269:'s current development approach and the competence of its scientific and engineering staff. Further, members recommended that the Air Force undertake a thorough review of up to a year, if necessary, to determine how best to achieve the earliest possible operational capability. Pending such a review, the Air Force should curtail all production of full-scale flight test vehicles and detailed design of the guidance system. On the other hand, the committee members encouraged continuing basic research in guidance systems,
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program." Unfortunately, no single company currently employed persons of that caliber; they would have to be recruited from among several industry, university, and government organizations. Looking ahead, the committee also noted that this proposed new development-management group would have to be free "of excessive detailed regulation by government agencies."
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At last, the Report concluded that the Atlas program could be accelerated only if it was entrusted to "an unusually competent group of scientists and engineers capable of making systems analyses, supervising the research phases and completely controlling the experimental and hardware phases of the
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that an emergency operational capability could be attained as early as 1958, if enough money and priority were provided. Gardner meant that, in an emergency, contractor engineers in lieu of Air Force personnel could launch the Atlas. Gardner's claim was facetiously dubbed a "PhD" type capability.
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and the countervailing advantage offered by the
American nuclear breakthrough, the committee concluded that it was imperative to accelerate Atlas development. However, the speed up and early delivery of the Atlas ICBM could be accomplished only by embarking on a "crash program" that would include
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Meeting first in
November and twice more afterward, the Teapot Committee rendered its report on February 10, 1954. Originally, the Teapot Committee had favored eliminating the Snark, but in its report recommended only that the Snark's guidance system be simplified and that development continue.
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Foremost among the committee's recommendations to accelerate the ICBM program, was the call to revise the Atlas's requirements in conformity with the new realities created as a result of the thermonuclear breakthrough. The promise of lighter, higher-yield weapons was later confirmed during the
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series, that began in March 1954. As a result, the stringent 1,500-foot (460 m) accuracy requirement for Atlas was reduced to between 2 and 3 nautical miles (5.6 km). This revision would also permit slashing the missile's weight and diameter. As a further benefit, the lower accuracy
291:, was begun in September 1953 for the purpose of finding ways to accelerate ICBM development. Not surprisingly, then, the Teapot Committee used and based much of its findings on Rand data. In connection with these studies, Trevor Gardner advised Assistant Secretary
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changing drastically the missile's specifications and creating an entirely new management organization. In its summary, the Teapot
Committee called for a "radical reorganization of the . . . project considerably transcending the Convair framework."
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Members contended that Snark's primary usefulness was as a decoy for the crewed bomber force. Similarly, the Teapot
Committee was not enthusiastic about the Navaho as a strategic weapon because of the inadequacies of
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as head of electronics research and eventually rose to the position of
Director of Guided Missile Research and Development; both Ramo and Dean Wooldridge had gained acclaim for their work on the Air Force's
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The Teapot
Committee centered its attention on the feasibility of developing the major subsystems for the Atlas-that is, propulsion, guidance, airframe, and warhead. Given the reported Soviet lead in
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Finally, the
Committee believed that, if it was assigned such a crash basis priority, the Air Force could obtain an operational Atlas ICBM in 6 to 8 years-that is, sometime between 1960 and 1962.
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Ltr, Simon Ramo to Trevor
Gardner, no subj, Feb 10, 1954, w/atch:Recommendation of the SMEC, Feb 10, 1954, in AFSC/HO, Alfred Rockefeller Documents, 1951-1954.
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162:. Ramo had become Director of Operations and Executive Vice President when he and Wooldridge, in September 1953, left Hughes to form their own company.
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all of which were Air Force projects. Gardner recruited eleven of the nation's leading scientists and engineers: Dr.
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In the management area, Committee had questioned the contractor's ability to complete the Atlas work, based on
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requirement eased the Atlas's guidance problem and prompted an investigation of an advanced, on board, all-
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study issued two days earlier, on February 8, 1954. The Rand study, headed by Dr.
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established the committee to study strategic missiles including the
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The Committee recommendations nearly duplicated those of a
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314:"Origins of the USAF Space Program 1945-1956: Chapter 4"
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16:1958 group to study US strategic missiles
32:This article includes a list of general
382:Memo, Gardner to Quarles, Feb 16, 1954.
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91:Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee
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399:Intercontinental ballistic missiles
334:Jacob Neufeld (23 September 2003).
316:. Federation of American Scientists
243:intercontinental ballistic missiles
38:it lacks sufficient corresponding
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338:. Center for Air Force History
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153:. After the war, Ramo joined
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260:inertial guidance system
167:Clark Blanchard Millikan
409:United States Air Force
271:North American Aviation
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223:Bernard A. Schriever
171:Charles C. Lauritsen
199:George Kistiakowsky
187:Bell Telephone Labs
289:Bruno W. Augustein
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300:References
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139:Simon Ramo
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87:codename
85:was the
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