933:
68:
908:
1145:
districts the entire district is represented by a single politician, even if a sizeable minority (or even a majority, in the case of plurality voting) of the electorate votes for candidates from other parties. This enables political parties to rig elections in their favor by drawing districts in such a way that more districts are won by their party than their proportion of the overall vote would dictate (in the
1017:, ratified in 1789, states: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States...Representatives...shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers." In other words, the Constitution specifies that each state will be apportioned a number of representatives in the
920:
1045:), under the justification that they served as bulwarks against southern Democrats diluting the electoral power of African Americans by using strategically drawn at-large multi-member districts. For instance, Southern Democrats could create a single statewide multi-member district elected by plurality vote, all but guaranteeing the white majority would elect only Democrats.
1125:
A safe seat is one in which a plurality or majority of voters, depending on the electoral system, support a particular candidate or party so strongly that the candidate's election is practically guaranteed in advance of the vote. This means votes for other candidates effectively make no difference to
1062:
On the other hand, today most voters tend to vote for a candidate because they are endorsed by a particular political party or because they are in favor of who would become or remain the leader of the government, more than their feelings for or against the actual candidate standing. Sometimes voters
1058:
It has been argued by proponents of single-member constituencies that it encourages a stronger connection between the representative and constituents and increases accountability and is a check on incompetence and corruption. In countries that have multi-member constituencies, it is argued that the
1106:
Supporters view this effect as beneficial, claiming that two-party systems are more stable, and that the minority opposition does not have undue power to break a coalition. First-past-the-post minimizes the influence of third parties and thus arguably keeps out forms of opposition outside of the
1144:
Single-member districts enable gerrymandering, the practice of manipulating district boundaries to favor one political party. Whereas proportional multi-member districts ensure that political parties are represented roughly in proportion to the share of the vote they receive, in single-member
1130:, by both supporters of the dominant candidate (who can confidently abstain from voting because their preferred candidate's victory is nearly assured) as well as supporters of other candidates (who know their preferred candidate is essentially guaranteed to lose).
1107:
dominant rival party. Critics of two-party systems believe that two-party systems offer less choice to voters, create an exaggerated emphasis on issues that dominate more marginal seats, and does not completely remove the possibility of a balanced chamber (or
1036:
By 1842, single-member House districts had become the norm, with twenty-two states using single-member districts and only six using at-large multi-member districts. On 14 December 1967, single-member House districts were mandated by law pursuant to the
1431:
1001:, members of the lower house of parliament are elected from single-member districts, while members of the upper house are elected from multi-member districts. In some other countries, such as
1161:
Contrary to conventional wisdom, a 2023 study found that single-member district systems do not have more geographically representative parliaments than systems with multi-member districts.
1096:
961:
1368:
1206:
652:
684:
546:
541:
954:
647:
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329:
1059:
constituency link is lost. For example, in Israel the whole country is a single constituency and representatives are selected by party-lists.
1313:
853:
104:
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1038:
947:
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those representatives should be apportioned. In the early years of the United States, a form of multi-member districts called
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511:
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government in 1989 but, because of dissatisfaction with its leadership, the premier and leader of the governing party,
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323:
305:
146:
1282:
1033:
multi-member districts (which had not yet been invented), plural districts were elected at-large in plurality votes.
876:
1063:
are in favor of a political party but do not like specific candidates. For example, voters in Canada re-elected the
1345:
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767:
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439:
240:
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131:
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100:
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1005:, members of parliament can be elected from either single-member or multi-member districts.
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1111:), which can also give undue power to independents and lead to more, not less, stability.
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1171:
Comparison of electoral systems § Compliance of selected single-winner methods
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218:
1153:
won 45% of the popular vote but 64% of the seats, due in part to gerrymandering).
1095:
system is mathematically over-represented in the legislature. For example, in the
1126:
the result. This results in feelings of disenfranchisement, as well as increased
409:
367:
310:
255:
1447:
1283:"There's a simple way to end gerrymandering. Too bad Congress made it illegal"
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628:
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414:
30:"Single-seat" redirects here. For a racing car with only one seat, see
998:
1079:
It has been argued that single-member districts tend to promote
1390:"The several layers of Republican power-grabbing in Wisconsin"
1021:
proportional to its population. It does not, however, specify
1087:, this principle has also been empirically supported by the
66:
27:
Electoral district with one representative in a legislature
986:
represented by a single officeholder. It contrasts with a
1103:
won 51.2% of the popular vote but 56.7% of the seats.
1226:"The History of Single Member Districts for Congress"
1165:
Comparison of single-member district election methods
1097:
990:, which is represented by multiple officeholders.
1432:"Electoral Systems and Geographic Representation"
1411:"What Is Gerrymandering? And How Does it Work?"
955:
8:
1207:National Archives and Records Administration
1430:Carella, Leonardo; Eggers, Andrew (2023).
1369:"The Biggest Problem in American Politics"
1219:
1217:
962:
948:
38:
1091:, which shows how the winning party in a
1304:"The Case for a Better Election System"
1193:
1029:were the norm. In contrast with modern
54:
1147:2018 Wisconsin State Assembly election
1255:
1253:
1238:from the original on 19 December 2020
1083:(with some regional parties). Called
7:
1436:British Journal of Political Science
1348:from the original on 16 October 2020
1316:from the original on 28 October 2020
1260:Editorial Board (10 November 2018).
1367:Salam, Reihan (11 September 2014).
1302:Amy, Douglas J. (1 January 1997).
1281:Yglesias, Matthew (20 July 2015).
1039:Uniform Congressional District Act
25:
1388:Bump, Philip (4 December 2018).
931:
918:
906:
854:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
500:Semi-proportional representation
132:First preference plurality (FPP)
1409:Wines, Michael (27 June 2019).
1262:"A Congress for Every American"
892:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
849:Moulin's impossibility theorem
814:Conflicting majorities paradox
1:
718:Frustrated majorities paradox
1202:"United States Constitution"
1009:History in the United States
887:Condorcet dominance theorems
827:Social and collective choice
993:In some countries, such as
553:By mechanism of combination
324:Proportional representation
18:Single-winner voting system
1492:
1168:
1137:
1118:
1015:United States Constitution
751:Multiple districts paradox
482:Fractional approval voting
470:Interactive representation
29:
1448:10.1017/S0007123423000121
1336:"Single Member Districts"
1157:Geographic representation
698:Paradoxes and pathologies
547:Mixed-member proportional
542:Mixed-member majoritarian
537:By results of combination
428:Approval-based committees
1019:House of Representatives
877:Condorcet's jury theorem
678:Double simultaneous vote
653:Rural–urban proportional
648:Dual-member proportional
610:
599:
566:Parallel (superposition)
458:Fractional social choice
445:Expanding approvals rule
274:
259:
244:
175:
164:
140:
804:Tyranny of the majority
581:Fusion (majority bonus)
398:Quota-remainder methods
1075:Fewer minority parties
976:single-member district
938:Mathematics portal
844:Majority impossibility
833:Impossibility theorems
629:Negative vote transfer
450:Method of equal shares
71:
1169:Further information:
988:multi-member district
741:Best-is-worst paradox
730:Pathological response
465:Direct representation
118:Single-winner methods
70:
925:Economics portal
872:Median voter theorem
91:Comparative politics
1395:The Washington Post
1149:, for example, the
1093:first-past-the-post
913:Politics portal
624:Vote linkage system
595:Seat linkage system
182:Ranked-choice (RCV)
1416:The New York Times
1267:The New York Times
1210:. 4 November 2015.
984:electoral district
809:Discursive dilemma
768:Lesser evil voting
643:Supermixed systems
346:Largest remainders
204:Round-robin voting
72:
1081:two-party systems
1071:, lost his seat.
1054:Constituency link
972:
971:
859:Gibbard's theorem
799:Dominance paradox
736:Perverse response
440:Phragmen's method
306:Majority judgment
234:Positional voting
192:Condorcet methods
60:electoral systems
16:(Redirected from
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1151:Republican Party
1128:nonparticipation
1101:Republican Party
1027:plural districts
964:
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950:
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923:
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866:Positive results
761:Strategic voting
658:Majority jackpot
615:
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475:Liquid democracy
351:National remnant
341:Highest averages
278:
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180:
171:Alternative vote
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153:Partisan primary
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86:Mechanism design
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1043:2 U.S. Code §2c
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839:Arrow's theorem
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746:No-show paradox
727:
713:Cloning paradox
703:Spoiler effects
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487:Maximal lottery
454:
435:Thiele's method
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301:Approval voting
289:Cardinal voting
285:
230:
224:Maximal lottery
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1476:Constituencies
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1182:Duverger's law
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1140:Gerrymandering
1138:Main article:
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1134:Gerrymandering
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1119:Main article:
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1085:Duverger's law
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708:Spoiler effect
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792:majority rule
790:Paradoxes of
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492:Random ballot
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336:Apportionment
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271:Antiplurality
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199:Condorcet-IRV
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81:Social choice
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56:Social choice
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32:Single-seater
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1350:. Retrieved
1339:
1330:
1318:. Retrieved
1307:
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1240:. Retrieved
1229:
1224:Mast, Tony.
1205:
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1031:proportional
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831:
789:
788:
773:Exaggeration
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702:
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634:Mixed ballot
589:Compensatory
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560:compensatory
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383:List-free PR
328:
296:Score voting
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219:Ranked pairs
190:
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122:
36:
673:Single vote
576:Conditional
571:Coexistence
420:Quota Borda
410:Schulze STV
368:Closed list
311:STAR voting
256:Borda count
1352:24 January
1320:25 January
1242:24 January
1188:References
1115:Safe seats
778:Truncation
507:Cumulative
330:Party-list
105:By country
96:Comparison
1456:0007-1234
1442:: 40–68.
1121:Safe seat
1089:cube rule
1069:Don Getty
1003:Singapore
995:Australia
685:Dual-vote
378:Panachage
373:Open list
363:List type
241:Plurality
137:Two-round
125:plurality
48:Economics
1470:Category
1346:Archived
1341:FairVote
1314:Archived
1309:FairVote
1236:Archived
1231:FairVote
1176:See also
405:Hare STV
44:Politics
42:A joint
1065:Alberta
1049:Aspects
415:CPO-STV
265:Baldwin
214:Schulze
209:Minimax
127:methods
1454:
1099:, the
982:is an
280:Coombs
50:series
1374:Slate
999:India
617:'MMP'
606:'AMS'
1452:ISSN
1354:2021
1322:2021
1244:2020
1013:The
997:and
558:Non-
512:SNTV
101:List
58:and
46:and
1444:doi
1288:Vox
1023:how
978:or
276:el.
261:el.
250:IRV
246:el.
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612:NZ
601:UK
177:US
166:UK
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142:US
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