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analyzed as a conjunction of a descriptive part and an evaluative part which, at least in principle, may be separated. A basic feature of this analysis is thus that the descriptive content of a thick concept may be given in absence of the evaluative content. Returning to the example of courage, ââŚis courageousâ could on this account be analyzed as something along the lines of ââŚopposing danger to promote a valued endâ and âthis is (prima facie) good-makingâ. The evaluative part, on this view, may thus be characterized as a âprescriptive flagâ attached to the concept. It is, on this view, in principle possible to construct a completely descriptive concept â i.e. without evaluative force â that picked out the same features of the world.
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profoundly involved in the practice of using it; one cannot understand a thick concept without also understanding its evaluative point. Therefore, descriptive terms cannot completely fill in the âalong the linesâ of a description such as ââŚopposing danger to promote a valued endâ. These descriptions may allow the novice to see the salient features. However a hooking on to the evaluative perspective allows the person to fully understand the 'thick' concept.
110:. Moral realists have argued that the world-guided content and the action-guiding content cannot be usefully separated, indicating that competent use of thick concepts constitutes ethical knowledge. Expressivists, favoring an account of moral values as attitudes projected onto the world, wish to maintain a distinction between the (morally neutral) descriptive features of a thick concept and the evaluative attitudes that typically go with them.
59:. Courage for example, may be given a rough characterization in descriptive terms as '...opposing danger to promote a valued end'. At the same time, characterizing someone as courageous typically involves expressing a pro-attitude, or a (prima facie) good-making quality â i.e. an evaluative statement.
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This account of thick concepts has been criticized by other theorists, notably of moral realist persuasion. In their view, the only way to understand a thick concept is to understand the descriptive and evaluative aspects as a whole. The idea is that, for a thick concept, the evaluative aspect is
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Thick concepts seem to combine the descriptive features of natural concepts such as water with an evaluative content similar to the thin evaluative concepts such as good and right. How are we to understand this âcombinationâ? Many theorists treat it as a conjunctive: a thick concept should be
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The rationale for calling an action 'cruel' rather than merely describing it in more neutral terms is to tune into this evaluative aspect. Cf. McDowell 1981.
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Thick concepts thus seem to occupy a 'middle position' between (thin) descriptive concepts and (thin) evaluative concepts. Descriptive concepts such as
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are commonly believed to pick out features of the world rather than provide reasons for action, whereas evaluative concepts such as
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are commonly believed to provide reasons for action rather than picking out genuine features of the world.
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McDowell 1978, 1979, 1981; Williams 1985; Dancy 1995, 2004; McNaughton and
Rawling 2000; and Little 2000.
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McNaughton, D. and
Rawling, P. (2000) Unprincipled Ethics, in Hooker and Little 2000, 256â275.
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Dancy, J. (1995) In
Defence of Thick Concepts, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein eds.,
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This 'double feature' of thick concepts has made them the point of debate between
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Little, M. (2000) Moral
Generalities Revisited, in Hooker and Little 2000.
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353:(Spring 2021 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
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McDowell, J. (1978) Are Moral
Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?
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Catherine Elgin calls this the âskeleton accountâ in Elgin 2005, 343.
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Blomberg, O. (2007) Disentangling The Thick
Concept Argument,
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McDowell, J. (1981), Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, in
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Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
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Gibbard, A. (1992) Thick
Concepts and Warrant For Feelings,
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Concept with both descriptive and evaluative content
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161:McDowell 1978, 1979, 1981; Dancy 1995, 2004.
259:Elgin, C. (2005) Williams on Truthfulness,
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