768:"posits that both parties to a conflict will rationally view strategic conflict and the attendant risk of a strategic nuclear exchange as untenable, and will thus avoid any escalation of sub-strategic conflicts to the strategic level. This effective “cap” on sub-strategic militarized conflict escalation emboldens states to engage in such conflict with the confidence that it would not spiral out of control and threaten their strategic interests. The causal force of this theory of increased sub-strategic conflict is the mutual recognition of the untenability of conflict at the level of strategic interests—a product of MAD . With strategic interests forming the “red line” neither side would dare to cross, both sides are free to pursue sub-strategic political objectives through militarized conflict without the fear that the terms of such conflict will escalate beyond their control and jeopardize their strategic interests. Effectively, with the risk of uncontrolled escalation removed, the net costs to engage in conflict are reduced."
39:
688:. It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. This occurs because rational actors want to avoid nuclear wars, and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts—thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts. For instance, during the
989:
745:, and prevent large scale wars, they simultaneously allow for more lower intensity conflicts. When one state has nuclear weapons, but their opponent does not, there is a greater chance of war. In contrast, when there is mutual nuclear weapon ownership with both states possessing nuclear weapons, the odds of war drop precipitously.
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in 2009 quantitatively evaluated the nuclear peace hypothesis, and found support for the existence of the stability–instability paradox. The study determined that while nuclear weapons promote
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Christopher J. Watterson 2017, 'Competing interpretations of the stability–instability paradox: the case of the Kargil War',
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Rauchhaus, Robert (2009). "Evaluating the
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The
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972:https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.1366623
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1003:. You can help Knowledge (XXG) by
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748:This effect can be seen in the
1050:International relations theory
934:Journal of Conflict Resolution
738:Journal of Conflict Resolution
678:international relations theory
537:Alternative dispute resolution
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808:Snyder, Glenn Herald (1965).
674:stability–instability paradox
18:Stability-instability paradox
878:. Cornell University Press.
686:mutually assured destruction
968:The Nonproliferation Review
831:Political Science Quarterly
750:India–Pakistan relationship
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604:Peace and conflict studies
511:Mutual assured destruction
735:A study published in the
946:10.1177/0022002708330387
680:regarding the effect of
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557:Conflict style inventory
361:Nonviolent Communication
872:Jervis, Robert (1989).
825:Jervis, Robert (1979).
446:International relations
376:Speaking truth to power
999:-related article is a
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752:and to some degree in
754:Russia–NATO relations
521:Nuclear proliferation
587:Paradox of tolerance
162:Nuclear-armed states
743:strategic stability
516:Nuclear disarmament
415:Conflict escalation
392:Conflict management
296:Conflict resolution
784:Minimal deterrence
634:Track II diplomacy
582:Prisoner's dilemma
552:Conflict continuum
547:Conflict avoidance
332:Dispute resolution
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913:on 12 August 2017
899:Krepon, Michael.
885:978-0-8014-9565-6
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718:Middle East
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455:Appeasement
371:Negotiation
337:Rule of law
312:Arbitration
303:Nonviolence
228:North Korea
138:Disarmament
1044:Categories
795:References
702:proxy wars
480:Deterrence
249:Kazakhstan
174:recognized
148:Opposition
46:Background
1055:Paradoxes
917:12 August
851:0032-3195
760:Mechanism
722:Nicaragua
562:Democracy
475:Diplomacy
470:Ceasefire
460:Armistice
384:Workplace
349:Mediation
143:Terrorism
128:Espionage
123:Blackmail
118:Arms race
997:military
954:34287191
773:See also
696:and the
690:Cold War
401:Violence
366:Pacifism
244:Belarus
223:Pakistan
108:Arsenals
79:Delivery
859:2149629
710:Vietnam
493:Nuclear
435:studies
317:Auction
254:Ukraine
96:Workers
91:Effects
74:Testing
64:Warfare
59:History
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714:Angola
676:is an
235:Former
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214:Israel
205:Others
193:France
183:Russia
153:Winter
101:Ethics
69:Design
995:This
950:S2CID
911:(PDF)
904:(PDF)
855:JSTOR
706:Korea
529:Other
209:India
198:China
84:Yield
1001:stub
919:2017
880:ISBN
847:ISSN
724:and
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942:doi
839:doi
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430:War
327:Law
172:NPT
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