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down to one of a number of different massive attacks. His new strategy was based on a number of limited counterforce attacks that would "limit the chances of uncontrolled escalation" and "hit meaningful targets" without causing widespread collateral damage. In most of these plans, majority of the U.S.'s nuclear force would be withheld in the hope that the enemy would not attack U.S. cities, while still inflicting serious military damage that might end any ongoing actions. He explicitly disavowed any intention to acquire a first-strike capability against the USSR.
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casualties. If such an attack was successful, the
Soviets would still have the capability of launching a second strike against U.S. cities, while the U.S. would be so reduced in power that their only militarily effective response would be an attack on Soviet cities, knowing the Soviets would respond. This would leave the Soviets in an extremely advantageous position for a negotiated peace. SIOP-62 simply had no response to this threat.
237:, recently cancelled, was brought back in order to provide a survivable strike option that could be launched as a show of U.S. intent. Additionally, Schlesinger put an emphasis on short range weapons that had clear counterforce capability, whose use would not signify an all-out countervalue attack. This led to further work on systems like the
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In June 1969 Kissinger briefed Nixon on the problem of MAD, and Nixon later addressed the issue in
Congress in February 1970, stating "Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty
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with limited accuracy but high survivability, the ability to carry out a counterforce strike while the enemy forces were still on the ground became increasingly difficult. This difficulty further increased with every new iteration of missile, which continued to reduce reaction time to the point where
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and typically included only one or two "all-out" plans of action that used the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal in a single strike. A key element of the new plans were a variety of limited strikes solely against enemy military targets while ensuring the survivability of the U.S. second-strike capability,
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Schlesinger felt that a credible deterrence would need to be based on several conditions; the U.S. would need to maintain some level of force parity with the USSR, the force would have to be highly survivable, and based on its survivability, there should be a wide range of plans that would not boil
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With the rise of MAD, all of the earlier problems with the "wargasm" approach returned. Adding to the problems, the U.S. now had obligations under various treaties to protect allies using their nuclear arms, the so-called "nuclear umbrella". This meant that the
Soviets could launch a limited attack
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The "solution" to this problem was developed under the
Kennedy Administration, and consisted of responding to limited attacks in kind. In this case, if the same scenario were to develop, the Soviets would be placed in the extremely uncomfortable position of having to allow the U.S. counterattack to
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Analyzing U.S. nuclear strategy, Schlesinger noted that the policies developed in the 1950s and 1960s were based on an overwhelming U.S. lead in nuclear forces. The plans focussed on doing as much damage to the USSR and its allies as possible, regardless of the actions the
Soviets might take in
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In the late 1950s a number of parties pointed out another serious problem with the all-or-nothing approach. If the
Soviets launched a limited attack against isolated U.S. military targets, they could cause significant damage to the U.S.'s own nuclear forces without causing serious civilian
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noted that an attack by the
Soviets would result in a retaliation that included China whether or not they were involved, and observed that "any plan that kills millions of Chinese when it isn't even their war is not a good plan. This is not the American way."
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Another concern was that while
Schlesinger stated the U.S. would not invest in first-strike weapons, through the 1970s and 1980s a number of weapon systems were developed that would only be useful in a first strike scenario. The most obvious example was the
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Some targets and target classes should not be struck, at least at first, to give the opponent a rational reason to terminate the conflict. Reduced collateral damage was another benefit of this "withhold" method. Nixon codified the basic concept as part of
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response. Schlesinger stated that "deterrence is not a substitute for defense; defense capabilities, representing the potential for effective counteraction, are the essential condition of deterrence. He expressed grave doubts about the entire concept of
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land and damage their own forces, or immediately launching as soon as the attack was discovered. Neither course of action would preserve any advantage, and so it was believed this policy would render the limited attack untenable. As early as 1962
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negotiations. At the start of negotiations, the U.S. delegation had assured their Soviet counterparts that the U.S. was not seeking a counterforce ability, but the
Schlesinger Doctrine clearly stated that they were. During the June 1974 summit,
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The basic outline of the
Schlesinger Doctrine remained in effect until the period of rapid disarmament in the 1980s, although it saw numerous modifications. Throughout this period it remained highly controversial for a variety of reasons.
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on May 10, 1973, Schlesinger became Secretary of Defense on July 2. As a university professor, researcher at Rand, and government official in three agencies, he had acquired an impressive background in national security affairs.
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vehemently criticized the Doctrine as a threat to Soviet forces, whose parity was a key concept of the SALT negotiations. Schlesinger's concerns about the SALT process would eventually lead to his resignation in 1975.
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had proposed a flexible strategy starting with a number of limited counterforce strikes before proceeding to full-out exchanges. These plans, codified in SIOP-62, remained virtually unchanged for over a decade.
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sites and thereby so reduce the Soviets' own counterforce abilities as to render them impotent. In a mutually assured destruction scenario, those targets would have already been hit by ICBMs or SLBMs.
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that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?" Kissinger and Nixon developed plans for a return to a flexible response strategy, but had to put these plans on hold until the
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The strategic missile forces for 1967-71 will provide more force than is required for 'Assured Destruction' ... a new advanced strategic aircraft does not at this time appear justified.
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162:(MAD) became the primary strategic concept of the era. McNamara became a major proponent of MAD, and used it as a reason to cancel other nuclear delivery systems, like the
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catching them still in their silos would be extremely difficult. As these weapons were, at the time at least, relatively inaccurate, they were limited primarily to
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referred to as a "wargasm". SIOP-62 called for a single coordinated attack that used up all of the U.S.'s arsenal on a wide variety of targets in the
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Targeting should make it very explicit that the first requisite is selective retaliation against the enemy's military (i.e., tailored counterforce).
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The National Command Authority or its successors should have many choices about the use of weapons, always having an option to escalate.
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attacks on the enemy's cities, further eroding the idea of a limited attack against them being responded to in-kind.
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The first coordinated nuclear attack policy in the United States was codified as SIOP-62 at the prompting of the
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against an ally, leaving the U.S. with the choice of backing down, or accepting a full-scale exchange.
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However, the plan that developed was still based on the same basic concept of an all-out war, or what
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In order to meet the needs of SIOP-5, a number of changes were made to the U.S. force structure. The
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and various basing arrangements in Europe that would not reach fruition until the 1980s.
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options against a wide variety of potential enemy actions, a major change from earlier
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As a result of these technical changes, the idea of flexible response ossified, while
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298:, Introduction by Henry S. Rowen, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004
296:"Getting Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice"
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The announcement of the Doctrine immediately caused problems during the
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Schlesinger described the new doctrine as having three main aspects:
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which was intended to leave an opening for a negotiated settlement.
310:"The Creation of SIOP-62: More Evidence on the Origins of Overkill"
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History of the foreign relations of the United States
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bomber. In testimony before Congress he stated that "
392:"War-Fighting Deterrence and Alliance Cohesiveness"
379:"James R. Schlesinger, 12th Secretary of Defense"
146:However, as nuclear forces moved from bombers to
430:Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations
364:, Annual Defense Department Report, 4 March 1974
390:Cimbala, Stephen J. (September–October 1984),
459:Foreign policy doctrines of the United States
16:1974 alteration of U.S. nuclear strike policy
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426:"SALT II: The obstacles Multiply"
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201:mutually assured destruction
160:mutually assured destruction
56:Mutually Assured Destruction
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449:1974 in the United States
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96:for extensive oversight.
78:Eisenhower Administration
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32:US Secretary of Defense
413:Depression to Cold War
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294:Henry Sokolski (ed),
186:Schlesinger's reforms
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21:Schlesinger Doctrine
360:James Schlesinger,
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362:"Strategic Forces"
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115:Commandant
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443:Categories
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235:B-1 bomber
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63:Background
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203:(MAD).
182:ended.
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68:Wargasm
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142:MAD
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