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1078:, and so can be easier than proving such compliance for other method types. For instance, if the base method passes the majority criterion, a sequential loser-elimination method based on it will pass mutual majority. Loser-elimination methods are also not much harder to explain than their base methods.
1111:), so long as eliminating a candidate can't remove another candidate from the set in question. This is because when all but one of the candidates of the set have been eliminated, the single-candidate criterion applies to the remaining candidate.
1092:, the loser-elimination method is equivalent to the base method. In other words, methods that are immune to weak spoilers are already "their own" elimination methods, because eliminating the weakest candidate does not affect the winner.
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that repeatedly eliminate the last-place finisher of another voting method until a single candidate remains. The method used to determine the loser is called the
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Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge - TARK '07
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Klunover, Doron (December 2023). "Bureaucracy and labor market inefficiency: A contest model".
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1103:), then a sequential loser method satisfies the corresponding set criterion (e.g. the
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1143:. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. pp. 279–288.
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If the base method satisfies a criterion for a single candidate (e.g. the
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Proofs of criterion compliance for loser-elimination methods often use
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However, loser-elimination methods often fail monotonicity due to
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1137:"Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes"
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Xia, Lirong; Lang, JĂ©rĂ´me; Ying, Mingsheng (2007-06-25).
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Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Sang-Hyun (July 2017).
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1090:independence from the weakest alternative
77:Learn how and when to remove this message
1733:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
1511:Sequential proportional approval voting
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1543:Indirect single transferable voting
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550:Semi-proportional representation
182:First preference plurality (FPP)
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1654:Mixed ballot transferable vote
1251:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102472
1026:sequential elimination methods
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899:Moulin's impossibility theorem
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768:Frustrated majorities paradox
1855:Comparison of voting systems
1697:Satisfaction approval voting
1682:Single non-transferable vote
1501:Proportional approval voting
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877:Social and collective choice
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603:By mechanism of combination
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520:Interactive representation
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1860:Voting systems by country
1763:Mutual majority criterion
1718:Condorcet loser criterion
1664:Vote linkage mixed system
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1222:10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012
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587:By results of combination
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1768:Participation criterion
1743:Later-no-harm criterion
1559:Highest averages method
1149:10.1145/1324249.1324286
854:Tyranny of the majority
631:Fusion (majority bonus)
448:Quota-remainder methods
61:more precise citations.
16:Class of voting systems
1819:First-preference votes
1758:Monotonicity criterion
1728:Independence of clones
1431:Simple majoritarianism
1076:mathematical induction
988:Mathematics portal
894:Majority impossibility
883:Impossibility theorems
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1409:Instant-runoff voting
1052:Instant-runoff voting
1042:instant-runoff voting
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1101:Condorcet criterion
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859:Discursive dilemma
818:Lesser evil voting
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396:Largest remainders
254:Round-robin voting
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34:list of references
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1357:Condorcet methods
1297:Electoral systems
1158:978-1-4503-7841-3
1036:. Common are the
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356:Majority judgment
284:Positional voting
242:Condorcet methods
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53:Please help
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1829:Spoilt vote
1592:Droop quota
1531:Schulze STV
1506:Rural–urban
1451:STAR voting
1347:Borda count
1216:: 486–493.
1064:Borda count
1034:base method
723:Single vote
626:Conditional
621:Coexistence
470:Quota Borda
460:Schulze STV
418:Closed list
361:STAR voting
306:Borda count
59:introducing
1892:Categories
1848:Comparison
1602:Hare quota
1552:Allocation
1538:Spare vote
1526:Hare-Clark
1496:Party-list
1245:: 102472.
1115:References
1070:Properties
828:Truncation
557:Cumulative
380:Party-list
155:By country
146:Comparison
67:March 2024
1839:Unseating
1834:Sortition
1436:Plurality
1312:Economics
1259:262024392
735:Dual-vote
428:Panachage
423:Open list
413:List type
291:Plurality
187:Two-round
175:plurality
98:Economics
1706:Criteria
1659:Scorporo
1308:politics
1230:43411835
1058:, while
455:Hare STV
94:Politics
92:A joint
1878:Project
1569:D'Hondt
1521:CPO-STV
1479:Systems
1107:or the
1099:or the
465:CPO-STV
315:Baldwin
264:Schulze
259:Minimax
177:methods
55:improve
1872:Portal
1809:Ballot
1585:Quotas
1314:series
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330:Coombs
100:series
1802:Other
1621:Mixed
1255:S2CID
1226:S2CID
1206:(PDF)
1184:Mimeo
1180:(PDF)
667:'MMP'
656:'AMS'
40:, or
1310:and
1153:ISBN
1024:The
608:Non-
562:SNTV
151:List
108:and
96:and
1634:MMP
1247:doi
1218:doi
1214:104
1145:doi
326:el.
311:el.
300:IRV
296:el.
1894::
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