliers and distributors who did business with
Standard's competitors.
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While some scholars have agreed with
Justice Harlan's characterization of prior case law, others have agreed with William Howard Taft, who concluded that despite its different verbal formulation, Standard Oil's
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concurred with the result, but dissented against adopting a "rule of reason". It departed from precedent that the Sherman Act banned any contract that restrained trade "directly." He said the following:
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By 1870, Standard Oil was producing about 10% of the United States output of refined oil. This quickly increased to 20% through the elimination of the competitors in the Cleveland area.
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All who recall the condition of the country in 1890 will remember that there was everywhere, among the people generally, a deep feeling of unrest. The nation had been rid of human
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May, James (1989). "Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1888–1918".
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into 43 separate companies. Many of these have since recombined; the largest present direct descendants of Standard Oil are
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actions. The Court's remedy was to divide Standard Oil into several geographically separate and eventually competing firms.
341:. The Court recognized that "taken literally," the term "restraint of trade" could refer to any number of normal or usual
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in November 1906, and the court issued its decree of dissolution in November 1909 and its opinion in December 1909.
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471:(Standard Oil of California). Some Standard Oil descendants merged into other companies, particularly
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The Unreasonable Obiter Dicta of Chief Justice White in the Standard Oil Case: A Critical Review
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Over a period of decades, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey bought up virtually all of the
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McGee, John S. (October 1958). "Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case".
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Page, William (1991). "Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy".
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Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act
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1148:"The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division"
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1284:
Meese, Alan J. (2003). "Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason".
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White, joined by McKenna, Holmes, Day, Lurton, Hughes, Van Devanter, Lamar
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I have made these extended extracts from the opinion of the court in the
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Meese, Alan J. (1999). "Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era".
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The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, et al. v. The United States
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Supreme Court Reporter: U.S. Reports. Cases Argued and Determined
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would thus infringe liberty of contract. The Court endorsed the
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44:
467:(Standard Oil of New Jersey and Standard Oil of New York) and
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that do not harm the public. The Court embarked on a lengthy
995:. Vol. 31. West Publishing Company. 1911. p. 525.
937:(Englewoods Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 409-410.
472:
1054:"British Petroleum Is Buying Amoco in $ 48.2 Billion Deal"
293:
The government sought to prosecute Standard Oil under the
921:
public domain material from this U.S government document
368:(1899), written when Taft had been Chief Judge of the
1766:
Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations)
1326:"The Problem of Bigness: From Standard Oil to Google"
880:
List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 221
1853:
United States Supreme Court cases of the White Court
1158:(4). The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 75, No. 3: 373–475.
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Economic Development of the North Atlantic Community
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United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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1305:McConnell, Campbell R.; Brue, Stanley L. (2005).
1028:"A Guide to the ExxonMobil Historical Collection"
1087:"Sohio name being replaced by BP after 63 years"
953:, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
949:Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. United States
365:Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. United States
1758:Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States
1408:Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States
1401:Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States
898:Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States
491:" was entirely consistent with prior case law.
387:
309:market power, as implied by the Antitrust Act.
250:Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States
117:United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey
38:Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States
1500:
1307:Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies
1007:"The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Standard Oil"
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299:Circuit Court of Eastern District of Missouri
8:
1309:(16th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
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1128:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
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277:industry through a series of abusive and
1246:Competition Policy in America, 1888–1992
1139:The Antitrust Acts And The Supreme Court
1052:Ibrahim, Youssef M. (August 12, 1998).
890:
1324:Lamoreaux, Naomi R. (August 1, 2019).
1121:
676:National Soc. of Prof. Engineers v. US
1248:. New York: Oxford University Press.
699:Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcast
350:reduced output, and reduced quality.
32:1911 United States Supreme Court case
7:
1817:
967:United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n
653:United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.
607:Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. US
297:. The action was brought before the
18:Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. US
745:Arizona v. Maricopa County Med Soc
722:Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.
263:Supreme Court of the United States
50:Supreme Court of the United States
25:
1848:United States Supreme Court cases
584:Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. US
1858:United States antitrust case law
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1807:
1806:
1394:
1330:Journal of Economic Perspectives
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791:FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists
538:US v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asn
459:case resulted in the breakup of
43:
1418:1 (1911) is available from:
561:US v. Joint Traffic Association
1868:1911 in United States case law
1794:Petroleum in the United States
837:California Dental Assn. v. FTC
814:Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.
768:NCAA v. University of Oklahoma
267:Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey
1:
1863:United States energy case law
1137:Taft, William Howard (1914).
1032:University of Texas at Austin
475:, which acquired/merged with
1361:Journal of Law and Economics
1265:Boston University Law Review
630:Chicago Board of Trade v. US
439:Justice John Marshall Harlan
59:Reargued January 12–17, 1911
27:1911 U.S. Supreme Court case
430:Trans-Missouri Freight Case
416:life, liberty, and property
1894:
1674:Standard Oil of New Jersey
1650:Standard Oil of California
1516:Standard Oil Company, Inc.
1477:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1114:Walker, Albert H. (1911).
919:This article incorporates
451:Successors of Standard Oil
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1195:. New York: Random House.
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1682:Standard Oil of New York
1666:Standard Oil of Kentucky
1244:Peritz, Rudolph (1996).
1187:Letwin, William (1965).
1146:Bork, Robert H. (1965).
57:Argued March 14–16, 1910
1658:Standard Oil of Indiana
1592:Henry Huttleston Rogers
1536:William Rockefeller Jr.
331:As in the case against
1202:Ohio State Law Journal
442:
392:anti-trust act of 1890
1873:ExxonMobil litigation
1014:University of Houston
295:Sherman Antitrust Act
241:Sherman Antitrust Act
1878:1911 in American law
1690:Standard Oil of Ohio
1567:John Dustin Archbold
477:Standard Oil of Ohio
382:John Marshall Harlan
174:Oliver W. Holmes Jr.
61:Decided May 15, 1911
1709:Atlantic Refinering
1582:Oliver Hazard Payne
1551:Stephen V. Harkness
1531:John D. Rockefeller
1468:Library of Congress
1343:10.1257/jep.33.3.94
1286:Illinois Law Review
360:William Howard Taft
198:Willis Van Devanter
1058:The New York Times
1016:. January 9, 2014.
158:Associate Justices
94:31 S. Ct. 502; 55
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1843:Standard Oil
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1702:Acquisitions
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1577:Daniel O'Day
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457:Standard Oil
456:
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445:Significance
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314:oil refining
311:
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271:monopolizing
249:
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235:Laws applied
201:
189:
177:
165:
125:C.C.E.D. Mo.
116:
108:Case history
87:
69:
29:
1622:Chesebrough
1518:(1870–1911)
1367:: 137–169.
1118:. New York.
851: (1999)
828: (1990)
805: (1986)
782: (1984)
759: (1982)
736: (1979)
713: (1979)
690: (1978)
667: (1972)
644: (1918)
621: (1911)
598: (1899)
575: (1898)
552: (1897)
422:of 1890...
376:Concurrence
1837:Categories
1645:(Marathon)
1637:Vacuum Oil
1560:Executives
1108:References
1037:January 9,
465:ExxonMobil
301:under the
269:guilty of
255:221 U.S. 1
100:U.S. LEXIS
98:619; 1911
1731:Odell, Il
1653:(Chevron)
1604:companies
1602:Successor
1381:153539977
1352:0895-3309
1298:0276-9948
1277:0006-8047
1237:0041-3992
1214:0048-1572
1124:cite book
1066:0362-4331
963:See, e.g.
343:contracts
275:petroleum
76:Citations
1812:Category
1750:Lawsuits
1612:Atlantic
1524:Founders
1406:Text of
1180:31721002
495:See also
437:—
380:Justice
347:exegesis
327:Judgment
219:Majority
1822:Commons
1789:Big Oil
1777:Related
1693:(Sohio)
1685:(Mobil)
1677:(Exxon)
1661:(Amoco)
1441:Findlaw
1423:Cornell
1208:: 258.
469:Chevron
407:slavery
285:History
132:Holding
1769:(1949)
1761:(1911)
1711:(1874)
1669:(Kyso)
1480:
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1459:Justia
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230:Harlan
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176:
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166:·
164:
138:fined.
119:, 173
96:L. Ed.
1414:
1377:S2CID
1271:: 1.
1231:: 1.
1176:S2CID
1168:JSTOR
1010:(PDF)
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886:Notes
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481:Amoco
127:1909)
123:177 (
113:Prior
1416:U.S.
1348:ISSN
1311:ISBN
1294:ISSN
1290:2003
1273:ISSN
1250:ISBN
1233:ISSN
1210:ISSN
1130:link
1098:2022
1073:2022
1062:ISSN
1039:2014
975:U.S.
906:U.S.
862:and
858:See
846:U.S.
823:U.S.
800:U.S.
777:U.S.
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685:U.S.
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639:U.S.
616:U.S.
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547:U.S.
479:and
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273:the
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102:1725
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81:U.S.
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1369:doi
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1160:doi
1091:UPI
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