Knowledge (XXG)

Social welfare function

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the poor to the rich results in a bigger increase in the utility of the rich than the decrease in the utility of the poor, the society is expected to accept such a transfer, because the total utility of the society has increased as a whole. Alternatively, society's welfare can also be measured under this function by taking the average of individual incomes:
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individuals in society. In this case, maximizing the social welfare means maximizing the total income of the people in the society, without regard to how incomes are distributed in society. It does not distinguish between an income transfer from rich to poor and vice versa. If an income transfer from
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of utility for everyone in the society from ethically lowest on up (with ties permitted), that is, it makes interpersonal comparisons of utility. Welfare maximization then consists of maximizing the welfare function subject to the possibility function as a constraint. The same welfare maximization
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Every social ordering can be made into a choice function by considering only the highest-ranked outcome. Less obviously, though, every social choice function is also an ordering function. Deleting the best outcome, then finding the new winner, results in a runner-up who is assigned second place.
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These two social welfare functions express very different views about how a society would need to be organised in order to maximize welfare, with the first emphasizing total incomes and the second emphasizing the needs of the worst-off. The max-min welfare function can be seen as reflecting an
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locus of utility combinations imposed by the restraints and allowed by Pareto efficiency. At a given point on the possibility function, if the utility of all but one person is determined, the remaining person's utility is determined. The welfare function ranks different hypothetical
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may belong, which is randomly picked from the sum of all unequally distributed incomes. This welfare function marks the income, which a randomly selected Euro most likely belongs to. The inverse value of that function will be larger than the average per capita income.
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dimension. As Bergson noted, a welfare improvement from the social welfare function could come from the "position of some individuals" improving at the expense of others. That social welfare function could then be described as characterizing an equity dimension.
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By Harsanyi's theorem, any non-utilitarian social choice function will be incoherent; in other words, it will agree to some bets that are unanimously opposed by every member of society. However, it is still possible to establish properties of such functions.
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the set of utility functions for everyone in the society. Each can (and commonly does) incorporate Pareto efficiency. The possibility function also depends on technology and resource restraints. It is written in implicit form, reflecting the
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that ranks a set of social states by their desirability. A social welfare function may yield several possible outcomes; each person's preferences are combined in some way to determine which outcome is considered better by society as a whole.
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demonstrated the problems with such an approach, though he would not immediately realize this. Along earlier lines, Arrow's version of a social welfare function, also called a 'constitution', maps a set of individual orderings
2568:, which holds if all alternatives have been exhausted to put at least one person in a more preferred position with no one put in a less preferred position. Bergson described an "economic welfare increase" (later called a 3443: 3347: 3744:: the relation between two utility profiles does not change if both of them are multiplied by the same constant. For example, the utility function should not depend on whether we measure incomes in cents or dollars. 3025: 2778:), and returns as output a numeric representation of the collective welfare. The underlying assumption is that individuals utilities can be put on a common scale and compared. Examples of such measures include 1909:
as a way to identify socially-optimal decisions, giving a procedure to rigorously define which of two outcomes should be considered more desirable for society as a whole (e.g. to compare two different possible
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prefers (2, 2, 4) to (1, 3, 4), it also prefers (2, 2, 9) to (1, 3, 9); the utility of agent 3 should not affect the comparison between two utility profiles of agents 1 and 2. This property can also be called
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The respective hypothetical utilities of the two persons in two-dimensional utility space is analogous to respective quantities of commodities for the two-dimensional commodity space of the indifference-curve
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Two-person welfare maximization at the tangency of the highest Welfare function curve on the Possibility function is analogous to tangency of the highest indifference curve on the budget constraint.
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on utility profiles—it can tell us, given any two utility profiles, if they are indifferent or one of them is better than the other. A reasonable preference ordering should satisfy several axioms:
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measurable, and it was commonly inferred that redistributing income from a rich person to a poor person tends to increase total utility (however measured) in the society. But Lionel Robbins (
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As Samuelson (1983, p. xxii) notes, Bergson clarified how production and consumption efficiency conditions are distinct from the interpersonal ethical values of the social welfare function.
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Under instant-runoff voting, Top is the winner. Center is eliminated in the first round, and their second-preferences are evenly split between Top and Bottom, allowing Top to win.
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with the intention "to state in precise form the value judgments required for the derivation of the conditions of maximum economic welfare." The function was real-valued and
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Here the Theil-T index is applied. The inverse value yielded by this function has a concrete meaning as well. There are several possible incomes to which a
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Here maximizing societal welfare would mean maximizing the income of the poorest person in society without regard for the income of other individuals.
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is a key result on social welfare functions, showing an important difference between social and consumer choice: whereas it is possible to construct a
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Auxiliary specifications enable comparison of different social states by each member of society in preference satisfaction. These help define
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should strictly prefer the second profile. For example, it should prefer the profile (1, 4, 4, 5) to (1, 2, 4, 5). Such a change is called a
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election between Top, Center, and Bottom. Top has the most first-preference votes; Bottom has the second-most; and Center (positioned
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To find the second-place finisher, we find the winner if Top had not run. In this case, the election is between Center and Bottom.
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on the part of society as a whole, since it is concerned only with the worst conditions that a member of society could face.
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a complete and transitive ranking (an ethically "better", "worse", or "indifferent" ranking) of all social alternatives and
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function maps each candidate to a number representing their quality. For example, the standard social scoring function for
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The value yielded by this function has a concrete meaning. There are several possible incomes which could be earned by a
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The marginal "dis-welfare" of each "dollar's worth" of labor is equal for each commodity produced of each labor supplier
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dimension of a particular social welfare function with distribution of commodities among individuals characterizing
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The marginal "dollar" cost of each unit of resources is equal to the marginal value productivity for each commodity.
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Arrow's theorem shows that it is impossible for an ordinal social welfare function to satisfy a standard axiom of
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but not sufficient for defining interpersonal normative equity." Still, Pareto efficiency could also characterize
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function selects a single best outcome (a single candidate who wins, or multiple if there happens to be a tie).
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Instead of imposing rational behavior on the social utility function, we can impose a weaker criterion called
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For a two-person society, there is a graphical depiction of such welfare maximization at the first figure of
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utility functions onto a single output, in a way that accounts for the judgments of everyone in a society.
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The form of the social welfare function is intended to express a statement of objectives of a society.
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_____, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of 'Reasonable' Bergson–Samuelson Social Welfare Functions,"
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should be indifferent between (1, 4, 4, 5) and (5, 4, 4, 1), because the only difference is whether
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as implying interpersonally comparable utility. Irrespective of such comparability, income or wealth
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In contrast, the max-min or Rawlsian social welfare function (based on the philosophical work of
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is a function that takes as input numeric representations of individual utilities (also known as
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one set out of an infinity of welfare indices and cardinal indicators to characterize the belief.
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social welfare function measures social welfare as the total or sum of individual utilities:
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The marginal "dollar's worth" of welfare is equal for each individual and for each commodity
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Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson
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Because of this close relationship, the three kinds of functions are often conflated by
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should be independent of individuals whose utilities have not changed. For example, if
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must be equal to the utility functions of each individual. This result is known as
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The average per capita income of a measured group (e.g. nation) is multiplied with
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For the purposes of this section, income is adopted as the measurement of utility.
1962: 1824: 1738: 1683: 1578: 1568: 1563: 1488: 1036: 529: 293: 286: 216: 4072:, ch. 3, "Collective Rationality." p. 33, and ch. 3*, "Social Welfare Functions." 3563:
Every preference relation with properties 1–4 can be represented as by a function
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The notion of social utility is analogous to the notion of a utility function in
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For a discussion of the same concept in the context of voting and politics, see
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Some authors maintain a distinction between three closely-related concepts:
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Necessary general conditions are that at the maximum value of the function:
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had described a standard of economic efficiency despite dispensing with
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There are two different notions of social welfare used by economists:
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_____, 1981. "Bergsonian Welfare Economics", in S. Rosefielde (ed.),
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behavior at the social level impossible. This result is now known as
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Function that ranks states of society according to their desirability
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as to two commodities consumed, there are the following parallels:
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the values in the utility profile should not change the output of
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If the preference relation has properties 1–5, then the function
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individualistic sense to derive Pareto efficiency (optimality).
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____, 1938, "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment,"
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Samuelson further sharpened that distinction by specifying the
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Repeating this process gives a full ranking of all candidates.
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The Possibility function is analogous to the budget constraint
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The Welfare function is analogous to the indifference-curve
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An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science
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Earlier neoclassical welfare theory, heir to the classical
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one ethical belief, Pareto-bound or not, consistent with:
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used in producing different commodities, including labor.
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is the total number of voters who rank a candidate first.
3190:{\displaystyle W_{\mathrm {Gini} }={\overline {Y}}(1-G)} 2442: 2227: 3967: 3927: 3894: 3861: 3825: 3763: 3701: 3691:—implies that the social choice function must be the 3683:
Introducing one additional axiom—the nonexistence of
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The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson
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The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson
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may be too technical for most readers to understand
4343:, Cambridge, pp. 223–66. Reprinted in (1986) 4191:in Paretian welfare economics from the New School. 3973: 3939: 3906: 3873: 3840: 3805: 3716: 3660: 3437: 3341: 3244: 3224: 3189: 3103: 3019: 2938: 2918: 2898: 2871: 2848: 2011:function lists the candidates, from best to worst. 3918:welfare function—maximizing the sum of utilities. 3104:{\displaystyle W=\min(Y_{1},Y_{2},\cdots ,Y_{n})} 1918:governments to choose between several options in 3806:{\displaystyle {\frac {c^{1-\eta }-1}{1-\eta }}} 3050: 2750:, the unique social welfare function satisfying 2701:Arrow found that contrary to the assertions of 2281:for grammar, style, cohesion, tone, or spelling 3961:(that inequality is not a positive good) then 5057: 4435: 4216:, 1987, “interpersonal utility comparisons," 1844: 953: 8: 4892:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives 4089:. New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. p. 67. 2746:that if societies must make decisions under 2641:conditions emerge as in Bergson's analysis. 4414:The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 4219:The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 2200:Learn how and when to remove these messages 5064: 5050: 5042: 4629: 4442: 4428: 4420: 4189:Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions 3529:and the set of profiles weakly worse than 2649:Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions 1851: 1837: 971: 960: 946: 36: 3966: 3926: 3893: 3860: 3824: 3771: 3764: 3762: 3700: 3649: 3633: 3622: 3606: 3587: 3575: 3525:, the set of profiles weakly better than 3427: 3419: 3414: 3403: 3375: 3374: 3368: 3331: 3323: 3318: 3307: 3279: 3278: 3272: 3237: 3205: 3162: 3143: 3142: 3136: 3092: 3073: 3060: 3042: 3007: 2998: 2988: 2977: 2963: 2955: 2931: 2911: 2890: 2884: 2864: 2840: 2830: 2819: 2807: 2472:Learn how and when to remove this message 2407:Learn how and when to remove this message 2305:Learn how and when to remove this message 2250:Learn how and when to remove this message 2234:, without removing the technical details. 1973:better one choice is compared to another. 4412:_____, 1987, “social welfare function," 4243:The new Palgrave dictionary of economics 2113: 2052: 4887:Independence of irrelevant alternatives 4665:Sequential proportional approval voting 4137:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 4058: 3981:in the above family must be at most 1. 3815:This family has some familiar members: 2734:independence of irrelevant alternatives 1905:Social choice functions are studied by 983: 52: 2849:{\displaystyle W=\sum _{i=1}^{n}Y_{i}} 1922:, based on the preferences of voters. 3885:—maximizing the product of utilities. 3675:is a continuous increasing function. 3128:proposed a welfare function in 1973: 2626:(1947, pp. 243–49). Each has as 2232:make it understandable to non-experts 2050:) has the fewest first preferences. 1969:information, with agents stating how 1965:) functions additionally incorporate 7: 4369:Collective Choice and Social Welfare 4135:Fair Division and Collective Welfare 4070:Collective Choice and Social Welfare 2345:adding citations to reliable sources 5141:Agent-based computational economics 4697:Indirect single transferable voting 4374:, ch. 3, "Collective Rationality." 4166:Social Choice and Individual Values 3542:Independence of unconcerned agents: 2541:law of diminishing marginal utility 3934: 3835: 3415: 3394: 3388: 3385: 3382: 3379: 3376: 3319: 3298: 3292: 3289: 3286: 3283: 3280: 3153: 3150: 3147: 3144: 2742:later strengthened this result by 25: 4229:(2008), "social welfare function 3841:{\displaystyle \eta \to -\infty } 2643: 2436:to comply with Knowledge (XXG)'s 2181:This section has multiple issues. 5599:neoclassical–Keynesian synthesis 4304:Foundations of Economic Analysis 4202:, expanded edition with annexe, 3940:{\displaystyle \eta \to \infty } 2772:cardinal social welfare function 2423: 2321: 2266: 2211: 2170: 1818: 1806: 991: 929: 916: 904: 852:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem 498:Semi-proportional representation 130:First preference plurality (FPP) 4386:Choice, Welfare and Measurement 4037:Production-possibility frontier 2332:needs additional citations for 2189:or discuss these issues on the 1093:Concepts, theory and techniques 4808:Mixed ballot transferable vote 4392:and scroll to chapter-preview 4185:, 52(2), February 1938, 310–34 4183:Quarterly Journal of Economics 3931: 3829: 3726:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem 3711: 3705: 3695:, i.e. the weighting function 3655: 3642: 3612: 3580: 3219: 3207: 3184: 3172: 3098: 3053: 2156:sequential elimination methods 890:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem 847:Moulin's impossibility theorem 812:Conflicting majorities paradox 1: 5535:Critique of political economy 3997:Arrow's impossibility theorem 2723:Arrow's impossibility theorem 1978:Arrow's impossibility theorem 716:Frustrated majorities paradox 5009:Comparison of voting systems 4851:Satisfaction approval voting 4836:Single non-transferable vote 4655:Proportional approval voting 4002:Community indifference curve 3742:independence of common scale 3567:which is a sum of the form: 3457:Axioms of cardinal welfarism 3408: 3312: 3167: 3012: 2906:is the income of individual 885:Condorcet dominance theorems 825:Social and collective choice 4615:Graduated majority judgment 4301:, 1947, Enlarged ed. 1983, 4085:Tresch, Richard W. (2008). 1992:Terminology and equivalence 551:By mechanism of combination 322:Proportional representation 6188: 5673:Real business-cycle theory 4867:Condorcet winner criterion 4558:First-past-the-post voting 4341:Cambridge University Press 2523:interpersonally-comparable 2020:first-preference plurality 749:Multiple districts paradox 480:Fractional approval voting 468:Interactive representation 29: 6113: 5022: 5014:Voting systems by country 4917:Mutual majority criterion 4872:Condorcet loser criterion 4818:Vote linkage mixed system 4730:Largest remainders method 4457: 4325:–88. Reprinted in (1986) 4110:Quesada, Antonio (2002). 3689:axioms of rational choice 2713:) social orderings makes 2696:ordinal utility functions 2356:"Social welfare function" 1914:). They are also used by 696:Paradoxes and pathologies 545:Mixed-member proportional 540:Mixed-member majoritarian 535:By results of combination 426:Approval-based committees 4907:Majority loser criterion 4793:Additional member system 4751:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota 4670:Single transferable vote 4595:Positional voting system 4531:Minimax Condorcet method 4489:Combined approval voting 4007:Distribution (economics) 3883:Nash bargaining solution 3504:reordering or relabeling 2490:social welfare function, 2449:may contain suggestions. 2434:may need to be rewritten 1081:JEL classification codes 875:Condorcet's jury theorem 676:Double simultaneous vote 651:Rural–urban proportional 646:Dual-member proportional 608: 597: 564:Parallel (superposition) 456:Fractional social choice 443:Expanding approvals rule 272: 257: 242: 173: 162: 138: 5313:Industrial organization 5136:Computational economics 4932:Resolvability criterion 4922:Participation criterion 4897:Later-no-harm criterion 4713:Highest averages method 4163:, 1951, 2nd ed., 1963, 4087:Public Sector Economics 3907:{\displaystyle \eta =1} 3874:{\displaystyle \eta =0} 3678: 3461:Suppose we are given a 1873:social welfare function 1267:Industrial organization 1124:Computational economics 802:Tyranny of the majority 579:Fusion (majority bonus) 396:Quota-remainder methods 18:Social ranking function 6172:Mathematical economics 5518:Modern monetary theory 5183:Experimental economics 5153:Pluralism in economics 5126:Mathematical economics 4973:First-preference votes 4912:Monotonicity criterion 4882:Independence of clones 4585:Simple majoritarianism 4227:Pattanaik, Prasanta K. 4200:On Economic Inequality 3975: 3958:Pigou–Dalton principle 3941: 3908: 3875: 3842: 3807: 3718: 3662: 3638: 3439: 3343: 3246: 3226: 3191: 3105: 3021: 2993: 2940: 2920: 2900: 2879:is social welfare and 2873: 2850: 2835: 2782:or per capita income. 1119:Experimental economics 936:Mathematics portal 842:Majority impossibility 831:Impossibility theorems 627:Negative vote transfer 448:Method of equal shares 69: 4877:Consistency criterion 4798:Alternative vote plus 4563:Instant-runoff voting 4133:Herve Moulin (2004). 3976: 3974:{\displaystyle \eta } 3942: 3909: 3876: 3843: 3808: 3719: 3663: 3618: 3468:on utility profiles. 3440: 3344: 3247: 3227: 3225:{\displaystyle (1-G)} 3192: 3106: 3022: 2973: 2941: 2921: 2901: 2899:{\displaystyle Y_{i}} 2874: 2851: 2815: 1949:) functions use only 739:Best-is-worst paradox 728:Pathological response 463:Direct representation 116:Single-winner methods 68: 6167:Social choice theory 5392:Social choice theory 5148:Behavioral economics 5131:Complexity economics 4947:Seats-to-votes ratio 4718:Webster/Sainte-LaguĂ« 4194:James E. Foster and 4042:Social choice theory 3965: 3925: 3892: 3859: 3823: 3761: 3717:{\displaystyle w(u)} 3699: 3574: 3521:: for every profile 3367: 3271: 3236: 3204: 3135: 3120:uncertainty aversion 3041: 2954: 2930: 2910: 2883: 2863: 2806: 2624:possibility function 2539:, often treated the 2517:Bergson argued that 2488:introduced the term 2341:improve this article 2032:abuse of terminology 1912:income distributions 1869:social choice theory 1346:Social choice theory 923:Economics portal 870:Median voter theorem 89:Comparative politics 5476:American (National) 5176:Economic statistics 4927:Plurality criterion 4526:Kemeny–Young method 4321:, N.S., 44(173), p 4263:Also available as: 4027:Justice (economics) 3992:Aggregation problem 3753:isoelastic function 3463:preference relation 2484:In a 1938 article, 2054: 1813:Business portal 1134:Operations research 1114:National accounting 911:Politics portal 622:Vote linkage system 593:Seat linkage system 180:Ranked-choice (RCV) 4968:Election threshold 4902:Majority criterion 4578:Supplementary vote 4265:a journal article. 4239:Blume, Lawrence E. 4235:Durlauf, Steven N. 4116:Economics Bulletin 3971: 3955:If we require the 3937: 3904: 3871: 3838: 3803: 3714: 3679:Harsanyi's theorem 3658: 3491:Pareto improvement 3435: 3339: 3242: 3222: 3187: 3101: 3017: 2936: 2916: 2896: 2869: 2846: 2570:Pareto improvement 2285:You can assist by 2053: 1144:Industrial complex 1139:Middle income trap 807:Discursive dilemma 766:Lesser evil voting 641:Supermixed systems 344:Largest remainders 202:Round-robin voting 70: 6162:Welfare economics 6149: 6148: 5680:New institutional 5039: 5038: 4937:Reversal symmetry 4846:Cumulative voting 4828:Semi-proportional 4803:Mixed single vote 4769: 4768: 4645:Mixed single vote 4553:Exhaustive ballot 4516:Copeland's method 4511:Condorcet methods 4451:Electoral systems 4299:Paul A. Samuelson 4282:, 1935, 2nd ed.. 4274:Jan de Van Graaff 4096:978-0-230-52223-7 4047:Welfare economics 4022:Gorman polar form 4017:Extended sympathy 3801: 3411: 3315: 3245:{\displaystyle G} 3170: 3015: 2971: 2939:{\displaystyle n} 2919:{\displaystyle i} 2872:{\displaystyle W} 2756:Pareto efficiency 2730:rational behavior 2684: 2683: 2565:Pareto efficiency 2519:welfare economics 2482: 2481: 2474: 2464: 2463: 2438:quality standards 2417: 2416: 2409: 2391: 2315: 2314: 2307: 2260: 2259: 2252: 2204: 2152: 2151: 2106: 2105: 1865:welfare economics 1861: 1860: 970: 969: 857:Gibbard's theorem 797:Dominance paradox 734:Perverse response 438:Phragmen's method 304:Majority judgment 232:Positional voting 190:Condorcet methods 58:electoral systems 32:electoral systems 16:(Redirected from 6179: 5353:Natural resource 5188:Economic history 5114:Mechanism design 5066: 5059: 5052: 5043: 4978:Liquid democracy 4630: 4610:Two-round system 4521:Dodgson's method 4444: 4437: 4430: 4421: 4358:Economic Journal 4293:Economic Journal 4256: 4214:John C. Harsanyi 4161:Kenneth J. Arrow 4149: 4148: 4130: 4124: 4123: 4107: 4101: 4100: 4082: 4076: 4063: 4012:Economic welfare 3980: 3978: 3977: 3972: 3946: 3944: 3943: 3938: 3913: 3911: 3910: 3905: 3880: 3878: 3877: 3872: 3847: 3845: 3844: 3839: 3812: 3810: 3809: 3804: 3802: 3800: 3789: 3782: 3781: 3765: 3723: 3721: 3720: 3715: 3693:utilitarian rule 3667: 3665: 3664: 3659: 3654: 3653: 3637: 3632: 3611: 3610: 3592: 3591: 3444: 3442: 3441: 3436: 3434: 3433: 3432: 3431: 3418: 3412: 3404: 3399: 3398: 3397: 3348: 3346: 3345: 3340: 3338: 3337: 3336: 3335: 3322: 3316: 3308: 3303: 3302: 3301: 3251: 3249: 3248: 3243: 3231: 3229: 3228: 3223: 3196: 3194: 3193: 3188: 3171: 3163: 3158: 3157: 3156: 3118:extreme form of 3110: 3108: 3107: 3102: 3097: 3096: 3078: 3077: 3065: 3064: 3026: 3024: 3023: 3018: 3016: 3008: 3003: 3002: 2992: 2987: 2972: 2964: 2945: 2943: 2942: 2937: 2925: 2923: 2922: 2917: 2905: 2903: 2902: 2897: 2895: 2894: 2878: 2876: 2875: 2870: 2855: 2853: 2852: 2847: 2845: 2844: 2834: 2829: 2776:cardinal utility 2766:Cardinal welfare 2760:utilitarian rule 2644: 2620:welfare function 2526:cardinal utility 2477: 2470: 2459: 2456: 2450: 2427: 2419: 2412: 2405: 2401: 2398: 2392: 2390: 2349: 2325: 2317: 2310: 2303: 2299: 2296: 2290: 2270: 2269: 2262: 2255: 2248: 2244: 2241: 2235: 2215: 2214: 2207: 2196: 2174: 2173: 2166: 2114: 2055: 1853: 1846: 1839: 1825:Money portal 1823: 1822: 1821: 1811: 1810: 1307:Natural resource 1099:Economic systems 995: 972: 962: 955: 948: 934: 933: 921: 920: 909: 908: 864:Positive results 759:Strategic voting 656:Majority jackpot 613: 602: 473:Liquid democracy 349:National remnant 339:Highest averages 276: 261: 246: 178: 169:Alternative vote 167: 151:Partisan primary 143: 84:Mechanism design 37: 21: 6187: 6186: 6182: 6181: 6180: 6178: 6177: 6176: 6152: 6151: 6150: 6145: 6142:Business portal 6109: 6108: 6107: 6067: 5831:von Böhm-Bawerk 5719: 5718: 5709: 5481:Ancient thought 5459: 5458: 5452: 5443: 5442: 5441: 5192: 5157: 5109:Contract theory 5094:Decision theory 5075: 5070: 5040: 5035: 5018: 4997: 4951: 4942:Smith criterion 4855: 4822: 4783:Parallel voting 4765: 4761:Imperiali quota 4734: 4701: 4619: 4573:Contingent vote 4536:Nanson's method 4494:Unified primary 4484:Approval voting 4470: 4453: 4448: 4399:Kotaro Suzumura 4354:Sen, Amartya K. 4295:, 43(4), 635–41 4253: 4225: 4157: 4152: 4145: 4132: 4131: 4127: 4109: 4108: 4104: 4097: 4084: 4083: 4079: 4064: 4060: 4056: 4051: 4032:Liberal paradox 3987: 3963: 3962: 3923: 3922: 3921:The limit when 3890: 3889: 3857: 3856: 3821: 3820: 3819:The limit when 3790: 3767: 3766: 3759: 3758: 3734: 3732:Non-utilitarian 3697: 3696: 3681: 3645: 3602: 3583: 3572: 3571: 3459: 3423: 3413: 3370: 3365: 3364: 3327: 3317: 3274: 3269: 3268: 3234: 3233: 3202: 3201: 3138: 3133: 3132: 3088: 3069: 3056: 3039: 3038: 2994: 2952: 2951: 2928: 2927: 2908: 2907: 2886: 2881: 2880: 2861: 2860: 2836: 2804: 2803: 2780:life expectancy 2768: 2653:consumer theory 2478: 2467: 2466: 2465: 2460: 2454: 2451: 2441: 2428: 2413: 2402: 2396: 2393: 2350: 2348: 2338: 2326: 2311: 2300: 2294: 2291: 2284: 2271: 2267: 2256: 2245: 2239: 2236: 2228:help improve it 2225: 2216: 2212: 2175: 2171: 2164: 2162:Ordinal welfare 2048:between the two 2040: 1994: 1927:consumer choice 1875:—also called a 1857: 1819: 1817: 1805: 1798: 1797: 1768: 1758: 1757: 1756: 1755: 1519:von Böhm-Bawerk 1407: 1396: 1395: 1157: 1149: 1148: 1104:Economic growth 1094: 1086: 1085: 1027: 1025:classifications 966: 928: 927: 915: 903: 895: 894: 861: 837:Arrow's theorem 827: 817: 816: 785: 755: 744:No-show paradox 725: 711:Cloning paradox 701:Spoiler effects 698: 688: 687: 662: 549: 532: 522: 521: 494: 485:Maximal lottery 452: 433:Thiele's method 422: 392: 324: 314: 313: 299:Approval voting 287:Cardinal voting 283: 228: 222:Maximal lottery 186: 118: 108: 35: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 6185: 6183: 6175: 6174: 6169: 6164: 6154: 6153: 6147: 6146: 6144: 6139: 6134: 6129: 6124: 6119: 6114: 6111: 6110: 6106: 6105: 6100: 6090: 6085: 6079: 6078: 6077: 6075: 6069: 6068: 6066: 6065: 6058: 6053: 6048: 6043: 6038: 6033: 6028: 6023: 6018: 6013: 6008: 6003: 5998: 5993: 5988: 5983: 5978: 5973: 5968: 5963: 5958: 5953: 5948: 5943: 5938: 5933: 5928: 5923: 5918: 5913: 5908: 5903: 5898: 5893: 5888: 5883: 5878: 5873: 5868: 5863: 5858: 5853: 5848: 5843: 5838: 5833: 5828: 5823: 5818: 5813: 5808: 5803: 5798: 5793: 5788: 5783: 5778: 5773: 5768: 5763: 5758: 5753: 5748: 5743: 5738: 5733: 5728: 5722: 5720: 5714: 5711: 5710: 5708: 5707: 5702: 5697: 5692: 5687: 5682: 5677: 5676: 5675: 5665: 5664: 5663: 5653: 5648: 5643: 5642: 5641: 5631: 5626: 5621: 5620: 5619: 5618: 5617: 5607: 5602: 5587: 5582: 5577: 5572: 5567: 5562: 5557: 5552: 5547: 5545:Disequilibrium 5542: 5537: 5532: 5527: 5522: 5521: 5520: 5510: 5505: 5500: 5495: 5494: 5493: 5483: 5478: 5473: 5468: 5462: 5460: 5448: 5445: 5444: 5440: 5439: 5434: 5429: 5424: 5419: 5414: 5409: 5404: 5399: 5394: 5385: 5380: 5375: 5370: 5365: 5360: 5358:Organizational 5355: 5350: 5345: 5340: 5335: 5330: 5325: 5320: 5315: 5310: 5305: 5300: 5295: 5290: 5285: 5280: 5275: 5270: 5265: 5260: 5255: 5250: 5245: 5240: 5235: 5230: 5225: 5220: 5215: 5210: 5204: 5203: 5202: 5200: 5194: 5193: 5191: 5190: 5185: 5180: 5179: 5178: 5167: 5165: 5159: 5158: 5156: 5155: 5150: 5145: 5144: 5143: 5133: 5128: 5123: 5121:Macroeconomics 5118: 5117: 5116: 5111: 5106: 5101: 5096: 5089:Microeconomics 5085: 5083: 5077: 5076: 5071: 5069: 5068: 5061: 5054: 5046: 5037: 5036: 5023: 5020: 5019: 5017: 5016: 5011: 5005: 5003: 4999: 4998: 4996: 4995: 4990: 4985: 4980: 4975: 4970: 4965: 4959: 4957: 4953: 4952: 4950: 4949: 4944: 4939: 4934: 4929: 4924: 4919: 4914: 4909: 4904: 4899: 4894: 4889: 4884: 4879: 4874: 4869: 4863: 4861: 4857: 4856: 4854: 4853: 4848: 4843: 4841:Limited voting 4838: 4832: 4830: 4824: 4823: 4821: 4820: 4815: 4810: 4805: 4800: 4795: 4790: 4785: 4779: 4777: 4771: 4770: 4767: 4766: 4764: 4763: 4758: 4753: 4748: 4742: 4740: 4736: 4735: 4733: 4732: 4727: 4726: 4725: 4720: 4709: 4707: 4703: 4702: 4700: 4699: 4694: 4689: 4688: 4687: 4682: 4677: 4667: 4662: 4657: 4652: 4647: 4642: 4636: 4634: 4627: 4621: 4620: 4618: 4617: 4612: 4607: 4602: 4597: 4592: 4587: 4582: 4581: 4580: 4575: 4570: 4568:Coombs' method 4560: 4555: 4550: 4549: 4548: 4546:Schulze method 4543: 4538: 4533: 4528: 4523: 4518: 4508: 4506:Bucklin voting 4503: 4498: 4497: 4496: 4491: 4480: 4478: 4472: 4471: 4458: 4455: 4454: 4449: 4447: 4446: 4439: 4432: 4424: 4418: 4417: 4416:, v. 4, 418–20 4410: 4396: 4384:_____ (1982). 4382: 4367:_____, 1970 , 4365: 4351: 4333: 4315: 4296: 4289: 4280:Lionel Robbins 4277: 4270: 4269: 4268: 4267: 4258: 4257: 4251: 4223: 4222:, v. 2, 955–58 4211: 4192: 4186: 4176: 4156: 4153: 4151: 4150: 4143: 4125: 4102: 4095: 4077: 4066:Amartya K. Sen 4057: 4055: 4052: 4050: 4049: 4044: 4039: 4034: 4029: 4024: 4019: 4014: 4009: 4004: 3999: 3994: 3988: 3986: 3983: 3970: 3953: 3952: 3936: 3933: 3930: 3919: 3903: 3900: 3897: 3886: 3870: 3867: 3864: 3853: 3837: 3834: 3831: 3828: 3799: 3796: 3793: 3788: 3785: 3780: 3777: 3774: 3770: 3733: 3730: 3713: 3710: 3707: 3704: 3680: 3677: 3669: 3668: 3657: 3652: 3648: 3644: 3641: 3636: 3631: 3628: 3625: 3621: 3617: 3614: 3609: 3605: 3601: 3598: 3595: 3590: 3586: 3582: 3579: 3458: 3455: 3446: 3445: 3430: 3426: 3422: 3417: 3410: 3407: 3402: 3396: 3393: 3390: 3387: 3384: 3381: 3378: 3373: 3350: 3349: 3334: 3330: 3326: 3321: 3314: 3311: 3306: 3300: 3297: 3294: 3291: 3288: 3285: 3282: 3277: 3241: 3221: 3218: 3215: 3212: 3209: 3198: 3197: 3186: 3183: 3180: 3177: 3174: 3169: 3166: 3161: 3155: 3152: 3149: 3146: 3141: 3112: 3111: 3100: 3095: 3091: 3087: 3084: 3081: 3076: 3072: 3068: 3063: 3059: 3055: 3052: 3049: 3046: 3028: 3027: 3014: 3011: 3006: 3001: 2997: 2991: 2986: 2983: 2980: 2976: 2970: 2967: 2962: 2959: 2935: 2915: 2893: 2889: 2868: 2857: 2856: 2843: 2839: 2833: 2828: 2825: 2822: 2818: 2814: 2811: 2767: 2764: 2703:Lionel Robbins 2682: 2681: 2680: 2679: 2676: 2673: 2667: 2651:. Relative to 2613: 2612: 2609: 2578:Paul Samuelson 2533:utilitarianism 2515: 2514: 2511: 2508: 2494:differentiable 2480: 2479: 2462: 2461: 2431: 2429: 2422: 2415: 2414: 2329: 2327: 2320: 2313: 2312: 2274: 2272: 2265: 2258: 2257: 2219: 2217: 2210: 2205: 2179: 2178: 2176: 2169: 2163: 2160: 2150: 2149: 2146: 2142: 2141: 2136: 2132: 2131: 2126: 2122: 2121: 2118: 2104: 2103: 2100: 2097: 2093: 2092: 2087: 2082: 2078: 2077: 2072: 2069: 2065: 2064: 2061: 2058: 2044:instant-runoff 2039: 2036: 2024: 2023: 2012: 2005: 1993: 1990: 1975: 1974: 1954: 1859: 1858: 1856: 1855: 1848: 1841: 1833: 1830: 1829: 1828: 1827: 1815: 1800: 1799: 1796: 1795: 1790: 1780: 1775: 1769: 1764: 1763: 1760: 1759: 1754: 1753: 1746: 1741: 1736: 1731: 1726: 1721: 1716: 1711: 1706: 1701: 1696: 1691: 1686: 1681: 1676: 1671: 1666: 1661: 1656: 1651: 1646: 1641: 1636: 1631: 1626: 1621: 1616: 1611: 1606: 1601: 1596: 1591: 1586: 1581: 1576: 1571: 1566: 1561: 1556: 1551: 1546: 1541: 1536: 1531: 1526: 1521: 1516: 1511: 1506: 1501: 1496: 1491: 1486: 1481: 1476: 1471: 1466: 1461: 1456: 1451: 1446: 1441: 1436: 1431: 1426: 1421: 1416: 1410: 1409: 1408: 1402: 1401: 1398: 1397: 1394: 1393: 1388: 1383: 1378: 1373: 1368: 1363: 1358: 1353: 1348: 1339: 1334: 1329: 1324: 1319: 1314: 1312:Organizational 1309: 1304: 1299: 1294: 1289: 1284: 1279: 1274: 1269: 1264: 1259: 1254: 1249: 1244: 1239: 1234: 1229: 1224: 1219: 1214: 1209: 1204: 1199: 1194: 1189: 1184: 1179: 1174: 1169: 1164: 1158: 1156:By application 1155: 1154: 1151: 1150: 1147: 1146: 1141: 1136: 1131: 1126: 1121: 1116: 1111: 1106: 1101: 1095: 1092: 1091: 1088: 1087: 1084: 1083: 1078: 1073: 1068: 1063: 1058: 1049: 1044: 1039: 1034: 1028: 1022: 1021: 1018: 1017: 1016: 1015: 1010: 1005: 997: 996: 988: 987: 981: 980: 968: 967: 965: 964: 957: 950: 942: 939: 938: 926: 925: 913: 900: 897: 896: 893: 892: 887: 882: 877: 872: 860: 859: 854: 849: 844: 839: 828: 823: 822: 819: 818: 815: 814: 809: 804: 799: 784: 783: 781:Turkey-raising 778: 773: 768: 754: 753: 752: 751: 741: 736: 724: 723: 721:Center squeeze 718: 713: 708: 706:Spoiler effect 699: 694: 693: 690: 689: 686: 685: 680: 679: 678: 665:By ballot type 661: 660: 659: 658: 653: 648: 638: 637: 636: 635: 634: 629: 619: 618: 617: 606: 583: 582: 581: 576: 571: 566: 548: 547: 542: 533: 528: 527: 524: 523: 520: 519: 517:Limited voting 514: 513: 512: 493: 492: 487: 482: 477: 476: 475: 470: 451: 450: 445: 440: 435: 421: 420: 415: 410: 405: 391: 390: 389: 388: 386:Localized list 383: 378: 373: 368: 358: 357: 356: 354:Biproportional 351: 346: 341: 325: 320: 319: 316: 315: 312: 311: 306: 301: 296: 282: 281: 266: 251: 227: 226: 225: 224: 219: 214: 209: 199: 185: 184: 183: 182: 171: 158:Instant-runoff 155: 154: 153: 145:Jungle primary 132: 121:Single vote - 119: 114: 113: 110: 109: 107: 106: 96: 91: 86: 81: 75: 72: 71: 61: 60: 50: 49: 26: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 6184: 6173: 6170: 6168: 6165: 6163: 6160: 6159: 6157: 6143: 6140: 6138: 6135: 6133: 6130: 6128: 6125: 6123: 6120: 6118: 6115: 6112: 6104: 6101: 6098: 6094: 6091: 6089: 6086: 6084: 6081: 6080: 6076: 6074: 6070: 6064: 6063: 6059: 6057: 6054: 6052: 6049: 6047: 6044: 6042: 6039: 6037: 6034: 6032: 6029: 6027: 6024: 6022: 6019: 6017: 6014: 6012: 6009: 6007: 6004: 6002: 5999: 5997: 5994: 5992: 5989: 5987: 5984: 5982: 5979: 5977: 5974: 5972: 5969: 5967: 5964: 5962: 5959: 5957: 5954: 5952: 5949: 5947: 5944: 5942: 5939: 5937: 5934: 5932: 5929: 5927: 5924: 5922: 5919: 5917: 5914: 5912: 5909: 5907: 5904: 5902: 5899: 5897: 5894: 5892: 5889: 5887: 5884: 5882: 5879: 5877: 5874: 5872: 5869: 5867: 5864: 5862: 5859: 5857: 5854: 5852: 5849: 5847: 5844: 5842: 5839: 5837: 5834: 5832: 5829: 5827: 5824: 5822: 5819: 5817: 5814: 5812: 5809: 5807: 5804: 5802: 5799: 5797: 5794: 5792: 5789: 5787: 5784: 5782: 5779: 5777: 5774: 5772: 5769: 5767: 5764: 5762: 5759: 5757: 5754: 5752: 5749: 5747: 5744: 5742: 5739: 5737: 5734: 5732: 5729: 5727: 5726:de Mandeville 5724: 5723: 5721: 5717: 5712: 5706: 5703: 5701: 5698: 5696: 5693: 5691: 5688: 5686: 5683: 5681: 5678: 5674: 5671: 5670: 5669: 5668:New classical 5666: 5662: 5659: 5658: 5657: 5654: 5652: 5649: 5647: 5644: 5640: 5637: 5636: 5635: 5632: 5630: 5627: 5625: 5624:Malthusianism 5622: 5616: 5613: 5612: 5611: 5608: 5606: 5603: 5600: 5596: 5593: 5592: 5591: 5588: 5586: 5585:Institutional 5583: 5581: 5578: 5576: 5573: 5571: 5568: 5566: 5563: 5561: 5558: 5556: 5553: 5551: 5548: 5546: 5543: 5541: 5538: 5536: 5533: 5531: 5528: 5526: 5523: 5519: 5516: 5515: 5514: 5511: 5509: 5506: 5504: 5501: 5499: 5496: 5492: 5489: 5488: 5487: 5484: 5482: 5479: 5477: 5474: 5472: 5469: 5467: 5464: 5463: 5461: 5456: 5451: 5446: 5438: 5435: 5433: 5430: 5428: 5425: 5423: 5420: 5418: 5415: 5413: 5410: 5408: 5405: 5403: 5400: 5398: 5395: 5393: 5389: 5388:Public choice 5386: 5384: 5381: 5379: 5376: 5374: 5371: 5369: 5366: 5364: 5363:Participation 5361: 5359: 5356: 5354: 5351: 5349: 5346: 5344: 5341: 5339: 5336: 5334: 5331: 5329: 5326: 5324: 5323:Institutional 5321: 5319: 5316: 5314: 5311: 5309: 5306: 5304: 5301: 5299: 5296: 5294: 5291: 5289: 5286: 5284: 5281: 5279: 5276: 5274: 5273:Expeditionary 5271: 5269: 5266: 5264: 5263:Environmental 5261: 5259: 5256: 5254: 5251: 5249: 5246: 5244: 5241: 5239: 5236: 5234: 5231: 5229: 5226: 5224: 5221: 5219: 5216: 5214: 5211: 5209: 5206: 5205: 5201: 5199: 5195: 5189: 5186: 5184: 5181: 5177: 5174: 5173: 5172: 5169: 5168: 5166: 5164: 5160: 5154: 5151: 5149: 5146: 5142: 5139: 5138: 5137: 5134: 5132: 5129: 5127: 5124: 5122: 5119: 5115: 5112: 5110: 5107: 5105: 5102: 5100: 5097: 5095: 5092: 5091: 5090: 5087: 5086: 5084: 5082: 5078: 5074: 5067: 5062: 5060: 5055: 5053: 5048: 5047: 5044: 5034: 5033: 5028: 5027: 5021: 5015: 5012: 5010: 5007: 5006: 5004: 5000: 4994: 4991: 4989: 4986: 4984: 4981: 4979: 4976: 4974: 4971: 4969: 4966: 4964: 4961: 4960: 4958: 4954: 4948: 4945: 4943: 4940: 4938: 4935: 4933: 4930: 4928: 4925: 4923: 4920: 4918: 4915: 4913: 4910: 4908: 4905: 4903: 4900: 4898: 4895: 4893: 4890: 4888: 4885: 4883: 4880: 4878: 4875: 4873: 4870: 4868: 4865: 4864: 4862: 4858: 4852: 4849: 4847: 4844: 4842: 4839: 4837: 4834: 4833: 4831: 4829: 4825: 4819: 4816: 4814: 4811: 4809: 4806: 4804: 4801: 4799: 4796: 4794: 4791: 4789: 4786: 4784: 4781: 4780: 4778: 4776: 4772: 4762: 4759: 4757: 4754: 4752: 4749: 4747: 4744: 4743: 4741: 4737: 4731: 4728: 4724: 4721: 4719: 4716: 4715: 4714: 4711: 4710: 4708: 4704: 4698: 4695: 4693: 4690: 4686: 4683: 4681: 4678: 4676: 4673: 4672: 4671: 4668: 4666: 4663: 4661: 4658: 4656: 4653: 4651: 4648: 4646: 4643: 4641: 4638: 4637: 4635: 4631: 4628: 4626: 4622: 4616: 4613: 4611: 4608: 4606: 4603: 4601: 4598: 4596: 4593: 4591: 4588: 4586: 4583: 4579: 4576: 4574: 4571: 4569: 4566: 4565: 4564: 4561: 4559: 4556: 4554: 4551: 4547: 4544: 4542: 4539: 4537: 4534: 4532: 4529: 4527: 4524: 4522: 4519: 4517: 4514: 4513: 4512: 4509: 4507: 4504: 4502: 4499: 4495: 4492: 4490: 4487: 4486: 4485: 4482: 4481: 4479: 4477: 4476:Single-winner 4473: 4469: 4467: 4463: 4456: 4452: 4445: 4440: 4438: 4433: 4431: 4426: 4425: 4422: 4415: 4411: 4408: 4405:, 47(186), p 4404: 4400: 4397: 4395: 4391: 4388:, MIT Press. 4387: 4383: 4381: 4380:0-444-85127-5 4377: 4373: 4372:(description) 4370: 4366: 4363: 4359: 4355: 4352: 4350: 4347:, pp. 3 4346: 4342: 4338: 4334: 4332: 4328: 4324: 4320: 4316: 4314: 4313:0-674-31301-1 4310: 4306: 4305: 4300: 4297: 4294: 4290: 4287: 4286: 4281: 4278: 4275: 4272: 4271: 4266: 4262: 4261: 4260: 4259: 4254: 4252:9780333786765 4248: 4244: 4240: 4236: 4232: 4228: 4224: 4221: 4220: 4215: 4212: 4209: 4208:0-19-828193-5 4205: 4201: 4197: 4193: 4190: 4187: 4184: 4180: 4179:Abram Bergson 4177: 4175: 4174:0-300-01364-7 4171: 4168: 4167: 4162: 4159: 4158: 4154: 4146: 4144:9780262134231 4140: 4136: 4129: 4126: 4121: 4117: 4113: 4106: 4103: 4098: 4092: 4088: 4081: 4078: 4075: 4071: 4067: 4062: 4059: 4053: 4048: 4045: 4043: 4040: 4038: 4035: 4033: 4030: 4028: 4025: 4023: 4020: 4018: 4015: 4013: 4010: 4008: 4005: 4003: 4000: 3998: 3995: 3993: 3990: 3989: 3984: 3982: 3968: 3960: 3959: 3950: 3928: 3920: 3917: 3901: 3898: 3895: 3887: 3884: 3868: 3865: 3862: 3854: 3851: 3832: 3826: 3818: 3817: 3816: 3813: 3797: 3794: 3791: 3786: 3783: 3778: 3775: 3772: 3768: 3756: 3754: 3750: 3745: 3743: 3738: 3731: 3729: 3727: 3708: 3702: 3694: 3690: 3686: 3676: 3674: 3650: 3646: 3639: 3634: 3629: 3626: 3623: 3619: 3615: 3607: 3603: 3599: 3596: 3593: 3588: 3584: 3577: 3570: 3569: 3568: 3566: 3561: 3559: 3555: 3550: 3546: 3543: 3538: 3536: 3532: 3528: 3524: 3520: 3515: 3513: 3509: 3505: 3501: 3500: 3494: 3492: 3488: 3484: 3483: 3477: 3475: 3471: 3467: 3464: 3456: 3454: 3451: 3428: 3424: 3420: 3405: 3400: 3391: 3371: 3363: 3362: 3361: 3359: 3355: 3332: 3328: 3324: 3309: 3304: 3295: 3275: 3267: 3266: 3265: 3263: 3259: 3255: 3239: 3216: 3213: 3210: 3181: 3178: 3175: 3164: 3159: 3139: 3131: 3130: 3129: 3127: 3123: 3121: 3115: 3093: 3089: 3085: 3082: 3079: 3074: 3070: 3066: 3061: 3057: 3047: 3044: 3037: 3036: 3035: 3033: 3009: 3004: 2999: 2995: 2989: 2984: 2981: 2978: 2974: 2968: 2965: 2960: 2957: 2950: 2949: 2948: 2933: 2913: 2891: 2887: 2866: 2841: 2837: 2831: 2826: 2823: 2820: 2816: 2812: 2809: 2802: 2801: 2800: 2798: 2794: 2789: 2786: 2783: 2781: 2777: 2773: 2765: 2763: 2761: 2757: 2753: 2749: 2745: 2741: 2740:John Harsanyi 2737: 2735: 2731: 2727: 2724: 2720: 2716: 2712: 2708: 2704: 2699: 2697: 2692: 2688: 2687:Kenneth Arrow 2677: 2674: 2672: 2668: 2666: 2661: 2660: 2658: 2654: 2650: 2646: 2645: 2642: 2639: 2634: 2629: 2625: 2621: 2616: 2610: 2607: 2606: 2605: 2603: 2599: 2594: 2591: 2587: 2583: 2579: 2575: 2574:substantively 2571: 2567: 2566: 2560: 2558: 2554: 2553:unfalsifiable 2550: 2546: 2542: 2538: 2534: 2529: 2527: 2524: 2520: 2512: 2509: 2506: 2505: 2504: 2501: 2499: 2495: 2491: 2487: 2486:Abram Bergson 2476: 2473: 2458: 2448: 2444: 2439: 2435: 2432:This section 2430: 2426: 2421: 2420: 2411: 2408: 2400: 2389: 2386: 2382: 2379: 2375: 2372: 2368: 2365: 2361: 2358: â€“  2357: 2353: 2352:Find sources: 2346: 2342: 2336: 2335: 2330:This section 2328: 2324: 2319: 2318: 2309: 2306: 2298: 2288: 2282: 2280: 2275:This section 2273: 2264: 2263: 2254: 2251: 2243: 2233: 2229: 2223: 2220:This section 2218: 2209: 2208: 2203: 2201: 2194: 2193: 2188: 2187: 2182: 2177: 2168: 2167: 2161: 2159: 2157: 2147: 2144: 2143: 2140: 2137: 2134: 2133: 2130: 2127: 2124: 2123: 2119: 2116: 2115: 2112: 2109: 2101: 2098: 2095: 2094: 2091: 2088: 2086: 2083: 2080: 2079: 2076: 2073: 2070: 2067: 2066: 2062: 2059: 2057: 2056: 2051: 2049: 2045: 2037: 2035: 2033: 2028: 2021: 2017: 2013: 2010: 2006: 2003: 1999: 1998: 1997: 1991: 1989: 1987: 1983: 1979: 1972: 1968: 1964: 1960: 1959: 1955: 1952: 1948: 1947:ranked voting 1944: 1943: 1939: 1938: 1937: 1934: 1932: 1928: 1923: 1921: 1917: 1913: 1908: 1903: 1900: 1896: 1893: 1889: 1885: 1881: 1878: 1874: 1870: 1866: 1854: 1849: 1847: 1842: 1840: 1835: 1834: 1832: 1831: 1826: 1816: 1814: 1809: 1804: 1803: 1802: 1801: 1794: 1791: 1788: 1784: 1781: 1779: 1776: 1774: 1771: 1770: 1767: 1762: 1761: 1752: 1751: 1747: 1745: 1742: 1740: 1737: 1735: 1732: 1730: 1727: 1725: 1722: 1720: 1717: 1715: 1712: 1710: 1707: 1705: 1702: 1700: 1697: 1695: 1692: 1690: 1687: 1685: 1682: 1680: 1677: 1675: 1672: 1670: 1667: 1665: 1662: 1660: 1657: 1655: 1652: 1650: 1647: 1645: 1642: 1640: 1637: 1635: 1632: 1630: 1627: 1625: 1622: 1620: 1617: 1615: 1612: 1610: 1607: 1605: 1602: 1600: 1597: 1595: 1592: 1590: 1587: 1585: 1582: 1580: 1577: 1575: 1572: 1570: 1567: 1565: 1562: 1560: 1557: 1555: 1552: 1550: 1547: 1545: 1542: 1540: 1537: 1535: 1532: 1530: 1527: 1525: 1522: 1520: 1517: 1515: 1512: 1510: 1507: 1505: 1502: 1500: 1497: 1495: 1492: 1490: 1487: 1485: 1482: 1480: 1477: 1475: 1472: 1470: 1467: 1465: 1462: 1460: 1457: 1455: 1452: 1450: 1447: 1445: 1442: 1440: 1437: 1435: 1432: 1430: 1427: 1425: 1422: 1420: 1417: 1415: 1414:de Mandeville 1412: 1411: 1406: 1400: 1399: 1392: 1389: 1387: 1384: 1382: 1379: 1377: 1374: 1372: 1369: 1367: 1364: 1362: 1359: 1357: 1354: 1352: 1349: 1347: 1343: 1342:Public choice 1340: 1338: 1335: 1333: 1330: 1328: 1325: 1323: 1320: 1318: 1317:Participation 1315: 1313: 1310: 1308: 1305: 1303: 1300: 1298: 1295: 1293: 1290: 1288: 1285: 1283: 1280: 1278: 1277:Institutional 1275: 1273: 1270: 1268: 1265: 1263: 1260: 1258: 1255: 1253: 1250: 1248: 1245: 1243: 1240: 1238: 1235: 1233: 1230: 1228: 1227:Expeditionary 1225: 1223: 1220: 1218: 1217:Environmental 1215: 1213: 1210: 1208: 1205: 1203: 1200: 1198: 1195: 1193: 1190: 1188: 1185: 1183: 1180: 1178: 1175: 1173: 1170: 1168: 1165: 1163: 1160: 1159: 1153: 1152: 1145: 1142: 1140: 1137: 1135: 1132: 1130: 1127: 1125: 1122: 1120: 1117: 1115: 1112: 1110: 1107: 1105: 1102: 1100: 1097: 1096: 1090: 1089: 1082: 1079: 1077: 1074: 1072: 1069: 1067: 1064: 1062: 1059: 1057: 1053: 1050: 1048: 1047:International 1045: 1043: 1040: 1038: 1035: 1033: 1030: 1029: 1026: 1023:Branches and 1020: 1019: 1014: 1011: 1009: 1006: 1004: 1001: 1000: 999: 998: 994: 990: 989: 986: 982: 978: 974: 973: 963: 958: 956: 951: 949: 944: 943: 941: 940: 937: 932: 924: 919: 914: 912: 907: 902: 901: 899: 898: 891: 888: 886: 883: 881: 880:May's theorem 878: 876: 873: 871: 868: 867: 866: 865: 858: 855: 853: 850: 848: 845: 843: 840: 838: 835: 834: 833: 832: 826: 821: 820: 813: 810: 808: 805: 803: 800: 798: 795: 794: 793: 792: 791: 790:majority rule 788:Paradoxes of 782: 779: 777: 774: 772: 769: 767: 764: 763: 762: 761: 760: 750: 747: 746: 745: 742: 740: 737: 735: 732: 731: 730: 729: 722: 719: 717: 714: 712: 709: 707: 704: 703: 702: 697: 692: 691: 684: 681: 677: 674: 673: 672: 669: 668: 667: 666: 657: 654: 652: 649: 647: 644: 643: 642: 639: 633: 630: 628: 625: 624: 623: 620: 616: 611: 607: 605: 600: 596: 595: 594: 591: 590: 589: 588: 584: 580: 577: 575: 572: 570: 567: 565: 562: 561: 560: 559: 554: 553: 552: 546: 543: 541: 538: 537: 536: 531: 530:Mixed systems 526: 525: 518: 515: 511: 508: 507: 506: 503: 502: 501: 500: 499: 491: 490:Random ballot 488: 486: 483: 481: 478: 474: 471: 469: 466: 465: 464: 461: 460: 459: 458: 457: 449: 446: 444: 441: 439: 436: 434: 431: 430: 429: 428: 427: 419: 416: 414: 411: 409: 406: 404: 401: 400: 399: 398: 397: 387: 384: 382: 379: 377: 374: 372: 369: 367: 364: 363: 362: 359: 355: 352: 350: 347: 345: 342: 340: 337: 336: 335: 334:Apportionment 332: 331: 330: 329: 323: 318: 317: 310: 307: 305: 302: 300: 297: 295: 292: 291: 290: 289: 288: 279: 275: 270: 269:Antiplurality 267: 264: 260: 255: 252: 249: 245: 240: 237: 236: 235: 234: 233: 223: 220: 218: 215: 213: 210: 208: 205: 204: 203: 200: 198: 197:Condorcet-IRV 195: 194: 193: 192: 191: 181: 176: 172: 170: 165: 161: 160: 159: 156: 152: 149: 148: 146: 141: 136: 133: 131: 128: 127: 126: 124: 117: 112: 111: 104: 100: 97: 95: 92: 90: 87: 85: 82: 80: 79:Social choice 77: 76: 74: 73: 67: 63: 62: 59: 55: 54:Social choice 51: 47: 43: 39: 38: 33: 19: 6137:Publications 6093:Publications 6060: 5656:Neoclassical 5646:Mercantilism 5555:Evolutionary 5417:Sociological 5390: / 5288:Geographical 5268:Evolutionary 5243:Digitization 5208:Agricultural 5171:Econometrics 5099:Price theory 5030: 5024: 4640:Mixed-member 4625:Proportional 4600:Score voting 4541:Ranked pairs 4460:Part of the 4459: 4413: 4402: 4385: 4368: 4357: 4344: 4336: 4326: 4318: 4302: 4292: 4283: 4242: 4231:(definition) 4230: 4217: 4199: 4182: 4164: 4134: 4128: 4119: 4115: 4105: 4086: 4080: 4074:Description. 4069: 4061: 3956: 3954: 3948: 3849: 3814: 3757: 3751:must be the 3748: 3746: 3741: 3739: 3735: 3682: 3672: 3670: 3564: 3562: 3558:separability 3557: 3553: 3548: 3544: 3541: 3539: 3530: 3526: 3522: 3518: 3516: 3511: 3507: 3498: 3495: 3486: 3482:Monotonicity 3481: 3478: 3469: 3465: 3460: 3449: 3447: 3353: 3351: 3199: 3124: 3116: 3113: 3029: 2858: 2790: 2787: 2784: 2771: 2769: 2738: 2725: 2707:behaviorists 2700: 2685: 2670: 2664: 2656: 2637: 2632: 2623: 2619: 2617: 2614: 2601: 2595: 2589: 2585: 2581: 2573: 2569: 2563: 2561: 2544: 2530: 2522: 2516: 2502: 2489: 2483: 2468: 2452: 2443:You can help 2433: 2403: 2394: 2384: 2377: 2370: 2363: 2351: 2339:Please help 2334:verification 2331: 2301: 2292: 2279:copy editing 2277:may require 2276: 2246: 2237: 2221: 2197: 2190: 2184: 2183:Please help 2180: 2153: 2138: 2128: 2110: 2107: 2089: 2084: 2074: 2042:Consider an 2041: 2029: 2025: 2015: 2008: 2001: 1995: 1976: 1970: 1963:rated voting 1957: 1953:information. 1941: 1935: 1930: 1924: 1904: 1894: 1891: 1887: 1883: 1879: 1876: 1872: 1862: 1783:Publications 1748: 1371:Sociological 1344: / 1242:Geographical 1222:Evolutionary 1197:Digitization 1162:Agricultural 1066:Mathematical 1037:Econometrics 863: 862: 829: 787: 786: 771:Exaggeration 757: 756: 727: 726: 700: 664: 663: 632:Mixed ballot 587:Compensatory 585: 558:compensatory 555: 550: 534: 496: 495: 454: 453: 424: 423: 394: 393: 381:List-free PR 326: 294:Score voting 285: 284: 230: 229: 217:Ranked pairs 188: 187: 120: 5931:von Neumann 5700:Supply-side 5685:Physiocracy 5629:Marginalism 5318:Information 5258:Engineering 5238:Development 5233:Demographic 5104:Game theory 5081:Theoretical 4983:Spoilt vote 4746:Droop quota 4685:Schulze STV 4660:Rural–urban 4605:STAR voting 4501:Borda count 4390:Description 4360:, 73(292), 4196:Amartya Sen 3916:utilitarian 3914:we get the 3881:we get the 3685:Dutch Books 3535:closed sets 3474:total order 3262:Theil index 3126:Amartya Sen 2793:utilitarian 2748:uncertainty 2596:Samuelson ( 2557:behaviorism 1986:second-best 1619:von Neumann 1272:Information 1212:Engineering 1192:Development 1187:Demographic 1129:Game theory 1071:Methodology 671:Single vote 574:Conditional 569:Coexistence 418:Quota Borda 408:Schulze STV 366:Closed list 309:STAR voting 254:Borda count 6156:Categories 6088:Economists 5961:Schumacher 5866:Schumpeter 5836:von Wieser 5756:von ThĂĽnen 5716:Economists 5615:Circuitism 5580:Humanistic 5575:Historical 5550:Ecological 5540:Democratic 5513:Chartalism 5503:Behavioral 5466:Mainstream 5427:Statistics 5422:Solidarity 5343:Managerial 5308:Humanistic 5303:Historical 5248:Ecological 5213:Behavioral 5002:Comparison 4756:Hare quota 4706:Allocation 4692:Spare vote 4680:Hare-Clark 4650:Party-list 4155:References 4122:(16): 1–7. 3519:Continuity 3472:is a weak 3254:Gini index 3032:John Rawls 2797:Benthamite 2705:and other 2657:individual 2455:March 2024 2397:March 2024 2367:newspapers 2295:March 2024 2287:editing it 2240:March 2024 2186:improve it 2117:Runner-up 2090:Eliminated 1931:individual 1916:democratic 1907:economists 1778:Economists 1649:Schumacher 1554:Schumpeter 1524:von Wieser 1444:von ThĂĽnen 1405:economists 1381:Statistics 1376:Solidarity 1297:Managerial 1262:Humanistic 1257:Historical 1202:Ecological 1167:Behavioral 1061:Mainstream 776:Truncation 505:Cumulative 328:Party-list 103:By country 94:Comparison 6006:Greenspan 5971:Samuelson 5951:Galbraith 5921:Tinbergen 5861:von Mises 5856:Heckscher 5816:Edgeworth 5695:Stockholm 5690:Socialist 5590:Keynesian 5570:Happiness 5530:Classical 5491:Mutualism 5486:Anarchist 5471:Heterodox 5368:Personnel 5328:Knowledge 5293:Happiness 5283:Financial 5253:Education 5228:Democracy 5163:Empirical 5073:Economics 4993:Unseating 4988:Sortition 4590:Plurality 4466:Economics 4403:Economica 4319:Economica 4068:, 1970 , 3969:η 3951:ordering. 3935:∞ 3932:→ 3929:η 3896:η 3863:η 3852:ordering. 3836:∞ 3833:− 3830:→ 3827:η 3798:η 3795:− 3784:− 3779:η 3776:− 3620:∑ 3597:… 3421:− 3409:¯ 3392:− 3325:− 3313:¯ 3296:− 3214:− 3179:− 3168:¯ 3083:⋯ 3013:¯ 2975:∑ 2817:∑ 2752:coherence 2732:, called 2691:1963 book 2628:arguments 2582:necessary 2498:resources 2447:talk page 2192:talk page 2014:A social 2007:A social 2000:A social 1920:elections 1694:Greenspan 1659:Samuelson 1639:Galbraith 1609:Tinbergen 1549:von Mises 1544:Heckscher 1504:Edgeworth 1322:Personnel 1282:Knowledge 1247:Happiness 1237:Financial 1207:Education 1182:Democracy 1076:Political 1042:Heterodox 985:Economics 683:Dual-vote 376:Panachage 371:Open list 361:List type 239:Plurality 135:Two-round 123:plurality 46:Economics 6117:Category 6097:journals 6083:Glossary 6036:Stiglitz 6001:Rothbard 5981:Buchanan 5966:Friedman 5956:Koopmans 5946:Leontief 5926:Robinson 5811:Marshall 5661:Lausanne 5565:Georgism 5560:Feminist 5508:Buddhist 5498:Austrian 5397:Regional 5373:Planning 5348:Monetary 5278:Feminist 5223:Cultural 5218:Business 4860:Criteria 4813:Scorporo 4462:politics 4288:, ch. VI 4241:(eds.), 4198:, 1996, 3985:See also 3554:locality 3499:Symmetry 3258:Atkinson 2719:coherent 2715:rational 2711:cardinal 2633:feasible 2622:and the 2129:Excluded 2120:Round 1 2063:Round 2 2060:Round 1 2009:ordering 1982:rational 1967:cardinal 1958:Cardinal 1899:function 1895:function 1880:ordering 1787:journals 1773:Glossary 1724:Stiglitz 1689:Rothbard 1669:Buchanan 1654:Friedman 1644:Koopmans 1634:Leontief 1614:Robinson 1499:Marshall 1403:Notable 1351:Regional 1327:Planning 1302:Monetary 1232:Feminist 1177:Cultural 1172:Business 977:a series 975:Part of 403:Hare STV 42:Politics 40:A joint 6132:Outline 6103:Schools 6095: ( 6056:Piketty 6051:Krugman 5916:Kuznets 5906:Kalecki 5881:Polanyi 5771:Cournot 5766:Bastiat 5751:Ricardo 5741:Malthus 5731:Quesnay 5634:Marxian 5525:Chicago 5455:history 5450:Schools 5437:Welfare 5407:Service 5198:Applied 5032:Project 4723:D'Hondt 4675:CPO-STV 4633:Systems 4407:pp. 125 4362:pp. 771 3949:leximax 3947:is the 3850:leximin 3848:is the 3252:is the 2758:is the 2744:showing 2665:surface 2655:for an 2590:another 2537:Bentham 2381:scholar 2226:Please 2145:Bottom 2135:Center 2096:Bottom 2081:Center 2038:Example 2016:scoring 1951:ordinal 1942:Ordinal 1888:utility 1884:ranking 1793:Schools 1785: ( 1744:Piketty 1739:Krugman 1604:Kuznets 1594:Kalecki 1569:Polanyi 1459:Cournot 1454:Bastiat 1439:Ricardo 1429:Malthus 1419:Quesnay 1391:Welfare 1361:Service 1032:Applied 1008:Outline 1003:History 413:CPO-STV 263:Baldwin 212:Schulze 207:Minimax 125:methods 6041:Thaler 6021:Ostrom 6016:Becker 6011:Sowell 5991:Baumol 5896:Myrdal 5891:Sraffa 5886:Frisch 5876:Knight 5871:Keynes 5846:Fisher 5841:Veblen 5826:Pareto 5806:Menger 5801:George 5796:Jevons 5791:Walras 5781:Gossen 5705:Thermo 5383:Public 5378:Policy 5333:Labour 5298:Health 5026:Portal 4963:Ballot 4739:Quotas 4468:series 4394:links. 4378:  4331:47–54. 4329:, pp. 4323:pp. 81 4311:  4249:  4233:", in 4206:  4172:  4141:  4093:  3671:where 3358:median 3354:person 3232:where 2926:among 2859:where 2445:. The 2383:  2376:  2369:  2362:  2354:  2002:choice 1897:—is a 1892:choice 1877:social 1729:Thaler 1709:Ostrom 1704:Becker 1699:Sowell 1679:Baumol 1584:Myrdal 1579:Sraffa 1574:Frisch 1564:Knight 1559:Keynes 1534:Fisher 1529:Veblen 1514:Pareto 1494:Menger 1489:George 1484:Jevons 1479:Walras 1469:Gossen 1337:Public 1332:Policy 1287:Labour 1252:Health 1109:Market 278:Coombs 48:series 6127:Lists 6122:Index 6073:Lists 6046:Hoppe 6031:Lucas 5996:Solow 5986:Arrow 5976:Simon 5941:Lange 5936:Hicks 5911:Röpke 5901:Hayek 5851:Pigou 5821:Clark 5736:Smith 5651:Mixed 5610:Post- 5432:Urban 5412:Socio 5402:Rural 4956:Other 4775:Mixed 4054:Notes 2388:JSTOR 2374:books 1890:, or 1766:Lists 1734:Hoppe 1719:Lucas 1684:Solow 1674:Arrow 1664:Simon 1629:Lange 1624:Hicks 1599:Röpke 1589:Hayek 1539:Pigou 1509:Clark 1424:Smith 1386:Urban 1366:Socio 1356:Rural 1056:Macro 1052:Micro 1013:Index 615:'MMP' 604:'AMS' 6062:more 5786:Marx 5776:Mill 5761:List 5639:Neo- 5595:Neo- 4464:and 4409:–39. 4376:ISBN 4364:–78. 4349:–46. 4309:ISBN 4247:ISBN 4204:ISBN 4170:ISBN 4139:ISBN 4091:ISBN 3888:For 3855:For 3533:are 3450:Euro 2791:The 2754:and 2638:sets 2598:1947 2549:1935 2360:news 2068:Top 1971:much 1961:(or 1945:(or 1871:, a 1867:and 1750:more 1474:Marx 1464:Mill 1449:List 556:Non- 510:SNTV 99:List 56:and 44:and 6026:Sen 5746:Say 5605:New 5338:Law 4788:MMP 3556:or 3540:4. 3517:3. 3496:2. 3479:1. 3051:min 2795:or 2717:or 2689:'s 2671:map 2602:any 2586:one 2535:of 2343:by 2230:to 2148:34 2102:47 2099:34 2071:40 1863:In 1714:Sen 1434:Say 1292:Law 274:el. 259:el. 248:IRV 244:el. 6158:: 5029:— 4339:, 4237:; 4118:. 4114:. 3755:: 3728:. 3537:. 3502:: 3493:. 2770:A 2762:. 2559:. 2545:is 2195:. 2139:66 2125:— 2085:26 2075:53 2034:. 1988:. 1886:, 1882:, 1054:/ 979:on 610:NZ 599:UK 175:US 164:UK 147:) 140:US 6099:) 5601:) 5597:( 5457:) 5453:( 5065:e 5058:t 5051:v 4443:e 4436:t 4429:v 4255:. 4210:. 4147:. 4120:4 4099:. 3902:1 3899:= 3869:0 3866:= 3792:1 3787:1 3773:1 3769:c 3749:w 3712:) 3709:u 3706:( 3703:w 3673:w 3656:) 3651:i 3647:u 3643:( 3640:w 3635:n 3630:1 3627:= 3624:i 3616:= 3613:) 3608:n 3604:u 3600:, 3594:, 3589:1 3585:u 3581:( 3578:W 3565:W 3549:R 3545:R 3531:v 3527:v 3523:v 3512:R 3508:R 3487:R 3470:R 3466:R 3429:T 3425:T 3416:e 3406:Y 3401:= 3395:T 3389:l 3386:i 3383:e 3380:h 3377:T 3372:W 3333:L 3329:T 3320:e 3310:Y 3305:= 3299:L 3293:l 3290:i 3287:e 3284:h 3281:T 3276:W 3240:G 3220:) 3217:G 3211:1 3208:( 3185:) 3182:G 3176:1 3173:( 3165:Y 3160:= 3154:i 3151:n 3148:i 3145:G 3140:W 3099:) 3094:n 3090:Y 3086:, 3080:, 3075:2 3071:Y 3067:, 3062:1 3058:Y 3054:( 3048:= 3045:W 3010:Y 3005:= 3000:i 2996:Y 2990:n 2985:1 2982:= 2979:i 2969:n 2966:1 2961:= 2958:W 2934:n 2914:i 2892:i 2888:Y 2867:W 2842:i 2838:Y 2832:n 2827:1 2824:= 2821:i 2813:= 2810:W 2726:. 2694:( 2475:) 2469:( 2457:) 2453:( 2440:. 2410:) 2404:( 2399:) 2395:( 2385:· 2378:· 2371:· 2364:· 2337:. 2308:) 2302:( 2297:) 2293:( 2289:. 2283:. 2253:) 2247:( 2242:) 2238:( 2224:. 2202:) 2198:( 1852:e 1845:t 1838:v 1789:) 961:e 954:t 947:v 612:: 601:: 280:) 271:( 265:) 256:( 250:) 241:( 177:: 166:: 142:: 137:( 105:) 101:( 34:. 20:)

Index

Social ranking function
electoral systems
Politics
Economics
Social choice
electoral systems

Social choice
Mechanism design
Comparative politics
Comparison
List
By country
Single-winner methods
plurality
First preference plurality (FPP)
Two-round
US
Jungle primary
Partisan primary
Instant-runoff
UK
Alternative vote
US
Ranked-choice (RCV)
Condorcet methods
Condorcet-IRV
Round-robin voting
Minimax
Schulze

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